Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance

We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20‐year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low‐, medium‐, and high‐discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social influence effects and managerial compensation evidence from Germany

I extend existing theories of social influence effects on executive compensation while at the same time showing the context dependence of these effects. Using original data on German firms and a longitudinal design, results of this study suggest that the operating of social influence mechanisms depends on demographic and social similarity between CEOs and board chairs. The findings reconcile previous mixed findings on the role of CEO human capital factors such as education and tenure and furthermore show that board vigilance is conditional on board compensation and the presence of major shareholders with an incentive to monitor board behavior. Finally, the study contributes to compensation and corporate governance research by providing evidence on how social influence effects operate outside the United States. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure and process of diversification,compensation strategy,and firm performance

This study tests six hypotheses on the extent to which a match between compensation and diversification strategies affects firm performance. Using both archival and survey data, results generally support the notion that a firm's compensation strategies make a greater contribution to firm performance if these are attuned to extent and process of corporate diversification. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research on compensation-diversification strategy relations and their interactive effect on firm performance.     

CEO founder status and firm financial performance

Founders create their organizations, yet are often expected to eventually become liabilities to these same organizations. Past empirical research on the relationship between CEO founder status (i.e., is the CEO also the founder?) and firm performance has yielded inconsistent results. This study of 94 founder‐ and nonfounder‐managed firms finds that founder management has no main effect on stock returns over a 3‐year holding period, but that firm size and firm age moderate the CEO founder status–firm performance relationship. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structural vs. relational embeddedness: social capital and managerial performance

This paper examines the impact of managers' social capital on managerial performance. Two dimensions of social capital are compared—the structural embeddedness (i.e., configuration) of a manager's network of work relations and the relational embeddedness (i.e., quality) of those relations. Based on a sample of 120 product and sales managers in a Fortune 100 pharmaceutical firm, this paper presents evidence indicating that both elements of social capital influence managerial performance, although in distinct ways: structural embeddedness plays a stronger role in explaining more routine, execution‐oriented tasks (managerial sales performance), whereas relational embeddedness plays a stronger role in explaining new, innovation‐oriented tasks (managerial performance in product and process innovation). This research considers resource exchanges within firms as key to value creating behaviors and contributes a deeper understanding of how social capital influences productive resource exchanges. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social networking relationships,firm‐specific managerial experience and firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and nonfamily firms

The effect of social networking relationships, firm‐specific managerial experience, and their interactions on performance between family owned and nonfamily firms are studied. Using data from 106 organizations in Ghana, the findings show that family owned firms benefit more from networking relationships with bureaucratic officials than do nonfamily firms. However, nonfamily firms benefit more from networking relationships with community leaders and firm‐specific managerial experience than do family owned firms. Networking relationships with politicians impede performance for nonfamily firms. Nonfamily firms are better able than family owned firms to use their firm‐specific managerial experience to manage the resources and capabilities obtained from networking relationships with community leaders to create value. Moreover, firm‐specific managerial experience attenuates the detrimental effects of networking with politicians for both types of firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高管人员报酬激励与公司治理绩效研究——一项基于深、沪A股上市公司的实证分析

本文选取深、沪A股上市公司1107家,分别从报酬形式、总经理来源形式、公司规模、行业竞争环境、地区分布、股权结构、代理成本等方面来对高管人员报酬(高管薪酬和高管持股)激励与公司治理绩效之间的相关关系进行分析,主要结论是:在目前的报酬激励体系下,非年薪制激励形式优于年薪制和股权性报酬激励形式;总经理为董事长或董事的公司治理绩效和激励机制优于其他类型;公司规模、行业竞争环境和地区分布影响公司治理绩效水平;股权结构的外生性扭曲了股票市场的有效性理论;高管薪酬、公司治理绩效与代理成本显著负相关。最后,根据实证分析的结果,提出了相关的政策建议。     

When the former ceo stays on as board chair: effects on successor discretion,strategic change,and performance

Prior research on CEO succession has omitted consideration of a critical institutional reality: some exiting CEOs do not fully depart the scene but instead remain as board chairs. We posit that predecessor retention restricts a successor's discretion, thus dampening his or her ability to make strategic changes or deliver performance that deviates from pre‐succession levels. In short, a predecessor's continuing presence suppresses a new CEO's influence. Based on analysis of 181 successions in high technology firms, and with extensive controls (for circumstances associated with succession, the firm's need and capacity for change, and for endogeneity), we find substantial support for our hypotheses. In supplementary analyses, we find that retention has a more pronounced effect in preventing a new CEO from making big performance gains than in preventing big drops. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic reward systems: a contingency model of pay system design

A limited number of studies have addressed the idea of ‘strategic’ reward systems—the matching of compensation systems to a firm's strategy. Prior research on this topic has been confined to U.S. firms, however, and a number of key questions remain unanswered. Using a sample of 917 employees from two large Swiss financial institutions, we found that pay systems are linked with divisional strategic orientation, but in a different form than prior studies. Additionally, we identify hierarchical position as an important variable in the tailoring of reward systems. Hierarchy has a significant main effect on pay plan design, and an interactive effect with strategic orientation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory constraints and their relaxation on managerial discretion and internal fit in the context of the U.S. airline industry. Our results suggest that when managers' discretion is limited in one realm of choice, they compensate by using their greater level of discretion in some other arena to achieve internal fit. We show that the pursuit of fit matters, in the sense of having measurable efficiency consequences, and that fit trumps ‘best practice,’ at least in this context. In this respect, our findings provide a validation of the contingency perspective on internal fit. The ability to achieve fit under changing conditions may express a dynamic managerial capability necessary for adaptive organizational change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shareholder perceptions of the changing impact of CEOs: Market reactions to unexpected CEO deaths, 1950–2009

Research summary : Despite a number of studies highlighting the important impact Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have on firms, several theoretical and methodological questions cloud existing findings. This study takes an alternative approach by examining how shareholders' perceptions of CEO significance have changed over time. Using an event study methodology and a sample of 240 sudden and unexpected CEO deaths, we show that absolute (unsigned) market reactions to these events in U.S. public firms have increased markedly between 1950 and 2009. Our results indicate that shareholders act in ways consistent with the belief that CEOs have become increasingly more influential in recent decades. Managerial summary : With Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) facing increased scrutiny and receiving ever‐increasing pay packages, substantial debate exists about their overall contribution to firm outcomes. While prior research has sought to calculate the proportion of firm outcomes attributable to the CEO, this study takes an alternative approach by using the “wisdom of the crowds” to assess how shareholders think about the importance of CEOs. Our study finds that shareholders, perhaps the most financially motivated stakeholder, view CEOs as increasingly important drivers of firm outcomes, good and bad, versus their peers from decades earlier. Notably, market reaction to the unexpected death of a CEO has increased steadily over the last six decades, highlighting the importance of succession planning and supporting, at least partially, the increased compensation given today's top executives. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

More than network structure: how knowledge heterogeneity influences managerial performance and innovativeness

This study deals with individual managerial performance, both overall and in generating innovation. While prior work has demonstrated a relationship between network structure and managerial performance, inadequate attention has been paid to network content. We consider several micro‐social processes that might account for differences in managerial performance, taken from economic sociology and studies of managers' exploitation of their social networks and derived from work in psychology on the genesis of ideas. We compare the influence of these mechanisms on managerial performance using a sample of 106 middle managers in a European telecommunications company. Our findings suggest that, while network structure matters, access to heterogeneous knowledge is of equal importance for overall managerial performance and of greater importance for innovation performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chief executive scanning emphases,environmental dynamism,and manufacturing firm performance

Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.