Distressed exchange,bargaining power,and prior capital structure

Financially troubled companies often make Distressed Exchange (DE) offers to its creditors, to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization. We derive the optimal terms and timing of a DE offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm. The DE terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power, with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier DE offer, smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake. The impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher. We also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex-ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio. Both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power.     

基于价值创造的本量利分析模型的拓展

传统的本量利分析模型是基于经营利润,没有考虑资本成本。因此,利用它得到的保本点一定是损害股东财富,利用它得到的保利点并不能保证增加股东财富。遵从企业价值最大化的目标,根据本量利分析的原理,以经济增加值(EVA)作为函数得到的拓展模型,对企业的预测、决策和规划更有价值。     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.     

Southwest airlines: A case study linking employee needs satisfaction and organizational capabilities to competitive advantage

This article analyzes the sources of Southwest Airlines' competitive advantage using an integrative approach, employing economic analysis tools to illustrate the roles of commitment and organizational capabilities in delivering competitive advantage at Southwest. A framework is presented illustrating that much of the value Southwest generates is (1) created through employee needs satisfaction, (2) converted to customer and shareholder value via organizational capabilities, and (3) captured by the firm as a result of its cost advantage and superior service. This three-part framework may be applicable to other labor-dependent service organizations. © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

大股东内部资本配置的经济后果——基于国光瓷业的案例研究

本文运用案例分析法,对国光瓷业大股东的内部资本配置行为进行了研究。结果表明,系族企业构造的内部资本市场,为大股东进行关联交易、侵占中小股东的利益提供了方便。大股东通过内部资本配置,提高了自身的利益,但却损害了其控制的上市公司的利益。     

对一线仓库推行EVA考核提升自制产品加工的研究

将资本、成本、利润、价值等主要因素连在一起,寻找创造利润、创造股东与利益相关者共赢的最优化,并与主要业务绩效指标对应,通过加工产品的生产供应,进一步提升仓库管理和服务水平。     

Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?

This paper analyzes the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the optimal real option exercise strategies and the value of firms in duopoly. Both firms have an opportunity to invest in a project enhancing ( ceteris paribus ) the profit flow. We show that three types of equilibrium strategies exist. Furthermore, we express the critical levels of cost asymmetry delineating the equilibrium regions as functions of basic economic variables. The presence of strategic interactions among the firms leads to counterintuitive results. First, for a certain range of the asymmetry level, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the firm with the cost disadvantage can enhance this firm's own value. Moreover, such a cost increase can reduce the value of the competitor. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show that the presence of identical firms can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if one of the competitors has a significant cost (dis)advantage.     

股权结构、隧道挖掘与公司价值的实证研究

本文应用大小股东之间代理冲突的理论分析框架,研究了股权结构对于大股东隧道挖掘行为以及公司价值的影响。研究发现,大股东的隧道挖掘行为与其持股比例成显著的倒U型关系,股权制衡能够抑制隧道挖掘行为和缓解大、小股东之间的代理冲突;公司价值与第一大股东持股比例成显著的U型关系,股权制衡能在一定程度上提升公司价值,但效果不显著。研究结果证明,投资者能够识别股权结构所代表的代理问题,并给代理问题较大的公司予以较低的定价。     

公司治理与债务成本——来自深交所A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2002-2005年间深圳证券交易所1525家A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了公司治理结构与上市公司债务成本的关系。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例、董事会独立性与总债务成本和银行贷款债务成本显著负相关。表明第一大股东、独立董事能有效降低债权人面临的代理冲突。研究还发现,高管持股比例和控制人类型对总债务成本和银行贷款债务成本具有不同影响。     

Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK

Abstract

In 2002, the UK adopted a regulation allowing shareholders to cast non-binding (advisory) votes on their firm's Directors' Remuneration Report during annual general meetings (the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule). This study evaluates a decade of this regulation and examines how it affected the behavior of shareholders and boards in a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 firms during the period 2002–2012. I find evidence that shareholder dissatisfaction increases with excess Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. This relationship does not exist for the expected level of compensation, suggesting that shareholders take a sophisticated approach when casting their vote. Boards do not appear to respond to shareholder dissatisfaction systematically; however, they do respond selectively by reducing the excessiveness of CEO compensation when performance is poor. Boards also seem to respond swiftly to shareholder dissatisfaction. There is evidence that the probability of CEO turnover increases with shareholder dissatisfaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that ‘Say-on-Pay’ regulation addressed regulatory concerns about transparency, accountability, and performance linkage.     

21世纪的财务管理模式:价值基础管理

以股东价值最大化为目标是公司实施价值基础管理(VBM)的动源力。价值基础管理(VBM),涉及对自由现金流量、风险以及时间调整的分析和管理,涉及对公司人员从短期利润视角到长期价值创造的观念更新。一个深化地VBM系统使得CFO和财务的功能发生了质的变化:持续地为股东创造价值,不仅仅意味着使用现金流量贴现技术进行决策,所有的决策——包括投资、融资和经营——都必须与实现公司的价值目标相一致。CFO在VBM的实现中占据了举足轻重的地位。本文把价值基础管理定位为21世纪的财务管理模式。     

Pay for Talk: How the Use of Shareholder‐Value Language Affects CEO Compensation

The language that signals conformity to a prevailing norm can contribute to the appearance of managerial competency and organizational legitimacy. We argue that top corporate managers’ use of language that is congruent with a prevailing norm leads the boards of directors to evaluate the managers more favourably and to grant a higher level of compensation. We test this argument by analysing the letters to shareholders from 334 US firms and examine the CEOs’ expression of the shareholder value principle, which is a prevailing model of corporate governance in the USA. We found that the use of shareholder‐value language is significantly related to a higher level of CEO compensation and that the effect of shareholder‐value language is greater when shareholder activism is stronger.     

中国矿产资源行业并购对股东财富的影响研究

随着我国股票市场的日趋成熟,并购在资本市场中扮演越来越重要的角色。同全球并购的缓慢复苏相比,2011年中国却并购掀起了新一轮的高潮。2011年中国能源及矿产行业完成的并购交易数量为153起,占并购总量的13.2%;并购交易金额高达219.83亿美元,占并购总额的32.8%。本文运用事件法,从股东财富的角度分析了2005-2011年间中国矿产资源类上市公司的短期并购绩效。通过对并购事件发生的窗口期[-5,5]内上市公司的超额收益率的研究发现并购公司在并购窗口期内的股东财富仅仅在宣告日前后两天有少量的增加,此后一直呈现下降的趋势。说明并购事件并未对股东财富形成积极的影响。本文试图从股票市场本身做出进一步的阐释,意在说明我国的股票市场中存在短期投机性。     

Multi‐dimensional signaling with fixed‐price repurchase offers

This study presents a signaling model of fixed‐price repurchase offers which shows that the proportion repurchased and the premium paid in excess of the stock's full‐information value signal both earnings and risk. The model yields four novel implications: high risk firms repurchase smaller proportions at greater premiums, earnings held constant; and high earnings firms make offers for larger proportions at higher prices, but lower premiums, risk held constant. Empirical tests support the implications, even in the presence of alternatives, e.g., free cash flow, optimal leverage, and shareholder heterogeneity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

房地产开发企业如何创造股东价值

上市筹集资金是房地产企业发展的趋势,为了赢得更多的投资,房地产企业必须以股东价值最大化为管理目标。介绍了一种股东价值模型,从竞争优势缺口和竞争优势期间两方面,来说明专业化经营和品牌化战略是房地产企业增加股东价值的必要手段。     

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE COMPANIES ACT 2006

The Companies Act 2006 enshrines in law the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’, a form of corporate social responsibility, in place of a director's traditional common law duty of loyalty. This article demonstrates that the conceptual foundations of the enlightened shareholder value approach are flawed, resulting in a confusing compromise, with potentially damaging efficiency consequences.     

中国公司治理法律制度的形成和价值取向

在有关中国公司治理应当是什么样这种公司治理的“应当”的问题上,很多学者提出了很多看法。公司治理可以分为重视股东利益的股东主权型公司治理模式和重视职工等利益相关者利益的利益相关者公司治理模式,因此,学者们提出的看法也可以概括到这两种模式中。总体来看,2005年《公司法》的价值取向是保护中小股东。但是对公司治理的形成来讲,社会规范或者社会对公司的角色期待以及公司自身的认知等因素是重要的,应该从中国社会的对公司的角色期待如何或者中国社会责任应当如何的角度出发分析公司治理制度的趋向。从和谐社会的建设的社会目标来看,中国的公司治理发展方向应该是利益相关者主权型模式,尤其是侧重于职工的模式,而不是股东主权型公司治理模式。     

The Role of Corporate Sustainability in a Low‐Cost Business Model – A Case Study in the Scandinavian Fashion Industry

This multi‐level case study illustrates how corporate sustainability contributes to the low‐cost business model of a Scandinavian fashion company. Contrary to parts of the extant literature, we do not find that corporate sustainability directly adds measurable value (e.g. a better brand image); neither does it exert coercive control over critical supplier relationships. However, corporate sustainability minimizes the downside risk of the business model. It does so by (1) creating implicit contracts that reach beyond traditional ‘shareholder value’, (2) transferring risk to suppliers and (3) improving leadership by motivating management and employees, and by directing their attention to critical issues. For companies, we offer the insight that corporate sustainability is a necessary complement to shareholder value, even if the relationship is not obvious at first sight. We also suggest that concerted actions of companies or a positive connotation of certification create effective control over suppliers. As to public policy, we conclude that regulators could introduce mandatory disclosure of suppliers to facilitate controls through stakeholders, or alternatively an industry‐wide comply‐or‐explain code of conduct. We also address how regulators can take direct actions against countries with unsustainable labor policies. Last, we suggest future research topics, e.g. expanding the notion of a business model by interpreting ‘adding value’ as prevention of losses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Blockholders’ Ownership and Audit Fees: The Impact of the Corporate Governance Model

This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. Shareholder (stakeholder) countries rely heavily on public (private) information to reduce information asymmetry for outside investors in the context of high (low) litigation risk. We expect audit fees to reflect the level of agency conflicts in shareholder countries as well as the needs for information of the major blockholders in stakeholder countries. Using a sample of 7982 firm-year observations from 19 countries, we find a U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for shareholder countries and an inverted U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for stakeholder countries. These results are consistent across different firm-level governance arrangements.     

不完全契约下经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题研究

自詹森和麦克林提出代理成本理论以来,理论界对代理成本理论的研究,全部集中在股东与经理之间的股权代理成本和股东与债权人之间的债权代理成本。而关于经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题,几乎是空白。本文通过对经理作为“合同收益者”与“剩余收益者”双重属性的分析,提出了关于经理和债权人之间代理成本问题研究的基本思路。