要素市场扭曲、资源错置与生产率

要素市场政策扭曲会降低全要素生产率。本文在一个随机动态一般均衡模型框架下,定量考察我国偏向国有企业政策的效率损失。理论模型引入了垄断竞争的中间产品生产企业与内生化的进入退出选择,用不同的全要素生产率增长随机过程,刻画了要素市场面临政策扭曲的国有与私有企业。为了全面反映产业特征,本文用制造业企业微观数据,来校准企业全要素生产率随机增长。通过校准,定量模型表明,源于政策扭曲的资源错置,导致了非常高昂的效率损失。     

Entry, exit and business cycles in a general equilibrium model

This paper studies the role of entry and exit in the short run behavior of a general equilibrium model with industry dynamics. For tractability, and to preserve potential asymmetries in the impulse responses, I focus on the transition dynamics of the economy after shocks. Entry and exit are found to be insensitive to productivity shocks of reasonable magnitude. Moreover, the dynamics of GDP are insensitive to fluctuations in entry and exit rates, and any asymmetries are negligible. As an application of the model, the paper also asks whether firing costs may interact with entry and exit to affect transition dynamics after shocks, finding that they do not.     

Optimal Export Taxes, Welfare, Industry Concentration, and Firm Size: A General Equilibrium Analysis

By using an imperfect-competition model, it is shown that an export tax, optimal in partial equilibrium, is upwardly biased and may not be optimal in a general equilibrium setting with free entry/exit. It is shown also that the export tax has an ambiguous impact on firm size. The results of an applied general equilibrium model for the Turkish economy suggest that the export tax estimated with the PE formula is larger by a small factor than the computed export tax. However, the export tax leads to an increase in firm size and, most importantly, to a social welfare loss.     

R&D,free entry,and social inefficiency

We employ a three-stage game model with cost-reducing research and development (R&D) that is subject to spillovers to consider the problem of excess entry under free-entry equilibrium relative to the social optimum. Firms choose to enter or exit a market in the first stage, choose R&D in the second stage and output in the final stage. Results show that there is socially inefficient or excessive entry in equilibrium. However, we uniquely demonstrate that research spillovers hold the key to whether established results regarding socially inefficient entry hold. Specifically, excessive entry occurs as long as research spillovers are relatively small, but this is not necessarily the case with large spillovers. Some policy implications are discussed.     

Business cycle in an oligopolistic economy with entry and exit

In this paper we introduce a microfounded macromodel with endogenous market structure, where macroeconomic fluctuations may be determined by firms’ strategic interactions, entry and exit. All the agents have the same preferences but may differ in their budget constraints and change their social status according to idiosyncratic stochastic shocks that trigger entry, while exit is caused by firms’ bankruptcies. Our numerical simulations show that birth and death of firms (associated with entry and exit) can generate macroeconomic fluctuations without technology shocks.     

Slow recoveries

Economies respond differently to aggregate shocks that reduce output. While some countries rapidly recover their pre-crisis trend, others stagnate. Recent studies provide empirical support for a link between aggregate growth and plant dynamics through its effect on productivity: the entry and exit of firms and the reallocation of resources from less to more efficient firms explain a relevant part of transitional productivity dynamics. In this paper, we use a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to study the effect on aggregate short-run growth of policies that distort the process of birth, growth, and death of firms, as well as the reallocation of resources across economic units. Our findings show that indeed policies that alter plant dynamics can explain slow recoveries. We also find that output losses associated to delayed recoveries are large.     

Cost-Reducing Investment, Competition, and Industry Dynamics

We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of interfirm heterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with free entry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfect foresight. Atomistic firms with upward-sloping marginal cost curves undertake investment in firm-specific cost reduction. They earn negative net profits in early periods, compensated later by strictly positive net profits; no entry occurs after the initial time period. Some firms may exit before others even while other firms earn positive net profits.     

Credit mismatch and breakdown

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.     

Non-point source regulation — A self-reporting mechanism

Information feasible regulatory mechanisms (that do not require the regulator to acquire firm level information) have been proposed long ago for stochastic non-point emission problems. These mechanisms do not take polluter cooperation and firm entry–exit incentives simultaneously into account, nor are these issues addressed in an informationally efficient way. In this paper we propose an informationally feasible self-reporting mechanism that is robust to cooperation among polluters while giving participating firms correct abatement incentives as well as giving entry–exit incentives that are correct to a first order approximation.     

A theory of competitive industry dynamics with innovation and imitation

Empirical evidence on industry life-cycle reveals a pattern in which innovation rates remain fairly stable or are perhaps even higher at early stages, while patenting increases sharply as the industry matures. This increase in patenting in later stages is accompanied by net exit and lower rates of output growth and price decline. In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of a competitive industry with innovation and imitation that is consistent with these stylized facts. We derive an equilibrium growth path, along which leading firms invest in increasing the stock of technological knowledge and choose not to prevent imitation by other firms as long as the industry remains relatively small. As the industry expands including new entry, the leaders' optimal amount of investment gradually declines. We show that under some rather general conditions, there would exist a scale of the industry where innovating firms would choose to start preventing free imitation, bringing further expansion of the industry through new entry to a halt and causing net exit.     

A Simple Theory of Trade,Finance and Firm Dynamics

A stylized monopolistic competition model of international trade is proposed where firms differ with respect to the expected economic lifetime of their innovations. Upon entry, they receive a commonly observed signal which is updated over time. Jointly with partial irreversibility of investment, this generates heterogeneity in effective discount rates and, thus, in the cost of finance. In line with evidence, the model predicts a negative correlation between firms' financing costs and their age. Over a firm's life cycle, per period net profits and the export participation probability grow. Exporters are less likely to exit than purely domestic firms. Belief updating entails excessive financing of incumbents relative to entrants and too much exporting. Asymptotically, trade liberalization reduces overall general equilibrium exit rates, but it does not necessarily increase welfare. With multiple asymmetric export markets, firms gradually expand their market coverage and total sales. A confidence crisis modeled by belief reversion causes an over‐proportional decrease in exports, thereby offering a novel interpretation of the trade slump in 2008/09.     

FIRM DYNAMICS IN AN URBAN ECONOMY *

We develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explain firm entry, exit, and relocation decisions in an urban economy with multiple locations and agglomeration externalities. We characterize the stationary distribution of firms that arises in equilibrium. We estimate the parameters of the model using a method of moments estimator. Using unique panel data collected by Dun and Bradstreet, we find that agglomeration externalities increase the productivity of firms by up to 8%. Economic policies that subsidize firm relocations to the central business district increase agglomeration externalities in that area. They also increase economic welfare in the economy.     

Intrasectoral structural change and aggregate productivity development: robust stochastic nonparametric frontier function estimates

This paper investigates the sources of total factor productivity growth in the German manufacturing sector during 1981–1998. Decompositions of aggregate productivity growth are used to identify the effects of structural change and entry–exit on aggregate productivity growth. We find a substantial rise in productivity growth after the German reunification. The bulk of this rise can be attributed to structural change and entry–exit. Two methodological refinements are implemented. The first refinement is the application of robust stochastic nonparametric approaches to frontier function analysis, and the second is the calculation of bootstrap confidence intervals for the components of the productivity decompositions.     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation

We characterize optimal debt policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of defaults and devaluations in which self-fulfilling crises can arise. When the government cannot commit to repay its debt and cannot commit to maintain the exchange rate, consumers’ expectations of devaluation make the safe level of government debt very low. We show that, when the debt is in the crises zone—where self-fulfilling crisis can occur—the government finds it optimal to reduce the debt to exit the zone. The lower the probability that consumers assign to devaluation, however, the greater is the number of periods that the government will choose to take to exit the crisis zone. We argue that our model can help understand events in Argentina in 2001–2002 and throw light on some aspects of the current EMU sovereign debt crisis.     

EXIT OPTIONS AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS

We introduce a post‐entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash flow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded off against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct effect of financial frictions is to impose inefficient exit, but there is also an indirect effect through higher equilibrium price that leads to inefficient survival.     

Bankruptcy costs,economic policy uncertainty,and FDI entry and exit

In this paper, we examine how the effect of economic policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and exit varies with the cost of bankruptcy resolution. Using a sample of bilateral FDI entry and exit for 23 countries and areas from 2004 to 2012, we find that an increase in bankruptcy costs in a country exacerbates the dampening effect of economic policy uncertainty on both FDI entry and exit. Subsample analysis reveals that the bankruptcy resolution channel only exists in high political risk countries. We also find that the bankruptcy resolution channel does not exist for foreign portfolio investment, which is consistent with real option theory. Broadly put, our contribution is at the nexus of institutional theory and FDI, as we identify the bankruptcy resolution channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects FDI entry and exit.     

Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation

This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria.     

Industrial organization implications of QR trade regimes: Evidence and welfare costs

Evidence of the relationship between trade regimes, concentration and profitability in semi-industrial countries' manufacturing sectors is reviewed. This evidence is used to justify the formulation and simulation of a three sector general equilibrium model in which the manufacturing sectors's behavior is linked to the degree of restrictiveness of the QR regime. Simulations are conducted with several variants of the model to ascertain separately the effects of introducing economies of scale, firm entry/exit, departures from competitive pricing, and interactions between entry and pricing rules. Numerical results suggest that a 20 percent rationing rate of intermediates and consumption goods can have welfare costs of about 2.0 percent of national income in the absence of economies of scale and industrial organization interactions with the trade regime. When industrial organization features are included, the costs of the same 20 percent rationing quadruples.     

Merger policy,entry, and entrepreneurship

We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.