Banking with nominal deposits and inside money

Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. That framework describes traditional bank runs based on currency withdrawals as occurred historically in the US and more recently in developing countries. However, in a modern banking system, large withdrawals typically take the form of electronic payments of inside money, with no analog of a depletion of a scarce reserve from the banking system. In a new framework of nominal demand deposits repayable in inside money, pure liquidity-driven bank runs do not occur. If there were excessive early withdrawals, nominal deposits would hedge the bank and flexible monetary prices in the goods market would limit real consumption. The maturity mismatch of short term liabilities and long term assets is not sufficient for multiple equilibria bank runs without other frictions. A key role of the bank is to ensure optimal real liquidity, which allows markets to optimally distribute consumption goods through the price mechanism.     

Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area

This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008–2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011–2013).     

中国银行业系统流动性风险考察与控制——基于资产抛售价格视角

基于银行业在宏观风险来临时出现的流动性不足和系统性风险,通过建立 DSGE-VAR 模型,考量银行业在宏观经济运行框架下的系统流动性风险,结果发现:银行同业借贷、其他证券资产和交易性负债业务的综合作用会使得银行系统流动性风险总体增大,银行如果想要降低存款提取率对其流动性的影响,就要在银行间市场停止拆出资金、出售政府证券及其他流动资产,并出售潜在的流动性较低的资产.从监管层面来讲,应当通过监管的引导效应将交易性负债进行转化,引导同业借贷和其他证券资产业务向平衡区域集中,并在一定范围内减少银行其他证券资产业务的规模.     

银行资产配置趋势与中央银行流动性管理——基于动力系统模型的模拟分析

近年来,我国宏观流动性投放逐步由以前的被动投放(外汇占款)向主动投放转变,银行业资产配置结构更趋多元化,金融创新更加活跃,这些都在一定程度上改变了金融体系流动性传导的渠道和机制,迫使我们重新审视流动性在金融体系中消长、转移的内在逻辑,探讨新形势下流动性管理的合理方式和路径。本文运用动力系统模型来分析和论证银行资产配置结构变化对市场流动性状况的影响机制,以及中央银行流动性管理工具的有效性。研究表明,银行资产配置趋势的同质化容易导致市场流动性状况的恶化;中央银行需要进一步完善利率传导机制,强化货币政策与宏观审慎评估政策的协同配合,以提升流动性管理的有效性。     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

How do banks price liquidity? The role of market power.

We empirically examine the effects of different measures of liquidity on interest margins of a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2001 to 2018. Overall, the results reveal that liquidity ratios exert a positive influence on bank margins. Furthermore, the study investigates the role of market power in the relationship between liquidity and interest margins. It is documented that dominant banks incorporate the costs associated with investing in liquidity into the bank margins to a lesser extent than banks with less market power, suggesting that the cost of complying with regulatory liquidity standards is reduced when the competition in the banking sector is less intense. The study highlights that market competition might be important in the design and implementation of liquidity regulations.     

互联网金融影响了商业银行流动性创造吗?

选取2010-2019年中国98家商业银行年度数据就互联网金融对银行流动性创造的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析.研究发现:互联网金融通过分流银行存款及理财资金对银行盈利形成冲击,由此引发的"鲶鱼效应"会倒逼银行加大存贷期限错配来缓解盈利下降压力,从而促进银行流动性创造.相对于国有银行与城农商行,互联网金融对股份制银行流动性创造的促进力度更大.金融脱媒仅在P2P网络借贷对银行流动性创造的影响中承担着中介作用,但"第三方支付-金融脱媒-银行流动性创造"的传导渠道无效.银行业景气度提高会加剧互联网金融对流动性创造的促进作用,银行流动性创造存在顺周期倾向.     

Credit Scoring and the Availability of Small Business Credit in Low‐ and Moderate‐Income Areas

This paper estimates that credit scoring is associated with about a $3,900 increase in small business lending per sample banking organization, per low‐ and moderate‐income (LMI) area served, and this effect is roughly equivalent to that estimated for higher‐income areas. For our sample, this corresponds to a $536 million increase in small business credit in LMI areas in 1997 than otherwise would have been the case. This effect appears to be driven by increased out‐of‐market lending by banking organizations, as in‐market lending generally declines. Overall, it does not appear that credit scoring has a disparate impact on LMI areas.     

The crisis in UK banking

Unparalleled turmoil in the banking system over the past two years has impacted severely on the UK's economic prospects. What was once a profitable, fastgrowing, dynamic and highly innovative banking sector has been publicly humiliated, while its lending capacity has stalled. This article highlights the evolution of the credit crisis in the UK, as the fallout from American subprime lending and the housing market bubble spread rapidly across the Atlantic. Lessons from the crisis and policy recommendations are considered, focusing on rebuilding bank liquidity and capital, strengthening bank supervision and regulation, and improving risk evaluation and risk management practices throughout the banking and financial system.     

Banking and commerce: A liquidity approach

This paper looks at the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce, using the “liquidity” approach to financial intermediation. Bringing a nonfinancial firm into a banking conglomerate may be advantageous because it makes it easier for the bank to dispose of assets seized in a loan default. The conglomerate's internal market increases the liquidity of such assets and improves the bank's ability to perform financial intermediation. More generally, owning a nonfinancial firm may act either as a substitute or a complement to commercial lending. In some cases, a bank will voluntarily refrain from making loans, choosing to become a non-bank bank in an unregulated environment.     

Systemic liquidity shortages and interbank network structures

This paper aims to shed light on the systemic nature of liquidity risk and to propose a method for calculating systemic liquidity shortages. Our method incorporates not only direct liquidity shortages but also indirect liquidity shortages due to the knock-on effects through interbank linkages. We perform a simulation with a simple banking system model and find that a deficit bank can mitigate a liquidity shortage by holding more claims on a surplus bank. Meanwhile, a greater imbalance in liquidity positions across banks tends to aggravate the liquidity shortage of a deficit bank. According to comparative analysis between different types of network structures, a core-periphery network with a deficit money center bank gives rise to the highest level of systemic liquidity shortage, and a banking system becomes more vulnerable to liquidity shocks as its interbank network becomes more ill-matched.     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

Bank regulation,property prices and early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries

Early warning systems (EWS) for banking crises generally omit bank capital, bank liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the crisis probabilities, implying long-run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations may impose.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations1

This article derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority is concerned with both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a ‘discontinuous’ reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004.     

An examination of the effect of stock market liquidity on bank market power

This paper investigates the spillover effects of aggregate stock market liquidity on bank market power using a sample of 44 countries and 7297 individual banks from 1999 to 2014. Country-level and bank-level analysis shows that enhancement in stock market liquidity strengthens the market power of the banking sector. This relationship is more pronounced in developed market countries and in countries with common law origin, which offer better investor protection. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide comprehensive empirical evidence of the complementary relationship between banks and stock markets, providing important policy implications for regulators.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.