Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

The inflation tax in an open economy with imperfect competition

This paper studies the national welfare maximizing inflation tax in an open economy with imperfect competition. It shows that the presence of a monopolistic distortion dampens the incentive to engage in strategic use of the inflation tax. If this dampening effect is strong enough, monetary policy becomes completely inward-looking, restoring the Friedman rule as an equilibrium strategy regardless of the actions of the foreign government. This aspect of the policy interaction—driven entirely by the presence of imperfect competition—is important because it determines the underlying structure of the policy game and is therefore crucial for determining whether or not there exist welfare gains from international monetary cooperation.     

Monetary policy transmission under different banking structures: The role of capital and heterogeneity

This work deals with the transmission of monetary policy through the bank loan market, in the presence of a capital requirement regulation. Unlike standard models, based on the “representative bank” shortcut, we adopt the heterogeneous agents approach: this allows us to explicitly model the strategic interaction between well-capitalized and under-capitalized banks. The main results are the following. (I) The propagation of a monetary policy impulse through the loan market differs considerably, depending on the market structure: under monopolistic competition, strategic complementarity among well-capitalized banks leads to a “multiplier effect”; in the Cournot oligopoly framework, an effect of the opposite sign is at work, due to strategic substitutability. (II) Well-capitalized banks are more important, in shaping the adjustment following a monetary policy shock, than what is implied by their relative number over total; this fact strengthens the monetary policy effectiveness. This result holds under both monopolistic competition and oligopoly, although the interaction among banks, leading to such a result, differs across the two banking structures.     

Forward-looking monetary policy and anticipated shocks to inflation

This paper extends a standard New Keynesian model to describe the effects of anticipated shocks to inflation and forward-looking monetary policy. Using the data generated from this modified model suggests that overlooking these two factors in the standard Cholesky structural vector autoregressive identification scheme will generate a price puzzle. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that failing to account for these two factors may result in significant estimates of two other explanations of the price puzzle—the cost channel of transmission of monetary policy and indeterminacy due to violation of the Taylor principle—even though neither features in the data generating process.     

Imperfect credibility,sticky wages,and welfare

This paper studies optimal monetary policy under imperfect credibility in a New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting. In our imperfect credibility framework, the central bank commits to a policy plan but occasionally reneges on past promises with a given common knowledge probability. We find that the welfare gains from increasing credibility are approximately linear on the initial credibility level. We also find that the output-inflation stabilisation trade-off is nonmonotonic as higher credibility does not always reduce output volatility. The variance decomposition shows that wage markup shocks are the main driver of economic fluctuations and that these shocks are better contained, even in relative terms, when credibility is high. We then show that the degree of credibility impacts the effect of wage flexibility on welfare. When credibility is low, monetary policy is less potent and the economy can experience a feedback loop between wage volatility and price volatility. We show, though, that once wage markup shocks are taken into account, wage flexibility is usually welfare improving.     

Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules

This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and development [R&D] subsidy) in a dynamic setting when two firms, producing differentiated products, compete in the output market over time. Firms compete in a differential game setting over supply schedules, which encompasses a continuum of imperfect competition equilibria from Bertrand to Cournot. Although production generates environmentally damaging emissions, firms can undertake R&D that has the sole purpose of reducing emissions. In addition to characterizing the optimal policy, we examine how the optimal tax and subsidy, and the optimal level of abatement, change as competition intensifies, as the dynamic parameters change, and as the investment in abatement technology changes. In this setting, competition increases welfare through its impact on the final goods price. However, lower prices result in larger quantities and more pollution. Our key contribution is to show how the impact of increased competition on welfare depends on the extent of the market and the nature of preferences and technology.     

Money and credit with limited commitment and theft

We study the interplay among imperfect memory, limited commitment, and theft, in an environment that can support monetary exchange and credit. Imperfect memory makes money useful, but it also permits theft to go undetected, and therefore provides lucrative opportunities for thieves. Limited commitment constrains credit arrangements, and the constraints tend to tighten with imperfect memory, as this mitigates punishment for bad behavior in the credit market. Theft matters for optimal monetary policy, but at the optimum theft will not be observed in the model. The Friedman rule is in general not optimal with theft, and the optimal money growth rate tends to rise as the cost of theft falls.     

Oil shocks and monetary policy rules in emerging economies

We examine the effects of shocks in the oil market on key macroeconomic variables in small open economies using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and imperfect competition under different monetary policy rules. The numerical solutions show that the types of exchange rate regimes and monetary policies could partly explain the trends in macroeconomic volatilities considering negative shocks to oil supply (Hamilton, 1983) and positive shocks to oil demand (Kilian, 2009). These findings are confirmed in vector autoregressive responses for Chile and Israel with inflation targeting under flexible exchange regimes and Hong Kong with fixed regime.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus

Increases in government spending trigger substitution effects—both inter- and intra-temporal—and a wealth effect. The ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior. Studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption: higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect, while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate. This paper estimates Markov-switching policy rules for the United States and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior. When the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new Keynesian model, government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized. The paper reports the model's predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's implied path for government spending under alternative monetary–fiscal policy combinations.     

Monetary Policy Rules and Business Cycles

Basic features of business cycle properties under both exogenous and endogenous monetary policy rules are examined in calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities (the nominal wage contract model, the monopolistic competition model with price adjustment costs and a combination of these models). The experiments show that the difference in business cycle features under exogenous and endogenous monetary policy rules is as large as the change generated by introducing nominal rigidities (and monetary disturbances). This result suggests that, for monetary business cycle research, developing a proper way to incorporate endogenous monetary policy rules may be as important as developing new transmission mechanisms of monetary policy disturbances.     

Imperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output

This paper shows imperfect competition can lead to indeterminacy in aggregate output in a standard DSGE model with imperfect competition. Indeterminacy arises in the model from the composition of aggregate output. In sharp contrast to the indeterminacy literature pioneered by Benhabib and Farmer [J. Benhabib, R. Farmer, Indeterminacy and increasing returns, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1) (1994) 19-41] and Gali [J. Gali, Monopolistic competition, business cycles, and the composition of aggregate demand, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1) (1994) 73-96], indeterminacy in our model is global; hence it is more robust to structural parameters. In addition, sunspots in our model can be autocorrelated. The paper provides a justification for exogenous variations in desired markups, which play an important role as a source of cost-push shocks in the monetary policy literature. Our model outperforms a standard RBC model driven by technology shocks in several dimensions, including the volatility of labor market and the hump-shaped output dynamics.     

Bank behavior, incomplete interest rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission

This paper employs a New Keynesian DSGE model to explore the role of banks within the cost channel of monetary policy transmission for shaping the interest rate pass-through from money market rates to loan rates. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting their loan rates in a staggered way, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the euro area by adopting a minimum distance approach. Our findings exhibit that (i) financial costs are an important factor for price changes, (ii) frictions in the loan market have an effect on the propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through from a change in money market rates to loan rates is incomplete, and (iii) the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing loan rates.     

Competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous

This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers. The small country attracts less firms than the large one but accommodates a share of the industry that exceeds its capital share—a reverse home market effect. This allows the small country to be more aggressive and to set a higher tax rate than the large one, thus implying that tax competition reduces international inequalities. However, the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country. Our model thus encapsulates both the “importance of being small” and the “importance of being large”. Last, tax harmonization benefits to the small country but is detrimental to the large one.     

Inflation aversion and macroeconomic policy in a perfect foresight monetary model

This paper reexamines monetary non-superneutrality and the optimality of the optimum quantity of money in the money-in-utility Sidrauski model with endogenous fluctuations of the time preference by introducing inflation aversion. It is shown that the long-run superneutrality of the standard Sidrauski model does not hold, and Friedman's optimum quantity of money is not optimal.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Exchange rate management when sterilized interventions represent signals of monetary policy

The signalling channel of foreign exchange market interventions suggests that sterilized interventions represent signals of future monetary policy and thus affect exchange rate expectations. Within a two-country game-theoretic framework, which incorporates two novel factors—partial credibility and non-rational expectations—that reduce the exchange rate effects of intervention operations, I derive non-cooperative and cooperative policies of exchange rate management. To retain credibility in the future, sterilized interventions must be accomodated by corresponding subsequent changes in the money supply. Thus, interventions do not represent an instrument independent from general monetary policy. It is shown that the implied tradeoff between internal and external policy objectives makes the coordination of intervention operations advantageous, even in the case of conflicting exchange rate targets.     

The size distribution of the banking sector and the effects of monetary policy

In recent years, the industrial organization of the banking system has received a large amount of attention. In particular, it is generally viewed that the size distribution of the banking sector has changed where it is dominated by a small number of large institutions. In this paper, we develop a model of imperfectly competitive banks that differ in terms of the size of their deposit base. Such differences are important for aggregate credit market activity and the effects of monetary policy. Notably, we explain how the optimal size distribution of the banking system involves trade-offs from distortions in credit markets due to imperfect competition across banking markets. Second, the effects of monetary policy on credit market activity are weaker in an economy dominated by a small number of large banks. Empirical analysis examining the role of concentration among the current members of the European Monetary Union is consistent with the predictions of the model.     

On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and of Fiscal Policy

There has been a major shift within macroeconomic policy over the past two decades or so in terms of the relative importance given to monetary policy and to fiscal policy in both policy and theoretical terms. The former has gained considerably in importance, with the latter being rarely mentioned. Furthermore, the nature of monetary policy has shifted away from any attempt to control some monetary aggregate (prevalent in the first half of the 1980s), and instead monetary policy has focused on the setting of interest rates as the key policy instrument. There has also been a general shift towards the adoption of inflation targets and the use of monetary policy to target inflation. This paper considers the significance of this shift in the nature of monetary policy. This enables us to question the effectiveness of monetary policy, and to explore the role of fiscal policy. We examine these questions from the point of view of the "new consensus" in monetary economics and suggest that it is rather limited in its analysis. When the analysis is broadened out to embrace empirical issues and evidence the clear conclusion emerges that monetary policy is relatively impotent. The role of fiscal policy is also considered, and we argue that fiscal policy (under specified conditions) remains a powerful tool for macroeconomic policy. This is particularly an apt conclusion under current economic conditions.     

货币政策传导机制与货币政策有效性:争论与启示

我国当前以信贷渠道为主的货币政策传导渠道将逐步被货币渠道所取代,货币政策传递的环境和条件不完善是制约我国货币政策传导效果的主要原因,我国货币政策传导效果存在明显的地区差异。     

对我国货币政策中介目标的研究

货币供应量作为我国货币政策中介目标虽仍具备合理性,却面临一系列困难和障碍;同时,由于利率形成机制并不完善,利率暂时不能作为货币政策中介目标.目前我国应将货币供应量作为货币政策直接中介目标,而以利率作为辅助中介目标,发挥利率在货币政策体系中应有的作用.