What Happened to Australia's Productivity Surge?

Australia's productivity has grown 1 percentage point per year slower in the current decade than in the 1990s. This article shows that almost one-half of the slowdown is related to unusual developments in the mining industry, the effects of drought and the overstatement of productivity growth in the 1990s. Part of the remainder might be as a result of a combination of slower technological change, unmeasured declines in labour quality, the diminishing effects of past reforms and the increasing profitability of Australian firms.     

A Decomposition of Changes in Labour Productivity in Australia: 1970-71 to 1989-90*

We show that business-cycle phenomena, climatic conditions and industrial structure are important determinants of annual variations in Australia's labour productivity growth. Another finding is that Australia's productivity slowdown in the 1980s was associated with a reduction in capital growth per unit of labour. The methodology relies on production functions at the industry level We analyze the sensitivity of results to the specification of these functions.     

EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION,TECHNOLOGY CHOICE,AND WORKER ALLOCATION

We show empirically that high‐risk sectors, which contribute strongly to aggregate productivity growth, are relatively small and have relatively low productivity growth in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand these findings, we develop a two‐sector matching model where firms endogenously choose between a safe technology and a risky technology. For firms that have chosen the risky technology, EPL raises the costs of shedding workers in case they receive a low productivity draw. According to our calibrated model, high‐EPL countries benefit less from the arrival of new risky technologies than low‐EPL countries. Parameters estimated through reduced‐form regressions of employment and productivity on exit costs, riskiness, and in particular their interaction are qualitatively similar for actual cross‐country data and simulated model data. Our model is consistent with the slowdown in productivity in the European Union relative to the United States since the mid‐1990s.     

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN: AN EFFCIENCY WAGE PERSPECTIVE

Many OECD economies suffered a productivity slowdown beginning in the early 1970s. However, the increase in unemployment that followed this slowdown was more pronounced in European economies relative to the USA. In this paper we present an efficiency wage model, which enables us to identify two basic channels through which the productivity slowdown can affect workers' effort incentives. Predictions of the model are consistent with the different trends in unemployment across countries over this period in the face of a similar slowdown in productivity. We also demonstrate how the link between growth and unemployment depends upon labour market institutions in such a way that we can reconcile the mixed empirical results observed in the literature.     

The Dutch productivity slowdown: the culprit at last?

Two aspects of the recent performance of the Dutch economy (1982–2001) have attracted wide international attention: (1) rapid employment growth and (2) a significant slowdown in labour productivity growth. This paper argues that the shift from a high-productivity, low-employment towards a low-productivity, high-employment growth path constitutes a structural change set off by the policy of low wage growth launched in 1982. Various theoretical perspectives—including neo-classical substitution, induced technological change, vintage and the Verdoorn Law—point to channels through which wage growth restraint may hold back labour productivity growth. Our growth accounting analysis—based on these perspectives—suggests that a substantial part of the Dutch labour productivity growth slowdown can be attributed to the wage growth slowdown.     

Employment protection and productivity: evidence from firm-level panel data in Japan

Recent developments in the literature on Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) have revealed that changing the stringency of employment protection can lead to extensive consequences outside the labour market, by affecting firms’ production decisions or workers’ commitment levels. This article provides the first empirical evaluation of the comprehensive effect of restrictions on firing employees in Japan, by exploiting the variations in court decisions. We find that judgements lenient to workers significantly reduce firms’ total-factor productivity growth rate. The effect on capital is mixed and inconclusive, although we obtain modest evidence that an increase in firing costs induces a negative scale effect on capital inputs.     

Evaluating the Effects of Product Innovation on the Performance of European Firms by Using the Generalised Propensity Score

The relationship between product innovation intensities and the performance of European firms is assessed, assuming that the selection into different intensities is based on a set of observed covariates. Most studies only distinguish between the innovating and non‐innovating status of firms within a binary treatment framework. Instead, we use a generalised propensity score to estimate a dose–response function, which connects the product innovation intensities of the firms to their labour productivity and profitability growth rates, as measures of performance. The results indicate that high levels of product innovation intensity have significant positive effects on the profitability rate, whilst no significant effects are found on productivity rate.     

Atypical work: a threat to labour productivity growth? Some evidence from Italy

Various theories suggest the existence of a negative relationship between the use of atypical employment contracts and productivity growth, arguing that firms’ utilisation of atypical contracts may reduce the incentive to innovate and internal training, inducing firms to follow a ‘low-road’ to competitiveness, based upon cost-cutting strategies.

This paper aims to provide new evidence on the occurrence of these effects in the Italian economy, where changes in labour legislation from the mid-Nineties onwards, associated with an ‘institutional’ wage moderation period, have brought about a significant process of job creation, but also an appreciable slowdown in labour productivity.

This issue is investigated using a microeconomic approach, taking a rich source of microdata for firms and estimating a dynamic model for labour productivity on a pseudo-panel of firms for the period 2003-2008.

The results support the hypothesis of a negative impact of external labour flexibility on labour productivity growth at firm level, such effect proving stronger for small and medium than for large enterprises and of varying magnitude for the different atypical contracts.     

Catching-up of East German Labour Productivity in the 1990s

We provide empirical evidence for exogenous and endogenous catching-up of East German labour productivity to West German levels. We argue that labour productivity in East Germany has caught up faster than has happened elsewhere. The sudden formation of the German Monetary Union was followed by large transfers to East Germany, migration of workers to West Germany, reorganization and privatization of East German firms. This has quickly led to a partial closing of the organizational, idea and object gaps that existed between East and West Germany. This paper analyses labour productivity in East and West Germany using both aggregate German data and unbalanced panel analysis of developments in East and West Germany. Factors affecting the organization of production, and especially privatization and 'foreign' firms, are found to be particularly important in this context.     

Social Preferences, Skill Segregation, and Wage Dynamics

We study the earning structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers to firms in a model in which workers have social preferences, and skills are perfectly substitutable in production. Firms offer long-term contracts, and we allow for frictions in the labour market in the form of mobility costs. The model delivers specific predictions about the nature of worker flows, about the characteristics of workplace skill segregation, and about wage dispersion both within and across firms. We show that long-term contracts in the presence of social preferences associate within-firm wage dispersion with novel "internal labour market" features such as gradual promotions, productivity-unrelated wage increases, and downward wage flexibility. These three dynamic features lead to productivity-unrelated wage volatility within firms.     

Demand,employment, and labour productivity in the European economies

This paper presents an explanation of the causes of the slowdown in growth in labour productivity in European economies in recent decades. In first instance, the weakness of domestic demand is what determines this slowdown in productivity. However, differences with the (mediocre) rates of growth of productivity between European countries are also related to the specific features of their respective labour markets because, in a context of weak domestic demand, there is a trade-off between employment and productivity.     

The relationship between efficiency and profitability with respect to the size of firms: An empirical investigation for Austria

In this paper, an attempt is made to investigate the performance of Upper-Austrian firms by size class. Considering the six derived hypotheses, why small firms have a better performance measure, some of the hypothesis with respect to profitability and labour cost efficiency are confirmed. On average, the gross residual quota (profitability measure) of small firms is higher than the one of medium-sized and large firms. However, a similar result could not be found for the productivity development. Considering the influence of the firm size on the productivity measure, there is in three out of four cases no statistically significant influence at all and in one case the opposite result is obtained indicating the larger the firm, the higher is the productivity. In the case of labour cost efficiency, the hypothesis (the smaller the firm the lower the labour cost per employee) is clearly confirmed.     

Aggregate profitability and income distribution in the UK corporate sector, 1963–1985

This paper analyses the secular and cyclical behaviour of the rate of profit for the UK corporate sector from 1962 to 1985, using the growth accounting framework developed by Weisskopf (1979) for the USA, and the labour share decomposition of Henley (1987). The results show that the five per cent per annum decline in net profit rate in the UK over the period is explained in part by each of the three factors of declining profit share, declining capital productivity and, to a lesser extent, declining capacity utilization. As in the USA profitability peaks prematurely in each business cycle as a result of distributional pressure. Further decomposition of these components points to the importance of inadequate growth of real labour productivity as an explanatory factor, and to the inability of firms to protect profit share from the effect of the pre-1979 growing employer labour tax burden. The post-1980 profit revival in the UK is not explained by a ‘breakthrough’ in terms of an improved growth rate of labour or capital productivity but rather by the sheer length of the sustained business upswing and, as yet, absence of the usual midcycle upward pressure on labour share.     

Training,productivity and wages: An investigation of China's manufacturing enterprises in a privatization era

We estimated a structural model of production and wage determination in which labour quality can be affected by a firm's training decision using data of China's manufacturing enterprises in an era of privatization (2004–2007). Training increased both productivity and wages, but the former increased more, which explained the voluntary provision of on-the-job training. Our results also indicate that state-controlled enterprises' investment in training could be both privately and socially efficient; unions played a role in promoting training; it might be more privately and socially efficient for manufacturing firms to prioritize training resources to lower-educated, female and junior workers, if they had not done so, during privatization.     

Foreign ownership wage premia in emerging economies

In this article we examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity and ownership using a linked employer–employee dataset covering a large fraction of the Czech labour market in 2006. We distinguish between different origins of ownership and study wage and productivity differences. The raw wage differential between foreign and domestically‐owned firms is about 23 percent. The empirical analysis is carried out on both firm‐ and individual‐level data. A key finding is that industry, region and notably human capital explain only a small part of the foreign–domestic ownership wage differential. Both white and blue collar workers as well as skilled and unskilled employees obtain a foreign ownership wage premium. Foreign ownership premia are more prevalent in older and less technologically advanced firms. Joint estimation of productivity and wage equations show that, controlling for human capital, the difference in productivity is about twice as large as the wage differential. Overall, results indicate that the international firms share their rents with their employees.     

Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries

To the layman, the upward trend in European unemployment is related to the slowdown of economic growth. We argue that the layman's view is correct. The increase in European unemployment and the slowdown in economic growth are related, because they stem from a common cause: an excessively rapid growth in the cost of labour. In Europe, labour costs have gone up for many reasons, but one is particularly easy to identify: higher taxes on labour. If wages are set by strong and decentralized trade unions, an increase in labour taxes is shifted onto higher real wages. This has two effects. First, it reduces labour demand, and thus creates unemployment. Secondly, as firms substitute capital for labour, the marginal product of capital falls; over long periods of time, this in turn diminishes the incentive to invest and to grow. The data strongly support this view. According to our estimates, the observed rise of 14 percentage points in labour tax rates between 1965 and 1995 in the EU could account for a rise in EU unemployment of roughly 4 percentage points, a reduction of the investment share of output of about 3 percentage points, and a growth slowdown of about 0.4 percentage points a year.     

The evolving patterns of global production of multi‐product firms

We extend the framework of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to investigate how multi‐product firms choose different production structures for producing various products and derive four equilibrium patterns of global production. We show that the evolving patterns of inward foreign direct investment and outward processing trade observed in China can be explained by the rapid increase in labour productivity relative to wages. The model predicts that, as labour productivity increases, outsourcing activities will eventually exhibit an inverse U‐shape. We also find that technology spillover increases outsourcing but reduces FDI; the increase in labour productivity, however, could raise both FDI and outsourcing activities.     

TRAINING AND ESTABLISHMENT SURVIVAL

Training decisions are affected by beliefs about the returns to training, surrounding which firms face considerable uncertainty. We model the consequent association between training, profitability and establishment survival. We propose a plausible definition of optimism about training effectiveness, and show that more optimistic firms train more. We then present estimates of the relationship between training and the likelihood of medium‐term commercial survival. We find that increased training of non‐manual workers in large establishments is associated with a greater chance of survival; however, disaggregation reveals that the association differs across occupational groups. In smaller establishments, increased training for Craft and Technical workers is associated with better chances of survival, while for Professional workers the opposite effect is found.     

Adjusting to a New Technology: Experience and Training

How does the economy react to the arrival of a new major technology? The existing literature on general-purpose technologies (GPTs) has studied the role that mechanisms like secondary innovations, diffusion, and learning by firms play in the adjustment process. By contrast, we focus on a new mechanism: the interplay between technological change and two types of human capital—technology-specific experience and education. We show that technological change that requires more education and training, like computerization, necessarily produces an initial slowdown. On the other hand, technological change that lowers the training requirements, like the move from the artisan shop to the factory, can produce either a bust or a boom. We identify three key properties that determine the outcome: (1) the productivity of inexperienced workers, (2) the speed with which experience raises productivity, and (3) the level of general skills required to operate the new technology.     

Italy’s decline and the balance-of-payments constraint: a multicountry analysis

According to the literature, the decline experienced by the Italian economy in the last two decades depends on a slowdown of its labour productivity, starting in the 1990s. The supply-side explanations of this slowdown are inconsistent with the major stylised facts. In this paper, we verify whether a better explanation is provided by the effect of a negative demand shock, through Italy’s external constraints, in the framework of Kaldor-Dixon-Thirlwall’s cumulative growth model. To this end, we use a multi-country generalisation of Thirlwall’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, which allows us to investigate the contribution of Italy’s main trade partners to Italy’s long-run growth from 1970 to 2010. The trade partners are disaggregated into seven groups: Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery, United States, other European countries, OPEC countries, BRIC, and the rest of the world. The results show that Italy’s long-run growth has been consistent with the Bop-constraint, that its decline can be explained by a progressive tightening of this constraint, that the sudden slowdown of labour productivity in the 1990s corresponds to a major shock on Italy’s external constraint, and that the major contributions to this shock came, through different channels of transmission, from the core Eurozone countries and from OPEC countries.