Environmental Goods and Measures for Their Promotion: An Analysis Using a Fair Wage Model

In this paper, we model a two‐sector small open economy with emissions and unemployment associated with the fair wage effort hypothesis, and investigate the environmental and employment impact of an emission tax, a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods in the downstream polluting industry, and a subsidy to the upstream eco‐industry. We then show that if the eco‐industry is skilled labor intensive relative to the polluting final goods industry, while a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled labor, it may increase total emissions. In contrast, the emission tax and the subsidy to eco‐industry firms worsen the unemployment rate, though both policies decrease total emissions. Hence, if the emission tax is set equal to the marginal environmental damage, and either a downstream or upstream subsidy is used to mitigate unskilled unemployment, the optimal subsidy to purchase the goods is positive whereas the optimal subsidy to the eco‐industry is negative, i.e., a tax on the eco‐industry.     

Strategic Exports and R&D with Internationally Mobile Skilled Labor and Exchange Rate Volatility*

This paper extends the Spencer and Brander (1983) model of strategic exports and R&D by introducing exchange rate volatility and R&D activities that require internationally mobile skilled labor. We find that an increased volatility reduces both the levels of optimal export subsidy and R&D tax. We also find that the endogeneity of skilled wage increases the level of export subsidy and reduces the level of R&D tax if the country is an exporter of skilled labor.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road Pricing

This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation. The resulting welfare loss in the labor market can easily exceed the Pigouvian welfare gain from internalizing the congestion externality. However, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the net impact on labor supply is positive, and this can raise the overall welfare gain from the congestion tax by around 100 percent. Nonetheless the optimal congestion tax still equals the Pigouvian tax.
JEL classification R 41; H 21; H 23     

Second‐Best Taxation of Incomes and Non‐Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages

This paper considers a Mirrleesian optimal income tax model wherein labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and their wages are determined endogenously. It shows: (i) If skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth complements, skilled workers will necessarily face a marginal subsidy and unskilled workers a marginal tax on their incomes (these may not be the case if skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth substitutes); and (ii) redistributive concerns call for taxation of those inputs whose elasticity of complementarity with skilled labor is larger than with unskilled labor, and subsidization of those whose elasticity of complementarity is smaller.     

Stress that Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox*

People spend a lot of time commuting and often find it a burden. According to standard economics, the burden of commuting is chosen when compensated either on the labor or on the housing market so that individuals' utility is equalized. However, in a direct test of this strong notion of equilibrium with panel data, we find that people with longer commuting time report systematically lower subjective well‐being. This result is robust with regard to a number of alternative explanations. We mention several possibilities of an extended model of human behavior able to explain this “commuting paradox”.     

Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth

This paper develops an endogenous growth model that sheds light on the roles of the revenue-sharing scheme in a macro-economy. We show that a higher sharing ratio attributable to labor unambiguously promotes the equilibrium working time, but has an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. Of interest, if the economy is characterized by a higher degree of monopoly, a sharing compensation system is more likely to boost the balanced growth rate. In a normative analysis, we show that to remedy the distortions caused by the sharing scheme and market imperfections, the government should provide a subsidy to capital incomes, while it may either tax or subsidize labor incomes.     

农机补贴的收入分配效应：效率、公平，抑或兼而有之*

农机补贴是具有门槛效应的效率增益政策，通常效率与公平如鱼和熊掌不可兼得。本文通过理论模型分析了农机补贴对农业生产及农村劳动力转移的影响；并通过工具变量法和中介变量法研究了农机补贴的收入分配效应及其作用机制。研究发现，农机补贴显著降低了农户收入的基尼系数，提高了收入分配公平性；其作用机制是农机补贴提升了农业生产效率，促进了农村劳动力转移，提高了打工收入，尤其是相对贫困农户，溢出效应对冲了门槛效应，使得农机补贴的收入分配效应兼具了效率和公平。     

Assortative marriage and the effects of government homecare subsidy programs on gender wage and participation inequality

We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled males in equilibrium, even when males and females constitute ex-ante identical populations. We then examine how different government homecare subsidy schemes may affect such gender inequality in the labor market. We show that the effect of government homecare subsidy schemes on gender inequality depends crucially on the form in which the subsidy is given and to whom it is allocated.     

LOCAL LABOR MARKETS,JOB MATCHING,AND URBAN LOCATION*

We present a new way of modeling local labor markets by linking the space of workers' skills and the physical space of cities. The key lesson of our analysis is that firms exploit workers in these two spaces by setting wages that are below the competitive level. The degree of monopsony power depends on the elasticity of the firm's labor pool, which is inversely related to the costs workers incur in commuting and acquiring skills. Our analysis thus shows how socioeconomic ghettos emerge as workers with poor skill matches are also those who incur the highest commuting costs.     

SOCIAL SECURITY AND LABOR SUPPLY INCENTIVES

Many provisions of the Social Security program distort an individual's labor supply incentives. In particular, the payroll tax, the earnings test, the offsetting actuarial adjustment, and the dependence of the size of future benefits on the level of current earnings all affect the net return to extra work. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of the net tax rate on labor income in a variety of circumstances, taking into account all these provisions, as well as the personal income tax. We find that the Social Security Program on net in the past has provided a large subsidy to labor supply, which for many people effectively offset the personal income tax. This subsidy rate, however, has been declining steadily over time     

Saving and retirement behavior under quasi-hyperbolic discounting

This paper investigates saving and retirement behavior using a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with endogenous labor supply. The behavior of quasi-hyperbolic-discounting consumers is compared with optimal behavior, which is obtained under exponential discounting. The quasi-hyperbolic discounters, whether naïve or sophisticated, under-save and retire early compared with an exponential discounter, if and only if the present-biased marginal utility of future consumption decreases with stronger present bias. Logarithmic utility functions and constant-absolute-risk-aversion utility functions can both exhibit this property. In other words, quasi-hyperbolic discounting explains why, consistent with previous empirical studies, under-savers might also be early retirers. Under logarithmic utility, a wage tax and an interest subsidy can counteract the under-saving and early retirement and improve consumer welfare.     

Imperfect Labor Mobility and Unemployment in a Dual Economy*

This paper examines the implications of imperfect labor mobility and unemployment in developing countries. We analyze the effects of wage subsidy policies, factor growth, and the change in labor mobility on unemployment and national income in an economy that is characterized by the existence of both imperfect labor mobility and urban unemployment.     

Government Subsidies of R&D in a Product Cycle Framework: US–Japan Simulations

The welfare effects of R&D subsidies are examined using a product cycle model of trade between two developed countries. Simulations are done for steady-state welfare in Japan and the USA for high- and low-skilled labor over different combinations of subsidy rates. Japanese subsidies to R&D usually benefit Americans owing to an increase in product variety. However, because Japanese R&D reduces wages in the US high-tech sector, American high-skilled workers are hurt if Japanese subsidies are too large. Large American subsidies may cause Japanese innovation to cease. However, Japanese steady-state welfare would be maximized in this case.     

Optimal urban land use and zoning

The paper studies the optimal distribution of business and residential land in a circular city. Once the optimum is characterized, we analyze the effect of changes in commuting costs and externality parameters. We also propose policies like labor subsidies, land taxes and zoning restrictions that can implement the efficient allocation as an equilibrium, or close the gap between the optimal and equilibrium allocations. The results show that business land is more concentrated at the center of the city in the optimum and that higher commuting costs increase the difference between optimal and equilibrium allocations.     

农村剩余劳动力培训能促进产业转移吗?

文章综合发展经济学Lewis模型和新经济地理学Krugman模型,构建了农村剩余劳动力跨区转移的空间经济模型,根据2005-2013年中国内地31个省份和2010-2012年河南省109个县两个层面的面板数据,采用面板和双重差分估计方法实证检验了农村剩余劳动力转移培训的产业转移效应.研究表明:(1)当前针对"转移农村劳动力"的培训补贴政策并无"产业转移效应",而存在"城市化效应".(2)"就地转移劳动力"培训补贴政策同样不存在"产业转移效应",而其"城市化效应"更强;唯有针对"欠发达地区企业"的劳动力培训补贴政策,在区域一体化水平突破 "门槛值"时才有"产业转移效应".文章研究的重要启示是:中西部地区若以促进城市化为目的,选择"就地转移劳动力"补贴更有效;而若以吸引产业转移为目的,则一方面需要针对"欠发达地区企业"的劳动力培训进行补贴,另一方面需要着重提高区域一体化水平.同时,若要实现农村剩余劳动力培训的产业转移效应,则需要改变现有的培训补贴方式,由向政府培训提供补贴转为向企业培训提供补贴.     

Dual Poverty Trap: Intra‐ and Intergenerational Linkages in Frictional Labor Markets

This paper constructs an overlapping generations model with a frictional labor market to explain persistent low education in developing countries. When parents are uneducated, their children often face difficulties in finishing school and therefore are likely to remain uneducated. Moreover, if children expect that other children of the same generation will not receive an education, they expect that firms will not create enough jobs for educated workers, and thus are further discouraged from schooling. These intergenerational and intragenerational mechanisms reinforce each other, creating a serious poverty trap. Escape from the trap requires the well‐organized and combined implementation of a subsidy for schooling, support for disadvantaged children, and public awareness programs.     

Do employers avoid hiring workers from poor neighborhoods? Experimental evidence from the real labor market*

We investigate whether employers avoid hiring workers who live in neighborhoods with low socio-economic status and/or with long commuting times. In a large-scale field experiment in the Swedish labor market, we sent more than 4,000 fictitious résumés, with randomly assigned information about the applicants' residential locations, to firms with advertised vacancies. Our findings show that commuting time has a negative effect on the likelihood of being contacted by an employer, while the socio-economic status of a neighborhood does not appear to be important. These results offer guidance for policymakers who are responsible for reversing segregation patterns.     

Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

Do emission subsidies reduce emission? In the context of environmental R&D organization

This paper, which reexamines the Poyago-Theotoky model, provides additional investigation that was conducted under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new findings, we obtain the following. First, social welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy. Moreover, total emissions under the emission subsidy scenario become less than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is high.