Bank Panics,Government Guarantees,and the Long‐Run Size of the Financial Sector: Evidence from Free‐Banking America

Governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility. Confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector, but observing the long‐run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult. We look to America's free‐banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the Indiana‐centered Panic of 1854 to the Panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored. Our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long‐run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government's ability to honor its guarantees.       

财政支出、银行信贷与经济增长——来自2008年汶川大地震的新因果证据

学术界就财政支出与银行信贷如何影响经济增长这一问题一直未能达成共识.本文将2008年汶川大地震作为研究窗口,在财政支出和银行信贷由于震后出台的行政命令与政策外生化的研究前提下,综合使用合成控制法(SCM)、系统广义矩估计(System GMM)、回归控制法(RCM)、交叉滞后模型(Cross-lagged Panel Model)等方法,检验了地震后财政支出、银行信贷和经济增长的具体变化以及相互作用方向.研究发现:尽管汶川地震后财政支出和银行信贷显著增加,促进了经济增长,但由于震后四川省的直接经济损失较大,最终四川省在短期内GDP明显减少.这一发现明确了财政支出、银行信贷以及经济增长之间的因果关系与作用方向:首先,在中国,财政支出与经济增长之间的因果关系符合“凯恩斯假设”,即财政支出的增加“因果性地”决定了GDP的增长.其次,增加银行信贷能够“因果性地”促进GDP增长.最后,财政支出增加促进了银行信贷的扩张,而非公共投资“挤出”了私人投资.     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

农发行面临的信贷风险及防范对策

目前,农业发展银行面临的信贷风险主要体现在政策风险、经营风险、信用风险、体制风险和管理风险。要切实防范信贷风险,必须强化风险意识,优化运行环境和硬化防范措施,努力探索一条符合农业政策信贷资金运行规律,将封闭管理与风险管理有机结合起来的新路子。     

中国农业发展银行信贷业务的再思考

近年来,中央出台了一系列旨在促进农村金融改革和发展的方针与政策。随着农村金融改革的不断深化,各类金融机构纷纷在"三农"领域加大了投入,服务"三农"能力有所增强。中国农业发展银行(以下简称农发行)作为支持"三农"的中坚力量,国家也赋予了其重要使命。中央一号文件就指出"加大政策性金融对农村改革发展重点领域和薄弱环节支持力度,拓展农发行支农领域,大力开展农业开发和农村基础设施中长期政策性信     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

中国农业发展银行信贷政策调整趋势分析

从1994年农业发展银行成立以来,其业务范围便因农业的弱质性特点以及国家的宏观支农政策定位而具有相对的垄断性。但随着我国粮食市场化改革的不断深入及国家粮食购销体制的变化,农业发展银行的政策性信贷范围也不可避免地受到了新兴资本市场以及商业银行的冲击和蚕食。如何调整农发行的信贷政策范围及其管理方式,积极参与这场意义深远的粮食流通体制改革,正是本文要探讨的主要问题。     

会计稳健性与银行借款契约——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

会计稳健性在银行借款契约中居于重要地位。借款人采用高水平的稳健性可以帮助银行降低风险,相应地,银行会提供一定的优惠作为回报。使用手工收集的2000-2007年中国A股上市公司的单笔银行贷款为研究数据,我们对上述问题进行了实证检验。结果发现,企业的会计稳健性越强,企业获得的每笔贷款金额越大,贷款期限越长,贷款的利率越低。另外,我们发现在法制环境越好,优惠政策越多,政府干预越少的地区,上述关系更为显著。     

The Impact of House Prices on Consumer Credit: Evidence from an Internet Bank

This paper shows that house price fluctuations can have a significant impact on credit availability. Data from Prosper.com, a peer‐to‐peer lending site that matches borrowers and lenders to provide unsecured consumer loans, indicate that homeowners in states with declining house prices experience higher interest rates, greater credit rationing, and faster delinquency. We find especially large effects for subprime borrowers whose balance sheets are likely most exposed to asset price declines. This evidence suggests that asset price fluctuations can play an important role in determining credit conditions and are thus a potentially significant mechanism for propagating macroeconomic shocks.     

Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.     

Government ownership,audit firm size and audit pricing: Evidence from China

The present study provides empirical evidence on the impact of government ownership on audit pricing behaviour based on data from Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2008. Our findings, having controlled for auditor choice, indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) incur significantly lower audit fees than non-SOEs. The results also reveal a significant interaction between the type of SOE (i.e., owned by central vs. local government) and audit firm size, which also affects audit fees. More specifically, large auditors tend to charge the central-SOEs lower audit fees than local-SOEs (province, city and county), while small auditors charge central-SOEs higher fees than local-SOEs. We explore a political economy rationale from a supply-side perspective in explaining the results.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

Underwriter Reputation,Issuer Ownership,and Pre‐IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the correlation between pre‐initial public offering (pre‐IPO) earnings management and underwriter reputation for issuers with different ownership structures in China. We document a significantly inverse relationship between underwriter reputation and pre‐IPO earnings management for non‐state‐owned enterprises (NSOE) issuers only, while no significant association is found for state‐owned enterprises (SOE) issuers. We also find that for the NSOE new issue market, underwriter reputation is positively correlated with issuer post‐IPO performance indicating that prestigious underwriters can incrementally improve issuer post‐IPO performance.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Contagious Bank Runs: Evidence from the 1929–1933 Period

This paper empirically examines contagion effects of bank failures by analyzing the behavior of deposit flows in a sample of failed and healthy banks over the 1929–1933 period. We find evidence of contagion for 1930–1932, while none seems to have existed in 1929 or 1933. In addition, the pace of contagion accelerated over 1930–1932. We find that even during 1930–1932, failing-bank deposit outflows exceeded those at a matched control sample of nonfailing banks. This finding is consistent with the presence of a significant number of informed depositors who distinguished among ex ante failing and nonfailing banks.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: G21.     

The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply,Reach‐for‐Yield,and Real Effects

We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).     

Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

怎样申请国家开发银行贷款

国家开发银行的贷款种类　　国家开发银行发放基本建设贷款、技术改造贷款、设备储备贷款、外汇固定资产贷款、外汇流动资金贷款.　　……     

Corporate Governance,Political Connections,and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.