Shift from gross profit taxation to distributed profit taxation: Are there effects on firms?

This paper investigates the consequences of the corporate tax reform in Estonia in 2000. This unique reform nullified the taxation of retained earnings and maintained corporate income tax only on distributed profits. We investigate the outcome of the reform by comparing the performance of the affected firms in Estonia with that of firms from Latvia and Lithuania, the two other Baltic countries. We use firm-level financial data and the difference in differences approach for our analysis. The results are consistent with an increase in holdings of liquid assets and lower use of debt financing after the reform. A positive relationship of the reform with post-reform investment and productivity has also been found. The results point to a stronger effect on smaller firms.     

A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who made different choices, in which case he can compare their choices and choose accordingly. A novel feature of the model is that agents observe not only the choices made by others, but also some information about the process that led them to those choices. We study two cases: In the first, an agent notes whether the observed agent imitated others or whether he actually compared the available alternatives. In the second, an agent notes whether the observed agent’s decision was hasty or not. It is shown that in equilibrium the probability of making a mistake is higher in the second case and that the existence of these nonstandard “neuro” observations systematically biases the equilibrium distribution of choices.     

A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance for the experimental outcome.

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The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market

Online labor markets have great potential as platforms for conducting experiments. They provide immediate access to a large and diverse subject pool, and allow researchers to control the experimental context. Online experiments, we show, can be just as valid—both internally and externally—as laboratory and field experiments, while often requiring far less money and time to design and conduct. To demonstrate their value, we use an online labor market to replicate three classic experiments. The first finds quantitative agreement between levels of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma played online and in the physical laboratory. The second shows—consistent with behavior in the traditional laboratory—that online subjects respond to priming by altering their choices. The third demonstrates that when an identical decision is framed differently, individuals reverse their choice, thus replicating a famed Tversky-Kahneman result. Then we conduct a field experiment showing that workers have upward-sloping labor supply curves. Finally, we analyze the challenges to online experiments, proposing methods to cope with the unique threats to validity in an online setting, and examining the conceptual issues surrounding the external validity of online results. We conclude by presenting our views on the potential role that online experiments can play within the social sciences, and then recommend software development priorities and best practices.     

The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.     

Profit-sharing versus interest-taking in the Kaldor–Pasinetti theory of income and profit distribution

Abstract

This paper reformulates the Kaldor–Pasinetti model of income and profit distribution by introducing the interest rate from the very outset of the model but maintaining other Kaldor–Pasinetti assumptions intact. It is shown that the profit rate and the share of profits in national income are not independent from either the capitalists' or workers' propensity to save. Many contributors to the theory of income and profit distribution have erred in attributing a potentially positive impact of the interest rate upon profits. The interest rate is always and everywhere a tax on functional and personal incomes together. This result explains Schumpeter's observation that ‘Interest acts as a tax upon profit.’ In an alternative model, workers receive a share of profits instead of fixed contractual interest. It is shown that the profit rate and share are not independent from either propensity to save. Furthermore, the workers' share of profits has a positive impact on the rate and share of profits. This implies that a profit sharing regime could be more conducive to capital accumulation and job creation. It is found that Pasinetti's Cambridge Equation is more akin to a profit sharing regime.     

A copula–GARCH model for macro asset allocation of a portfolio with commodities

Many authors have suggested that the mean-variance criterion, conceived by Markowitz (The Journal of Finance 7(1):77–91, 1952), is not optimal for asset allocation, because the investor expected utility function is better proxied by a function that uses higher moments and because returns are distributed in a non-Normal way, being asymmetric and/or leptokurtic, so the mean-variance criterion cannot correctly proxy the expected utility with non-Normal returns. In Riccetti (The use of copulas in asset allocation: when and how a copula model can be useful? LAP Lambert, Saarbrücken 2010), a copula–GARCH model is applied and it is found that copulas are not useful for choosing among stock indices, but can be useful in a macro asset allocation model, that is, for choosing stock and bond composition of portfolios. In this paper I apply that copula–GARCH model for the macro asset allocation of portfolios containing a commodity component. I find that the copula model appears to be useful and better than the mean-variance one for the macro asset allocation also in presence of a commodity index, even if it is not better than GARCH models on independent univariate series, probably because of the low correlation of the commodity index returns to the stock, the bond and the exchange rate returns.     

Productivity,earnings, and profit sharing — An econometric analysis of alternative models

The theoretical status of the relationship between productivity, wages, and profit sharing (PS) is poor. Only some alternative hypotheses can be formulated. From these explanations six different econometric models are derived. Using data of the German Socio-Economic Panel the models are estimated and tests and indicators are employed to choose the best model. Our investigation speaks in favour of hybrid simultaneous Tobit models where the level of profit sharing is positively correlated with productivity which induces positive wage effects on the one hand. But on the other hand the level of wages is also relevant to the question whether a firm introduces or decides to continuePS and which amount ofPS should be paid.What is obvious is not always true and introspection is a notoriously unreliable guide to empirical magnitudes. Blinder (1990, p.2)     

Professor Fisher and the quantity theory – a significant encounter

Abstract

Irving Fisher's encounter with the Quantity Theory of Money began in the 1890s, during the debate about bimetallism, and reached its high point in 1911 with the publication of The Purchasing Power of Money. His most important refinement of the theory, derived from his recognition of bank deposits as means of exchange, was to treat their out of equilibrium recursive interaction with inflation as integral to it. This treatment underlay both his 1920s work on the business cycle as a “dance of the dollar” and his advocacy of subjecting monetary policy to a legislated price stability rule, initially to be based on his “compensated dollar” scheme. Fisher's failure to recognise the onset of the Great Depression even as it was happening was directly related to his faith in the quantity theory's seeming implication that price level stability in and of itself guaranteed the continuation of prosperity, while his subsequent work on the debt deflation theory of great depressions initially failed to repair the damage that this failure did to his reputation, and to that of the quantity theory. In the 1930s Fisher nevertheless remained an active supporter of various schemes to reflate and then stabilise the price level. His subsequent influence on the quantity theory based Monetarist counter-revolution that began in the 1950s lay, directly, in its deployment of his analysis of expected inflation on nominal interest rates, and, indirectly, in its espousal of the case for subjecting monetary policy to a legislated rule.     

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants’ beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants’ elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.     

Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem. We would like to thank Charles Noussair and the participants of the Experimental Economics Workshop (2006) at the University of Melbourne for their comments. Daniel Piccinin and Revy Sjahrial have provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the World Bank for their financial assistance.     

Lost in translation – a revival of Wolfgang Stützel's Balances Mechanics

Wolfgang Stützel was a prominent German economist who coined a very special terminology in national accounting and in international economics. Therefore, it can be said that his contributions to economics got lost in translation. Especially, the Balances Mechanics approach and the paradox of competition are his biggest achievements in economic theory, but he never received international recognition. The objective of this paper is to pay tribute to his work by applying his analytical frameworks to the balance of payments crisis in the Eurozone and to the distributional impacts of austerity policy.     

Mortgage product diversity: responding to consumer demand or protecting lender profit? An asymmetric panel analysis

This article explores determinants of mortgage product diversity for owner-occupied and investment loans in the Australian housing mortgage market. From 2001 to 2012, 65 lenders introduced 1220 mortgage products in Australia. We examine whether the product proliferation was a result of consumer demand or a response to pressure to lower lending rates. We find that consumer demand for mortgages does not have a significant relationship with the number of mortgage products, but that decreases in the policy interest rate are highly significant as an explanatory variable for product proliferation. Such behaviour is consistent with information obfuscation, reducing the ease with which consumers can compare lending rates. Further, the relationship between mortgage products offered and the policy interest rate is asymmetric: decreases in the cash rate are associated with increased mortgage products offered, but increases in the cash rate have a more muted effect on decreasing the number of products.     

The adoption and termination of profit sharing for employees: does management’s attitude play a role?

Examinations on the determinants of profit sharing usually focus on objective firm characteristics. Using data from manufacturing firms in Germany, this study shows that managers’ subjective attitudes towards profit sharing also play an important role in the adoption and termination of this payment scheme. Positive management attitudes are associated with an increased likelihood of adopting profit sharing. While to some extent this entails failed experimentation, positive managerial attitudes also substantially contribute to a sustained use of profit sharing. The pattern of results holds even when controlling for a variety of objective firm characteristics.