明晰产权与扼制会计舞弊

现 今会计信息市场上 ,信息失真严重 ,会计舞弊层出不穷 ,如中国的银广夏 ,美国的安然公司、世通公司等 ,会计舞弊已成为世界性的问题 ,如何治理 ,许多学者对此作了多方探讨 ,提出了许多有益的建议。笔者认为扼制舞弊应从扼制舞弊需求开始 ,提出割裂董事会与经营者之间的利益关系 ,量化经营者的经营责任 ,建立有效的制约机制 ,完善法律 ,建立有效的保障机制等来扼制会计舞弊。一、会计舞弊需求产生的原因(一 )会计舞弊需求的成因分析1 股东的舞弊需求股东包括大股东 (含董事会 )和中小股东。在我国“一股独大”现象广泛存在的情况下 ,这种大股东与中小股东之间在会计信息占有上存在的不对称问题应该特别引起注意。从我国上市公司舞弊案例来看 ,绝大多数并不是经营者背着大股东去舞弊。恰恰相反 ,正是在大股东的压力之下经营者才去舞弊。为大股东谋利益是舞弊的直接动机。大股东对舞弊的需求是为了募集到更多的资金 ,或为了把上市公司作为提款机从中谋利 ,或为了获得某种资格、避免被处罚 ,或为了政治动机和保住职位等。而中小股东对舞弊的需求是舞弊可以带来股票价格的上升 ,从中可以获得额外的收益。在舞弊行为败露之前 ,无论是大股东还是中小股东...     

上市公司股权结构与财务报告舞弊关系分析

经理人员对上市公司的内部控制已不能完全解释上市公司的财务报告舞弊问题,大股东控制了上市公司,通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人收益,财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文以截至到2005年受到证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,分析了股权结构与财务报告舞弊的相关性,从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。     

上市公司财务舞弊的识别与治理研究

识别和治理上市公司的财务舞弊一直以来都是会计界的重点课题。辨识财务舞弊行为，防止和治理既存的财务舞弊行为，解决这些问题才能净化社会投资环境，才能让我国的证券市场健康发展。     

浅论防范上市公司财务舞弊的对策

文章分析了2008年我国上市公司财务舞弊现状,基于经济学方法从财务舞弊的经济内涵和供求关系角度,对上市公司最新财务舞弊行为的动因进行了剖析,从改善制度环境和完善法律环境入手,提出了防范上市公司财务舞弊的对策。     

审计收费与审计质量的关系研究——基于第一大股东不同持股比例的视角

以2002—2009年度因财务舞弊受到中国证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,分析在第一大股东不同持股比例下,审计收费与审计质量的关系,在控制了审计意见的相关影响因素后发现:在上市公司第一大股东持股比例较高时,审计收费与审计质量呈负相关;第一大股东持股比例较低时,审计收费与审计质量正相关。     

关于我国上市公司财务舞弊成因的浅析

近年来,国内外许多上市公司爆出令人震惊的财务舞弊事件且存现出不断蔓延的趋势,2001年11月,美国安然公司会计丑闻,拉开了人们了解财务舞弊事件的大幕,安然事件尚未平息,世界通信、美国在线时代华纳等公司的财务舞弊,进一步的加剧了对证券市场的震动.与欧美发达国家相比,我国上市公司财务舞弊更为严重,琼民源、银广夏等一个接一个财务舞弊事件的接连出现,到最近的中信泰富事件.打击了投资者的投资信心,破坏了证券市场的运营秩序,给国家经济发展蒙上了阴影.本文就上市公司舞弊动机与财务舞弊的关系进行分析,认为财务舞弊既有上市公司的主观因素,也有社会客观因素,还有我们会计制度建设方面存在的缺陷,认为财务舞弊的深层次原因在于上市公司缺乏健全、完善、有效的内部治理结构.     

基于治理主体视角的财务舞弊治理机制研究综述

世界范围内财务舞弊案的持续发生，使得财务舞弊的治理在21世纪重新面临着严峻挑战。各国证券监管机构不断寻求有效治理财务舞弊的系统框架。我国财务舞弊的治理机制研究尚处于初步探索阶段，本文以治理主体为视角对此领域的相关文献进行述评，以期为我国上市公司财务舞弊治理展开系统研究提供一个新的框架。     

掏空或支持——来自我国上市公司关联并购的实证分析

本文以我国上市公司与其第一大股东或实际控制人的331起关联并购为研究样本，分析了上市公司大股东在关联并购中的可能动机，并检验了发生关联并购的上市公司的长期财务绩效与短期股票市场表现。实证研究表明，大股东在与其控制的业绩优良的上市公司的关联并购中具有较强的掏空动机，而对于业绩一般和较差的公司，大股东为了“保壳”或保“配”，会向上市公司注入优质资产或转让部分盈利性的股权，表现为一种“支持”。此外，关联并购并没有真正提高上市公司的财务绩效。     

导致我国上市公司出现财务舞弊的因素分析

我国资本市场目前得到快速的发展,取得的成就备受瞩目,但是随之而来的上市公司中出现的财务舞弊现象是越来越严重,这不但对上市公司的健康发展造成伤害,同时对资本市场的资源配置运行带来了破坏,并且使上市公司的财务报告和由此而形成的审计报告都丧失了应有的风险预警的作用。在总结原有研究结论的基础之上分析现在我国上市公司的财务舞弊的动机,并提出相应治理建议,以期对我国的证劵市场中的财务舞弊现象起到遏制的作用。     

关于我国上市公司财务舞弊问题的探讨

自1720年英国南海公司财务舞弊案件发生以来,如何防范财务舞弊已成为国内外学者共同探讨的热点问题。从财务舞弊的含义及其表现形式出发,结合近年来我国上市公司几个典型的财务舞弊案例,分析了财务舞弊的动因,并提出了防范财务舞弊的若干措施和建议。     

Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist

This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered. A third externality – that between firms and inspectors – is the source of the perverse effect; more cheating by firms is good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking inspectors are good for cheating firms.     

证券欺诈的理论与实证分析

本文用经济学分析及实证的方法研究了中国证券市场关于信息披露的欺诈行为。结论是：当监管加强，欺诈的预期成本增加，欺诈上市减少，反之，欺诈上市增加；当一股独大时，市场监督容易失效，便产生持续信息披露上的欺诈行为，此时，社会公众股东承担的总成本是无欺诈条伯下的代理成本与受欺诈导致的成本之和；监督失效时，削弱了诚实公司潜在的长期融资能力。实证结果表明，欺诈公司及其高层管理人员所受处罚量与其欺诈行为量的相关度很差，处罚的公平性值得商榷。     

会计错误和舞弊的防范

会计错误和舞弊行为不是孤立的,错误之间、舞弊行为之间、错误和舞弊行为之间、都存在着内在的联系。本文通过对会计错误和舞弊行为的种类、查找方法和防范措施的研究,可以全面地、科学地、系统地了解各种错误和舞弊行为的发生规律,总结审查经验,为实现审计目标提供重要条件,从而可以更好地杜绝和防范会计信息失真。     

Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field?

In this paper, we study the correlation between cheating in the lab and cheating in the field. We conduct a laboratory experiment using a variant of the Mind game (Jiang, 2013). Payoffs above a certain threshold are indicative of cheating behavior. Subjects are paid their earnings by bank transfer. A fraction of the subjects is deliberately paid more than their earnings. We send subjects a reminder e-mail stating their earnings and asking them if they have received their payment. We find a significant correlation of 0.31 between cheating in the lab and in the field. Subjects with higher payoffs in the Mind game are also less likely to report the overpayment. Our results speak to the lab-field generalizability of cheating behavior.     

Students Cheat More: Comparing the Dishonesty of a Student Sample and a Representative Sample in the Laboratory*

Unethical behavior has been found in numerous experiments, yet mainly among university students. The use of student participants is potentially problematic for generalizability and the resulting policy recommendations. In this paper, I report on an experiment with potential dishonesty. The experiment was completed by a representative non-student sample and a student sample. The results show that cheating does exist, but also that students cheat systematically more. This suggests that focusing on students as participants tends to overestimate the magnitude of cheating. I further find that age is an important explanation for this difference in dishonesty. The older the participants are, the less they cheat.     

Reciprocity in Ranked Relationships: Does Social Structure Influence Social Reasoning?

Many economic and evolutionary theories have modeled cooperation as the evolutionary outcome of decisions made by autonomous, self-interested agents operating in a social vacuum. In this paper we consider the implications for cooperative interactions when prior social structures and corresponding social norms exist. In particular we investigate the influence of social rank/status on perceptions of fairness and tolerance of cheating. We review evidence from a series of experiments employing the Wason selection task (a test of conditional reasoning) and the ledger task (a decision making task) suggesting that people cued to adopt a perspective of high social rank are more tolerant of cheating and simultaneously believe that they have been more fairly treated (even when cheated) than people cued to adopt a perspective of low social rank. However, the evidence also suggests interesting cross-cultural differences in perceptions of fairness and tolerance of cheating in ranked relationships. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

NONCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR AS A CREDIBLE THREAT

In this paper we consider some limitations on the credibility of the threat of noncooperative behaviour as a response to cheating in cartels.     

The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

Fair play in contests

The aim of this paper is to incorporate fair play norms into the analysis of contests where players have the ability to cheat in order to improve their chances of winning. We propose a utility function integrating fair play norms and apply it to a stylized model of rank-order tournament with cheating. We study how the set of equilibria is affected by the presence of fair play values. These values are shown to have an ambiguous impact on the incentives to cheat so that it may happen that there is more cheating with fair play values than without. We also study the impact of the number of contestants, with results suggesting that fair play norms may be effective in closed tournaments with few competitors (such as, for example, promotions in firms), but not in large-scale tournaments such as worldwide athletic or academic contests.