Optimal investment and reinsurance policies for an insurer with ambiguity aversion

In this paper, we study the optimal investment and reinsurance problem for an insurer based on the variance premium principle, in which three cases are considered. First, we assume that the financial market does not exist. The insurer only holds an insurance business, and the optimal reinsurance problem is studied. Subsequently, we assume that there exists a financial market with an accurately modeled risky asset. The optimal investment and reinsurance problem is investigated under these conditions. Finally, we consider the general case in which the insurer is concerned about the model ambiguity of both the insurance market and the financial market. In all three cases, the value function is set to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth. By employing the dynamic programming principle, we derive the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations, which are satisfied by the value functions and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal reinsurance and investment policies and the value functions in all three cases. Most interestingly, we elucidate how investment improves the insurer’s utility and find that the existence of ambiguity can significantly affect the optimal policies and value functions. We also compare the ambiguities in the two markets and find that ambiguity in the insurance market has much more significant impact on the value function than the ambiguity in the financial market. It implies that it is more valuable for insurer to precisely evaluate the insurance risk. We also provide some numerical examples and economic explanations to illustrate our results.     

Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint

Pairwise majority voting over alternative nonlinear income tax schedules is considered when there is a continuum of individuals who differ in their labor productivities, which is private information, but share the same quasilinear-in-consumption preferences for labor and consumption. Voting is restricted to those schedules that are selfishly optimal for some individual. The analysis extends that of Brett and Weymark (2016) by adding a minimum-utility constraint to their incentive-compatibility and government budget constraints. It also extends the analysis of Röell (2012) and Bohn and Stuart (2013) by providing a complete characterization of the selfishly optimal tax schedules. It is shown that individuals have single-peaked preferences over the set of selfishly optimal tax schedules, and so the schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner.     

Voting with One's Feet

A bstract . Unemployment on Indian reservations averages close to 45 percent, and welfare in its various forms is a more significant source of income for reservation inhabitants than employment. Given these circumstances and given the very low levels of human capital possessed by the American Indian population, there is reason to expect that higher welfare benefit levels would be attractive to Indian migrants. Based on 1990 Census data, this study empirically finds that, over the 1985–1990 period, American Indians, when making migration decisions, exhibited a strong preference for higher welfare areas. This finding lends support to the Tiebout hypothesis of "voting with one's feet" and provides support as well for the establishment of uniform real welfare levels across states.     

Regular economies with ambiguity aversion

We consider a family of exchange economies with complete markets where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable multiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of the differentiable approach.     

Asset pricing with loss aversion

The use of standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful in matching asset price characteristics, such as the risk-free interest rate, equity premium and the Sharpe ratio, to time series data. Behavioral finance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as those with loss aversion. Research is starting to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics. Encouraged by some studies of Benartzi and Thaler [1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1), 73–92] and Barberis et al. [2001. Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVI (1), 1–53] we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy. Here, we employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with an adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences. As our results show using loss aversion we get considerably better results than one usually obtains from pure consumption-based asset pricing models including the habit formation variant.     

Stochastic dominance with pair-wise risk aversion

A class of stochastic orders is defined on the set of bivariate distribution functions. This class of orders is linearly orderable by inclusion. A family of utility functions, coherent with each of the stochastic orders previously defined, is determined. These utility functions represent pair-wise risk aversion. The relations with univariate stochastic orders are examined.     

Voting on public pensions with hands and feet

Aging changes the political power in a democracy in favor of the older generations. With free labor mobility like that of the EU, the success of the gerontocracy is, nevertheless, limited by migration of the young generations. This connection between political voting and voting with the feet is analyzed in a two-country model with overlapping generations. The interregional competition on public pensions yields premium payments which are larger when the young generations' migration decisions take the impact on future pensions into account (strategic migration) than when these decisions are made myopically. The paper also pays attention to migration (in-)efficiency and to the implications of harmonization principles. Received: November 1999 / Accepted: July 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The paper benefited greatly from discussions at the EEA conference in Santiago de Compostela, the CESifo Workshop on Public Pensions in Munich and seminars in G?ttingen, Mainz, and Tellow. We are grateful to many seminar participants, two anonymous referees of Economics of Governance and, in particular, to Paolo Manasse for their valuable comments and creative hints. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Convergence of a branching type recursion with non-stationary immigration

The asymptotic distribution of a branching type recursion with non-stationary immigration is investigated. The recursion is given by , where (X _l ) is a random sequence, (L _n ⁻¹⁽¹⁾ ) are iid copies ofL _n−1,K is a random number andK, (L _n ⁻¹⁽¹⁾ ), {(X _l ),Y _n } are independent. This recursion has been studied intensively in the literature in the case thatX _l ≥0,K is nonrandom andY _n =0 ∀n. Cramer, Rüschendorf (1996b) treat the above recursion without immigration with starting conditionL ₀=1, and easy to handle cases of the recursion with stationary immigration (i.e. the distribution ofY _n does not depend on the timen). In this paper a general limit theorem will be deduced under natural conditions including square-integrability of the involved random variables. The treatment of the recursion is based on a contraction method. The conditions of the limit theorem are built upon the knowledge of the first two moments ofL _n . In case of stationary immigration a detailed analysis of the first two moments ofL _n leads one to consider 15 different cases. These cases are illustrated graphically and provide a straight forward means to check the conditions and to determine the operator whose unique fixed point is the limit distribution of the normalizedL _n .     

Voting with one's feet: a critique of the evidence

This study offers an interpretation of the literature on voting with one's feet, that is, moving to that area which best satisfies one's preferences for public goods. The implications of the literature to date are examined. The study also offers ways in which to improve future research efforts. Regional labor market distortions are examined in depth.     

Tenant assignment policies with time-dependent priorities

Public housing authorities require flexible methods for determining how to allocate scarce housing units. Some tenant assignment policies assign applicants using absolute priority structures (for example, emergency versus regular applicants). Other policies utilize mixing ratios to achieve objectives such as racial or social integration of housing projects. In this paper, we develop a class of policies with time-dependent priorities which incorporates the features of both approaches discussed above. We show that time-dependent priorities repair some of the problems associated with fixed priority systems. In addition, we emphasize the ease with which time-dependent priorities can be implemented.     

Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system

We analyse voting on the devolution of the responsibilities for the provision of public goods to local governments in a federal country, with a bicameral national legislature. In our set-up, devolution means a constitutional fiscal reform which reduces federal public expenditure on a local public good, and simultaneously increases the transfers received by regions, via a tax-sharing mechanism. This allows the regions to provide a greater amount of a local public good which can compensate for the reduction of that provided upon a federal basis. We show under which conditions such a devolution reform is adopted or rejected.     

A dual-dual migration model with price policies

It seems likely that the massive rural-urban migration streams in developing countries are partly man-made in the sense that they probably have been strengthened by urban-biased development policies. The migration model presented in this paper allows for price and market policies in order to identify the various types of information needed for an analysis of that question. It appears that our knowledge at this moment is still too limited to deal with it satisfactorily. An illustrative exercise shows the mechanism of the algorithm applied here and simulates the effects of four policy variants on migration behaviour and other relevant variables.     

Informational cascades with endogenous prices: The role of risk aversion

In this paper, we show that long run market informational inefficiency and informational cascades can easily happen when trades occur at market clearing prices. We consider a sequential trade model where: (i) the investors’ set of actions is discrete; (ii) dealers and investors differ in risk aversion; (iii) investors’ information is bounded. We show that informational cascade occurs as soon as traders’ beliefs do not differ too sharply. Thus, prices cannot fully incorporate the private information dispersed in the economy.     

Voting with their feet: Relative economic conditions and state migration patterns

Over the past decade, state and local policymakers and business leaders across the U.S. have expressed concern regarding the ability to attract and retain skilled workers, given the economic climate of their states compared with other parts of the nation. Examining the factors underlying state-level migration trends is important to determine what role, if any, public policy might play in addressing their potential impact on local labor supply. Using data from the Internal Revenue Service for each of the 48 states in the continental United States from 1977 through 2006, this paper examines the role of three economic factors—namely labor market conditions, per capita incomes, and housing affordability—in determining domestic state-to-state migration flows. Estimates from a logistic model of out-migration show that while all three measures of relative economic conditions are significant determinants of migration, the magnitude of their impact varies and has changed considerably over time. For example, the importance of per capita income as a determining factor has fallen considerably since the late 1970s, while that of housing affordability has risen. Interestingly, the role of labor market conditions—while significant throughout the entire 30-year period—was most prominent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Estimates from the model are used to forecast migration for 2009 for selected states. The results from this exercise are surprisingly accurate when compared to actual state migration patterns for that year.     

Modeling society with statistical mechanics: an application to cultural contact and immigration

We introduce a general modeling framework to predict the outcomes, at the population level, of individual psychology and behavior. The framework prescribes that researchers build a cost function that embodies knowledge of what trait values (opinions, behaviors, etc.) are favored by individual interactions under given social conditions. Predictions at the population level are then drawn using methods from statistical mechanics, a branch of theoretical physics born to link the microscopic and macroscopic behavior of physical systems. We demonstrate our approach building a model of cultural contact between two cultures (e.g., immigration), showing that it is possible to make predictions about how contact changes the two cultures.     

Cross-sectional implications of dynamic asset pricing with stochastic volatility and ambiguity aversion

Building on recent research that highlights the importance of macroeconomic volatility and ambiguity aversion in explaining the dynamics of stock returns, in this paper we propose a dynamic asset pricing model that simultaneously accounts for stochastic macroeconomic volatility and ambiguity, assuming that investors deal with uncertainty about the mechanics of macroeconomic fluctuations using first-release consumption and revisions to aggregate consumption on vintage data. Our results show that the proposed model captures a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation of excess returns for a wide range of market anomaly portfolios. Furthermore, while the price of risk for ambiguity is positive and significant for the vast majority of assets under study, macroeconomic volatility yields ambiguous outcomes, although it significantly increases the explanatory power of the model for specific assets. Our results suggest that macroeconomic volatility and ambiguity complement each other in explaining the cross-sectional behavior of stock returns.     

Gains from interest-rate smoothing in a small open economy with zero-bound aversion

We extend the Monacelli [Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary policy in a low pass-through environment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(6), 1047–1066] model to allow for a central bank that penalizes nominal interest rate paths that are too close to the zero lower bound. We analytically derive the optimal interest-rate policy rule in each equilibrium under four policy regimes: (i) benchmark commitment to an ex-ante optimal monetary-policy plan; (ii) benchmark discretionary policy; (iii) optimal delegation to a discretionary policy maker with similar preferences to society; and (iv) optimal delegation to a discretionary policy maker with an additional taste for interest-rate smoothing. Under the commitment benchmark, the optimal interest-rate rule is proved to be intrinsically inertial, whereas this property is non-existent under discretionary policy. In the absence of commitment, there are gains to delegating policy to an interest-rate smoothing central banker. We show that while the endogenous law of one price gap in the model exacerbates the optimal policy trade-off that arises under discretionary policy, the latter feature of interest-rate smoothing acts to weaken it, by mimicking intrinsic inertia under the commitment policy.     

Fiscal policies in open cities with firms and households

This paper provides an equilibrium numerical model of an open city economy with mobile firms and resident workers. Given household preferences and firm technologies and an exogenous configuration of city tax rates and national grants and fiscal mandates, the model calculates equilibrium values for aggregate city economic activity, factor prices, and finally, local tax bases, revenues, and public goods provision. The model is calibrated to the Philadelphia economy for Fiscal Year 1998. We then explore the economic and fiscal consequences of raising city tax rates and the city’s ability to finance rising local welfare payments. We find the city to be incapable of bearing significant increases in local responsibility for welfare transfers.