A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time

We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-)continuous time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The cooperation levels of the continuous time treatments are not significantly different from the discrete time treatments. Providing subjects with the information on the effort choices of all group members increases the average effort level in continuous time only. The minimum effort level in continuous time with full information feedback is also substantially higher than that with limited information feedback, but the difference is statistically insignificant. With limited information feedback, subjects rarely coordinate to increase their efforts simultaneously to change the group minimum within a period. Our findings imply that continuous time games are not behaviorally equivalent to infinitely repeated discrete time games.     

Recommended play and performance bonuses in the minimum effort coordination game

We use experiments to investigate the efficacy of recommended play and performance bonuses in resolving coordination failures in a stag-hunt type coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, often referred to as a “weak link” game. Participants routinely find it difficult to coordinate to the payoff-dominant outcome in such games. We look at performance in both fixed and randomly re-matched groups. A recommendation to the payoff-dominant outcome is successful in resolving coordination failures with fixed groups but only when this recommendation is “common knowledge” in the sense that all members of the group receive the same message and it is read out loud for everyone to hear. Resolving coordination failures is harder with randomly re-matched groups and the greatest success is achieved only upon payment of a performance bonus.     

Rewarding effort

According to liberal egalitarian ethics, individuals should be rewarded for factors under their control (the principle of responsibility), but not for factors outside their control (the principle of equalization). The paper analyses the effects of two requirements on how to reward effort within a liberal egalitarian framework: the requirement of equal reward and the requirement of solidarity. We show that it is impossible to establish a framework that satisfies the principle of equalization in all respects, and that a generalized version of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism is a very plausible liberal egalitarian approach. We should like to thank Aanund Hylland, Dirk Van de Gaer and two anonymous referees for extremely valuable comments.     

Income inequality in the trust game

This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced income inequality affects trust and trustworthiness. Low endowment subjects paired with high endowment subjects showed more trust than subjects in other pairs; this trust was reciprocated with high trustworthiness.     

Anonymity in the dictator game revisited

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.     

Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game

We introduce threshold uncertainty, à la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are established. Further restricting the threshold uncertainty to a uniform distribution, we show the equilibrium strategies are very simple, even allowing for any number of players with asymmetric distributions of values. Comparative statics with respect to changes in players' distributions are derived, allowing changes in both the intensity and the dispersion of values. For example, increased uncertainty, in the sense of mean-preserving spreads of players' distributions of values, increases equilibrium contributions. Finally, we show the equilibrium is interim incentive inefficient. The sharpness of our results greatly contrasts with the more qualified insights of earlier private-values models with known cost threshold, which relied on there being two symmetric players and generally exhibited multiple equilibria.     

Incomplete information in the acid rain game

This paper provides a model that attempts to deal with the transboundary nature of the acid rain problem, using a game theoretic approach consistent with mainstream economic theory. The general forms of cooperative and non cooperative equilibria in explicit and implicit set-up of the model are presented under the assumptions of complete and incomplete information.     

Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game

Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Efficient communication in the electronic mail game

The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players' mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmations no longer pass standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium, and are no longer evolutionary stable.     

股东财富最大化与企业价值最大化之比较研究

本文针对我国学术界目前争论的两种有代表性的企业理财目标观点即“股东财富最大化”和“企业价值最大化”进行比较，探讨我国公司理财目标的选择，并就研究企业理财目标需注重的问题提出了自己的看法。     

Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.     

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.      

Counter-intuitive results in game theory

General comparative game statics results are derived in order to provide testable hypotheses in game-like situations. These results run counter to ordinary economic intuition. It becomes necessary to initially define whether a situation represents perfect competition or monopoly on the one hand or a game-like situation on the other hand because these different assumptions lead to greatly differing results. Several empirical applications of the theory are suggested.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

考研过程中的博弈现象分析

从博弈论角度出发,对学生考研过程中的是否考研、是否上专业课、是否上名校这三个博弈现象进行分析.通过分析可知,考研过程中每一次选择都需要对自身情况和考研的宏观信息进行全面分析,才可能实现自身最优化选择.     

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.     

房地产投资决策的期权博弈分析

近年来随着房地产行业竞争的日益加剧,基于房地产企业核心竞争力的战略投资越来越引起房地产企业的重视。在一些资产雄厚的企业中,一家房地产公司可以同时对几个项目进行投资,这就需要企业充分考虑内部资金的合理分配,项目的投资顺序等系列投资决策问题,以使企业获得的综合效益最大。引用期权博弈理论对房地产企业内部的项目投资决策进行研究,在深入剖析房地产开发项目所具有的期权特性的基础上,建立房地产企业内部双项目投资期权博弈模型。此外,我们还将利用变分法对模型的最优解进行讨论,从而为房地产企业内部多项目投资提供最优化策略建议。     

Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25–37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

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Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

我国燃油税改革中的利益博弈

燃油税从提出到现在已十余年.为何燃油税改革无法推进?这其中有方方面面的原因,本文仅从博弈论的角度分析.分别从交通部门与税务部门、中央与地方、政府与国有垄断石油公司三个方面分析了燃油税改革的内在阻力,并提出了燃油税改革的具体策略.     

Natural resource endowments and the domestic revenue effort

We examine whether there is evidence of an offset between government revenues from hydrocarbon (oil and gas) related activities and revenues from other domestic sources in a panel of 30 hydrocarbon producing countries. Our main finding is that there is an offset of about 20%, which is robust to the inclusion of control variables, the exclusion of outliers, and alternate estimation methodologies. While the impact of the offset on long-term development prospects is not clear, there is a risk of significant adjustment costs in moving to a higher level of domestic taxation once natural resources are depleted.