Communication and Comovement: Evidence from Online Stock Forums

We study investor communication and stock comovement using a novel data set from an active online stock forum in China. We find substantial comovement among the returns of a stock and its “related stocks,” which are frequently discussed in the subforum dedicated to the given stock. Comovement is greater when the discussion of related stocks is more intensive. Further, the effect of communication on comovement is stronger for stocks associated with higher information uncertainty. Codiscussed stocks are more actively traded and experience more correlated trading. A trading strategy that exploits communication‐driven comovement generates abnormal returns. Our findings highlight the impact of investor communication on asset comovement.     

Investor Recognition and Post‐Acquisition Performance of Acquirers

The literature has documented a negative relation between investor recognition and expected returns. This negative relation is consistent with the prediction in Merton (1987, Journal of Finance 42, 483–510). This paper investigates whether the changes in investor recognition of acquirers around the time of the acquisitions can explain the post‐acquisition underperformance of acquirer stocks. Using a large sample of U.S. acquisitions from 1980 to 2010, this paper finds that investor recognition, proxied by the number of institutional investors and the number of common shareholders, increases significantly during acquisitions. Once the increases in investor recognition are controlled for, the “puzzling” long‐run underperformances of acquirers disappears.     

Fear and the Fama‐French Factors

Investors’ expectations of market volatility, captured by the VIX (the Chicago Board Options Exchange's volatility index, also known as the “investor fear gauge”), affects the expected returns of US equities. Changes in the VIX drive variations in the expected returns of the factors included in the Fama and French three‐factor model augmented with a momentum factor. The market risk premium (R_m– R_f) and the value premium (HML) are especially sensitive to changes in the VIX. An increase in expected volatility is associated with flights to quality and increases in estimated required returns.     

Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital

We develop a continuous‐time model of liquidity provision in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have constant relative risk‐aversion (CRRA) utility, while hedgers' asset demand is independent of wealth. An increase in hedgers' risk aversion can make arbitrageurs endogenously more risk‐averse. Because arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, an increase in their wealth or a reduction in their CRRA coefficient can raise risk premia despite Sharpe ratios declining. Arbitrageur wealth is a priced risk factor because assets held by arbitrageurs offer high expected returns but suffer the most when wealth drops. Aggregate illiquidity, which declines in wealth, captures that factor.     

The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage

We develop a model in which financially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self‐correcting: following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, which allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross‐sectional relationship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversification of arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs' risk and price volatility.     

Negative earnings,positive earnings and stock return predictability: An empirical examination of market timing

We examine the predictive ability of earnings-price ratios or yields for the S&P 500 index. We decompose the aggregate earnings-price ratio into its positive and negative components (“winners” vs “losers”) and find that the negative component has the most predictive ability. We also find that the earnings-price measures forecast both future returns and earnings growth. Our models display substantial variation in explanatory power over time with forecast power resurfacing in the latter 1990s. We conclude that to the extent that earnings-price yields predict future S&P 500 returns, the negative earnings component is the driving factor.     

我国股票市场“聪明投资者”投资绩效归因研究

不同于寻找具有超额收益“证券”的股票市场主流投资方法,根据历史投资绩效来“选人”,即寻找“聪明投资者”可为构建有效的投资策略提供新思路。本文利用我国投资者全账户交易信息,根据历史投资绩效界定“聪明投资者”,并探索其获得超额收益的原因。结果显示,我国股票市场存在“聪明投资者”,在牛熊市中均可获得显著的超额收益;相比其他投资者,“聪明投资者”风险偏好较低但能获得超额收益,即不是因为他们高杠杆融资和配置更多风险资产承担风险而获得风险溢价,而是因为这类投资者具有更好的仓位管理能力、市场风格适应能力及显著的选股能力。本研究拓展了对我国这一部分特殊群体投资者行为的探索,结论可以用于构建具有实践意义的投资策略。     

Transfers of corporate control in firms with noncontrolling blockholders

I model the choice between a negotiated block trade and a public tender offer as means of acquiring control in a firm with a large minority blockholder. Potential acquirers differ in their (privately known) value‐creation ability. In equilibrium, block trades are made by lower ability acquirers compared to tender offers. The equal opportunity rule (EOR) and the “freezeout” rule are complements in promoting efficiency of control transfers. Stronger investor protection may hamper value‐increasing takeovers when the EOR is present. The model also delivers predictions about announcement returns and the incidence of block trades and tender offers under different legal regimes.     

Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns

There is substantial evidence of short‐term stock price continuation, which the prior literature often attributes to investor behavioral biases such as underreaction to new information. This paper investigates the role of information uncertainty in price continuation anomalies and cross‐sectional variations in stock returns. If short‐term price continuation is due to investor behavioral biases, we should observe greater price drift when there is greater information uncertainty. As a result, greater information uncertainty should produce relatively higher expected returns following good news and relatively lower expected returns following bad news. My evidence supports this hypothesis.     

The Global Crisis and Equity Market Contagion

We analyze the transmission of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis to 415 country‐industry equity portfolios. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the United States and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic fundamentals. This confirms the “wake‐up call” hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country‐specific characteristics during the crisis.     

Investor sentiment and interest rate volatility smile: evidence from Eurodollar options markets

This paper studies the extent to which investor sentiment affects the Eurodollar option smile and finds that there is the dynamic interplay between sentiment-driven investors and arbitrageurs. The results reveal a significant relation between investor sentiment and interest rate volatility smile. The significant relations are stronger for put options, for short-maturity options, and for periods with higher uncertainty. The results are robust when considering controlling variables, net buying pressure, different interest rate option models, model-free method, or excluding rational components from the sentiment measures. Our findings favor the limits to arbitrage hypothesis against the positive feedback hypothesis, suggesting that the sentiment effect is transitory. Change in investor sentiment explains the time-varying smile that can be explained neither by rational interest rate models nor by net buying pressure.     

What's in a “China” Name? A Test of Investor Attention Hypothesis

We study whether a firm's name affects investor attention and firm valuation. Some Chinese firms listed on US stock exchanges have the word “China” included in their company names (“China‐name stocks”), while others do not (“non‐China‐name stocks”). During the 2007 China stock market boom, we find that China‐name stocks significantly outperform non‐China‐name stocks. This is not due to differences in firm characteristics, risk, or liquidity. The “China‐name effect” is largely consistent with the investor attention hypothesis that price pressure caused by increased investor attention on China‐name stocks during the boom period drives up China‐name stocks more than non‐China‐name stocks.     

Inference,arbitrage, and asset price volatility

Does the presence of arbitrageurs decrease equilibrium asset price volatility? I study an economy with arbitrageurs, informed investors, and noise traders. Arbitrageurs face a trade-off between “inference” and “arbitrage”: they would like to buy assets in response to temporary price declines—the arbitrage effect—but sell when prices decline permanently—the inference effect. In equilibrium, the presence of arbitrageurs increases volatility when the inference effect dominates the arbitrage effect. From a technical point of view, the paper offers closed form solutions to a dynamic equilibrium model with asymmetric information and non-Gaussian priors.     

Say on Pay: Is It Needed? Does It Work?

A leading compensation practitioner reviews “Say on Pay” rules, those corporate practices giving shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. The assumption behind “Say on Pay” is that managers may be overpaid because directors fail to provide adequate oversight. O'Byrne questions this underlying assumption. He provides substantial evidence that directors do a poor job overseeing executive pay and that directors have weak incentives to pursue shareholder interests in executive pay. He also finds that “Say on Pay voting is sensitive to differences in pay for performance, but so forgiving that extraordinary pay premiums are required to elicit a majority ‘no’ vote”; and “that three quarters of institutional investors have lower SOP voting quality… than the average investor and almost all have a short‐term focus, with much greater vote sensitivity to current year grant date pay premiums than to long‐term pay alignment and cost.” The common corporate practice of providing competitive target compensation regardless of past performance leads to low alignment of pay and performance. Unfortunately, directors have little incentive to protect shareholder interests “because they are paid labor providers, just like management, not stewards of substantial personal capital.”     

Global market inefficiencies

Using point-in-time accounting data, we estimate monthly fair values of 25,000+ stocks from 36 countries. A trading strategy based on deviations from fair value earns significant risk-adjusted returns (“alpha”) in most regions, especially Asia-Pacific, that are unrelated to known anomalies. The strategy's 40–70 basis point per month alpha difference between emerging and developed markets contrast with prior research findings. A country's pre-transaction cost alpha is positively related to its trading costs, but exceeds country-specific institutional trading costs. Thus, global equity markets are inefficient, particularly in countries with quantifiable market frictions, like trading costs, that deter arbitrageurs.     

Do investor expectations affect sell-side analysts’ forecast bias and forecast accuracy?

We examine the association between investor expectations and its components and sell-side analysts’ short-run quarterly earnings forecast bias and forecast accuracy. To measure investor expectations, we use the Index of Consumer Expectations survey and decompose it into the “fundamental” component related to underlying economic factors (FUND) and the “sentiment” component unrelated to underlying economic factors (SENT). We find that analysts are the most optimistic and the least accurate when SENT is higher. Management long-horizon earnings forecasts attenuate the effects of SENT on forecast optimism and forecast accuracy. Analysts are also the most accurate when FUND is higher. Last, the market places more weight on unexpected earnings when SENT is high. These findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment and the market reacts more strongly to unexpected earnings when analyst forecasts are the least accurate. The last result potentially explains why prior research (for example, Baker and Wurgler, The Journal of Finance 61:1645–1680, 2006) finds an association between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

Are Trade Size‐Based Inferences About Traders Reliable? Evidence from Institutional Earnings‐Related Trading

The use of observed transaction sizes to differentiate between “small” and “large” investor trading patterns is widespread. A significant concern in such studies is spurious effects attributable to misclassification of transactions, particularly those originating from large investors. Such effects can arise unintentionally, strategically, or endogenously. We examine comprehensive records of a sample of institutional investors (i.e., “large” traders), including their order sizes and overall position changes, to assess the degree to which such misclassifications give rise to spurious inferences about “small” and “large” investor trading activities. Our analysis shows that these institutions are heavily involved in small transaction activity. It also shows that they increase their order sizes substantially in announcement periods relative to nonannouncement periods, presumably as an endogenous response to earnings news. In the immediate earnings announcement period, transaction size‐based inferences about directional trading are quite misleading—producing spurious “small trader” effects and, more surprisingly, erroneous inferences about “large trader” activity.     

The CDS‐bond basis

We investigate the cross‐sectional variation in the credit default swap (CDS)‐bond bases and test explanations for the violation of the arbitrage relation between cash bond and CDS contract, which states that the basis should be zero in normal conditions. The evidence is consistent with “limits to arbitrage” theories in that deviations are larger for bonds with higher frictions as measured by trading liquidity, funding cost, counterparty risk, and collateral quality. Surprisingly, we find the basis to be more negative when bond lending fee is higher suggesting that arbitrageurs are unwilling to engage in a negative basis trade when short interest on the bond is high.     

Volatility Risk Premium,Risk Aversion,and the Cross‐Section of Stock Returns

We test if innovations in investor risk aversion are a priced factor in the stock market. Using 25 portfolios sorted on book‐to‐market and size as test assets, our new factor together with the market factor explains 64% of the variation in average returns compared to 60% for the Fama‐French model. The new factor is generally significant with an estimated risk premium close to its time series mean also when industry portfolios and portfolios sorted on previous returns are augmented to the test assets.