Inter-store externalities and space allocation in shopping centers

This article analyzes the problem of optimal space allocation in shopping centers in the presence of inter-store externalities. In the model, a given store's sales depend on its own space as well as on the space allocated to other stores in the center. The given stores' own sales rise as other stores grow in size because the shopping center is then more attractive to customers. Taking this externality into account, the developer allocates space to the various stores to maximize the shopping center's profit, which equals total rent minus operating costs. The solution to this problem is analyzed under a number of different behavioral assumptions.     

Signaling,network externalities,and subsidies

A signal may be more effective the greater the number of people who use the same signal, thereby creating a network externality and potentially generating multiple equilibria. A subsidy to the signal can increase efficiency, and the signalers may benefit from the subsidy even if they pay taxes to finance it. But people who benefit from the signal may oppose too large a subsidy, because a large subsidy could destroy the signaling value.     

Tourism, globalization, social externalities, and domestic welfare

One of the impacts of globalisation has been the growth in tourism and mobility of capital. This paper examines the welfare effect of tourism on the host economy with imperfect competition. Three channels that affects domestic welfare by tourism are: social externalities accompanied with tourists, the terms of trade effect via rises in the non-tradable prices, and the resource movement effect to the manufacturing sector. Owing to the positive terms-of-trade effect and/or the beneficial resource movement effect, the optimal levels of tourism occur at the situations that tourists bring negative social externalities to the economy.     

Convertible bond arbitrage,liquidity externalities,and stock prices

In the context of convertible bond issuance, we examine the impact of arbitrage activity on underlying equity markets. In particular, we use changes in equity short interest following convertible bond issuance to identify convertible bond arbitrage activity and analyze its impact on stock market liquidity and prices for the period 1993 to 2006. There is considerable evidence of arbitrage-induced short selling resulting from issuance. Moreover, we find strong evidence that this activity is systematically related to liquidity improvements in the stock. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of arbitrage activity.     

Communication networks,externalities, and the price of information

Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre‐trade network formation stage. An application to citation graphs results in eigenvector‐like measures of intellectual influence.     

Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses inthe U.S. in concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. Weexplain this anomaly by analyzing banks' decisions to screen projects andtheir competition in loan provisions. It is shown that, by exacerbating thewinner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can reduce banks'screening probability by so much that the number of banks that activelycompete in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This isthe case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders tobe informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, inwhich case there are sufficiently many uninformed banks in bidding toattenuate the winner's curse. We also examine the social optimum     

Dwelling Age,Redevelopment, and Housing Prices: The Case of Apartment Complexes in Seoul

The aging of a housing structure not only leads to depreciation but also increases the possibility of redevelopment. If redevelopment accompanies an increase in structural density in order to accommodate the increased demand for housing, it provides large capital gains to the existing owners. In this case, expectations of redevelopment in the near future and the eventual announcement of redevelopment plans can have a strong positive impact on the current price of housing. We test this hypothesis using a hedonic pricing model designed to decompose the age effects into depreciation effect and redevelopment effect. Based on 3,474 observations on apartments in Seoul in 2001, estimation results confirm our hypothesis. While the depreciation effect dominates the redevelopment effect until 15 to 19 years of age, depending on the specification, the redevelopment effect eventually dominates the depreciation effect thereafter, causing the apartment price to increase. At 27 years of age, the apartment price decreases by as much as 4553 percent of the initial value, due to depreciation. However, the redevelopment effect increases the price by as much as 2832 percent, driving the price up to 7687 percent of the original value.     

网络外部性、银行规模与顾客转移成本

顾客转移成本与银行规模相关是前人在研究中发现的现象,出现这种现象的原因是网络外部性的存在使不同规模银行的顾客所获得的银行服务的价值不同,因而造成顾客的转移成本不同。网络所有者可通过价格手段将网络外部性内在化,并改变顾客转移成本。银行间差别定价就是一种内在化网络外部性的手段,采用这种定价政策可提高市场有效性,给银行提供按市场规律运行的环境,有利于向顾客提供多层次的银行服务,并有助于形成顾客在银行之间的合理分布。因此,根据银行规模差别定价是适合我国银行业现状的交易账户业务定价策略。     

Capital market equilibrium with externalities, production and heterogeneous agents

The paper studies general equilibrium in an economy with externalities, production and heterogeneous agents. The model developed builds on Brock [Brock, W.A., 1982. Asset prices in a production economy. In: McCall, J.J. (Ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1–43] and Merton [Merton, R.C., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510]; it involves both a stock market and a market for loans, together with negative externalities produced by a subset of firms. Importantly, the technological production structure of the firms is reflected in the properties of the shares traded in the stock market. Agents are heterogeneous in their financial choices, potentially discriminating against the firms producing a negative externality. The model sheds light on the utility costs of the discriminating behavior and on the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is responsible for the externality. The model is used to study the factors which may magnify or reduce the impact of discrimination. A set of discriminated firms may be seriously affected only if the discriminating investors command a large portion of overall wealth and/or they do not represent important diversification instruments. The model can be applied to understanding the effects of socially responsible investment, whereby investors discriminate against companies belonging to some sectors which are perceived as socially dangerous or unethical.     

Market transparency,liquidity externalities,and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds

We develop a simple model of the effect of public transaction reporting on trade execution costs and test it using a sample of institutional trades in corporate bonds, before and after initiation of the TRACE reporting system. Trade execution costs fell approximately 50% for bonds eligible for TRACE transaction reporting, and 20% for bonds not eligible for TRACE reporting, suggesting the presence of a “liquidity externality.” The key results are robust to changes in variables, such as interest rate volatility and trading activity that might also affect execution costs. Market shares and the cost advantage to large dealers decreased post-TRACE. These results indicate that market design can have first-order effects, even for sophisticated institutional customers.     

The avenue effect,landmark externalities,and cubic transformation: Manhattan office valuation

A functional form for the valuation of office buildings is a third-order function that replicates the constrained cost function in which one of the inputs, land, is fixed. The third-order transformation improves a hedonic regression pricing model and reduces the autocorrelation. The presence of neighborhood landmarks, selected avenue address, and building size influence the office building value. The data set includes 103 midtown Manhattan office building sales transactions from 1980 to first quarter 1990.     

Cross-Subsidization,Cost Allocation,and Tacit Coordination

This paper considers the prospect that multiproduct firms facing each other in separate markets might tacitly coordinate their production through strategic common service cost allocations and mutually benefit from such action as a consequence. Our analysis suggests that decentralization cum tacit coordination may be possible in equilibrium, with or without public disclosure of allocation choices. In turn, tacit coordination may contribute to explanations for multiproduct firms' decisions to decentralize. The implications for trade oversight bodies are ambiguous. While tacit coordination results in an anti-competitive distortion toward monopolies, it also induces greater specialization which reduces the diseconomies of scope.     

Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants

This paper describes the tax and expenditure externalities that can occur in a federation, focusing on the (relatively neglected) vertical tax and expenditure externalities which arise when state governments' tax and expenditure decisions affect the federal government's budget constraint and vice versa. Formulas are derived for matching grants which correct the distortions in governments' decision-making caused by fiscal externalities. With vertical tax externalities, the matching revenue grant may result in transfers from the state government to the federal government. With vertical expenditure externalities, the federal government should provide a matching expenditure grant equal to the additional federal revenue that is generated from an additional dollar spent by a state on productivityenhancing activities such as education.     

从金融外部性视角分析不良资产与金融脆弱性

不良资产一直是困扰我国银行业健康发展的重要问题，其负面影响放大了金融脆弱性的风险。大量的不良资产损害了商业银行的安全性原则，同时降低了商业银行资产的收益性，严重影响中国银行业的竞争力。在这个意义上，不良资产具有巨大的金融负外部性。当前，一方面要采取措施防止不良资产反弹，包括引入经济资本管理理念，加强行业风险研究，推行全面风险管理，加快现有不良资产的处置等；另一方面，为了消除其金融负外部性的影响，有必要通过建立明晰的银行业产权制度，增加金融激励，引进民营银行等手段促使外部性内部化，保障中国银行业的健康发展。     

从金融外部性视角分析不良资产与金融脆弱性

不良资产一直是困扰我国银行业健康发展的重要问题,其负面影响放大了金融脆弱性的风险。大量的不良资产损害了商业银行的安全性原则,同时降低了商业银行资产的收益性,严重影响中国银行业的竞争力。在这个意义上,不良资产具有巨大的金融负外部性。当前,一方面要采取措施防止不良资产反弹,包括引入经济资本管理理念,加强行业风险研究,推行全面风险管理,加快现有不良资产的处置等;另一方面,为了消除其金融负外部性的影响,有必要通过建立明晰的银行业产权制度,增加金融激励,引进民营银行等手段促使外部性内部化,保障中国银行业的健康发展。     

An equitable,efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions

We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo ratio of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in the proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that fully internalize the global externality. Although based on an admittedly ideal scheme, these results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for various forms of transfers in international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. JEL Code: C72 · D62 · D78 · H41 · H77 · Q28     

完善绿色消费税制的思路和建议

消费税具有较强的政策调控功能,被世界各国广泛用于控制能源消耗和减少环境污染。本文梳理了我国消费税促进节能减排的实践过程,并测算了消费税对我国税制绿化的贡献度,认为我国整体税制绿化度一直处于较低水平,但消费税对我国税制绿化的贡献度却很高。在此基础上,提出了我国消费税进一步改革的思路和具体措施。     

Asymmetric Information,Asset Allocation,and Debt Financing

We analyze a signaling game where firms' financing announcements convey private information about their prospects but a moral hazard problem exists in that managers may suboptimally invest. Consequently, the attempt to address an asymmetric information problem exacerbates moral hazard. The equilibrium recognizes both imperfect information problems. Additionally, the firm must determine how to allocate funds between two technologies differing in cash flow timing and managerial accessibility. We define an above-average firm's comparative advantage as that technology which is most dominant relative to a firm with lesser prospects and show that the resultant equilibria follow the lines of the firm's comparative advantage. Finally, we show that separation may be achieved costlessly, i.e., with no explicit signaling cost.