Financial markets, the pattern of industrial specialization and comparative advantage: Evidence from OECD countries

Due to underlying technological and organizational differences, industries differ in their need for external finance. Since services provided by the financial sector are largely immobile across countries, the pattern of industrial specialization should be influenced by the level of financial development. Among OECD countries we find a strong causal effect of the financial sector on industrial specialization. Further, the financial sector is a source of comparative advantage in a way consistent with the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek model. Results are also presented on which aspects of financial systems are important for specialization and comparative advantage.     

Ethics,welfare, and capital markets

We examine implications of a society's cultural emphasis on moral sentiments. Entrepreneurs and investors interact in a game that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard; entrepreneurs may attempt to breach their contracts and expropriate investors. An agent is born into a particular culture but chooses whether to develop a moral conscience and thereby subject himself to moral sentiments. In equilibrium, societies that place less emphasis on guilt exhibit a lower risk of expropriation in contracts, a greater net price of capital, a larger size of firms, increased capital inflows and greater social welfare. The results of a greater emphasis on pride are in the same direction.     

Relative wages, labor specialization and bargaining patterns

The goal of this paper is to study the effects of centralized and decentralized bargaining patterns on wage inequality when there are two different types of labor, skilled and unskilled. We present two models where labor is specialized between firms, that is, there are two types of firms, each one employing one type of labor. We show that the revenue shares of the production factors in each type of firm and the union power are crucial determinants of the relative wage. In contrast, the relative expected wage is the same across models and bargaining patterns.     

Arithmetics of research specialization

In hiring decisions, universities explicitly reward focusing on a specific field. I model the use of research specialization (focusing) in hiring as a signal of ability. Without explicit reward for focusing, candidates who focus are more likely to be able. However, if job market rewards focusing, less able candidates who would otherwise be indifferent between focusing or not, start focusing, which leads to smaller likelihood of observing an able candidate among those who focus than among those who do not. Specialization works as an effective ability signal only when generation of good ideas is highly likely for all ability levels.     

The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development

Summary. As noted by Gurley and Shaw, there is a typical pattern of economic development in which the evolution of the financial system is an essential aspect of the growth process. We focus on one component of this evolution: the increasing importance of equity markets as an economy grows. We develop a growth model where capital accumulation is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity. We illustrate why equity market activity might grow – often very rapidly – as an economy develops. We also illustrate why access to equity markets may not be needed in the early stages of economic development. Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: May 26, 1998     

Schumpeter's circular flow,learning by doing and cyclical growth

A two-sector growth model with endogenous technical change is presented. Concerning technical change, we assume that it is reflected by increases in the stock of human capital which are acquired through learning by doing. As a result, it turns out that transitory or, using the Hopf bifurcation theorem, persistent oscillations of the economic variables may be the outcome. Thus we are able to show that learning mechanisms alone may be sufficient to destroy the circular flow as described by Schumpeter.     

Time-consistent protection with learning by doing

Can a government induce efficiency gains in his domestic industry by protecting it against foreign competition? Would such trade protection be time consistent? The present paper builds a dynamic equilibrium model that accounts for learning-by-doing effects that link firms’ strategies over time. The model shows that the existence of dynamic economies of scale suffices to overcome the traditional government's lack of commitment of its tariff policy. This paper compares the infinite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium of this game with the dynamic equilibrium under commitment as well as the static Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies are derived in closed form by solving a linear-quadratic differential game. Optimal trade policy involves higher tariff levels than in the static setup in order to account for future gains in efficiency. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique stable MPE is characterized by a domestic price and tariff that decrease as experience accumulates, thus supporting the future liberalization of trade as an equilibrium feature of this dynamic game.     

Cooperation and specialization in German technology regions

In this paper we focus on the technological knowledge of a region and the pattern of cooperative behavior of the innovative actors within that region as a means of transferring this knowledge. In particular, we are concerned with the relationship between the kind and level of knowledge and/or the degree of specialization within a region, the propensity to cooperate and the kind of cooperation. Based on a theoretical discussion of research cooperation we derive appropriate hypotheses and provide an econometric analysis based on data of co-patenting. We find that technologically moderately specialized regions show the highest number of research cooperations, and the higher a regions specialization, the more cooperations take place with partners inside that region.JEL Classification: L29, O31, R12We thank Jens J. Krüger, Michel Quéré, Cees van Beers, Henry Overman and participants of the ZEW Summer Workshop on Innovation, Location and European Integration in Mannheim as well as two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

On the dynamics of an endogenous growth model with learning by doing

Summary. The paper studies the local dynamics of an endogenous growth model with externalities of investment. It is demonstrated that, in case of sustained per capita growth, the competitve economy is characterized by a situation with a unique balanced growth path which is saddle point stable or by a situation with two balanced growth paths. If there are two balanced growth paths, the one with the higher growth rate is a saddle point whereas the path with the lower growth rate is either completely stable, with convergence to a rest point or limit cycle, or completely unstable. In the social optimum the existence of a balanced growth path implies that it is unique and that this path is a saddle point. Received: May 15, 2000; revised version: December 14, 2001     

Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing

This paper examines how learning by doing affects the allocation of pollution abatement between heterogeneous technologies over time. The optimal policy balances current abatement costs against reductions in future costs and infant technologies may be preferred to mature technologies despite greater initial costs. We characterize when a technological winner might emerge and we identify conditions under which optimal abatement is shared across all technologies. Pigouvian taxes can implement the first-best, but may need to be differentiated across technologies. When technical change is induced, an important role of environmental policies is to put abatement on the right technological trajectories.     

Financial Market Imperfections, Labour Market Imperfections and Business Cycles

A Greenwald–Stiglitz (1993a) style rational expectations business cycle model is introduced in which uncorrelated productivity shocks or monetary shocks generate autocorrelated employment fluctuations due to financial constraints. The propagation mechanism is carefully modelled: because of capital market imperfections (only standard debt contracts are traded), firms' labour demand changes in response to changes in their balance-sheet position; because of labour market imperfections (efficiency wages), employment and unemployment fluctuate in response to shifts in labour demand. The virtue of the model is its simplicity. Despite the fact that unemployment is endogenous, the dynamic behaviour of the model under rational expectations can be characterised analytically.
JEL classification : E 32     

Monopoly versus competition: The learning by doing case

This paper studies the monopolistic and perfect competitive market structures, where the production process incorporates learning by doing. This analysis provides conditions under which monopoly is preferred to perfect competition from the consumers' point of view.     

Financial market integration, labor markets, and macroeconomic policies

We used a dynamic two-country optimizing model featuring a labor–market friction to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of macroeconomic policies in an open economy. Our main result is that the labor–market friction we analyzed substantially reduces the magnitude of the effect of financial market integration on the propagation of macroeconomic policies.     

公共财政、金融支农与农村金融改革--基于贵州省及其样本县的调查分析

本文通过对贵州省及其样本县农户和金融机构的问卷调查和分析,得出了一些实证性的结论。一方面,贫困地区公共财政未能发挥其应有的作用,健全的农村金融体系无法建立;另一方面,将农村金融机构作为支农的工具,进一步扭曲了农村的金融体制。分析表明,只有让公共财政发挥应有的作用,才能进一步改革农村金融体系,形成商业可持续的农村金融体制。     

The Dutch disease revisited: absorption constraint and learning by doing

This paper revisits the Dutch disease by analyzing the general equilibrium effects of a resource shock on a dependent economy, both in a static and dynamic setting. The novel aspect of this study is to incorporate in one coherent framework two distinct features of the Dutch disease literature that have previously been analyzed in isolation: capital accumulation with absorption constraint, and productivity growth induced by learning-by-doing. The result of long run exchange rate appreciation is maintained in line with part of the Dutch Disease literature. In addition, a permanent change in the employment shares occurs after the resource windfall, in favor of the non-traded sector and away from the traded sector growth engine of the economy. In other words, in the long run both of the classic symptoms of the Dutch Disease remain in place.     

消费者金融行为、消费者金融教育和消费者福利

消费者金融行为的研究是一个多学科的研究领域,并在近十年来开始得到主流经济学和金融学的重视。消费者金融行为的研究集中在如何定义、描述、理解和预测、改变、发展,以及比较消费者的金融行为。本文从上述六个方面对美国关于消费者金融行为的研究进行了简要综述,并讨论了消费者金融行为与消费者金融教育、消费者福利之间的关系。最后,对中国消费者金融学的研究提出了几点建议,希望对中国消费者金融学领域的发展有所贡献。     

Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Market crashes,speculation and learning in financial markets

A natural conjecture is that if agents’ beliefs are almost correct then equilibrium prices should be close to rational expectations prices. Sandroni (J Econ Theory 82:1–18, 1998) gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots and complete markets. We extend Sandroni’s result by showing that the conjecture is generically true for economies with complete markets. We consider a standard General Equilibrium model with large but finite horizon and complete markets. We show that, for almost every such economy, if conditional beliefs eventually become correct along a path of events then equilibrium prices of assets traded along this path converge to rational expectations equilibria in the sup-norm. Moreover, we establish that, generically, there exist along any such path local diffeomorphisms between individual beliefs and equilibrium prices. I would like to thank C. Ewerhart and A. Kirman for their comments, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Minho, the General Equilibrium Workshop 2005 in Zurich, and the 15th Asian General Equilibrium Conference 2007 in Singapore. An anonymous referee also provided very valuable comments.     

Endogenous growth cycles—Arrow's learning by doing reconsidered

A two-sector growth model is presented in which human capital is acquired through learning by doing. It is shown that, for both the competitive situation and the social optimum, endogenous growth cycles may be the outcome. Concerning the economic prerequisite for persistent oscillations we detect a bunching of investment at nearby dates leading economic variables to overshoot the long-run steady state values. This clustering of investment, for its part, may be caused by adjacent complementarity with respect to the stocks or by a sufficiently strong external effect of investment on the marginal product of physical capital or on the opportunity costs of investment.