Thinking strategically about thinking strategically: the computational structure and dynamics of managerial problem selection and formulation

A new model of managerial problem formulation is introduced and developed to answer the question: ‘What kinds of problems do strategic managers engage in solving and why?’ The article proposes that a key decision metric for choosing among alternative problem statements is the computational complexity of the solution algorithm of alternative statements. Managerial problem statements are grouped into two classes on the basis of their computational complexity: P‐type problems (canonically easy ones) and NP‐type problems (hard ones). The new model of managerial cognitive choice posits that managers prefer to engage with and solve P‐type problems over solving NP‐type problems. The model explains common patterns of managerial reasoning and decision making, including many documented ‘biases’ and simplifying heuristics, and points the way to new effects and novel empirical investigations of problem solving‐oriented thinking in strategic management and types of generic strategies, driven by predictions about the kinds of market‐ and industry‐level changes that managers will or will not respond to. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investor activism,managerial responsiveness,and corporate social performance

We study relationships between shareholder proposal activism, managerial response, and corporate social performance (CSP). We find that shareholder proposal activism reduces CSP. We infer that rather than pressuring firms to improve CSP, activism may engender diversion of resources away from CSP into political activities used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion. We also find that managers are more likely to settle proposals filed by ‘salient’ shareholders (i.e., those with power, legitimacy, and urgency). Settlement with salient shareholders, however, also reduces CSP, suggesting that managers' responses are symbolic; i.e., they settle with salient shareholders to demonstrate conformance but continue to resist making the substantive changes to core policies that may compromise their discretion. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Give it to us straight (most of the time): Top managers’ use of concrete language and its effect on investor reactions

Research Summary : Building on the communications and linguistics literatures, we explore the language attributes managers use in interactions with investors and the subsequent reactions of investors. Specifically, we hypothesize that top managers’ use of concrete language attributes in communication with investors broadly associates with positive investor reactions. We further posit that this relationship will be moderated by the level of firm risk. Our results support our hypotheses and, thus, offer important insights to the impression management literature. First, subtle elements of managerial communication can have significant impression management consequences. More specifically, language concreteness is a key language attribute that generally induces positive investor responses. Finally, the effectiveness of language concreteness is conditional on the informational environment of the firm. Managerial Summary : How can managers communicate in a way that presents the firm more positively or reduces the negativity associated with perceived firm risks? Our findings indicate that choosing appropriate persuasive language features in interactions with investors can help a firm manage its impressions. Specifically, we find that top managers’ use of concrete language that provides details and specific information in communication with investors, in general, garners positive investor reactions. Further, the effectiveness of top managers’ use of concrete language depends on investor concerns. More specifically, we find that when a firm is seen as having a riskier profile, using concrete language helps induce a more positive investor response; while when a firm is seen as low risk, using abstract language may be more beneficial.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic orientations,incentive plan adoptions,and firm performance: evidence from electric utility firms

This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory constraints and their relaxation on managerial discretion and internal fit in the context of the U.S. airline industry. Our results suggest that when managers' discretion is limited in one realm of choice, they compensate by using their greater level of discretion in some other arena to achieve internal fit. We show that the pursuit of fit matters, in the sense of having measurable efficiency consequences, and that fit trumps ‘best practice,’ at least in this context. In this respect, our findings provide a validation of the contingency perspective on internal fit. The ability to achieve fit under changing conditions may express a dynamic managerial capability necessary for adaptive organizational change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial perceptions of global pioneering advantage: Theoretical framework and empirical evidence in the U.S. and Korea

Managers form mental models of their business environment, and make strategic decisions based on these perceptions of reality. We study managerial perceptions of the competitive advantage gained by a pioneering firm. We expect that managers will make pioneering entry decisions based on their perceptions of pioneering advantages. Due to cross-national cultural and business environment differences, managers from different countries will employ different mental models and thus perceive the relative advantage of pioneering differently.Drawing from the literature on cultural influence on decision-making, we build a theoretical framework of perceived pioneering advantage in different cultural environments. From this framework, and from cultural differences that exist between the United States and South Korea, we derive hypotheses regarding expected cross-cultural perceptual differences. We test these hypotheses using samples of senior product managers from both countries. We find that some, but not all, of the principles of pioneering advantage empirically verified in North America are generalizable to the culturally-different South Korean business environment.     

Learning experiences and managerial role performance: Perceptions of New Zealand managers and their subordinates

The present study was based upon Luthans' (1988) model of effective management, which has implications for managerial training and development, but has not been examined cross-nationally. A sample of New Zealand managers was surveyed to explore job-related and off-the-job experiences which they perceived to have affected their skills development. In addition, questionnaires were distributed to subordinates of these managers to assess their perceptions of managerial performance levels. Managers attributed most of their development to on-the-job experiences, which were often haphazard and unplanned, with formal education and training accounting for considerably less skills acquisition. Few links were found, however, between learning experiences and perceptions of managerial performance. Implications of the findings for managerial development and the design of constructive learning environments within organisations are discussed.The authors are from the University of Waikato, New Zealand and the Copenhagen School of Economics and Social Science, Denmark, respectively. Financial assistance for this project from the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Personnel and Human Resources Management Conference, Hong Kong, 1989. The authors wish to thank Paul Taylor and Elizabeth Brady for their helpful comments. Correspondence should be addressed to Michael P O'Driscoll, Department of Psychology, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand.     

Managerial response to constitutional constraints on shareholder power

Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self‐interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair. Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Network picturing: An action research study of strategizing in business networks

Our paper is concerned with how managers understand their surrounding network and what strategic actions they take based on this insight. Recent research in the areas of network management and business relationships shows increasing interest in the interplay between cognition and action, particularly on how managers relate perceptions about their business network (“network picturing”) to decision-making and strategizing activities. In this study, we apply a novel research approach combining process research and action research methodology. Our sample is introduced to business network theories and concepts, and the use and adaptation of these concepts results in managerial options being articulated and applied. Our findings add new insight in the field of network strategy and network picturing. Network picturing represents a way to understand the boundaries of the firm and how this understanding affects managers' decisions. This differs from the fundamental distinction between the external and the internal environments of classical strategy analysis. In terms of network picturing, strategizing is a way to understand the resulting actions or network outcomes that managers see as viable within their surrounding network. We also provide a conceptual process exercise as an example of how this insight can be relevant for managers in their decision-making processes.     

Mental representation and the discovery of new strategies

Research summary : Managers' mental representations affect the perceived payoffs and alternatives that managers consider. Thus, mental representations affect how managers search for profitable strategies as well as the quality of strategies they discover. To study how mental representation and search interact, we formally model the dual search over possible representations and over policy choices of a strategy “landscape.” We analyze when it is preferable to emphasize searching for the best policies rather than the best mental representation, and vice versa. We show that, in the long run, a balance between the two search modes not only results in better expected performance, but also reduces the variation in performance. Additionally, the article describes conditions under which increased accuracy of mental representations can actually worsen firm performance. Managerial summary : Managers' mental representations affect the perceived payoffs and alternatives that managers consider. Thus, mental representations affect the quality of strategies managers can discover. We analyze a computer simulation of how managers use mental representations to search for strategies. This sheds light on how managers should deal with the trade‐off between searching for policies and searching for representations; that is, whether managers should think creatively about how to represent a strategy problem or whether they should just stick to the current problem understanding, and try to find ways to improve performance as suggested by the current representation. We provide insight regarding the balance between the two search modes and describe conditions under which increasingly accurate mental representations can worsen firm performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy formulation processes: Differences in perceptions of strength and weaknesses indicators and environmental uncertainty by managerial level

Some literature suggests that managers' perceptions of strengths and weaknesses indicators vary by management level. Differences likely result because of individuals' cognitive schemes, which include their cognitive biases. In turn, systematic errors may occur in managerial decisions. Results from the research reported herein support the notion that managers' perceptions of the indicators of a firm's strengths and weaknesses, and of environmental uncertainty, vary by managerial level. Differences in these perceptions were discovered to be more significant within each firm. Implications of these results are examined, including the impact on the deployment of firms' strategy formulation processes.     

Strategic Response to a Volatile Environment: The Case of Cross-Cultural Cooperative Ventures

Unlike free-standing companies, joint ventures involve more complex governance structures and organizational systems. Because of interpartner dependence in the managerial process, it is more difficult for joint ventures to configure their strategies with environmental dynamics. Without such configuration, however, joint ventures will suffer from operational instability and resource misallocation. This study assesses the strategic response of joint ventures to a dynamic environment. Based on a survey of top managers in international joint ventures (IJVs) in China, it is found that managerial perceptions of increased environmental complexity and hostility are positively related to an Analyzer strategy. Proactive and Defensive strategies are either negatively or non-significantly linked with perceived environmental dynamics. Further, the Analyzer strategy is associated with superior performance for IJVs in the context of an emerging economy.     

Barriers to Mobility in Europe's Civil Aviation Markets: Theory and New Evidence

A questionnaire-based survey is applied to investigate the perception of mobilitybarriers by European airline managers. Whilst the liberalisation of Europe's airline markets removed regulatory mobility barriers, we find that mobility impediments still appear to exist. Potential entrants moreover, perceive some mobility barriers as significantly more effective than others. The perceived effectiveness of a particular mobility barrier varies considerably among airline managers. We also provide an overview of previous studies on the contestability hypothesis and the effectiveness of endogenous (strategic) mobility barriers. Our results support earlier findings for the U.S. to the effect that barriers to mobility are perceived to exist and matter. Whilst our results are clearly subjective, as they are based on the perceptions of managers, we believe such perceptions matter as they inform managerial actions. In this sensewe believe our results are of value.     

Working effectively in strategic alliances through managerial fit between partners: some evidence from Sino–British joint ventures and the implications for R&D professionals

To succeed in R&D strategic alliances requires not only strategic fit and cultural fit at the organisational level, but also managerial fit at the micro, inter–personal interaction level. This paper provides the results from a cross–cultural study of managerial fit between British and Chinese managers in joint ventures (JVs) initiated in 1993–1998 with a focus on two important issues: the perceived competence and managerial roles of the partners. Managerial fit between partners is critical for the success of R&D strategic alliances including JVs. Misfit in partners' managerial behaviour often results from the fact that JVs are characterised by the lack of specificity of various managerial tasks shared by the partners at the operational stage. In addition, a manager's managerial competence as perceived by the counterpart is a contributory factor to trust and supportive reaction from the counterpart, both of which are important for cohesive interaction between partners. This study has revealed that (1) there are similarities and significant differences in some of the characteristics of managerial competence perceived by the counterpart between the British and Chinese managers; and (2) there is often a mismatch of perceptions between the British and Chinese managers with regard to who plays a particular managerial role in a JV. Managerial implications are discussed and issues for further research are highlighted.     

Strategy implementation versus middle management self-interest

This paper focuses on middle management motivation to implement strategy. It uses expectancy theory to predict that middle managers will intervene in organizational decision-making processes leading to strategy implementation when their self-interest is at stake. It develops the notion of ‘counter effort’, as an extension of expectancy theory. The paper reports an empirical study of middle management intervention theory. The data and analysis of this study provide strong, if indirect, evidence that middle managers who believe that their self-interest is being compromised can not only redirect a strategy, delay its implementation or reduce the quality of its implementation, but can also even totally sabotage the strategy. Implications of the study for the management of strategy implementation are developed.     

Foreshadowing as Impression Management: Illuminating the Path for Security Analysts

Research summary: Managers can disclose information to security analysts as a form of impression management, but doing so is problematic because competitors can use that same information at the expense of the firm. We identify an impression management technique we call foreshadowing, which refers to hinting about future potential strategic activity. Foreshadowing provides information of value to analysts that can influence their evaluations of a firm, but not so much information as to put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. We hypothesize and find that managers who foreshadow acquisition announcements receive fewer analyst downgrades following the announcements, especially when there is more analyst uncertainty about the firm. We also hypothesize and find that analysts' responses to foreshadowing positively influence the likelihood that managers eventually acquire other firms. Managerial summary: Security analysts are often suspicious when firms announce acquisitions as those announcements are cumbersome to analyze on short notice and raise questions about managerial motivations that might not represent the best interests of the firm. We find that managers can improve analyst reactions to acquisition announcements by disclosing some information of value to analysts—specifically by hinting that an acquisition could occur in the future. We refer to such hints as foreshadowing. Foreshadowing entails giving analysts information to reduce their suspicions and facilitate their analyses, but not so much information as to degrade the firm's competitive information advantage over other firms. Foreshadowing also allows managers the option to reconsider actually executing the acquisition if analysts respond negatively to its possibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.