Market institutions and economic evolution

Our cognitive limitations cause us to rely on institutions to guide reasonable behaviour; market institutions reduce the costs of search, negotiation, and monitoring entailed in making single transactions. The making of markets requires an investment of immaterial capital, the major share of which typically is provided by those who expect to be very active on one side of the market. This `external organisation' provides producers with information for the development of new products; by simplifying transactions it also allows consumers greater scope for developing consumption capabilities. Thus the evolution of institutions guides the evolution of goods and services.     

Knowledge of growth and the growth of knowledge

The central theme of this address is the complicated relationship between the growth of the economy and the growth of knowledge. This theme is explored with the help of a single concept “restless capitalism” which is used to capture the idea that capitalism in equilibrium is a contradiction in terms precisely because the growth of knowledge cannot be meaningfully formulated as the outcome of a constellation of equilibrating forces. This theme is explored through a discussion of growth accounting, the relationship between innovation, markets and institutions and, as an example, the development of innovation in the field of ophthalmology. We also discuss some pioneering contributions made by Simon Kuznets and Arthur Burns to the discussion of evolutionary growth. From this Schumpeterian perspective we see the economy as an ensemble not an aggregate entity and so see more clearly the importance of microdiversity in the relationship between growth of knowledge and growth of the economy.     

Variety,growth and demand

A dynamic model of demand compatible with a changing composition of the economic system is presented in this paper. Consumers are not expected to have completely formed preferences for radically new objects of consumption. Consumers adopt new goods or services ,created by innovation, only if three barriers are overcome: 1) a critical (minimum) level of income, 2) critical human capital, 3) critical fitness. However, even a new good or service with a fitness higher than that of pre-existing ones, will not be immediately adopted. Consumers'.limited knowledge will slow down the rate of adoption of any new good or service.     

Intangible investment and human resources

To make intangibles more ‘tangible’ for empirical analysis, statistical cluster techniques are applied in the development of two new taxonomies of manufacturing industries. The first focuses on the distinction between exogenous, location dependent comparative cost advantages, such as the relative abundance of capital or labour, and endogenously created firm specific advantages resulting from intangible investments in marketing or innovation. The second taxonomy discriminates between industries according to their employment of skilled labour. Finally, econometric tests are used to investigate the presumed complementarity between intangible investments and human resources.     

A resource-based view of Schumpeterian economic dynamics

This paper seeks to offer a theoretical platform where the modern “resource-based view” of the firm might meet with evolutionary economics and the study of entrepreneurship, and with the economics of industrial organization. It does so by proposing the concept of the “resource economy” within which productive resources are produced and exchanged between firms. This is presented as the dual of the mainstream goods and services economy – where the “resource economy” captures the dynamic capital structure of the economy. The paper is concerned to bring out the distinctive principles governing resource dynamics in the resource economy, capturing competitive dynamics in such categories as resource creation, replication, propagation, exchange and leverage; evolutionary dynamics in terms of resource variation, selection and retention; entrepreneurial dynamics in terms of resource recombination and resource imitation, transfer and substitution; and industrial organizational dynamics in terms of resource configuration, resource complementarities and resource trajectories.     

Growth and equilibrium indeterminacy: the role of capital mobility

Summary. The paper presents a human capital driven endogenous growth model which, in general, permits a multiplicity of equilibrium balanced growth paths. It is shown that allowing for perfect capital mobility across countries increases the range of parameter values for which the model permits equilibrium indeterminacy. As opposed to the closed capital markets case, simple restrictions on preferences are no longer sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy. Intuitively, under perfect capital mobility agents are able to smooth consumption completely. This induces an economy with open capital markets to behave like a closed economy with linear preferences thereby increasing the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Received: 18 November 1998; revised version: 10 August 1999     

Comparing evolutionary dynamics across different national settings: the case of the synthetic dye industry, 1857–1914

Current models of industry evolution suggest that development patterns should be the same across different levels of analysis. In comparing the evolution of the synthetic dye industry at the global level and in the five major producer countries before World War I (Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland and the United States), it is shown that patterns of industry evolution differed significantly across national contexts. Based on a quantitative and qualitative database of all firms and plants in the industry, the paper analyzes how German firms came to dominate the industry and identifies factors such as availabilities of crucial skills, economies of scale and scope, and positive feedback mechanisms between firms and national institutions that likely produced these national differences. The empirical analysis calls for formal models of evolution that incorporate differences in institutional environments.     

Multiple attractors and global bifurcations in a Kaldor-type business cycle model

We consider a Kaldor-type discrete-time nonlinear business cycle model in income and capital, where investment is assumed to depend both on the difference between normal and current levels of capital stock, and on the difference between the current income and its normal level, through a nonlinear S-shaped increasing function. As usual in Kaldor business cycle models, one or three steady states exist, and the standard analysis of the local stability and bifurcations suggests that endogenous oscillations occur in the presence of only one unstable equilibrium, whereas the coexistence of three equilibria is characterized by bi-stability, the central equilibrium being on the boundary which separates the basins of the two stable ones. However, a deeper analysis of the global dynamic properties of the model in the parameter ranges where three steady states exist, reveals the existence of an attracting limit cycle surrounding the three steady states, leading to a situation of multistability, with a rich and complex dynamic structure.     

Could institutional reform have saved Easter Island?

This paper extends the Brander and Taylor general-equilibrium model of population and resource management dynamics to a variety of institutional settings. The authors simulate the economic history of Easter Island, modifying the model to examine the impact of market institutions and different property-rights structures. The major finding of the paper is that modification of the economic institutions on Easter Island could have damped the feast-and-famine cycles that plagued its later history.     

Consumption,preferences, and the evolutionary agenda

The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary evolutionary account of preferences, consumption and demand. This is particularly relevant for the study of innovation which offers consumers the opportunity to develop new behaviours. The paper approaches this question in two stages. First it recognises the importance of time as well as income constraints on consumer behaviour. Secondly, it develops a behavioural approach to consumption routines in terms of Herrnstein's concept of meloriation. In this account the focus is upon activities for which commodities and time are inputs and, with innovation, time is rescheduled on many fronts. Consumer learning is related to a replicator dynamic process. It is shown how changes in wages, prices and the time required to consume influence the demand for activities.     

Capitalism and democracy in the 21st Century: from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy*

 This paper explains how and why the developed countries are undergoing a fundamental shift away from a managed economy and towards an entrepreneurial economy. This shift is shaping the development of western capitalism and has triggered a shift in government policies away from constraining the freedom of business to contract through regulation, public ownership and antitrust towards a new set of enabling policies which foster the creation and commercialization of new knowledge. The empirical evidence from a cross-section of countries over time suggests that those countries that have experienced a greater shift from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy have had lower levels of unemployment.     

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

Abstract. Enrollment rates to higher education reveal a quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, will agents choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Cars Hommes, Florian Wagener, seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, participants of the workshop on ‘Skill Needs and Labor Market Dynamics’ at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) for helpful discussions, and an editor of this Journal and three anonymous referees for their comments. Tuinstra's research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under a MaG-Pionier grant. Neugart acknowledges financial support from the German Ministry of Education. Parts of the research were done while Tuinstra was visiting the WZB and when Neugart was visiting CeNDEF. Correspondence to: The research for this paper was done while the first author was affiliated with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.     

Weber, Schumpeter and Knight on entrepreneurship and economic development

This paper interprets the discussion on entrepreneurship and economic development that started off with Weber's papers on the Protestant Ethic. Weber sought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of the Occident in the rational, Calvinist attitude to life. Calvinism – in his view – exactly suited a society of free labourers, who were not tied to master and soil by extra-economic considerations as in tribal and feudal societies. Schumpeter gave an alternative explanation, emphasizing the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship. Knight, who stressed neither rationality nor innovation but uncertainty and perceptiveness as the sole source of progress and profits, followed up German language writing on this subject. Only the investor who can detect hitherto hidden qualities in people can gain. The paper demonstrates how these three authors influenced each other. The debate between these three authors has raised many issues of governance and organization that feature contemporary thinking.     

Capitalism, profits and innovation in the new techno-economic paradigm

Innovative profits (of the kind conceptualized by Schumpeter) are today being increasingly created through international corporate networks for technological development. Such profits through innovation are encouraged by newer more flexible organizational forms, and further encouraged (unlike in the conventional perspective on profits and on the incentive to innovate) by knowledge flows between firms. Our empirical evidence, based on US patent data, shows that multinational companies are currently more likely to develop abroad technologies which are less science-based, and less dependent upon tacit knowledge. However, within the science-based industries firms may generate abroad some technologies which are heavily dependent on tacit knowledge, but normally in fields that lie outside their own core technological competencies. We find some evidence of a convergence in corporate technological diversification across large firms, facilitated by the now common spread in the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) as an integrator of formerly separate technological systems. This has led smaller firms to diversify, but giant firms to consolidate activity around those technologies that have become most interrelated.     

Schumpeter and Steindl on the dynamics of competition

This paper compares and contrasts the contributions of Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Josef Steindl to the competitive paradigm. Both reject the static nature of traditional profit maximizing analysis and the analytical device of a representative firm. Instead they both opt for a dynamic framework in which there is a key role for innovation. Differences emerge in terms of the characteristics of individual firms that nurture the competitive struggle and are responsible for technical change. The maturation process of a capitalist economy, whereby a natural progression will involve an increase in concentration, as prescribed by Schumpeter and Steindl is also explored, as is criticism of their analyses. Finally the holistic approach to competitive modelling, a legacy of these two economists, is expounded and challenges for the future identified.     

Genetics, family structure, and economic growth

Recent biomedical research shows that roughly three-quarters of cognitive abilities are attributable to genetics and family environment. This paper presents a growth model that characterizes the role of the intergenerational transmission of genes and the effect of family environment on growth trajectories. If the average human or physical capital stocks are sufficiently low, the model shows that the economy will be caught in a poverty trap. Conversely, countries with more resources will converge to a bala nced growth path where the average rate of genetic transmission of skills from parents to children determines the long-run rate of output growth. Increased genetic diversity (or income inequality) is shown to raise the fertility rate and reduce output growth in the transitional dynamics. Thus, nature and nurture are able to explain a variety of countries' growth experiences.     

Relative backwardness and technology catching up with scale effects

Controlling for capital accumulation from per capita income growth, this paper shows robust scale effects on total factor productivity growth. The estimated speeds of technology catching up are around 2 percent per year. In addition, the empirical analysis confirms the catching up theory, in which the initial relative backwardness and policy variables conducive to technology adoption are statistically significant. RID="*" ID="*" This is a revised part of Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I would like to thank the committee members, Charles I. Jones, Anne O. Krueger, and Paul Romer as well as Ronald Findlay, Ronald I. Mckinnon, Yasuyuki Sawada, Robert Sinclair, a referee and seminar participants at Stanford University, the Pacific Rim Allied Economic Organizations Conference, the East Asian Economic Association Conference, and the 8th World Congress.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment

Summary. This paper discusses how numerical techniques may be used to solve the simultaneous functional equations that arise in general dynamic stochastic games. Unlike the conventional linear-quadratic approach, our methods may be used to address general model specifications that may include non-quadratic objective functions, non-linear equations of motion, and constraints on decision variables. As an illustration, we apply our methods to a dynamic duopoly game in which competing firms play short-run quantity game subject to production cost that can be lowered through investment in capital stock in the long run. Received: June 1, 2000; revised version: December 27, 2000     

Democracy and capitalism: Are they compatible in the long-run?

Starting from a discussion of Schumpeter's analysis of the relationships of capitalism, socialism and democracy, it is shown that, in a complex society, democracy is only compatible with a decentralized market economy with safe property rights. But in time democracy shows a tendency to weaken the capitalist system by more and more regulations and an ever-increasing share of government (including the social security system) in GDP. This tendency is a consequence of political competition because of the development of interest groups and the presence of rationally uninformed voters. It leads to a weakening of efficiency, investment, innovation and thus to lower growth rates of GDP. But in time forces opposing this development arise. First, because of the negative consequences of growing government the welfare and regulatory state is bound to move into a crisis in the long run. Thus innovative politicians have a chance to win the support of a majority of voters for reform projects, who perceive finally the ever-increasing burden of higher taxes and regulations and realize that these burdens are not worth the benefits bestowed on them. In doing so, they may face, however, the competition of ideologies. Second, there are other states with lower taxes and less unnecessary regulations which show higher growth rates of GDP, and gain thus relative advantages in international political and military competition since they can command greater resources with the passage of time. To maintain their relative international power position, reforms are thus considered as necessary by rulers. This may be helped by pressure resulting from comparisons of the standards of living done by their citizens.