共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
Lars Ehlers 《Economic Theory》2002,20(1):113-131
Summary. We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences.
Thomson (1994a), S?nmez (1994), and Moulin (1999) introduce three different resource-monotonicity conditions. In each characterization they derive, the axioms are independent. Under Pareto-optimality, the three resource-monotonicity conditions are equivalent. We investigate whether the interchange of these conditions still yields a valid characterization,
and when the characterization still holds, whether it is a tight result or not. We strengthen each of the results, that is
either the used resource-monotonicity condition can be replaced by a weaker one, or by using another resource-monotonicity condition, the result is not tight. Our main result is that when at least three agents are present, the class of fixed-path
rationing methods is characterized by weak one-sided resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and consistency.
Received: April 24, 2000; revised version: April 10, 2001 相似文献
2.
Summary. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally
implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B
ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition.
As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential
information are coalitionally implementable.
Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000 相似文献
3.
Dictatorial domains 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined
on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates
that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide
an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial
and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments.
Correspondence to: A. Sen 相似文献
4.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
5.
Ning Sun 《Economic Theory》1999,13(3):735-742
Summary. This note introduces a new concept of core –open core, using which it shows a quasi-equilibrium existence result in an economy where consumers' preference relations are assumed
to be lower semi-continuous, but not necessarily to have open lower sections nor to be open valued, such as the lexicographic
ordering. As an application, a competitive equilibrium existence result without non-satiation assumption is proved.
Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: November 4, 1997 相似文献
6.
Summary. We consider the determination of an optimal dividend policy in the presence of cash flow uncertainty and transaction costs. We state a set of weak conditions under which the optimal dividend policy can be explicitly characterized for a broad class of diffusions modelling the underlying cash flow dynamics and demonstrate that increased dividend policy flexibility does not only increase the maximal expected cumulative present value of the future dividends, it also increases the rate at which this value grows (i.e. Tobin’s marginal q). We also prove that increased transaction costs result into larger but less frequent dividend payments.Received: 23 November 2003, Revised: 23 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
G35, G31, C44, Q23.Luis H.R. Alvarez: Correspondence toLuis H. R. Alvarez acknowledges the financial support from the Foundation for the Promotion of the Actuarial Profession, the Finnish Insurance Society, the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, and the Research Unit of Economic Structures and Growth (RUESG) at the University of Helsinki. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments and suggested improvements on an earlier version of this study. 相似文献
7.
Aldo Rustichini 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):677-702
Summary. We consider the extension of the classical problem of preference for flexibility to many periods. Preferences are defined
over sets of infinite paths of choices. The main result provides a set of axioms on preferences that yield an additive representation
over a subjective state space. This space is the set of preferences over choice today and feasible set tomorrow. The main
new axiom, stochastic dominance, is a stronger form of the assumption of monotonicity.
Received: September 11 2000; revised version: December 18, 2001 相似文献
8.
Summary. This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing
generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for
a risky project that can be affected by an accident during its realization. Accident losses and final returns are private
information to the firm, but they can be evaluated by two costly auditing technologies. We derive the optimal financial contract:
it is a bundle of a standard debt contract and an insurance contract with franchise, trading off bankruptcy costs vs auditing
costs. We then analyze how this optimal contract can be achieved by decentralized trading on competitive markets when insurance
and credit activities are exogenously separated. With additive risks, the insurance contract involves full coverage above
a straight deductible. We interpret this result by showing how our results imply induced risk aversion for risk-neutral firms.
Received: December 14, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999 相似文献
9.
Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable
good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically,
in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower
quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
10.
Makoto Shimoji 《Economic Theory》2002,19(3):637-648
Summary. We first consider money-burning games studied by Ben-Porath and Dekel [6]. We show that iterative weak dominance and extensive
form rationalizability yield the same unique outcome in this class of games. This result suggests that weak dominance captures the forward induction logic implied by extenisve
form rationalizability. Next, we consider an example of entry model by Arvan [1] to demonstrate the power of forward induction.
In this example, despite the presence of multiple equilibria, forward induction chooses a unique outcome.
Received: January 25, 2000; revised version: January 5, 2001 相似文献
11.
The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency
occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not
selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is
required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule.
Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002
Correspondence to:S. Nitzan 相似文献
12.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
13.
The genuine savings criterion and the value of population 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Summary. In any dynamic model of the economy with changing population, the latter should properly be one of the state variables of
the system. It enters both in the maximand, at least under total utilitarianism, and into the production function in one way
or another. If population growth is exponential and constant returns prevails, then a simple transformation to per capita variables can be used to eliminate one state variable, but this ceases to be true if growth is not exponential, as it obviously
is not and cannot be. If the growth of population is exogenous, then introducing it into the system does not affect the optimal
policy. However, if one asks whether the system is sustainable, in the sense of at least maintaining total welfare (integral
of discounted utilities), then the criterion is that that the value of the rates of change of the state variables is non-negative,
so that the shadow price of population becomes relevant. In this paper, we derive explicit formulas in a simple model, showing
that the rate of growth of per capita capital is not the correct formula but must have another terms added to it. We also study the question under an alternative
criterion of long-run average utilitarianism.
Received: June 1, 2002; revised version: September 27, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"Research support was provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented
at a celebration of Mordecai Kurz's 66th birthday at Stanford University, 1–3 August 2002.
Correspondence to: K.J. Arrow 相似文献
14.
Nicolas Gravel 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):163-180
Summary. This paper examines two problems associated with the use of potential Pareto criteria in welfare economics. The first problem
is the well-known intransitivity of the compensation criteria à la Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky. The second problem is the possible incompatibility between the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion
and the Pareto principle. The main result of this paper is that, in order to avoid either of these problems, it is necessary
and sufficient that the domain to which these criteria are used is such that the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion encompasses
completely the Pareto criterion. When interpreted in a standard economic environment, this result is shown to be equivalent
to Gorman's requirement of non-crossing between utility possibility frontiers.
Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: March 2, 2000 相似文献
15.
Summary. Pagan and Shannon's (1985) widely used approach employs local linearizations of a system of non-linear equations to obtain
asymptotic distributions for the endogenous parameters (such as prices) from distributions over the exogenous parameters (such
as estimates of taste, technology, or policy variables, for example). However, this approach ignores both the possibility
of multiple equilibria as well as the problem (related to that of multiplicity) that critical points might be contained in
the confidence interval of an exogenous parameter.
We generalize Pagan and Shannon's approach to account for multiple equilibria by assuming that the choice of equilibrium is
described by a random selection. We develop an asymptotic theory regarding equilibrium prices, which establishes that their
probability density function is multimodal and that it converges to a weighted sum of normal density functions.
An important insight is that if a model allows multiple equilibria, say , but multiplicity is ignored, then the computed solution for the i-th equilibrium generally no longer coincides with the expected value of that i-th equilibrium. The error can be large and correspond to several standard deviations of the mean's estimate.
Received: December 7, 1999; revised version: December 4, 2000 相似文献
16.
Executive compensation: a calibration approach 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives
of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable
job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory.
Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997 相似文献
17.
Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic
theory.
Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002
Correspondence to: K. Shimomura 相似文献
18.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
19.
Rabah Amir 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,15(2):132-148
We reconsider the Cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games. Invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by Milgrom and Shannon, we generalize Novshek's existence result, derive the associated uniqueness result, give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry, and provide conditions making a Cournot oligopoly into a log-supermodular game (with the natural order on the action sets). We also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best-responses are widely regarded as being “typical” for the Cournot model with production costs. Several illustrative examples are provided.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, L10, L13. 相似文献
20.
Summary. We consider the problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim. We prove
existence of efficient insurance contracts and that the indemnity function in such contracts is non-decreasing in the damage.
We further show that either there is no insurance, or the indemnity is positive for all losses, or efficient insurance contracts
have a unique jump. We study variants of the model and provide a generalization to the case of non expected utilities. Our
results are then applied to Townsend's model of deterministic auditing.
Received: November 8, 2000; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to F. Salanié for pointing out an error in the previous version of the paper and for suggesting Proposition
6 to us.
Correspondence to: R.-A. Dana 相似文献