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1.
Summary. This incorporates a debt contracting problem with asymmetric information into a standard monetary business cycle model. The model incorporates a limited participation assumption in order to induce a liquidity effect of monetary shocks and propagate monetary disturbances. The model economy shows that a positive money supply shock generates a decrease in nominal interest rates and an increase in output level. Asymmetric information amplifies the response of capital to the money supply shock, but does not propagate them in other ways. When the monetary shock is an innovation in reserve requirements, it induces a persistent response of the economy. Received: March 20, 1998; revised version: 1 April 1998 相似文献
2.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):141-168
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth
cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation
growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the
no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the
tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently
between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of
capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments,
which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at
Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University,
and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. 相似文献
3.
A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let (resp., denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet
winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain , and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain .
Received: August 29, 2000; revised version: November 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"We are grateful to Wulf Gaertner and our two referees for insightful comments on a previous draft.
Correspondence to: D. E. Campbell 相似文献
4.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):169-192
Summary. This paper shows new properties about the equilibria of a stationary OG economy by establishing a connection between its
stationary equilibria and those of a finite economy, with and without extrinsic uncertainty. Specifically, it shows the countability
and local uniqueness with respect to the sup metric of the so-called sunspot cycles introduced here, that encompass both the
deterministic cycles and the usual finite Markovian stationary sunspot equilibria. These sunspot cycles are, moreover, able
to generate, at a lower cost in terms of assumptions than other sunspot equilibria, time series with the recurrent but irregular
fluctuations typical of economic time series.
Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 5, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I want to thank an anonymous referee for comments that have helped greatly to improve this paper, as well as the comments
about its contents received from several audiences in different seminars and conferences (the Economic Theory seminar of the
University of Pennsylvania, the 2001 Meeting of the Econometric Society held at New Orleans, the 2000 Econometric Society
World Congress, the 2000 Society for Economic Design Conference) and from comments to a previous paper, Dávila [10], specially
from Jim Peck at the 1997 Workshop on General Equilibrium held at the University of Venice, that eventually lead to this one. 相似文献
5.
Summary. The economy we study is comprised of a continuum of individuals. Each has a stochastic endowment that evolves continuously
and independently of all other individuals' endowment processes. Individuals are risk averse and would therefore like to insure
their endowment processes. The mutual independence of their endowment processes makes it feasible for them to obtain this
insurance by pooling their endowments. We investigate whether such a scheme would survive as an equilibrium in a noncooperative
setting.
Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: August 8, 2001 相似文献
6.
Ilaria Ossella 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):597-607
Summary. This paper establishes a ‘turnpike theorem’ for a closed linear model of production with a primitive input requirement matrix. Optimal programs of resource allocation have a ‘turnpike property’ if the growth factor of every sector in the economy converges, in the long run, to a common value. The usefulness of such a theorem is due to the fact that the input requirement matrix for an economy with a large number of goods may be primitive (some power of the matrix is strictly positive). Received: April 19, 1998; revised version: July 15, 1998 相似文献
7.
A simple characterization of majority rule 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Summary. Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity.
This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains
weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even.
Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: May 10, 1999 相似文献
8.
Summary. This paper develops a model with endogenous agency costs that is otherwise quite similar to the canonical real business cycle model. The traditional assumption in the literature is that these agency costs arise in the production of investment goods. In contrast, this paper assumes that these costs are all encompassing in the sense that they arise in the production of aggregate output. The paper explores both the importance of the investment vs. output assumption for business cycle dynamics, and the conditions under which these agency models can deliver amplification and/or persistence. The paper has two principal conclusions. First, in terms of amplification and propagation, the output model performs worse than does the investment model. This arises because a variable distortion in the investment market has more of an impact than a comparable distortion in the output market. Second, in this model with optimal consumption choice by entrepreneurs, there is a clear tension between amplification and persistence. Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: April 1, 1998 相似文献
9.
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Max R. Blouin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):245-262
Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where
two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents),
then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless
of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to
models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson).
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's
University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer
Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments. 相似文献
10.
Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic
theory.
Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002
Correspondence to: K. Shimomura 相似文献
11.
Summary. We consider a discrete-time two-sector Cobb-Douglas economy with positive sector specific external effects. We show that
indeterminacy of steady states and cycles can easily arise with constant or decreasing social returns to scale, and very small
market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast with most of the contributions in the literature in which increasing social
returns are required to generate indeterminacy.
Received: July 31, 2000; revised version: June 5, 2001 相似文献
12.
Summary. We establish conditions under which indeterminacy can occur in a small open economy business cycle model with endogenous labor supply. Indeterminacy requires small externalities in technologies with social constant returns to scale, independently of the intertemporal elasticities in both consumption and labor. Received: December 12, 2001; revised version: May 17, 2002 RID=\"*\" ID=\"*\"The paper has benefited from discussions with Jess Benhabib and Mark Weder, as well as from the comments of an anonymous referee. Correspondence to: Q. Meng 相似文献
13.
Summary. In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading in a Static, Kyle-type model. In our model the insider
is also the manager of the firm. Hence the insider chooses both the amount of the real output to be produced and the amount
of the stock of the firm to trade. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between financial decisions and real
decisions. In particular, we examine how insider trading on the stock market affects the real output and price and how the
real decision making affects the financial variables, such as the extent of insider trading, stock prices, and the stock pricing
rule of the market maker. In the model, the market maker observes two correlated signals: the total order flow and the market
price of the real good. We study the informativeness of the stock price and the effects on insider's profits. We also construct
a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the insider and the firm. Finally, we generalize the pricing rule set up
by a competitive market maker and analyze the comparative statics of the model.
Received: October 3, 1999: revised version: December 1, 1999 相似文献
14.
Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes. Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997 相似文献
15.
Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable
good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically,
in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower
quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
16.
Erik Canton 《Economic Theory》2002,19(3):477-492
Summary. This paper analyzes the impact of cyclical volatility on long-term economic growth: does growth increase or decrease with increased cyclical volatility? We construct a stochastic two-sector model of endogenous growth to analyze this question in detail. We will show that economic growth is higher in the presence of business cycles, since people devote more time to learning activities in an uncertain economic environment. Human capital is a hedge against future income uncertainty. Hence, the rate of economic growth will be higher in a stochastic environment. Based on a calibration of the model, we find that economic growth increases by 0.46%-point as a result of observed business cycle variability. When account is taken of the interaction between the model's general equilibrium and the cycle, welfare gains (measured in units of a permanent percentage increase in consumption) from eliminating business cycle volatility are approximately 1.87%. Received: January 25, 2000; revised version: November 3, 2000 相似文献
17.
Shouyong Shi 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):439-461
Summary. This paper examines the influence of fashion on wealth accumulation in an economy with two groups of agents. Fashion is modelled as an externality generated by a particular dependence of individual agents' time preference on the two groups' per-capita consumption habits. It is shown that fashion causes excessive wealth fluctuations in the sense that stronger and more persistent fashion is more likely to generate limit cycles in wealth. Opposite to intuitive arguments , however, the externality in fashion does not necessarily generate instability in wealth. In a special case, equilibrium consumption and wealth are stable but the optimal ones that internalize the externality are locally unstable. Whether equilibrium consumption is excessive relative to optimal consumption depends on the distribution as well as the aggregate level of wealth. Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: July 21, 1998 相似文献
18.
Summary. This note presents a simple proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem using Saari's [3, 4] “geometry of voting”. Received: March 5, 2001; revised version: August 16, 2001 相似文献
19.
Frederic Palomino 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):683-700
Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market (OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset. Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999 相似文献
20.
Pere Gomis-Porqueras 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):791-810
Summary. This paper considers a monetary growth model in which banks provide liquidity, and in which a government finances a deficit
by printing money and selling bonds. In this context, I examine the possibility that the government may want to impose binding
reserve requirements on banks' holdings of both money and government bonds. Conditions are established under which doing so
increases steady state welfare and reduces the scope for indeterminacies. Furthermore, under a binding system of multiple
reserve requirements we have that money is superneutral. On the other hand, if reserve requirements are imposed on cash holdings
alone, increases in the steady state inflation rate adversely affect capital accumulation and long run real activity. Thus
systems of multiple binding reserve requirements can insulate real activity from the consequences of inflationary taxation.
Received: June 30, 2000; revised version: January 31, 2001 相似文献