Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether to bundle or not. We also contrast the simultaneous and the sequential order of moves in the duopoly market. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multi-product firm offers the predicted number of units. When the multi-product firm is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum, bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.     

Resource and Waste Taxation in the Theory of the Firm with Recycling Activities

The management of solid waste has become an urgent problem in nations with a great population density. Accordingly, waste reduction through source reduction and recycling has become increasingly important. Our purpose is to show how prevention, recycling and disposal of waste could be part of a theory of the firm. We first derive efficient production functions from production processes with waste as a by-product. Waste obtained as new scrap can partially be recycled by using additional inputs in order to cut back the purchase of virgin material. Waste not completely recyclable will leave the firm as disposal which also entails cost to the firm. We use the dual cost function approach to develop a theory of the firm under solid residual management.Since the producer does not bear the full cost of disposal, there will be a bias toward virgin materials and away from recycling. The goal of the government is to stimulate the firms to recycle with respect to the preservation of exhaustible resources. An incentive to recycle is a tax on resources or on waste. In order to determine the tax levels the government maximizes welfare subject to the dynamic constraint for decumulation of land fill for waste deposits. This gives the user cost and its time profile for taxing waste disposal or virgin material.In a comparative statics analysis we compare the effect of taxes on waste vs. virgin material on effort to produce in a resource saving manner, on the quantity of recycled material, on output, and on the reduction of waste. Since the impact of environmental regulation on employment is important, our model detects seven effects on labor demand as part of resource conservation policy. We finally carry out a comparative statics analysis of waste intensive firms operating in different market structures. Of interest is the impact of a resource or waste taxation on market volume, on the number of firms, on resource saving effort, and on profit.     

替代、互补及互嵌:企业与市场关系的新考察

在现实世界中,企业市场关系呈现出替代、互补及互嵌等多种特征,使得单一的“替代”说或“互补”论均缺乏足够的解释力。本文从交易费用角度将交易关系分为三种类型并指出企业和市场谁更有利于交易费用的节约,主要取决于交易品的特征以及交易本身的具体职能。企业其实是一种通过非人力资本和人力资本、人力资本和人力资本间相互交易以实现生产功能的特殊履约机制。这样就不难理解,只有部分交易可以通过企业与市场间的相互替代来提高效率,而更多的交易则须通过改善企业内部管理或改进市场制度本身来提高其效率。     

Mixed bundling with profit and sales objectives

Suppose the marginal cost of a bundle is less than the sum of the marginal costs of the two products that make up the bundle. In this case, even when demands are completely uncorrelated, bundling is profitable but usually reduces total sales. The primary assumption of this paper is that firms are reluctant to bundle because they resist the loss in sales. Three optimization problems are analyzed: no bundling, mixed bundling, and bundling with profits and sales objectives, in which the firm has an objective function with a penalty for lost sales. This paper will show that firms benefit by bundling even if they modify their prices in such a way to reduce (or reverse) any loss in sales.     

技术进步、企业边界与外包决策——基于中国制造业数据的经验研究

技术进步通过节约企业的内部协调成本和市场交易成本影响着企业边界的变动。技术进步对企业边界的影响往往集中体现于外包行为。笔者首先通过选取中国制造业的典型企业和行业作为样本,针对技术进步对企业边界造成的影响进行了实证研究;同时对技术进步与制造业相关行业的外包决策之间的关系进行了进一步的研究。研究结果表明,技术进步使得中国制造业企业的纵向一体化程度呈现增大的趋势,企业边界逐渐扩大;技术进步与外包行为间存在正相关的关系。     

The Influence of a Neighbouring Market on Product Qualities and Prices

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation in which there is a primary market with two firms and a secondary market with no firms. Consumers in the secondary market incur a cost when purchasing the product from the primary market. The firms sequentially choose product quality and then simultaneously choose prices. Firm 1 always chooses the maximum quality, while firm 2's quality and the prices depend on the cost. Also, the cost determines which firm(s), if either, serves the secondary market. It is shown that the firms and the consumers of each market prefer different levels of costs.     

Bundling in the Australian Telecommunications Industry

This article considers some of the implications for social welfare of bundling in the Australian telecommunications industry. The practice of bundling—offering two or more products for sale as a single package—is a strategy used in many industries. Although common, there are circumstances when the practice can be used anti-competitively. Yet bundling does not always harm consumers; at times, the practice benefits both consumers and producers, and it can even advantage consumers to the detriment of producers. The general literature on bundling suggests that its effect on social welfare depends on several factors such as market structure, the elasticity of demand for the products, the marginal cost of production, economies of distribution and the use of complex menus. We consider these factors when assessing the likely welfare effects of bundling in the Australian telecommunications industry, concluding that the potential effects of bundling on competition and the information costs imposed on consumers by complex menus of services seem the most significant considerations for social welfare. It is desirable that regulatory authorities monitor developments closely, although heavy-handed regulation of bundling seems undesirable.     

中国工业产业结构与企业技术研发行为的实证分析

产业结构升级一直是我国经济学界所关心的一个问题，工业产业的升级更是一个众所关注的焦点。本文在前人研究的基础上，利用中国工业产业数据，采用了经典的SCP范式模型．对熊彼特的两个经典假说进行了验证。发现竞争与企业利润同时对企业研发具有促进作用．熊彼特两个相互矛盾的结论同时得到了支持。通过对应分析，我们对中国工业内产业不同特点和企业不同特点进行了归类，提出国有企业在不同行业的产值比重是导致了这两个看似矛盾的结论同时并存的原因。     

Beyond the need to boast: Cost concealment incentives and exit in Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it can exclude its competitors from the market. Hence, the rankings of expected profit and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the inefficient firms is possible. Although the efficient firm has stronger incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there remain cases in which the firm conceals information in equilibrium to induce exit.     

Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms—two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm—are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.      

数字产品定价中传统经济学方法失灵原因及定价策略

数字产品的高固定成本、低边际成本的成本结构导致了传统的供求曲线和均衡分析的失灵,使得传统的边际成本定价不适用于数字产品。数字产品定价中传统定价方法失灵的原因主要有：数字产品的网络外部性、成本结构的特殊性、需求曲线及供给曲线的变化、市场供求均衡的打破,研究表明采用产品差异化和差别定价、免费,捆绑销售、两段收费的定价策略有一定的积极意义。     

网络信息商品的定制化捆绑定价策略

该文基于网络信息商品的特征,对垄断公司的网络信忠商品定制化捆绑定价策略进行了研究.通过分析我们证明,当存在合同管理成本时,信息商品的纯捆绑合同定价与激励相容的定制捆绑合同定价并不是垄断公司的最优选择;相比之下,将这两种定价策略相结合的混合定制捆绑合同定价策略才是垄断公司的严格帕累托最优定价选择.     

Rapid Technology Change, ‘Technological Visions’, Corporate Organisation And Market Structure

This paper is a contribution to the analysis of how rapid technology change influences market structure. The paper uses a simple simulation model to explore the effects of four main factors on the development of market structure. These are: (1) the variance (or unpredictability) of the technology trajectory; (2) the speed with which the organisation's ‘technological vision’ adjusts to ongoing technological developments; (3) the absorptive capacity of each division in the multi-divisional firm to experience gained in other divisions; (4) the extent to which competence-destroying innovations generate greater cost penalties for the division of a multi-divisional firm than for a comparable mono-divisional firm. Simultion results are obtained for 100 technological trajectories, and a variety of parameterisations. While there is a tendency for noisier trajectories to disadvantage the larger multi-divisional firm, there are conditions under which such a firm benefits from a noisy technological environment. When competence-destorying innovations affect the division of a multi-divisional firm no worse than the comparable mono-divisional firm, the multi-divisional firm is not disproportionately affected by a noisy trajectory. It may, however, be seriously damaged by a slow adjustment of technological vision, especially when all scale economies are dynamic (rather than static). The simulations confirm that the absorptive capacity of each division to experience from others can be critical in determining the ultimate market structure. A brief empirical motivation for the model is offered by reference to some case studies of the semiconductor industry.     

Temporary hires and innovative investments

The flexicurity approach claims a positive effect of flexible labour on firm performance, also through an increased ability to innovate. Critics consider it a deregulation of the labour market, decreasing investment in human capital and innovation. We contribute to this broad debate providing an estimate of the relationships linking innovative investment, substitution investment, permanent hires and temporary hires. In particular, we aim at affirming or denying that innovative investments are accompanied by a specific kind of workforce, being it stable or flexible. In doing so, we contribute to bridge the gap among two quite separate strands of literature, as existing literature usually analyses capital and labour separately. Estimating a nonlinear recursive equation system we highlight a significant increase in the likelihood of hiring on a permanent base when the firm innovates; this holds till 2008. Afterward, during the crisis, innovating firms are more likely to hire using temporary contracts instead, a possible signal of a cost saving strategy adopted in a loose labour market by firms still able to innovate. Furthermore, both permanent and temporary hires never depend on increases in labour costs; however, substitution investment increases when labour cost increases, maybe in an attempt to increase labour productivity through a more efficient capital equipment.     

Synergy,learning and the changing industrial structure

In a set-up of two local firms and one foreign firm, we construct a model to capture the dynamics of local industrial structure induced by formation and breakdown of cross-border joint ventures (JVs). There is a synergic gain to the JV, and the partners learn from each other. Firms play a repeated game. We characterize the resulting industrial configurations under different scenarios as defined by the extent of cost saving. In particular, we show that when cost saving is moderate, an alliance formed between two firms in the first period, breaks up and a new alliance is formed in the second period, but again it breaks up; thereafter the market becomes an oligopoly of all three firms.     

MODELLING PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS OF TRADE OPENNESS: A DUAL APPROACH*

A cost function framework is used to model the productivity effect of trade openness in terms of cost saving. The idea of ‘cost saving’ is closer to the entrepreneur's view of productivity. An entrepreneur would expect a reduction in the cost of production if trade openness brings any benefits to their firm. The output‐enhancing (primal) productivity effect of openness is obtainable from the cost‐saving (dual) productivity effect through the cost‐output link. The cost‐function framework also enables us to investigate whether trade openness induces firms to adopt a technology that is biased towards the use or saving of any factor of production. An empirical exercise based on time series data for the Australian two‐digit manufacturing industries reveals significant cost‐saving and output‐enhancing productivity effects of trade openness. Trade openness is biased towards the saving of labour and the use of capital. These results are quite insensitive to the choice of alternative measures of openness.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

Bundling strategy and product differentiation

The existing literature shows that a decrease in the degree of substitutability increases a monopoly’s incentive to bundle. This paper in addition takes into account competition in the second product market and then re-examines how intra-brand and inter-brand product differentiations affect the incentive to bundle. In order to formally examine the above conjectures, this research builds up a two-firm, two-product model in which product 1 (monopoly product) is produced only by the bundling firm and product 2 (competing product) is produced by both firms. The analysis shows that under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions the incentive to bundle does not necessarily increase with the degree of intra-brand differentiation, while it strictly decreases with the degree of inter-brand differentiation. Moreover, under Bertrand competition bundling always decreases consumer surplus, but may increase the competitor’s profit and social surplus. Under Cournot competition bundling always reduces the opponent’s profit and social welfare, but may increase consumer surplus.     

全面风险管理:必然的选择

始于运用VaR方法度量金融市场风险的金融风险管理革命,目前已扩展至对企业的全面风险管理。一个理想的全面风险管理体系应站在企业全局的角度去识别、度量和管理风险。全面风险管理体系的优势在于:它有助于通过对冲风险以达到降低收益波动性的目的,从而增加企业价值;它有助于降低对冲的成本,因为它实际上是对净风险的对冲,而不是在单独的风险管理方法下的逐个对冲,这就使得风险的对冲成本下降了。     

Public Monopoly,Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency

In general, the introduction of competition into the public sector seems to lead to higher cost‐efficiency in service production. However, there are examples of substantial cost increases in some areas. In this paper, using a mixed oligopoly model, we investigate the effects of deregulation on the cost‐reducing incentives of a public firm. Our results show that a firm that is a public monopoly has greater incentive to conduct cost‐reducing investment than a public firm within mixed oligopoly market.