Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

Computing,the bootstrap and economics

A major contention in this paper is that scientific models can be viewed as virtual realities, implemented, or rendered, by mathematical equations or by computer simulations. Their purpose is to help us understand the external reality that they model. In economics, particularly in econometrics, models make use of random elements, so as to provide quantitatively for phenomena that we cannot or do not wish to model explicitly. By varying the realizations of the random elements in a simulation, it is possible to study counterfactual outcomes, which are necessary for any discussion of causality. The bootstrap is virtual reality within an outer reality. The principle of the bootstrap is that, if its virtual reality mimics as closely as possible the reality that contains it, it can be used to study aspects of that outer reality. The idea of bootstrap iteration is explored, and a discrete model discussed that allows investigators to perform iteration to any desired level.     

Economies of scale,school violence and the optimal size of schools

This article argues that policy in relation to education has relied too extensively on the more easily measured costs of production to support a common conclusion of economies of scale in school and/or district size. It argues that there are external costs that increase with size but that can be measured less easily that offset this case. This would imply that the tendency within the education profession to advocate ever-larger school sizes is premature at best. To make the case, it models the choice of school size to emphasize that costs, such as school violence, born by both students and their parents but not (necessarily) by education administrators may result in school sizes that are too big from the perspective of school users. The second and third parts of the article introduces evidence to suggest that school violence is one of these external costs.     

Hoarding of international reserves: It's a neighbourly day in Asia

To explain why Asian countries seem to have been hoarding international reserves, especially since the 1997 crisis, we consider various regional neighbourhood effects. One such effect is that of “catching up with the Joneses”. We revisit that effect by analysing several refinements of it. We also consider the fear of the kind of contagion that the crisis‐hit countries saw in 1997. Finally, we look at the possibility of a regional financial cycle, in which the conditions that led to the crisis might have been correlated across countries. We find that refining the Joneses effect to take account of trade links strengthens its power to explain the build‐up of reserves. We also observe that a country that finds itself more vulnerable than its regional neighbours would tend to accumulate more reserves. Finally, we find that a common regional factor related to current‐account balances spurs further reserve accumulation. Contrary to previous analyses, our results suggest that only a couple of Asian countries have been holding excessive reserves. Some were actually holding less reserves than would be optimal in the presence of neighbourhood effects.     

The healthy development of economies: A strategic framework for competitiveness in the health industry

Applying a strategic decision-making perspective on the economics of business, we suggest that a competitive locality in the health industry is one that, relative to other localities, is effective in: (1) providing the healthcare that enables everyone to participate fully in the democratic development of the locality; (2) providing the healthcare that is democratically identified as a direct objective of this development; (3) contributing through the health industry to any other democratically determined objectives of the locality's development. The paper hypothesizes that strategic decision-making in organizations is an especially significant determinant of the impacts of the health industry. We conclude that: (i) a locality that suffers concentration in the power to determine the objectives of its health industry could not be strictly competitive in that industry; (ii) the first best way to achieve competitiveness in the health industry would be to democratize its strategic decision-making. What this would entail in practice is discussed in some detail.     

Intra‐firm trade,exporting, importing,and firm performance

Abstract This paper examines firm heterogeneity in terms of size, wages, capital intensity, and productivity between domestic and foreign‐owned firms that engage in intra‐firm trade, firms that export and import, firms that import only, and firms that export only. As previously documented, heterogeneity between different groups of trading firms is substantial. Taking into account intra‐firm trade in addition to exporting and importing yields new insights into the productivity advantage previously established for exporting firms. The results presented here show that this premium accrues only to exporters that also import and to exporters that also engage in intra‐firm trade, but not to firms that export only. Using simultaneous quantile regressions, the paper illustrates that heterogeneity within different groups of trading firm is equally large. Some of this within‐group heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in trading partners.     

HUMAN NATURE, COMMUNICATION AND TRUST

ABSTRACT ** :  The facts that people can sometimes commit to fulfill promises even when there are no binding penalties and that kind and trusting acts are often reciprocated by trustworthy ones make possible forms of group action that might be ruled out in a hypothetical world of perfectly opportunistic individuals. I discuss some new experiments with a modified Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) ' trust game' that provide evidence that most subjects adhere to non-binding agreements, that many are prepared to rely on trust rather than use binding but moderately costly contracts, that the possibility of exchanging words rather than mere numerical proposals enhances trusting and trustworthiness, and that subjects are drawn to fair and efficient exchanges despite the self-interest model's prediction of outcomes more favorable to first-movers.     

Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements

We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group. We therefore consider self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements that are robust not only to single-person deviations but also to potential deviations by subgroups. However, such deviations must be credible, in the sense that the subgroup must pass exactly the same test that we apply to the entire group; it must itself employ some self-enforcing risk-sharing agreement. We observe that the stability of subgroups is inimical to the stability of the group as a whole. Two surprising consequences of this analysis are that stable groups have (uniformly) bounded size, a result in sharp contrast to the individual-deviation problem, and that the degree of risk-sharing in a community is generally non-monotonic in the level of uncertainty or need for insurance in the community.     

Money as Social Exergy

Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems (‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem. Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization. However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem. The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.      

Multinationals and Training: Some Evidence from Irish Manufacturing Industries

This paper sets out to analyse the effect of plant and sectoral level characteristics on the provision of training to employees using plant level data for Irish manufacturing. There is no clear evidence that foreign owned plants are more likely to provide training. By contrast, we find that they spend less than domestic plants on training, ceteris paribus. There is also no evidence that plants that receive training grants are more likely to provide training. This may be likely to reflect the targeting of training grants on plants that are otherwise unlikely to provide much training. We do, however, find that training activity in the sector, either by other foreign or domestic plants, has a positive effect on plant level training activity, at least for domestic owned plants.     

The propensity to hedge using futures contracts: the case of potato futures contracts

This paper studies why UK non-financial firms hedge with potato futures contracts. It is found that the financial characteristics of firms in the sample play an important role in influencing the propensity to hedge. For example, it is found that firms that hedge are on average larger than firms that do not hedge. Firms that hedge also have more volatile earnings. Furthermore, firms that do hedge appear to want to smooth earnings to reduce the costs of financial distress and avoid entering the highest tax threshold.     

Predictive validation of modeled health technology assessment claims: lessons from NICE

Abstract

The use of cost-effectiveness modeling to prioritize healthcare spending has become a key foundation of UK government policy. Although the preferred method of evaluation—cost-utility analysis—is not without its critics, it represents a standard approach that can arguably be used to assess relative value for money across a range of disease types and interventions. A key limitation of economic modeling, however, is that its conclusions hinge on the input assumptions, many of which are derived from randomized controlled trials or meta-analyses that cannot be reliably linked to real-world performance of treatments in a broader clinical context. This means that spending decisions are frequently based on artificial constructs that may project costs and benefits that are significantly at odds with those that are achievable in reality. There is a clear agenda to carry out some form of predictive validation for the model claims, in order to assess not only whether the spending decisions made can be justified post hoc, but also to ensure that budgetary expenditure continues to be allocated in the most rational way. To date, however, no timely, effective system to carry out this testing has been implemented, with the consequence that there is little objective evidence as to whether the prioritization decisions made are actually living up to expectations. This article reviews two unfulfilled initiatives that have been carried out in the UK over the past 20 years, each of which had the potential to address this objective, and considers why they failed to deliver the expected outcomes.     

Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient,Stable, and Maximum Matchings*

In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy-to-implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.     

Traceroute的网络拓扑发现及其效率优化措施

网络拓扑发现是网络工程的一个重要的研究子分支，是实现网络管理的基础性环节。同时，网络拓扑发现是对宏观网络进行科学布局的基础，也是进行网络建设、网络信息、网络协议设计与评价以及相关网络算法改进的重要依据。在介绍网络拓扑发现的概念的基础上，重点分析了基于Traceroute的网络拓扑发现原理，探讨了其发现效率优化措施。     

Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment?

Contracts that involve the government differ from contractsbetween two private parties in that the identity of one of theparties, the government, is subject to change. Given that theincumbent government knows that it might not be in power whenthe contract is completed, it may have an incentive to structurethe contract to make it more difficult for a new governmentto renegotiate it. I show that traditional damage measures usedin contracts between two private parties exacerbate this problem.The reliance damage measure induces the incumbent governmentto enlarge projects beyond the socially optimal level when itfears that a new government will want to cut it back. Expectationdamages suffer from the same defect, though to a lesser extent.     

Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism

A liberalism that does not close its eyes to the constitutional level of choice must seek to extend the same fundamental logic that it applies in its theory of the market to the questions of what the sovereignty of the individual can mean, and how it can be secured, in constitutional matters. The problems that arise with such an extension to the constitutional level may well be more difficult than those that the liberal theory of the market has to deal with, and the conclusions that a constitutional liberalism arrives at may be less determinate that what the free-market approach pronounces. Yet, if these difficulties are inherent in the subject matter, and if the indeterminacy follows from arguments that we are required to accept, then denying them does not seem to be a promising strategy for strengthening the liberal paradigm.     

The limits of liberalism: Good boundaries must be discovered

Determining good boundaries for governance jurisdictions is among the most difficult problems in political theory and political philosophy. But to whom the rules of a given jurisdiction applies is a problem that afflicts private as well as public governance. Clubs have boundaries no less than cities, states, or nations. This essay applies Hayek’s conception of competition as a discovery procedure to boundary problems, arguing that good jurisdictional boundaries are subject to a great deal of contingent variation according to particular the conditions of time and place. Philosophical speculation, therefore, cannot fully replace a trial and error process that facilitates social learning about where good boundaries fall. I outline the features of good boundaries that make them subject to such variation, then evaluate two criteria for evaluating whether existing jurisdictional boundaries are good: one that emphasizes ex ante consent to boundaries, and one that focuses on the ability of individuals to exit from jurisdictions ex post, arguing that the exit-focused approach is underappreciated.     

The innovative bureaucrat: evidence from the correctional authorities in Washington State

Bureaucracies are usually regarded as inefficient, wasteful mechanisms. Contrary to this deeply rooted perception of bureaucracy, this paper documents the case of the correctional authorities in Washington State, a bureaucracy that acted with a considerable degree of innovation and professionalism. Their task was to administer a risk assessment instrument that measured the level of risk posed by offenders by way of a numerical score. They used that score to identify the level of supervision offenders were to receive once released into the community. In analyzing the data, I discovered an unusual application of the instrument that resulted in many offenders being bumped to a higher supervision level. Using a regression discontinuity design, I uncover the mechanics of the bumping-up process and I generate an instrument that is cleansed of the manipulation. I find that the manipulated instrument predicts serious recidivism events better than the cleansed instrument, especially when these events involve high-risk offenders, thus providing evidence that the authorities had good reason to undertake the manipulation.     

援疆失能老年人居家长期照护选择原因分析

基于对新疆728名援疆汉族失能老年人的调查数据,应用Multinomial Logistics回归方法分析失能老年人选择居家长期照护的原因及影响因素。多数失能老年人受"恋家情结"的影响而选择在家中接受照护,其中性别、年龄、文化程度、来疆时间、来疆原因、失能时间及失能程度对失能老年人选择居家长期照护有显著的影响。