The CEO Performance Effect: Statistical Issues and a Complex Fit Perspective

How CEOs affect strategy and performance is important to strategic management research. We show that sophisticated statistical analysis alone is problematic for establishing the magnitude and causes of CEO impact on performance. We discuss three problem areas that substantially distort the measurement and sources of a CEO performance effect: (1) the nature of performance time series, (2) confounding and (3) the discovery of many interactions associated with the CEO performance effect. We show that the aggregate of empirical research implies complex interdependency as the driver of the CEO performance effect. This suggests a ‘fit’ model requiring new research approaches. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS

We investigate the role that a voluntary corporate restructuring can play in the design of efficient internal corporate control mechanisms. To this end, we examine the post-restructuring internal control practices in 78 voluntary corporate spin-offs that were completed between 1972 and 1987. We find that the selection of the new CEOs, the design of their compensation contracts, and the staffing of the boards of directors and their compensation committees in the spun-off firms can be seen as ex ante efficient. These governance and control practices, however, are not strongly related to the observed positive market reactions to the spin-off announcements. The results indicate that equity reorganizations facilitate the implementation of efficient internal governance and control practices, but that other factors must influence the share price reactions to the announcement of such voluntary corporate restructurings.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO tenure and organizational performance: an intervening model

While CEO job tenure is seen as influencing firm performance, the intervening mechanisms that govern this influence have remained largely unexplored. Given that individuals in the firm most closely influenced by the CEO are members of the top management team (TMT), we focus on the CEO‐TMT interface as one important intervening mechanism. Specifically, our tested model suggests that CEO tenure indirectly influences performance through its direct influences on TMT risk‐taking propensity and the firm's pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. Results from structural equation modeling are consistent with this model and support its associated hypotheses. In the discussion, we trace the implications of our study for research and practice. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY,ENTRY MODE,AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE OF CHOICE AND CONSTRAINTS

Despite theoretical arguments matching type of diversification strategy with mode of entry, the exact form of relationships between strategy, mode of entry, and performance remains enigmatic. Our analysis, based on two samples, demonstrates that matches between strategy and mode did improve performance in one time period, but not a second. In addition, the results show that exclusive reliance on a single mode (internal development or acquisition) can restrict performance. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reaffirming the CEO effect is significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza (2014)

A recent study by Fitza argued that the prior estimates of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) effect are conflated with events outside the CEO's control, are largely the result of random chance, and that the true CEO effect is smaller than has been previously estimated. We suggest that the empirical methodology employed by Fitza to support these claims substantially overstates the “random chance” element of the CEO effect. We replicate Fitza's findings, highlight methodological issues, offer alternative conclusions, and using multilevel modeling (MLM), suggest that his analyses mischaracterize the CEO effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance consequences of new CEO ‘Outsiderness’: Moderating effects of pre‐ and post‐succession contexts

This study seeks to reconcile inconsistent findings on the performance consequences of new CEO origin. Drawing on five decades of empirical research on CEO succession outcomes, I develop a more refined theoretical conceptualization and a finer‐grained measurement of the underlying construct of the insider vs. outsider CEO, and build and test a more comprehensive and nuanced framework of the succession context. A longitudinal investigation of the U.S. airline and chemical industries (1972–2002) indicates that new CEO ‘Outsiderness’, conceptualized as a continuum raging from new CEOs who have a greater combination of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the firm and the industry, has no main effect on post‐succession firm performance. However, significant moderating effects are found when environmental munificence, pre‐succession firm performance, and concomitant strategic and senior executive team changes are considered. Together, these findings highlight the need to consider both pre‐ and post‐succession contextual factors for evaluating the performance effects of new CEO outsiderness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Higher Highs and Lower Lows: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in CEO Dismissal

Research summary: Investing a firm's resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives remains a contentious issue. While research suggests firm financial performance is the primary driver of CEO dismissal, we propose that CSR will provide important additional context when interpreting a firm's financial performance. Consistent with this prediction, our results suggest that past CSR decisions amplify the negative relationship between financial performance and CEO dismissal. Specifically, we find that greater prior investments in CSR appear to expose CEOs of firms with poor financial performance to a greater risk of dismissal. In contrast, greater past investments in CSR appear to help shield CEOs of firms with good financial performance from dismissal. These findings provide novel insight into how CEOs' career outcomes may be affected by earlier CSR decisions. Managerial summary: In this study, we examined a potential personal consequence for CEOs related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We explored the role prior investments in CSR play when a board evaluates the firm's financial performance and considers whether or not to fire the CEO. Our results suggest that while financial performance sets the overall tone of a CEO's evaluation, CSR amplifies that baseline evaluation. Specifically, our results suggest that greater past investments in CSR appear to (a) greatly increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is poor, and (b) somewhat reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is good. Thus, striving to deliver profits in a socially responsible manner may have both positive and negative personal consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PREDICTED CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL SYNERGY AND POST-ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRED BUSINESSES

The 1980s acquisitions are widely believed to have unwound the conglomerate boom of the 1960s through horizontal mergers, yet alternative forms of unwinding have not been examined. This study tests the explanation that changes in the opportunity to share resources and activities among businesses of the firm may have contributed to post-acquisition performance improvements in the recent acquisition wave. After estimating the sources of competitive performance that are due to these changes within each of 356 manufacturing industries, the study calculates predictions of changes in competitive performance for each acquired business between 1980 and 1984. The predictions are positive and in turn are positively associated with change in competitive performance between 1984 and 1986. This finding highlights the importance of resource sharing and activity sharing in these acquisitions, and leads to the reexamination of theories for the second acquisition wave that are supported by the finding of horizontal acquisitions.     

CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder‐bargaining perspective

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility‐maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market‐based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking

Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs. Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investor perceptions of CEO successor selection in the wake of integrity and competence failures: A policy capturing study

Research summary : Drawing on theory about signaling, sensemaking, and the romance of leadership, we extend inquiry on investors' perceptions of CEO succession following misconduct. Whereas past studies have treated misconduct monolithically, we examine failures of integrity and competence separately. Using a policy capturing methodology that isolates investors' decision making from potential confounds, we find that, following an integrity failure, investors perceive outside and interim successors positively but inside successors negatively. Following a competence failure, investors perceive outside successors positively but are ambivalent toward inside and interim successors. Our findings indicate that whether an act of misconduct was an integrity failure or a competence failure, and what type of successor the firm chooses, are important considerations when using CEO succession as a means to restore investor confidence. Managerial summary: Business headlines regularly feature episodes of organizational misconduct, such as product safety problems, environmental violations, employee mistreatment, and securities lawsuits, and their aftermath. In such scenarios, shareholders demand answers from the people at the top, even if those people were not directly responsible for the problem. As a result, companies often fire the CEO as a means to restore investor confidence. Does this work? It depends on the type of misconduct and who is the CEO's successor. Following a competence failure, investors welcome the appointment of an outsider, but they are indifferent to inside and interim successors. Following an integrity failure, shareholders greet outside and interim CEO successors favorably while frowning on the promotion of insiders. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Doubts about the conceptual and empirical status of context-free and firm-specific control expectancies: A reply to boone and de brabander

Boone and De Brabander (1993) contend mat Hodgkinson's (1992) strategic locus of control scale will not lead to interesting research results and that researchers should continue to adopt the well known Rotter (1966) I-E scale. Central to their argument is the assertion that responses to domain-specific control expectancy scales, such as the strategic locus of control scale, largely reflect actors' perceptions of their current circumstances, whereas responses to the I-E scale are a function of stable personality differences. In this reply the literature on the locus of control construct is briefly reviewed, in order to show that the accumulated empirical research evidence does not support the notion of generalized control expectancies as a simple unidimensional personality trait, but points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that control expectancies are more appropriately construed as a multidimensional, domain-specific, cognitive variable shaped by the combined effects of disposition, prior learning experiences, reinforcement histories and current circumstances. The rationale for the development of the strategic locus of control scale is further explained, in order to clarify a number of other misconceptions.     

RESOURCE AND MARKET BASED DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper explores the implications of studying industry competitive patterns at the level of resource accumulation and the relationship between resource endowments and firm performance outcomes in the U.S. banking industry. It uses the strategic group framework to evaluate two models of rivalry and performance and concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for competitive analysis, strategic group theory and the banking industry.