Efficiency in an Economy with Fixed Costs

It is by now well known that in an economy with increasing returns, first-best efficiency may be impossible to attain through an equilibrium concept based on market prices, even if firms are regulated to follow marginal cost pricing. We examine the efficiency issue in a special but important class of economies in which the only source of nonconvexities is the presence of fixed costs. Even in this context, it is possible that none of the equilibria based on marginal cost pricing are efficient (unless additional, strong assumptions are made). We argue that available results on the existence of an efficient two-part tariff equilibrium rely on very strong assumptions, and we provide a positive result using a weak surplus condition. Our approach can also be used to establish the existence of an efficient marginal cost pricing equilibrium with endogenously chosen lump-sum taxes if the initial endowment is efficient in the economy without the production technology.     

Efficiency properties of binary ecolabeling

We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a homogeneous good market with heterogeneous consumers. Faced with the minimum technology standard, firms make endogenous entry, certification, and price/quantity decisions. We consider both perfect and imperfect competition with or without sunk fixed costs. Our findings are as follows. Ecolabeling alone does not achieve the first-best outcome and, to achieve the second best, may need to set the standard less strict than the efficient level. Without sunk fixed costs, ecolabeling can achieve the first-best outcome provided that both the technology standard and the complementary pollution tax are set at efficient levels. With sunk fixed costs, however, differential excise taxes that would restore allocative efficiency induce more entry than optimal, and thus, can be even welfare decreasing relative to no tax outcome. Tightening the technology standard may ameliorate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax system by reducing excessive entry and pollution per output by the certified firms.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

An African Growth Trap: Production Technology and the Time-Consistency of Agricultural Taxation, R&D and Investment

Why do so many African governments consistently impose high tax rates and make little investment in productive public goods, when alternative policies could yield greater tax revenues and higher national income? The authors posit and test an intertemporal political economy model in which the government sets tax and R&D levels while investors respond with production. Equilibrium policy and growth rates depend on the initial cost structure. It is found that in many (but not all) African countries, low tax/high investment regimes would be time‐inconsistent, primarily because production technology requires relatively large sunk costs. For pro‐growth policies to become sustainable, new political commitment mechanisms or new production techniques would be needed.     

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE,HUMAN CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND MULTIPLE GROWTH PATHS*

This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the effects of technology change on growth rates of income and human capital in the uncertain environments of technology. The uncertainty comes from two sources: the possibility of a technology advance and the characteristics of new technologies. We set up an overlapping generations model in which young agents invest in both width and depth of human capital in order to adopt new technologies. The model develops explicitly the micro‐mechanism of the role of human capital in adopting new technologies as well as that of the process of human capital production in the uncertain environments. In our model, a higher level of width of human capital relative to the level of depth leads one country to a higher growth path. We also show that an economy can have different growth paths depending on the initial structure of human capital and the uncertainty about the nature of new technologies. In particular, new technologies with more uncertain characteristics may adversely affect human capital accumulation and income growth, leading the economy to a low growth trap.     

Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation

We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.     

Escaping the poverty trap in a developing rural economy

Abstract. In this paper, we examine the economic policies that might allow a developing rural economy to escape from the poverty trap characterized by a subsistence level of per capita consumption in the long run. In our model where labour is combined to land available in fixed quantity to produce a homogeneous good, saving could be made through only having children, the number of which is an endogenous decision. We provide conditions under which the economy runs into a poverty trap, and proceed to analyse the relevant policies in this case. We demonstrate that an escape from this poverty trap is possible through a suitable technology transfer, or an appropriate child‐rearing tax, but not with a foreign manufacturing sector, which increases only temporarily the labour income in this rural economy. JEL classification: J11, O11, O40     

Public good provision rules and income distribution: Some general equilibrium calculations

A central issue in the analysis of public goods is the relationship between the optimal provision level and the distribution of income. Theoretical research has stressed the conditions under which the optimum is independent of the distribution of income. Here we focus on numerical analysis of more policy-relevant concerns. Specifically, to what extent is a given redistribution of income likely to affect the optimal level of public good supply? And how significant are the welfare costs of not adjusting public good supply when income distribution changes? We use an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model of the Australian economy and public sector to generate numerical estimates of the impacts of redistributive policies on these variables. Results suggest that the traditional separation of allocation and distribution in determining the level of public good supply may be a justifiable empirical simplification, except where very dramatic redistributions are involved.     

Why Do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence*

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a ‘health’ good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent‐income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: ‘The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent‐income’. We test this implication for savings behaviour in Australia. We find that even after controlling for lifecycle and health characteristics, higher permanent income is positively related with higher savings rates and better saving habits.     

Evaluating the effects of entry regulations and firing costs on international income differences

This paper analyzes the effects of entry regulations and firing costs on cross-country differences in income and productivity. We construct a general equilibrium industry-dynamics model and quantitatively evaluate it using the cross-country data on entry costs and firing costs. Entry costs lower overall productivity in an economy by keeping low-productivity establishments in operation and making the establishment size inefficiently large. Firing costs lower productivity by reducing the reallocation of labor from low-productivity establishments to high-productivity establishments. The linear regression of the data on the model prediction accounts for 27% of the cross-sectional variation in total factor productivity. Moving the level of entry costs and firing costs from the U.S. level to that of the average of low income countries (countries with a Gross National Income below 2% of the U.S. level) reduces TFP by 27% in the model without capital, and by 34% in the model with capital and capital adjustment costs.     

Intermediation costs and capital flows

In this paper, we modify the standard neoclassical model by incorporating financial intermediation in order to deliver returns consistent with the observation that capital primarily flows to middle income countries. We build a static contracting framework where costly intermediation together with an adverse selection problem have quantitatively important effects on capital flows. When intermediation costs are ignored, the model behaves like the neoclassical model in terms of capital returns. However, when intermediation costs are considered, returns to capital in middle income countries could exceed those in poor and rich countries—high costs of intermediation cause poor countries to concentrate their investments in projects with low returns, while the standard neoclassical effect lowers returns in capital-rich countries. When we embed the return function from the static analysis in a two-country dynamic model, there is capital outflow from a poor country that removes capital controls and becomes open. Even though the closed economy dominates in terms of capital employed in production, it is the open economy that dominates in terms of income, consumption and welfare.     

The curse and blessing of fixed specific factors in small-open economies

This paper investigates how a country's specific-factor endowment affects its long-run economic performance. We build an open-economy version of the two-sector neoclassical growth model in which we introduce fixed industry-specific inputs in both activities. We show that differences in input shares between sectors can contribute to explain why nations that seem to have similar factor endowments can show very different income levels. In particular, under (productivity-adjusted) factor-price equalization, larger amounts of factors specific to the industry with a lower (larger) labor share lead the economy to enjoy larger (smaller) long-run income levels. The model can also account for overtaking episodes between countries along their development paths.     

Production Efficiency and the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix

In the design of the optimal direct/indirect tax mix, the canonical view was laid by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who showed that commodity taxes are unnecessary in an economy in which there is an optimal nonlinear income tax provided that commodities are separable from labor in the utility functions of all taxpayers, that the aggregators over these commodities are ordinally equivalent and that wages are fixed. When wages are endogenous, Naito (1999) showed that this result may not hold and in addition that production efficiency may not be Pareto optimal. Given an optimal nonlinear income tax, we show that production inefficiency is Pareto optimal if the aggregate technology set is strictly concave. The Atkinson–Stiglitz condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for zero commodity taxation and commodity taxes are part of almost all Pareto optima.     

The effect of technology choice on specialization and welfare in a two‐country model

This study presents a simple two‐country model in which firms in the manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show how trade costs and productivity levels affect technology choices by the firms in each country, where the fixed cost of adopting high technology differs between the two countries. This depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if the productivity of high technology is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology gap between countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity of the high technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be reduced.     

Profits and politics: Coordinating technology adoption in agriculture

This paper examines the political economy of government-led coordination of economic activity in a simple two-sector model in which individuals' choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria; the economy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, use of the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off. We show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income redistribution.     

Profits and politics: Coordinating technology adoption in agriculture

This paper examines the political economy of government-led coordination of economic activity in a simple two-sector model in which individuals' choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria; the economy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, use of the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off. We show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income redistribution.     

Average-cost Pricing, Increasing Returns, and Optimal Output: Comparing Home and Market Production

We employ a model with both market production and home production to show that, ignoring administrative costs and indirect effects (such as rent-seeking), even if both the home and the market sectors have the condition of increasing returns and there are no pre-existing taxes, it is still efficient to tax the home sector to finance a subsidy on the market sector to offset the under-production of the latter due to the failure of price-taking consumers to take account of the effects of higher consumption in reducing the average costs and hence prices, through increasing returns or the publicness nature of fixed costs. Within market production, it is efficient to subsidise more the sector with a higher fixed cost, a lower elasticity of substitution between goods (higher value of diversity), and a lower degree of importance in preference, which all increase the degree of increasing returns.     

Trade and the governance of ecosystem services

We work with a basic general equilibrium model of an economy with an industrial good and a rural good. Industrial good production results in pollution that affects the provision of ecosystem services and thereby the production of the rural good. The assignment of ecosystem rights to the industrial polluters or to the rural pollutees results in differential transaction costs that affect production possibilities between the two goods. Ecosystem rights are assigned to maximize social welfare. Over time, technological change and differences in income superiority affect the choice of the assignment of rights. Opening to trade affects the choice of the assignment of ecosystem rights depending on the nature of technological change, but the relative income superiority of goods no longer affects the assignment of ecosystem rights in a small economy. Thus, among other findings, we demonstrate that the phenomena known as the environmental Kuznets curve does not hold for the protection of ecosystem services in production, or production externalities generally, because trade separates consumption from production.     

Life beyond the Washington Consensus: An Introduction to Pro-poor Macroeconomic Policies

Abstract

This paper develops a rationale for the recession-induced inflation hypothesis. Within a conflicting claims framework we present a model in which both price leaders and organized workers set their nominal prices on the basis of a desired profit rate and a real wage target respectively. We argue that an absolute cost advantage in concentrated industries (for instance in fixed costs) may provide oligopolistic leaders sufficient margin to raise prices and restore a desired level of profitability during a recession. The resultizng unstable income distribution will set off an inflationary spiral if the firm's advantage in selling its output imparts an upward bias to the flexibility of input prices (specifically wages). Taking into consideration different scenarios for workers' bargaining power we present a simple simulation experiment to analyze the inflation and real wage paths of the economy after a negative output shock. When we endogenize output, we show that for a high degree of the bargaining power, output is likely to converge to a higher steady-state value.     

Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India

Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains.