Nested identities as cognitive drivers of strategy

Research Summary: Organizations face tensions to conform to industry norms for legitimacy yet differentiate for competitive advantage when implementing strategies. We suggest this tension is due to and resolved through organizations’ cognitive negotiations of multiple levels of identity. Through an inductive study in the recreational vehicle industry, we find that organizations concurrently draw on identities at the organizational, industry, and strategic group levels to formulate and enact specific competitive actions. Specifically, we find that organizational identity relates to decisions on product offerings; industry identity relates to downstream strategy; and strategic group identity relates to upstream strategy, firm boundaries, and expansion mode. Our findings highlight the importance of strategic group identity and inform a grounded model describing how organizations draw upon different levels of identity to influence strategy. Managerial Summary: Many managers experience tensions of differentiating their firms’ competitive actions from rivals, while conforming with industry norms and practices. In this article, we argue that a manager can navigate these tensions by understanding their firm, strategic group, and industry identities and how these identities interrelate. Through a qualitative case study of the U.S. recreational vehicle industry, we show that each level of identity influences different competitive actions, with firm identity connected to product offerings, industry identity related to managing downstream distribution, and strategic group identity related to firm boundary and acquisition strategies. Overall, strategic group identity is the most critical for managers as this level filters how they view competitors and provides the rules of competition.     

Strategic groups as reference groups: Theory,modeling and empirical examination of industry and competitive strategy

Previous studies on strategic groups have mainly focused on their static characteristics in order to test the theory of strategic groups and intraindustry performance differences (Porter, 1979; Cool and Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990). In contrast, this study takes a longitudinal, dynamic perspective and describes the forces driving strategic group membership and structural evolution. It proposes that a strategic group acts as a reference point for group members in formulating competitive strategy. A partial adjustment model of strategic mobility is then developed which incorporates the idea of a strategic group as a reference group. It models strategic change in an industry both within and across strategic groups. The model is tested in the context of an in-depth industry analysis of the more significant firms in the insurance industry over the 1970-84 time period. The results suggest that strategic groups act as reference points for firm strategies and that predictions of future firm strategies and industry/group structures may also be successfully derived.     

Do strategic groups exist? an economic framework for analysis

This paper offers a framework and methodology for resolving the question regarding the existence of strategic groups. We say that a strategic group exists if characteristics of the group affect firm performance independently of firm-level and industry-level effects. We argue that group-level effects are a byproduct of strategic interactions among members, and develop an empirical testing model, based on the ‘New Economics of Industrial Organization,’ to distinguish true group effects from spurious effects. From this model, we derive a series of logically consistent propositions, suggesting that while strategic interactions are critical for a group-level effect on profits, mobility barriers are necessary to preserve both groups and their effects over time. A review of prior empirical studies of strategic groups suggests that the inconclusive nature of prior research has been due more to the lack of a theoretical foundation for empirical analysis than to the nonexistence of groups. To the extent that our methods have been employed, there is limited evidence that a rigorous search for strategic groups may prove fruitful. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic groups: A cognitive perspective

The strategic group concept provides an attractive middle ground between firm and industry for both theory development and empirical analysis. To date, this concept has been defined by researchers in terms of secondary accounting and financial data, and a number of critics have questioned the validity of this work. Our research shows that industry participants share perceptions about strategic commonalities among firms, and that participants cluster competitors in subtle ways not reflected in extant academic research on strategic groups. Decision makers' perceptions and cognitions are phenomena that can be expected to influence industry evolution. They are of research interest as an additional source of data on firm commonalities which helps address concerns about previous strategic group research.     

RESOURCE AND MARKET BASED DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper explores the implications of studying industry competitive patterns at the level of resource accumulation and the relationship between resource endowments and firm performance outcomes in the U.S. banking industry. It uses the strategic group framework to evaluate two models of rivalry and performance and concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for competitive analysis, strategic group theory and the banking industry.     

How middle managers' group‐focus emotions and social identities influence strategy implementation

The literature on top‐down strategy implementation has overlooked social‐emotional factors. The results of a three‐year field study of a large technology firm show how top executives who favor an affect neutral task approach can inadvertently activate middle managers' organization‐related social identities, such as length of time working for the company (newcomers versus veterans) and language spoken by senior executives (English versus French), generating group‐focus emotions. These emotions prompt middle managers—even those elevated to powerful positions by top executives—to support or covertly dismiss a particular strategic initiative even when their immediate personal interests are not directly under threat. This study contributes to the strategy implementation literature by linking senior executives' actions and middle managers' social identities, group‐focus emotions, and resulting behaviors to strategy implementation outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive positioning within and across a strategic group structure: the performance of core,secondary, and solitary firms

Drawing from economic and cognitive theories, researchers have argued that firms within an industry tend to cluster together, following similar strategies. Their positioning in strategic groups, in turn, is argued to influence firm actions and firm performance. We extend this research to examine performance implications of competitive positioning not just among but also within groups. We find that performance differences within groups are significantly larger than across groups, suggesting that some firms within groups develop better resource or competitive positions. We also find that secondary firms within a group outperform both core firms within the group and solitary firms, the latter being those not belonging to any multifirm strategic group. This suggests that secondary firms may be able to effectively balance the benefits of strategic distinctiveness with institutional pressures for similarity. We conclude that the primary implication of strategic groups does not relate to the ability of firms to create stable, advantageous market segments through collusion. Instead, strategic groups represent a range of viable strategic positions firms may stake out and use as reference points. Moreover, our results concerning secondary firms indicate that firm positioning within a group structure can have performance implications. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Industry Platforms and Ecosystem Innovation

This paper brings together the recent literature on industry platforms and shows how it relates to managing innovation within and outside the firm as well as to dealing with technological and market disruptions and change over time. First, we identify distinct types of platforms. Our analysis of a wide range of industry examples suggests that there are two predominant types of platforms: internal or company‐specific platforms, and external or industry‐wide platforms. We define internal (company or product) platforms as a set of assets organized in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce a stream of derivative products. We define external (industry) platforms as products, services, or technologies that act as a foundation upon which external innovators, organized as an innovative business ecosystem, can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or services. Second, we summarize from the literature general propositions on the design, economics, and strategic management of platforms. Third, we review the case of Intel and other examples to illustrate the range of technological, strategic, and business challenges that platform leaders and their competitors face as markets and technologies evolve. Finally, we identify practices associated with effective platform leadership and avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of this important phenomenon and what firms can do to manage platform‐related competition and innovation.     

The influence of the board of directors on outside-in strategy

Evidence suggests that focusing on the needs of the marketplace to create customer value and firm advantage, an outside-in (OI) approach to strategy, yields superior firm performance. However, despite the acknowledged advantage of an OI approach to strategy, it has not yet achieved widespread adoption by industry practitioners. Absent formal insight regarding how a firm-wide OI approach to strategy emerges, we introduce the premise that a firm-wide practice requires influence from those at the top of firm hierarchy, i.e., its Board of Directors. We posit that if the OI construct is both: (1) strategic rather than tactical in nature, and (2) enterprise-wide rather than function specific (e.g., marketing), then firm-wide adoption requires BOD acceptance, if not advocacy and leadership. We present 10 research propositions that describe how the board influences a firm-wide OI approach to strategy and provide specific implications for scholars from marketing and corporate governance as well as boards and chief marketing officers.     

Management heterogeneity,competitive interaction groups,and firm performance

One of the fundamental problems in strategic management is to map a heterogeneous set of firms in an industry into subsets of firms within which firms are homogeneous in their conduct and performance. The strategic group concept provides an answer to this intriguing question. Researchers in strategic group theory argue that firms within the same strategic group are behaviorally similar and thus tend to compete more fiercely within the group than across groups. In this paper, we focus on the question whether firms within the same group show similar decision‐making characteristics. Strategic‐choice theorists argue that top management teams in firms have substantial discretion in determining the future strategic contour of firms. Upper‐echelon theorists also argue that top managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of competition in the industry. Further, they argue that top management team characteristics are an important element that determines the market niche in which a firm competes and the strategic direction a firm follows. Based on these arguments, we expect that there will be a significant link between grouping of firms by the patterns of competitive interactions and grouping of firms by top management team heterogeneity. Moreover, we argue that the closer the TMT heterogeneity of a firm is to the dominant heterogeneity in the competitive interaction group, the better it performs. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm,strategic group,and industry influences on performance

A long‐standing debate has focused on the extent to which different levels of analysis shape firm performance. The strategic group level has been largely excluded from this inquiry, despite evidence that group membership matters. In this study, we use hierarchical linear modeling to simultaneously estimate firm‐, strategic group‐, and industry‐level influences on short‐term and long‐term measures of performance. We assess the three levels' explanatory power using a sample of 1,165 firms in 12 industries with data from a 7‐year period. To enhance comparability to previous research, we also estimate the effects using the variance components and ANOVA methods relied on in past studies. To assess the robustness of strategic group effects, we examine both deductively and inductively defined groups. We found that all three levels are significantly associated with performance. The firm effect is the strongest, while the strategic group effect rivals and for some measures outweighs the industry effect. We also found that the levels have varying effects in relation to different performance measures, suggesting more complex relationships than depicted in previous studies. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments

We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to complementary activities affect their decision to invest in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives and bureaucratic costs, firm‐complementor organizational form plays an important role in the firm's ability to coordinate accompanying changes in complementary activities so as to shape the benefits from investing early in the new technology. We test our predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995–2006. The study makes a strong case for viewing firms' competitive strategies in the context of their business ecosystems and for the existence of an important link between firms' coordination choices and their strategic investments. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing: effects on product portfolio,product success,and firm performance

Most prior research has focused on vertical integration or strategic outsourcing in isolation to examine their effects on important performance outcomes. In contrast, we focus on the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing. Our baseline proposition is that balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing in the pursuit of taper integration enriches a firm's product portfolio and product success, and in turn contributes to competitive advantage and thus to overall firm performance. We derive a set of detailed hypotheses, and test them on a unique and fine‐grained panel of longitudinal data documenting over 3,500 product introductions in the global microcomputer industry. The results provide strong support for the notion that carefully balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing when organizing for innovation helps firms to achieve superior performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: a genetic algorithm‐based model

We develop a simulation model to examine conditions under which strategic groups emerge and their performance difference persists. In our model, mobility barriers, strategic interactions among high performers, dynamic capabilities (the mechanisms that allow winners to continue to survive), and boundary of rivalry are put together to derive their joint implications for the evolution of strategic groups. Not surprisingly, our model behavior shows that mobility barriers and strategic interactions play an important role in sustaining intergroup performance difference. However, the extremely high level of mobility barriers is shown to impede the emergence of strategic groups. We also find that dynamic capabilities and boundary of rivalry are as essential as mobility barriers in understanding the emergence and stability of strategic groups. When dynamic capabilities are absent or when rivalry is extended over firms with dissimilar strategies, strategic groups are less likely to exist. These findings can serve as a guideline for empirical research to probe why strategic groups exist sometimes and why they do not at other times. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining the effect of complexity in strategic group knowledge structures on firm performance

A developing stream of research in the strategy field explores the competitive structure of industries from the perspective of industry participants. This work has demonstrated that managers develop strategic group knowledge structures in order to make sense of their competitive environment. This study extends this line of research by examining the complexity evident in the strategic group knowledge structures developed by firms' top management teams and assessing the relationship between complexity in these knowledge structures and subsequent firm performance. Specifically, we examine the complexity of top managers' knowledge structures regarding their competition using a sample of 76 top management teams from banks in three U.S. cities. Using hierarchical regression, we find a significant relationship between the complexity of cognitive strategic groups and subsequent firm performance. These results suggest that the structure of the cognitive templates that top managers use to understand their environment and the actions of their competitor influence the degree of strategic success of their firm. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does group membership matter? Evidence from the Japanese steel industry

In this study we address criticism that performance differences among strategic groups found in past research may be spurious and attributable to firm effects. The Japanese steel industry provides the setting for the study. Our analysis is based on data from the carbon steel sector of the Japanese steel industry for the periods 1980–87 and 1988–93. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the average performance of firms in the two technology-based groups in this industry—the integrated mills and the minimills—were significantly different during the two periods. Subsequently, we performed a regression analysis to examine the residual group effect after controlling for both environment and firm-specific effects. We found that even after controlling for both environment and firm-specific effects group membership was significantly associated with firm performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.