Multiproduct Firms and Environmental Policy Coordination

The literature that analyzes the coordination of environmental taxes by governments considers that firms produce a single good at a single plant. However, in practice firms tend to produce several goods at various production plants (multiproduct firms). These firms may organize themselves in a centralized or decentralized fashion for purposes of decision-making: This affects their output and pollution levels. This paper sets out to analyze the coordination of environmental taxes considering multiproduct firms. We find that the organizational structure chosen by the owners of the firms depends on whether or not governments coordinate with one another in setting taxes, and on whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements. Social welfare is greater if a supranational authority sets taxes in all countries. In this case, joint welfare is never lower if the authority is constrained to set the same tax in all countries.     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

论正常垄断与非正常垄断

我国的垄断源自于计划经济,改革开放后有所改变,但行政垄断依然占主导地位。鉴于我国的国情,行政垄断组织的存在,有些是合理的,有些是不合理的。合理的行政垄断和经济垄断可称之为正常的垄断,不合理的行政垄断可称之为非正常的垄断。非正常的垄断会破坏资源的合理配置,损害社会经济福利。所以在我国反垄断应把矛头主要指向非正常的垄断。     

Multiproduct firm behaviour in a differentiated market

Abstract In this paper we offer a generalization of the circular model of product differentiation by introducing a multiproduct firm facing monoproduct competitors. We prove existence and explicitly characterize equilibrium when transportation costs are quadratic. We exhibit interesting equilibrium features for price policy, market shares, and profits. In equilibrium, the multiproduct firm uses its connected market shares to build asymmetric pricing schemes that allow a fraction of its product line (brands, stores or firms) to be shielded from outside competition and hence extracts maximum consumer surplus. Our results shed some light on the link between product differentiation and mergers and acquisitions activity (M&As). JEL Classification: D21, L11, L13
Le comportement de l'entreprise multi‐produits dans un marché différencié Cet article propose une généralisation du modèle circulaire de différenciation des produits en considérant le cas d'une firme multi‐produits en concurrence avec des firmes mono‐produit. Nous montrons l'existence d'un équilibre en prix, que nous caractérisons dans le cas de coûts de transports quadratiques. Nous exposons les propriétés de cet équilibre en terme de parts de marchés et de profits obtenus par les entreprises. A l'équilibre, la firme multi‐produits utilise ses niches de marché pour mettre en place une tarification asymétrique permettant à une partie de sa ligne de produits d'être protégée de la concurrence et d'extraire le maximum de surplus aux consommateurs. Nous proposons ensuite une discussion sur le lien entre différenciation des produits et activité de fusion et acquisition.     

论市场经济中反垄断与垄断利用

生产集中导致垄断,垄断阻碍自由竞争,发展市场经济,必须反对垄断。为此,各国政府普遍制定了《反托拉斯法》,并以此维护本国企业的竞争秩序。但实际效果怎样呢?应如何看待我国的垄断现象?应如何有效地反对垄断和合理地利用垄断?本文对相关问题加以探讨。     

Unit versus Ad Valorem Taxes in Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly

The welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes in a single‐market Cournot oligopoly is well known. This article extends the analysis to multimarket oligopoly. Provided all ad valorem taxes are equal and positive, unit costs are constant, firms are active in all considered markets, and a representative consumer has convex preferences, ad valorem taxes are shown to dominate in multiproduct equilibrium. Conditions exist, however, under which economic efficiency declines upon replacing specific taxes with ad valorem taxes that preserve output levels. We discuss the roles of unit cost covariances across multiproduct firms, and also of complementarity in demand, in determining the extent of cost efficiencies arising under ad valorem taxation. For goods that are complementary or independent in demand, conditions are found such that industry profits decline upon use of ad valorem taxes.     

Oligopolistic Competition, Technology Innovation, and Multiproduct Firms

Firms' proliferation behavior in a differentiated product market is studied using an oligopolistic competition model with multiproduct firms. The model has the following characteristics: (1) the elasticity of substitution across firm's own products and the elasticity of substitution across different firms are allowed to differ; (2) the product managers of the same firm behave cooperatively rather than independently; (3) the number of firms is determined by a free-entry condition and so is endogenous. If the elasticity of substitution across the firm's own products increases, it is shown that the firm proliferates less and the number of firms in the market increases. If the elasticity of substitution across different firms increases, firms proliferate more and the number of firms in the market decreases.     

Monopoly and demand uncertainty

We develop a formal framework to analyse a monopoly’s problem when demand is determined by a Poisson-distribution and the valuations of the buyers are draws from a common distribution. The buyers have unit demand, and the good in question is discrete. The monopoly has to make its quantity and pricing decisions before demand is realised. We determine sufficient conditions for the monopoly’s pricing decision to be unique, and we demonstrate the difference to the planner’s problem by numerical examples. We also study an economy with a fixed number of buyers assuming that the valuations are draws from the uniform distribution. When the economy grows in the limit one recovers the standard case of a monopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs.     

Monopoly Power and Stagflation

Post Keynesian economists have followed Joan Robinson's criticism of general equilibrium theory as abolishing history by allowing all contracts to be executed today for all future contingencies. This was the justification for the support of financial innovation to provide for the completeness of futures markets. The recent crisis has shown that force of history. Instead, many evolutionary and Keynesian economists have suggested the approach of cumulative causation as an approach that includes history and eschews equilibrium. This approach may provide a way to take history seriously in economic analysis.     

市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断

作为内生的垄断现象,市场权势实际上是争胜竞争过程的结果,并非垄断的市场结构所决定。如果将竞争理解为一个动态过程,市场权势具有竞争性和暂时性。自然垄断现象也是市场过程演化过程中的自然现象,无论源于规模经济还是范围经济,都表明自然垄断具有动态效率特征。除非政府人为阻碍争胜竞争过程的展开,通常市场过程内生力量能够有效制约非政府垄断现象。     

Revisiting the Link Between Stock Prices and Goods Prices in OECD Countries

Fisher hypothesis postulates positive relation between stock return and inflation; however early studies document negative relationship between the two and they conclude that stock cannot be used as a hedge against inflation. In this paper we explore long‐run nonlinear relationship between stock price and goods price. Our sample consists of 19 OECD countries; all or some of these countries have been studied before with the findings of linear cointegration between the stock index and goods price index. Based on unit root tests and linear cointegration test, we apply threshold cointegration tests, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration test and panel VAR method. With all these econometric methods we arrive at heterogeneous findings as follows: two countries have linear cointegration, five countries have threshold cointegration, nine countries do not have any cointegration and finally two countries provide inconclusive results. Estimates of Fisher coefficient provided by linear and nonlinear cointegration methods, which range between 1.27 and 1.86, are consistent with previous studies. Impulse response analysis from panel VAR for countries having no cointegrating relation shows that shock to inflation produces negative response in stock return, which supports findings of earlier studies.     

我国的垄断与反垄断

垄断形成的原因有两种，一为自然独占，二为人为垄断。自然独占的形成主要有三种，其一，大规模投资的经济效益，即有些资本密集型产业往往需要大量的投资才能开始生产，如电力工业，由于固定投资额的庞大，遂产生了大规模的效果，其结果就形成了自然独占。其二，掌握了天然资源，如果企业掌握了生产某项产品所需要的主要天然资源，该企业自然成为该项产品或天然资源的独占者。其三，经营效益的发挥。按照新达尔文主义的观点，企业在掌握了经营管理诀窍之后，往往可能随经济环境的改变而日益壮大，形成独家经营的局面。人为垄断的形成主要有三种，其一，法律保障，企业往往因拥有某项专利权、版权等知识产权而形成他人加入的障碍，成为法律所保证的独占，这种独占在科技日益发展的今天尤为突出。其二，政府授意，由于某些商品或服务内涵的特殊性，政府往往授意某个行政单位或事业单位独立供应。这种物品或服务有两类，一是政府欲禁止而因某些人的特殊需要无法全面禁止的（如麻醉品），二是涉及国民健康的物品或服务。其三，企业恶性竞争，某个企业挟其雄厚财力，以低地生产成本的价格打击竞争对手，迫使竞争者相继退出市场。     

Pareto-Improving Redistribution in a Monopoly

This paper discusses the impact of income transfers between consumers of a monopoly. In this context, redistributing the incomes could induce an increase of the demand elasticity which leads to a lower monopoly price, beneficial to any consumer. Under mild assumptions on the demand function, we prove the existence of a transfer maximizing the market coverage which remains advantageous for any contributing consumer. It is proved that the producer is also better off. Then the transfer is Pareto-improving. In the linear demand case, analytical results are found. Extensions to Cournot oligopoly and natural monopoly pricing are considered.
JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D64, H2, L13     

Monopoly capital and capitalist inefficiency

This paper examines the arguments and assertions of Baran’s and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (1966) by assessing the degree of economic efficiency or inefficiency in how surplus value and economic surplus were created by 16 major capitalist economies during the 2000s using data envelopment analysis (DEA). After assigning a score to the degree of economic efficiency/inefficiency for each country, one can then assess which factors influence the degree of efficiency/inefficiency. This paper finds empirical support for many of the arguments put forth by the authors, Baran and Sweezy, as well as others regarding the inefficiency of the use of some forms of economic activity to help absorb economic surplus and to create surplus value.     

行政性垄断导致行业生产成本低效

本文首先从产权和地区两个维度研究了行政性垄断对行业生产成本的影响,发现高行政性进入壁垒条件下的国有产权低效与地方政府扭曲要素价格造成的要素省际流动障碍,是造成行业生产成本无效率的主要原因。其次,依据行政性垄断对各行业生产效率的影响程度,建立了各行业行政性垄断程度的判定体系,考察了工业部门各行业的行政性垄断程度。最后,选取若干代表性行业对行政性垄断引致的成本无效进行了实证测算。     

市场规模、利润侵蚀和争取多产品跨国企业的政策竞争

本文考虑两个国家(或者地区)的政府为争取一家外国跨国企业直接投资(FDI)而进行的政策竞争。两国拥有不同的市场规模,跨国公司生产两种水平差别化产品。文章证明:均衡时跨国企业的FDI选择取决于市场规模效应(marketsize effect)、两种产品间的利润侵蚀效应(cannibalization effect)和两国FDI补贴政策的共同作用。在此基础上,本文进一步得到了政府间FDI竞争的福利含义。特别地,本文还证明了:两国福利可能因参与FDI竞争而获得帕累托严格改进,或者发生帕累托严格损失。     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.