Measuring the impact of sustainability policy and practices in tourism and hospitality industry

This paper aims to investigate the impact of environmental policy and training aspects on hotels' sustainability practices, as well as the impact of these practices on their environmental and financial performance. Based on survey data from 312 managers operating in tourism and hospitality industry, this study applies structural equation modelling. Empirical results reveal that hotels' environmental policy and training aspects are positively related to sustainability practices. Environmental communication has almost equal degree of impact on resource and energy conservation, whereas both resource conservation and energy conservation have a significant positive impact on both environmental and financial performance. The main findings of this research highlight that hotels are increasingly considering sustainability issues in their business models and strategies. These findings provide practical managerial implications for the development of tourism and hospitality industry in emerging countries.     

Incentives to work? The impact of a ‘Cash-for-Care’ benefit for immigrant and native mothers labour market participation

To what extent is labour market participation of mothers sensitive to economic incentives? We answer this question by studying the effect on labour market participation of a Norwegian family policy programme that clearly has affected the incentives to participate in the labour market of mothers with small children. From January 1999, all parents with one- and two-year-old children who did not use publicly subsidised day-care became entitled to a benefit, ‘Cash-for-Care’ (‘CFC’). The CFC reform has increased the price of publicly subsidised day-care relative to the price of own care. Economic theory of labour market participation postulates that the CFC reform would have a negative effect on labour market participation for the person most involved in childcare. The results show that the CFC reform has affected mothers' labour market participation negatively. The effects are much stronger for non-western immigrant mothers' than for native mothers. The results support the hypothesis that non-western immigrant mothers do react to changes in the relative prices of childcare and suggests that non-western female immigrants are quite responsive to changes in economic incentives.     

R&D Spillovers on a Salop Circle

The paper describes quality/price equilibrium and welfare effects of R&D spillovers when firms are located around the circumference of a Salop circle, and the extent of the spillovers may depend on the geographic proximity between firms. In particular, we show that an increase in competition may have a positive effect on the provision of quality and firms' profits. We also extend the model allowing a multinational enterprise to locate at the centre of the circle. In this scenario it is important to understand the interplay of local R&D spillovers with the spillovers that propagate from and to the centre. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Procyclical ratings and market reactions

We investigate stock price reactions to credit rating changes during competing economic environments. Prior research has shown that credit rating assignments differ during times of economic expansion and economic contraction. We investigate if equity prices adjust differently to changes in credit quality in different economic environments. Our results show that markets react more strongly to negative ratings news during times of economic contraction. When the economy is expanding, markets also overreact by pushing prices higher than they otherwise would during an economic downturn.     

Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand

We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in the closed-loop solution than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is sufficiently high. However, this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low (and below unit costs). Sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated.     

National pricing with local quality competition

We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.     

Competition in prescription drug markets: is parallel trade the answer?

This article uses a price determination model with dynamic panel data estimation to examine the extent to which pharmaceutical parallel trade promotes price competition and leads to downward price convergence. Little evidence of sustainable price competition is found. We find that prices are mainly affected by regulation and by competition in the wholesale distribution chain; that the pricing strategy of parallel distributors resembles that of originator drugs in importing countries; and that there may be upward rather than downward price convergence. Drawing on the European evidence, the findings also indicate that opening the US market to parallel imports will not necessarily lead to competition and enhance pharmaceutical cost containment. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing the Quality of the Fit between Complementary Products

In this paper, I examine how firms should position their complementary products. I assume that there are two competing firms, each producing two complementary products. Each firm decides whether to employ strategies that enhance the quality of the fit (the degree of complementarity) between its pair of complementary products before competing in prices. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for the four possible bundles. They are willing to pay a price premium in order to purchase a bundle from the same firm if this firm chose to make such bundle more attractive. I find that increasing the degree of complementarity between a firm's complementary products intensifies price competition and often leads to smaller profits. Only when complementarity‐enhancing strategies significantly increase the demand for a firm's matching bundle, does the firm benefit from employing them. The highest profits for both firms are obtained when both firms do not employ complementarity‐enhancing strategies. Deteriorating the quality of the fit between one's own and a rival's complementary products is never profitable.     

Customer‐oriented employees: Blessing or curse for firms?

I investigate whether the presence of customer‐oriented employees benefits firms in a competitive environment. Employees are defined as customer‐oriented if they are interested not only in their wage but also in the well‐being of their customers. I find that firms may obtain higher profits by hiring self‐interested rather than customer‐oriented employees. This is because the employees' customer orientation has opposing effects on the profits obtained by the firms. On the one hand, customer‐oriented employees provide a given level of quality for a lower wage. On the other hand, the employees' customer orientation increases competition reducing prices. If the second effect dominates, firms find themselves trapped in a prisoners' dilemma as the strategy of hiring self‐interested employees is strictly dominated by that of hiring customer‐oriented employees. Hence, the very presence of customer‐oriented employees may hurt firms. If motivated employees are merely interested in the quality of the good provided, the effect on the price outlined before disappears.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Price Discrimination in Two‐Sided Markets

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two‐sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one‐sided models and uniform prices in two‐sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two‐sided market. The conventional wisdom from one‐sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two‐sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one‐sided markets may not carry over to two‐sided markets.     

Dynamic competition with consumer inertia

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an equilibrium for low values of the discount factor. High discount factors increase opportunism and aggressiveness of competition to such an extent that high prices are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, we find that both monopolization and enduring market share and price fluctuations (price wars) can be equilibrium path phenomena without requiring exogenous shocks in market or firm characteristics.     

Harmonic symmetries of imperfect competition on circular city

Taking location as given, we study imperfect competition on a circular city. In Bertrand oligopoly, we identify price harmonics as a function of firm unit costs and locations. The sum of oligopoly profits is larger when costs and/or locations are more dispersed in the ‘dihedral majorization’ sense. This also tends to be the case in which prices are more variable. We study how phase shifts between cost parameters and inter-firm distance parameters change production and oligopoly profits. An exact characterization of production patterns is developed in terms of the eigenvalues for what we call the price harmonics matrix. The same techniques are applied to Cournot oligopoly with spatial externalities on circular city. Solutions are compared with first-best. Production patterns can differ markedly when cost spillovers are negative.     

Price Fairness in the Case of Green Products: Enterprises' Policies and Consumers' Perceptions

This study investigates the extent to which prices of ecological products are fair. In particular, it explores the gap that can exist between the pricing policies adopted by enterprises and the consumers' price expectations in terms of fairness. The existing academic literature on sustainable consumption neglects this question. Findings from a qualitative investigation combining a consumer study and enterprise case studies show that managers' behaviors vary. While some enterprises take into account consumers' expectations and purchasing power to propose a fair price based on the value of the green product, others continue to adopt a pricing policy that is exclusively based on profitability and competition. The authors draw some business and academic implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies

This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.     

How does competition among lodging sharing platforms affect welfare and profits?

We investigate the likely effect on prices, consumer surplus, and profits of intensified competition among peer‐to‐peer lodging platforms. We find that intensified competition in the sharing economy may give rise to some surprising results. For instance, intensified competition may allow platforms to charge higher fees from peer suppliers and lead, therefore, to a decline in consumer surplus. Only if the market of professional hoteliers is highly competitive, intensified competition among platforms leads to the traditional outcome that the entry of more platforms leads to lower fees charged from consumers and to enhanced consumer surplus. We also find that platforms may actually earn higher profits when there is intensified competition among professional hoteliers. In addition, while intensified competition among professional hoteliers leads to a decline in the fees that platforms can charge customers, it may actually result in higher lodging prices. We explain these counterintuitive results by the dual role that the lodging price plays in affecting the welfare of individuals active in the sharing economy. While a higher price has an adverse effect on the welfare of demanders of lodging it benefits peer suppliers of lodging because a higher lodging price raises the compensation they receive when offering lodging capacity to a platform.     

审计定价、声誉机制和处罚措施对审计质量维持的影响

维持审计质量是审计行业管制者的主要目标，限制竞争是管制者通常采取的维持审计质量的措施。本文基于期望效用框架，建立审计质量降低动机函数，分析了审计定价、年誉机制、处罚措施等几个影响审计质量维持的因素，发现限制行业竞争的做法在维持审计质量方面所起的作用很有限，而声誉机制和处罚措施在维持审计质量方面能发挥较好的作用。     

CEOs' reputation,quality management and environmental innovation: The roles of stakeholder pressure and resource commitment

In this paper, we examine how and when chief executive officers' (CEOs') reputation enhances environmental innovation by considering quality management as a mediating mechanism of this relationship. In addition, we introduce stakeholder pressures (primary and secondary stakeholder pressures) as important contingencies of the relationship between CEOs' reputation and quality management. Moreover, we test the moderating role of resource commitment on the quality management‐environmental innovation relationship. We test our research model using data from a manufacturing industry sample of 217 firms from Ghana. We find that quality management mediates the relationship between reputation and environmental innovation. Moreover, the relationship between CEOs' reputation and quality management is amplified when levels of both primary and secondary stakeholder pressures are greater. Finally, our findings show that the effect of quality management on environmental innovation is enhanced when resource commitment is greater. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia

We investigate whether privatization, competitive forces, and the hardening of budget constraints played efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia in the immediate post-privatization period. We find evidence of a positive impact of privatization on labor productivity: a 10% point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by 3–5%. The evidence on product market competition is weaker, depending on model specification. Soft budget constraints are usually found to reduce restructuring but the effect is small and insignificant. We find that in terms of their impacts on productivity, privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes; privatization and competition (measured as the geographic scope of markets) are complements; and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.