Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive positioning within and across a strategic group structure: the performance of core,secondary, and solitary firms

Drawing from economic and cognitive theories, researchers have argued that firms within an industry tend to cluster together, following similar strategies. Their positioning in strategic groups, in turn, is argued to influence firm actions and firm performance. We extend this research to examine performance implications of competitive positioning not just among but also within groups. We find that performance differences within groups are significantly larger than across groups, suggesting that some firms within groups develop better resource or competitive positions. We also find that secondary firms within a group outperform both core firms within the group and solitary firms, the latter being those not belonging to any multifirm strategic group. This suggests that secondary firms may be able to effectively balance the benefits of strategic distinctiveness with institutional pressures for similarity. We conclude that the primary implication of strategic groups does not relate to the ability of firms to create stable, advantageous market segments through collusion. Instead, strategic groups represent a range of viable strategic positions firms may stake out and use as reference points. Moreover, our results concerning secondary firms indicate that firm positioning within a group structure can have performance implications. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups

Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group‐level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant‐fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hybrid strategic groups

The notion of strategic groups has recently emerged as a critical perspective for uncovering firms' strategic postures/recipes and competitive market structures. Firms within strategic groups generally adopt similar strategic recipes and compete more intensely than firms across strategic groups. Building on recent research, the authors develop the concept of hybrid strategic groups, which blend the strategic recipes of more than one group, in contrast to existing conceptualizations of strategic groups, where either firms tightly follow the recipes of a strategic group (i.e., core firms) or firms loosely follow the recipes of a strategic group (i.e., secondary firms). Thus, competition among firms depends not only on the strategic group but also on the overlap of that strategic group with other strategic groups. The authors devise a combinatorial optimization-based classification procedure utilizing a bilinear model that accommodates multiple variable batteries that can estimate hybrid strategic groups. The proposed methodology is illustrated by using archival data on public banks. For this illustration, the hybrid strategic group solution outperforms ordinary cluster analyses and offers critical insights into the nature of competition among firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: a genetic algorithm‐based model

We develop a simulation model to examine conditions under which strategic groups emerge and their performance difference persists. In our model, mobility barriers, strategic interactions among high performers, dynamic capabilities (the mechanisms that allow winners to continue to survive), and boundary of rivalry are put together to derive their joint implications for the evolution of strategic groups. Not surprisingly, our model behavior shows that mobility barriers and strategic interactions play an important role in sustaining intergroup performance difference. However, the extremely high level of mobility barriers is shown to impede the emergence of strategic groups. We also find that dynamic capabilities and boundary of rivalry are as essential as mobility barriers in understanding the emergence and stability of strategic groups. When dynamic capabilities are absent or when rivalry is extended over firms with dissimilar strategies, strategic groups are less likely to exist. These findings can serve as a guideline for empirical research to probe why strategic groups exist sometimes and why they do not at other times. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic groups as reference groups: Theory,modeling and empirical examination of industry and competitive strategy

Previous studies on strategic groups have mainly focused on their static characteristics in order to test the theory of strategic groups and intraindustry performance differences (Porter, 1979; Cool and Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990). In contrast, this study takes a longitudinal, dynamic perspective and describes the forces driving strategic group membership and structural evolution. It proposes that a strategic group acts as a reference point for group members in formulating competitive strategy. A partial adjustment model of strategic mobility is then developed which incorporates the idea of a strategic group as a reference group. It models strategic change in an industry both within and across strategic groups. The model is tested in the context of an in-depth industry analysis of the more significant firms in the insurance industry over the 1970-84 time period. The results suggest that strategic groups act as reference points for firm strategies and that predictions of future firm strategies and industry/group structures may also be successfully derived.     

Rivalry,strategic groups and firm profitability

An analysis of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the period 1963–82 finds that a substantial decline in industry profitability is not explained by changes in the number and size distribution of firms, in segment interdependence and in strategic distance. In contrast, declining industry profitability is strongly associated with increasing rivalry. This increasing rivalry is associated with changes in strategic group structure and a concomitant shift from within group rivalry to between group rivalry.     

Playing dirty or building capability? Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign firm rivals

Research summary : We examine why a firm takes specific competitive action in nonmarket and resource‐market spaces, particularly when it perceives threats from informal and foreign competitor groups, respectively. We address this question by combining insights from competitive rivalry, strategic groups, and nonmarket strategy literatures in an emerging economy context. Specifically, we theorize how threats from informal and foreign rival firms in an emerging market influence a firm's engagement in corruption activities and its investments in HR training, respectively. We also argue that the likelihoods of such focal firm actions against competitor group threats differ, contingent on the focal firm's market and resource profiles. Results from the empirical analyses, with survey data from the Indian IT industry, provide broad support to our hypotheses. Managerial summary : Based on a World Bank dataset on the Indian IT industry, this study finds that corruption and HR training are pursued by firms in emerging economies as mindful strategies against specific types of rivals—informal and foreign firm rivals, respectively, and are not pursued simply as culturally‐based practices. Multinational companies may need to understand that domestic firms in emerging countries will engage in corruption strategically to reduce their costs and time to market of their products/services. Therefore, multinational firms may need to devise suitable strategies other than corruption to reduce their costs and time to market if they wish to compete with firms in emerging economies for customers who don't care about ethical issues and will buy a cheaper product/service that is delivered quickly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cointegration of firm strategies within groups: a long‐run analysis of firm behavior in the Japanese steel industry

This paper uses cointegration analysis to study the competitive interaction among firms within the integrated and minimill groups in the Japanese steel industry. The use of cointegration analysis overcomes some of the limitations associated with prior attempts at modeling firm behavior within groups, and allows us to model strategies that take considerable time to adjust. Results indicate that several strategies displayed slow adjustment characteristics. All of the strategies that displayed these properties were cointegrated within the group. Finally, over the long run, the rate of strategic response to ‘shocks’ in the system varied across members and strategies: some converged, while others diverged from the group relationship. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings to research on strategic groups and competitive dynamics among firms. Thus the paper contributes to the literature on strategic groups and competitive dynamics, and illustrates the use of cointegration analyses to study the competitive behavior of firms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic action and customer mobility: Antecedents and consequences of strategic actions in the Korean mobile telecommunication service industry

This paper investigates the sources and consequences of strategic actions in the Korean mobile telecommunication service industry. Based on competitive dynamics research and an organizational learning perspective, it suggests hypotheses and tests them with monthly data on service providers’ competitive and alliance actions, as well as statistics on monthly subscribers during 2002–2007. We show the positive effects of a firm’s own experience, other firms’ strategic actions, and firms’ alliance tendencies on the likelihood of firm-level competitive action and alliance. We also find that negative performance feedback accelerates the mimetic influence of rival firms’ competitive actions and that positive performance feedback strengthens the momentum effect of a firm’s own alliance experience on the likelihood of alliance. Both competitive actions and alliances appear to influence customer mobility across firms in a complex manner. Based on customer mobility data, this study finds that alliances increase market dynamism, that is, customer mobility. It also shows that competitive actions, in general, serve to effectively attract switching customers from rivals. This study partially answers questions regarding the triggers of competitive actions and alliance activities among mobile telecommunication service providers and their performance consequences.     

Nested identities as cognitive drivers of strategy

Research Summary: Organizations face tensions to conform to industry norms for legitimacy yet differentiate for competitive advantage when implementing strategies. We suggest this tension is due to and resolved through organizations’ cognitive negotiations of multiple levels of identity. Through an inductive study in the recreational vehicle industry, we find that organizations concurrently draw on identities at the organizational, industry, and strategic group levels to formulate and enact specific competitive actions. Specifically, we find that organizational identity relates to decisions on product offerings; industry identity relates to downstream strategy; and strategic group identity relates to upstream strategy, firm boundaries, and expansion mode. Our findings highlight the importance of strategic group identity and inform a grounded model describing how organizations draw upon different levels of identity to influence strategy. Managerial Summary: Many managers experience tensions of differentiating their firms’ competitive actions from rivals, while conforming with industry norms and practices. In this article, we argue that a manager can navigate these tensions by understanding their firm, strategic group, and industry identities and how these identities interrelate. Through a qualitative case study of the U.S. recreational vehicle industry, we show that each level of identity influences different competitive actions, with firm identity connected to product offerings, industry identity related to managing downstream distribution, and strategic group identity related to firm boundary and acquisition strategies. Overall, strategic group identity is the most critical for managers as this level filters how they view competitors and provides the rules of competition.     

Strategic groups: Theory,research and taxonomy

This paper discusses the concept of strategic groups, focusing upon the importance of intra-industry strategic groupings in understanding differences across firms within an industry. The problems involved in identifying strategic groups within industries are examined through a comprehensive review of recent studies. It is demonstrated that much of the research has used surrogates for elements of a firm's strategic direction, e.g. vertical integration, product range, R & D expenditure, to suggest bases by which creative and sustainable groups are formed. The authors argue that certain theoretical concepts such as mobility barriers, isolating mechanisms and controllable variablesprovide much firmer bases for identifying strategic groups within industries. Thus, taxonomies for understanding the nature of strategic group formulation can be developed. Implications of the strategic group concept for such strategic issues as the structure-performance linkage, firm mobility, patterns of rivalry, industry evolutionand firm growthare then examined. The paper concludes by indicating fruitful directions for strategic group research in the context of the strategic management field.     

Dynamic strategic groups: deriving spatial evolutionary paths

Recent theoretical developments in the domain of strategic groups, specifically those related to cognitive groups and strategic group identity, seem to suggest that strategic group membership is likely to be relatively stable over time and that firms in a strategic group co‐evolve. Yet appropriate data analytic approaches that use information about firms over time to identify stable strategic groups and their evolutionary paths have been lacking. To overcome such limitations, this research proposes a new clusterwise bilinear multidimensional scaling model that can simultaneously identify (1) the number of strategic groups, (2) the dimensions on which the strategic groups are based, and (3) the evolution of the strategy of these groups over time. Our discussion encompasses various alternative model specifications, together with model selection heuristics based on statistical information criteria. An illustration of the proposed methodology using data pertaining to strategic variables for a sample of public banks in the tristate area of New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania across three time periods (1995, 1999, and 2003) identifies two underlying dimensions with five strategic groups that display very different evolutionary paths over time. Post hoc analysis shows pronounced differences in firm performance across the five derived strategic groups. This article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings, as well as potential future research directions. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Management heterogeneity,competitive interaction groups,and firm performance

One of the fundamental problems in strategic management is to map a heterogeneous set of firms in an industry into subsets of firms within which firms are homogeneous in their conduct and performance. The strategic group concept provides an answer to this intriguing question. Researchers in strategic group theory argue that firms within the same strategic group are behaviorally similar and thus tend to compete more fiercely within the group than across groups. In this paper, we focus on the question whether firms within the same group show similar decision‐making characteristics. Strategic‐choice theorists argue that top management teams in firms have substantial discretion in determining the future strategic contour of firms. Upper‐echelon theorists also argue that top managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of competition in the industry. Further, they argue that top management team characteristics are an important element that determines the market niche in which a firm competes and the strategic direction a firm follows. Based on these arguments, we expect that there will be a significant link between grouping of firms by the patterns of competitive interactions and grouping of firms by top management team heterogeneity. Moreover, we argue that the closer the TMT heterogeneity of a firm is to the dominant heterogeneity in the competitive interaction group, the better it performs. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm,strategic group,and industry influences on performance

A long‐standing debate has focused on the extent to which different levels of analysis shape firm performance. The strategic group level has been largely excluded from this inquiry, despite evidence that group membership matters. In this study, we use hierarchical linear modeling to simultaneously estimate firm‐, strategic group‐, and industry‐level influences on short‐term and long‐term measures of performance. We assess the three levels' explanatory power using a sample of 1,165 firms in 12 industries with data from a 7‐year period. To enhance comparability to previous research, we also estimate the effects using the variance components and ANOVA methods relied on in past studies. To assess the robustness of strategic group effects, we examine both deductively and inductively defined groups. We found that all three levels are significantly associated with performance. The firm effect is the strongest, while the strategic group effect rivals and for some measures outweighs the industry effect. We also found that the levels have varying effects in relation to different performance measures, suggesting more complex relationships than depicted in previous studies. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic factor markets,scale free resources,and economic performance: The impact of product market rivalry

This paper analyzes how scale free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game‐theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, preexisting competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those preexisting asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profits—sacrificing some of their preexisting market power rents—by acquiring resources that they know to be overpriced. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

策略群组与企业盈利水平的差异

企业之间的盈利水平存在着一定的差异，。这是各个产业中常见的现象。不同领域的学者对此解释不同，比较有影响的解释有产业组织理论的SCP范式，企业战略管理的RBV理论。事实上，盈利水平差异并不仅仅是产业层面或企业层面的因素所决定的，还有一种更为重要的层面－策略群组起着非常重要的作用。因此，企业为了提高自身的盈利能力，必须不断地调整自己在整个策略群组中的地位，或者在不同策略群组之间进行流动。     

Research notes and communications co-ordinating mechanisms,consensus between marketing and manufacturing groups,and marketplace performance

This exploratory study investigated the relationship among use of various co-ordinating mechanisms, degree of consensus between marketing and manufacturing groups, and marketplace performance reputation. Consensus between marketing and manufacturing groups on key competitive strengths, company goals, and implementation actions was measured in 15 firms in the carpet industry. Those firms which made more frequent use of planning techniques (formal forecasting procedures, management-by-objectives linked to performance appraisal, and a written strategic plan) experienced higher levels of interdepartmental consensus. Consensus between departments was strongly related to marketplace performance reputation.     

Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction

In this study of firms’ entries into and exits from each other’s markets, we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action‐oriented, dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time. Our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in California reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others. We show that there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between firms’ rates of entry into and exit from each other’s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads. We also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.