The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.     

核电项目设备采购模式和采购过程风险分析

目前,我国核电项目设备采购模式大致可以分为业主自主采购和项目总承包(EPC)采购两大类模式,设备采购模式决定了设备采购的具体操作方式.文章通过比较这两种模式的优缺点,对核电项目设备采购过程中存在的部分风险和问题进行了分析和研究,并提出了相应的改进措施,为核电项目设备采购策划提供了一定的依据.     

Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

Procurement auction literature typically assumes that the suppliers are uncapacitated [see, e.g. Dasgupta and Spulber in Inf Econ Policy 4:5–29, 1990 and Che in Rand J Econ 24(4):668–680, 1993]. Consequently, the auction mechanisms award the contract to a single supplier. We study mechanism design in a model where suppliers have limited production capacity, and both the marginal costs and the production capacities are private information. We provide a closed-form solution for the revenue maximizing direct mechanism when the distribution of the cost and production capacities satisfies a modified regularity condition [Myerson in Math Oper Res 6(1):58–73, 1981]. We also present a sealed low bid implementation of the optimal direct mechanism for the special case of identical suppliers. The results in this paper extend to other principle-agent mechanism design problems where the agents have a privately known upper bound on allocation. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions and comments.     

The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements

This paper investigates the detail and dynamics of how contractual and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in managing complex, long-term public–private supply arrangements. Using empirical data from two UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) cases, the paper analyses the interplay of governance mechanisms along a timeline of project phases. Conceptual and practical findings confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but also that the relational intentions of all parties frame whether the contract is interpreted as a written sign of distrust or commitment. Equally, relational and contractual governance follow different development paths: both follow cumulative trajectories but (a) inter-personal relational mechanisms are more incremental and fragile, whereas (b) contractual mechanisms move with fewer degrees of freedom and ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns. The paper concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies.     

Organizations undertaking complex projects in uncertain environments

Recent evidence suggests that firms’ environments are becoming more complex and uncertain. This paper investigates the relationship between the complexity of a firm’s activities, environmental uncertainty and organizational structure. We assume agents are arranged hierarchically, but decisions can be made at different levels. We model a firm’s activity set as a modified NK landscape. Via simulations, we find that centralized decision making generates a higher payoff in more complex and uncertain environments, and that a flatter structure is better for the organization with centralized decision making, provided the cost of information processing is low enough. Financial Support from Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance is gratefully acknowledged.     

Managing risk and uncertainty in complex capital projects

In evaluating capital budgeting decisions, quantitative approaches, such as traditional discounted cash flow modeling and real options valuations, are useful when there is a presumed probability distribution for the future forecasted outcomes or for when there are lower levels of uncertainty. As uncertainty increases and forecasting becomes difficult, the value of financial modeling techniques decreases. Borrowing from the strategic management literature, we argue that it may be useful to employ a qualitative approach to evaluate capital projects when faced with high levels of uncertainty. In order to illustrate our argument, we use a derivative of scenario planning and qualitative real options to evaluate non-quantifiable factors in a project for the National Ignition Facility.     

A multicriteria decision framework for governance of PPP projects towards sustainable development

The lack of a suitable decision framework for the governance of public-private partnership (PPP) projects in Africa, especially Ghana, is a major setback to project success, retarding sustainable development. This study develops a hierarchical decision framework for prioritizing project governance factors and their relationships using the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method. We employ 30 experts to evaluate two main PPP governance factors and eleven subfactors. We found that contractual governance factors of PPP are more prominent than noncontractual ones for sustainable PPP projects. However, noncontractual governance factors have the highest net effect on contractual factors. Again, policy diffusion is the contractual factor with the highest net effect, while best practice team norm is the noncontractual factor with the highest net effect. Additionally, effective risk allocation is the most prominent contractual subfactor of PPP, while effective communication of project information is the most prominent noncontractual governance factor. The results imply that PPP project managers should improve governance factors for the sustainable development of PPP projects in Africa. However, they should emphasize the prominent and high net effect governance factors but not wholly disregard the less prominent ones.     

Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation

Although extant literature has shown that formal contracts and relational governance play a key role in interorganizational relationships, the nature of their interplay still remains equivocal. To better understand the relationships between contractual and relational governance, we conducted a qualitative review and meta-analysis of the existing literature. Meta-analytic results from 33,051 interorganizational relationships across 149 empirical studies have indicated that contractual governance is positively related to both sides of relational governance—trust and relational norms. Our results have also indicated that contracts, trust, and relational norms jointly improve satisfaction and relationship performance and jointly reduce opportunism. These findings provide strong evidence for the complementarity arguments of the contractual–relational governance relationships and their joint impacts on performance. We also found that the mutual relationships between contractual and relational governance are moderated by the institutional environments, the interorganizational relationship type and length, and the construct measurement of contracts. Overall, this study provides new insights on when contractual and relational governance complement or substitute each other. We discuss the implications of our study for theory and practice and propose a research agenda for future research on governance in interorganizational relationships.     

On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects

How do individuals' spatial decisions affect the institutions for public goods provision over time? This paper describes a dynamic model in which the provision mechanism for a public project is itself the object of locational choice of individuals. Individuals in an ongoing society must choose between a location with a Majority Rule mechanism and one with a Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Each mechanism determines a funding decision for a local public project which is repeated over time. Generations of individuals asynchronously supercede their ‘parents’, creating an entry/exit process that allows individuals with possibly different beliefs to enter society. A self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) belief process describes an evolution of beliefs in this society consistent with a self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) of the repeated location/provision game. It is shown that the process with belief mutation as new individuals enter society results in a globally absorbing state in which the Majority Rule mechanism is the unique survivor of the two.     

Relationship governance mechanisms and collaborative performance: A relational life-cycle perspective

Governance mechanisms protect the investments involved in transactions and thereby facilitate and promote sustainable and cooperative relationships; however, the empirical results of prior research concerning the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance are inconsistent. Based on transaction cost economy (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), a relational life-cycle framework that considers the dynamic evolution of collaborative relationships and re-examines the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance was developed in this study. Evidence from 124 manufacturers in Taiwan indicates that the effects of governance mechanisms on collaborative performance differ according to the current life-cycle phase. In the exploration phase, contractual control exerts a positive impact on cooperative performance. In the buildup and maturity phases, relational control remains positively associated with collaborative performance, whereas the impact of contractual control is insignificant. In the decline phase, both contractual control and relational control have an insignificant impact on collaborative performance. Herein, we discuss the implications of our empirical findings and their relevance to managers.     

Capability hierarchy in electronic procurement and procurement process performance: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the interrelationship between two hierarchically structured functional capabilities pertinent in the organizational procurement process, and the impact of these capabilities on procurement process performance. These functional capabilities operate at different levels in an organization's procurement process. We draw upon resource- and knowledge-based views of the firm to theorize that in this hierarchy of information technology-enabled procurement capabilities, the higher-level capability – procurement integration competence – enables firms to develop and deploy a lower-level capability – digital procurement competence. Further, we theorize that the lower-level capability impacts procurement process performance directly and completely mediates the relationship between higher-level capability and performance. Thus, although performance is impacted directly only by the lower-level capability, the higher-level capability facilitates the development and use of the lower-level capability. Our research model is tested using survey data from a large sample of 412 manufacturing firms. The results provide strong support for the proposed research model. In particular, we find that as hypothesized, the impact of procurement integration competence on performance is completely mediated by digital procurement competence. Our results suggest that when examined at the procurement process level, the impact of higher-level capabilities may be manifested completely through the lower-level capabilities. Theoretical and practical implications of the research are discussed.     

The economics of nonprofit organisations' governance

We determine theoretically when we can expect agency problems amenable to shirking agents to arise in nonprofit organisations and derive the conditions for governance measures to remedy these. Agents' private benefits of shirking need to be considered combined with the effect of their efforts on the probabilities of being successful in fundraising and production. If this effect is large, agency problems can more easily be avoided. Sufficient conditions for governance measures to reduce agency problems are derived. The empirical literature fits a number of the results derived and shows important gaps, especially w.r.t. the role of success probabilities.     

Promoting competitive markets: The role of public procurement

The study presented here examines how public procurement agencies address establishing and maintaining competitive markets; a topic still in its academic infancy. Cases are used to address impediments and improve understanding of strategic priorities in managing for competitive markets. Public policy academics have observed many competing policies in the wider public sector. Specifically, this paper identifies a need for research on supplier incentives at a market level, on the post contract management of suppliers and as an important sub-set, key supplier relationship management, along with professional development.     

浅探公司治理模式的趋同

本文分析了公司治理模式趋同的动因,并在此基础上指出利益相关者参与公司治理是公司治理模式的发展方向,从而得出了一些启示.     

The changing role of procurement: Developing professional effectiveness

The major objectives of this paper are to explore, from the perspective of 18 senior procurement professionals interviewed, the current status of their role and identify the skills they need to develop, in order to effectively manage the changes they are experiencing. The interviews revealed a schism in perception of the procurement role between professionals (strategic) and their organisations (transactional). Although skills have a direct impact on the ability of procurement professionals to fulfil their role proficiently, the degree of organisational support and internal acknowledgement of the role's importance, were found to be a major barrier to the development and progress of procurement professionals. A Procurement Skills Effectiveness Framework is presented to enable managers to assess the likely sophistication level of procurement and its impact, given a set of procurement skills and the degree and type of internal support for the role.     

The analysis of government procurement in the frame of principal agent theory

In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.     

The ethics of corporate governance in public sector organizations

The current climate of increased accountability in public sector organizations has brought to public attention the ethical dimension of corporate governance. This article presents a conceptually informed method for undertaking of an ethically focused audit corporate governance. The conceptual-theoretical terrain is set out in three dimensions: ethics as applied moral philosophy; equity as social justice; and corporate governance as the moral health of an organization. At an operational level, the conceptual model proposed provides a framework to evaluate the overall integrity of an organization and embraces the inter-related themes of individual responsibility, social equity and political responsibility. A method for ethical audits is also set out. It emphasizes the significance of key personnel in (re)producing and challenging the organizational ethos, while recognizing the necessary limitations placed on researchers' commitment to anonymity and confidentiality in the collection, interpretation and analysis of data, and in the eventual sharing of such data.     

The formation and interplay of social capital in crowdfunded social ventures

The multi-levelled processes taking place in Crowdfunding (CF), when tapping a large heterogeneous crowd for resources, and the often fundamentally different intentions of individual crowd members in the case of highly desirable social ventures with little prospect for economic gains, may lead to a different logic and approach to how entrepreneurship develops. Using this under-institutionalized sphere as both, context and subject, the author seeks evidence and a new understanding of entrepreneurial routes by using the sociological perspectives of Bourdieus' four forms of capital as a lens on 36 cases of social ventures. In the cases, opportunity recognition, formation and exploitation could not be distinguished as separate processes. CF and sourcing help form the actual opportunity and disperse information at the same time. In addition, the ‘nexus’ of opportunity and entrepreneur is breached in CF of social causes through the constant exchange of ideas with the crowd, leading to norm-value pairs between the funders and the entrepreneurs. Issues of identification and control are thus not based upon any formal relationship but based on perceived legitimization and offered democratic participation leading to the transformation of social capital (SC) into economic capital (EC). Success is based upon the SC of the entrepreneurial teams, yet the actual resource exchange and transformation into EC is highly moderated by cultural and symbolic capital that is being built up through the process.