基于委托——代理的薪酬有效激励的区间分析

合理的薪酬分配设计,在现代企业中对经营者的有效激励起着十分重要的作用.本文从企业的产出分配出发,利用委托--代理理论,构建企业所有者和企业经营者的期望收入模型,在对称信息和非对称信息条件下,对企业经营者的努力程度和期望收入进行分析,探讨不对称信息条件下企业经营者的期望收入变化状况.我们发现:在薪酬分配合同的有效激励区间内,企业所有者可以通过设计合理的薪酬分配合同,起到对企业经营者的有效激励.同时,企业所有者可以通过有效的手段调整有效激励区间的大小,同样也能满足经营者的有效激励区间要求.     

基于博弈论的企业利益主体关系分析

一、所有者（股东）与经营者之间的博弈分析 在企业所有者（股东）和经营者利益主体关系中，所有者知道经营者只可能处于尽责和不尽责两种状态，从这方面讲两者之间是完全信息的静态博弈；但所有者并不知道经营者采取的行为，所以他们之间的博弈又是不完全信息的静态博弈。     

信息不对称条件下经营者选择与激励研究

经营权与所有权的分离是现代企业的典型特征,而经营者与所有者之间普遍存在信息不对称问题。由于所有者与经营者目标利益的差异性、行动和信息上的隐蔽性,容易产生逆向选择和道德风险问题。因此,所有者有必要设计一个最优激励机制,诱导经营者从自身的利益出发,采取对所有者最有利的行动。委托一代理理论认为,在信息不对称的条件下,激励和风险分担的最优配置不可能同时达到,现实的选择只能在激励和风险之间寻求适度平衡。在很长一段时期内,该问题成为委托一代理理论研究的主要问题。     

基于风险偏好的委托代理博弈均衡分析

根据企业所有者与企业经营者之间的委托代理关系特点,在假设条件下构建基于双方风险偏好的博弈模型,以此模型通过均衡分析定性探讨企业收入和激励成效的影响因素,尤其是企业经营者和企业所有者风险偏好对企业收入和激励成效的影响.     

基于诚信产权的经营者报酬契约安排

传统理论认为经营者报酬契约可以调和经营者与所有者之间的潜在利益冲突.但是,股权激励这种旨在减少经营者偷懒行为的契约安排,可能引发经营者的会计操纵行为.要摆脱这种报酬契约安排中的两难困境,必须重视经营者的会计诚信产权,把经营者会计诚信的收益权纳入其报酬契约体系之内.本文通过建立企业所有者和经营者之间的两阶段动态博弈模型,来分析经营者报酬契约对会计诚信的影响,用以寻求基于会计诚信产权的最优报酬契约安排.     

用户参与创新与企业激励的信号传递博弈模型构建

论文从不完全信息博弈的角度出发,运用博弈论的相关理论与方法构建用户参与创新与企业激励的信号传递博弈模型,探讨企业在激励用户参与创新过程中双方的博弈行为选择和博弈均衡存在的条件,基于博弈分析的结果,针对企业如何有效地激励用户参与创新提出对策与建议。     

国有企业经营者激励机制研究

国有企业改革的目标是建立现代企业制度,这意味着企业所有权与经营权的分离.一方面,所有者与经营者不再同一,势必产生委托代理关系.在信息不对称条件下,代理人即经营者有可能通过勤奋劳动或偷懒实现自己的效用最大化,而置委托人的利益于不顾;另一方面,现代企业制度的运行需要一批懂知识、能组织、会管理的专家成为企业的经营者,需要这些经营者开拓市场,成为企业宝贵的"人格化"资本.因此,国有企业的经营者激励机制问题已成为研究的重点.激励机制是为了解决委托人与代理人之间关系的动力问题的机制,一个有效的激励机制在于使经营者能够努力实现公司所有者利益最大化,实现所有者与经营者利益的一致.     

基于诚信产权的经营者报酬契约安排

传统理论认为经营者报酬契约可以调和经营者与所有者之间的潜在利益冲突。但是,股权激励这种旨在减少经营者偷懒行为的契约安排,可能引发经营者的会计操纵行为。要摆脱这种报酬契约安排中的两难困境,必须重视经营者的会计诚信产权,把经营者会计诚信的收益权纳入其报酬契约体系之内。本文通过建立企业所有者和经营者之间的两阶段动态博弈模型,来分析经营者报酬契约对会计诚信的影响,用以寻求基于会计诚信产权的最优报酬契约安排。     

高校校办企业激励与约束机制问题研究

1校办企业激励与约束机制的理论依据 1.1建立校办企业约束与激励机制的经济学理论 现代企业(典型形式为股份制企业)的产权制度的安排更多表现为企业所有权与经营权的分离.根据现代企业理论,在两权分离的情况下,资本所有者必须建立激励约束机制的实践基础是所有者与经营者委托代理关系的产生及其之间非对称信息的存在.在资本所有权与控制权相分离的条件下,资本所有者作为委托人拥有剩余索取权,其所追求的目标是资本增值和资本收益最大化.拥有公司经营管理权的经理人员作为所有者的代理人,除了追求更高的货币收益外,还力图实现尽可能多的非货币收益.为此,从经济学的基本理论出发,资本所有者必须为现代企业的经营者建立激励约束机制.     

非上市公司虚拟股票期权的定价

在所有权与经营权相分离的现代企业中，经营者与所有者之间的信息不对称为经营者的寻租提供了机会并可能损害所有者的利益。在这种情况下，股东面临两种选择：对经营者实施适时的监督或者寻求恰当的激励，前者被证明是不经济的，后者导致了对经营者激励机制的研究。对经营者实施激励的形式多种多样，报酬激励是其中的重要内容。     

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model

In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231–273, 2006) for matrix games is extended to games with a broader class of payoff functions. This is a distribution-free model of incomplete information for finite games where players adopt a robust-optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. They are called robust players and seek the maximum guaranteed payoff given the strategy of the others. Consistently with this decision criterion, a set of strategies is an equilibrium, robust-optimization equilibrium, if each player’s strategy is a best response to the other player’s strategies, under the worst-case scenarios. The aim of the paper is twofold. In the first part, we provide robust-optimization equilibrium’s existence result for a quite general class of games and we prove that it exists a suitable value \(\epsilon \) such that robust-optimization equilibria are a subset of \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibria of the nominal version, i.e., without uncertainty, of the robust game. This provides a theoretical motivation for the robust approach, as it provides new insight and a rational agent motivation for \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibrium. In the last part, we propose an application of the theory to a classical Cournot duopoly model which shows significant differences between the robust game and its nominal version.     

Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces

We present a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces, as a model of situations where individual players are strategically negligible, as in large non-anonymous games, or where information is diffused, as in games with imperfect information. We present results on the existence of Nash equilibria in both kinds of games. Our results cover the case when the action sets are taken to be the unit interval, results now known to be false when they are based on more familiar measure spaces such as the Lebesgue unit interval. We also emphasize three criteria for the modelling of such game-theoretic situations—asymptotic implementability, homogeneity and measurability—and argue for games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces on the basis of these criteria. In particular, we show through explicit examples that a sequence of finite games with an increasing number of players or sample points cannot always be represented by a limit game on a Lebesgue space, and even when it can be so represented, the limit of an existing approximate equilibrium may disappear in the limit game. Thus, games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces constitute the ‘right' model even if one is primarily interested in capturing the asymptotic nature of large but finite game-theoretic phenomena.     

Die Theorie globaler Spiele: Private Information als Mittel zur Vermeidung multipler Gleichgewichte

Investment decisions with network effects, refinancing illiquid firms, and speculative attacks are typical examples for coordination games with multiple equilibria. By introducing private information about payoff relevant parameters, the theory of global games embeds such coordination games in a stochastic environment, in which the game may have a unique equilibrium. This paper provides an introduction to the theory of global games and shows that it delivers a unique equilibrium if private information is sufficiently precise, while public information may lead to equilibria with self-fulfilling beliefs. This implies some criteria for optimal mechanisms of information dissemination. For example, a well-informed central bank can minimize the prior probability of currency crises by committing to provide information to private actors with small idiosyncratic errors.     

基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究

为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益，就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下，文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中，建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型，提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平，进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性，更符合招投标实际操作的结论。     

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Our proof reveals that the assumption in global games that the noise errors are independent of the state imposes a non-trivial restriction on incomplete information perturbations.     

从网络传播的特征看网络游戏广告的发展契机

随着互联网的普及,网民的数量激增,而网络游戏玩家的数量也随之急速壮大。基于网络游戏用户的数量日益庞大,以网络游戏为媒体平台的网络游戏广告得以借势而发并成为一个新的研究热点。但作为新兴的广告形式,有关网络游戏广告方面的研究还相对较少。本文将结合网络传播自身特点来探讨其为网络游戏广告带来的发展契机。