Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems

This paper aims to understand why common law countries have more developed financial markets than civil law countries. One difference between these two legal origins is the procedure of evidence collection for a trial: It is adversarial in common law and inquisitorial in civil law. The adversarial system delegates the collection of evidence to a larger extent to lawyers than the inquisitorial system does. The paper presents a model of law and finance in which investors use courts to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. Investors are willing to lend more if courts collect evidence more efficiently. Financial markets are more developed in the adversarial than in the inquisitorial system if investors are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an ambiguous impact on finance.     

论当事人主义视角下的民事再审启动主体

不论是职权主义模式还是当事人主义模式,现代国家基本都把当事人主义作为民事诉讼的基本原则。但由于历史文化原因,我国理论及实践中尚存在误区,将＂职权进行主义＂与＂超职权主义＂混为一谈,混淆了当事人主义的内涵。这种混乱的典型体现就是我国民事审判监督程序的设置,该程序最大的问题就是违背了民事诉讼的当事人理念,由于其启动主体具有多元化、职权化的特点,造成诉讼程序混乱,司法权威不彰,终审既判力不定的局面。因此必须取消国家司法机关依职权启动再审程序的权力,确立当事人为启动民事再审程序的唯一主体。     

Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty

This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.     

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

The value of information about central bankers' preferences

I study the value to society of information about central bankers' preferences for inflation relative to output stabilization. I find that the value to society of information is only positive if bankers are “very” conservative. The reason is the following. More information has two effects. On the one hand it allows the public to make more accurate predictions, reducing surprise inflation and consequently the expected variance of output; on the other hand, information increases the expected variability of inflation. The latter effect dominates the former when bankers are not “sufficiently” conservative.     

A demand system for input factors when there are technological changes in production

In a system with n input factors there are n − 1 independent cost shares. An often-used approach in estimating factor demand systems is to (implicitly or explicitly) assume that there is a (independent) cointegrating relationship for each of the n − 1 independent cost shares. However, due to technological changes, there might not be as many cointegrating relationships as there are (independent) cost shares. This article presents a flexible demand system that allows for both factor neutral technological changes as well as technological changes that affect the relative use of the different factors. The empirical tests indicate that there are fewer cointegrating relationships than usually implied using conventional estimation approaches. This result is consistent with technological changes that affect the relative use of the different input factors. I argue that, since such unexplained technological changes are likely to affect input factor decisions, a demand system that allows for such changes should be preferred.     

A Time-Varying Risk Analysis of Equity and Real Estate Markets in the US and Japan

The paper offers some new evidence which suggests that Japanese equity and real estate markets might not necessarily behave in a parallel manner to US capital markets. These results are obtained from an examination of the nature of expected and unexpected movements in the returns of Japanese assets and US assets using a present-value model which allows for a time-varying expected discount rate in conjunction with a VAR process. Based on data from 1972–92, it is found that one distinctive difference is that changes in the future expected return for Japanese real estate and stocks are less persistent over time than their US counterparts. It is also found that the impact of Japanese markets on the US market was relatively small. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the US equity market had some significant impact on the Japanese equity market. Returns on Japanese stocks also exhibit a weaker mean reversion process relative to returns on US stocks and US real estate.     

On the economics of trials: adversarial process, evidence, and equilibrium bias

The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game inwhich two parties engage in strategic sequential search. Anaxiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decisionbased on the evidence provided. Although this process treatsthe evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibriumoutcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differencesin the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution.In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the firststage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally,the adversarial process generates additional costs that screenout some otherwise meritorious cases.     

AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICIES FOR ORGAN DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper examines the association between financial incentives and organ donations. Although the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits financial compensation for organs for transplant, we focus on the impact of laws that influence the relative cost of deceased and live organ donations on the supply of organs for transplant. First, we hypothesize that states that have relatively stringent funeral regulations, which have been associated with higher whole‐body donations, will have fewer organ donations. Second, we examine the impact of two common state laws that offer financial compensation to live donors: one that allows a tax deduction for costs incurred and the other which entitles government employees up to 30 days of paid leave. We find no evidence to support that these laws affect organ donations. (JEL I11, I18)     

Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way.     

Ownership and Cost‐Sharing Contracts

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost‐sharing contracts when procuring the good. Second, the owner of a private firm may divert resources that increase their own profit/utility but increase total costs. The cost sharing contract allows the government to reduce the private firm's incentives to dump quality in order to save on costs. However, this also leads to resource diversion, which increases total costs. We derive the preferred mode of ownership when the government optimally chooses the power of the cost sharing scheme. We find that the presence of quality‐reducing cost reductions only favours government ownership if the scope for resource diversion is substantial. A discussion of when resource diversion is likely to be important is also provided.     

Dynamic beliefs

This paper studies the temporal path of subjective probability assessments. A reference-dependent agent who experiences utility from anticipation and from changes in this anticipatory emotion makes utility-maximizing assessments about his likelihood of success in a future lottery. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that if the lottery is sufficiently valuable, optimism decreases as the payoff date approaches. Intuitively, as time goes by, last-period expected disappointment becomes increasingly important relative to the joy of anticipating a favorable outcome. Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity bonuses, I find that a decreasing path of beliefs reduces the cost of providing incentives. Thus, optimal bonuses are sizable and are not frequently offered.     

Corporate income tax,investment grants,and the cost of capital

While the influence of the corporate tax system on the cost of capital faced by firms in the corporate sector has been studied extensively, these studies generally assume that government intervention is restricted to alterations in the rates and deductibility allowances of the corporate income tax. In this paper the case where government intervention also includes the payment of investment grants to the corporate sector is considered; it is shown that the interactions between the corporate tax system and the grant structure are crucial in determiningthe cost of capital. In particular, conditions are derived under which a higher grant rate will raise the relative cost of capital.     

Quantity-cum-quality contests

Quality and quantity are very common features of production processes. People care about these two features and they tend to be connected. I consider a contest in which the quantity and quality of output are rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests are interlinked. I find that when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently high, then treating quality and quantity as the same has a disincentive effect on the production of quality. In contrast, when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently low, treating quality and quantity as the same has no disincentive effect on the production of quality. I also find an equilibrium in which no one exerts effort in the quantity contest. When there is a binding budget constraint on effort, I find that effort in the quantity contest is smaller relative to the unconstrained case but effort in the quality contest may remain unchanged.     

A Model of Final Offer Arbitration in Regulation

I study a regulatory process in which both the regulator and the regulated firm propose prices that, in case of disagreement, are settled through final-offer arbitration (FOA)—a practice currently used in Chile for setting prices in the water sector. Rather than submitting a single offer, each party simultaneously submits an offer for each of the firms cost units (e.g., cost of raw water, capital cost). While a multiple-offers scheme allow the arbitrator to better approximate her ideal settlement, it may induce parties to submit widely divergent offers. This divergence, however, does not affect the arbitrators ability to learn from the offers.     

Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation

Self-reporting of compliance status has become a common feature in the enforcement of environmental regulation. In this paper, I generalize existing models of enforcement with self-reporting to include the possibility of private enforcement of regulation through citizen suits. This allows me to identify an additional argument for the efficiency of self-reporting: it can increase the likelihood of a successful suit and thus facilitate private enforcement of regulation. Specifically, if self-reporting sufficiently increases the expected penalty for losing a citizen suit, if the costs of private enforcement are low, and if inspection costs are high enough relative to enforcement costs, self-reporting lowers expected regulatory and social costs by allowing the regulator to rely on private enforcement and decrease his enforcement efforts.

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Intertemporal capital substitution and Hayekian booms

Hayek’s business cycle theory portrays monetary expansion and monetary contraction with counterintuitive asymmetry. On the one hand, it suggests that they both change relative prices and cause costly reallocations of production factors. At the same time, the theory predicts that while a monetary contraction causes the economic crisis, the monetary expansion comes with the boom. I argue that what I call intertemporal capital substitution in industries close to final consumption explains why there is a boom in spite of the costly reallocations. More specifically, monetary expansion only gradually increases the demand for nonspecific factors of production by industries that are temporally remote from final consumption. Responding to the expected higher cost of nonspecific factors, consumer-goods industries temporarily increase output and depreciate specific durable production factors faster than they planned.     

Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime

Two districts with divergent productivity levels engage in policy-making on the provision of local public goods that enhance future income and hence create a dynamic linkage across periods. The policy choices of district representatives are derived under alternative fiscal systems, and the relative merits of the systems are evaluated. It is predicted that a decentralized system is more likely to be selected in a more equal society. On the other hand, when a great deal of benefit spills over from a local public good, or when policy makers are expected to care solely about the immediate effects of their decisions on their districts, a centralized system is more likely to be selected.     

基于过度自信的企业发展低碳经济激励机制研究

在考虑企业过度自信的情况下,建立了企业发展低碳经济的激励机制模型并进行了系统研究。结果表明:政府的最优激励补贴与企业的风险规避度、外界不确定因素方差、努力成本系数负相关,与企业节能减排产出系数和过度自信水平正相关;当企业的过度自信水平满足一定约束条件时,政府的激励补贴强度以及期望环境收益都要大于企业完全理性时的情形;当企业的过度自信水平超过一定约束条件时,政府的最优激励补贴以及期望环境收益小于0;企业过度自信的容忍度与企业风险规避系数以及外界不确定因素正相关。     

Will Self‐Managed Superannuation Fund Investors Survive?

The relative risk aversion coefficient that characterises the representative self‐managed superannuation fund (SMSF) investor reveals not only how much that investor dislikes risk but also other information about the investor's economic characteristics, including how his or her allocations to risky assets change as his or her wealth changes. Determination of the relative risk aversion coefficient for the average SMSF investor reveals a value of 5.05. This value is too high to be consistent with logarithmic utility. This is significant because it implies that SMSF investors may be too risk averse to maximise the expected growth rate of wealth share accumulation. We are left to consider a very important question: Will SMSF investors survive?