Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk, and Capital Formation

We use a comprehensive data set of funds-of-funds to investigate performance, risk, and capital formation in the hedge fund industry from 1995 to 2004. While the average fund-of-funds delivers alpha only in the period between October 1998 and March 2000, a subset of funds-of-funds consistently delivers alpha. The alpha-producing funds are not as likely to liquidate as those that do not deliver alpha, and experience far greater and steadier capital inflows than their less fortunate counterparts. These capital inflows attenuate the ability of the alpha producers to continue to deliver alpha in the future.     

Factor-based,Non-parametric Risk Measurement Framework for Hedge Funds and Fund-of-Funds

Abstract

A factor-decomposition based framework is presented that facilitates non-parametric risk analysis for complex hedge fund portfolios in the absence of portfolio level transparency. This approach has been designed specifically for use within the hedge fund-of-funds environment, but is equally relevant to those who seek to construct risk-managed portfolios of hedge funds under less than perfect underlying portfolio transparency. Using dynamic multivariate regression analysis coupled with a qualitative understanding of hedge fund return drivers, one is able to perform a robust factor decomposition to attribute risk within any hedge fund portfolio with an identifiable strategy. Furthermore, through use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques, these factors can be employed to generate implied risk profiles at either the constituent fund or aggregate fund-of-funds level. As well as being pertinent to risk forecasting and monitoring, such methods also have application to style analysis, profit attribution, portfolio stress testing and diversification studies. This paper outlines such a framework and presents sample results in each of these areas.     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

The Style Consistency of Hedge Funds

This study examines the style classification and the style consistency of hedge funds using a new proprietary database over the period May 1989 to April 1999. First, a hard clustering procedure is applied to classify hedge funds into homogeneous groups. It is shown that the methodology is robust and can be used to build stable hedge funds indexes. The method performs equally well as the principal component analysis in explaining in‐ and out‐of‐sample cross‐sectional hedge funds' returns. Second, we extend hard to fuzzy cluster memberships, relaxing the full assignment of the funds to individual clusters. We apply the fuzzy clustering methodology to estimate hedge funds' probabilistic exposure to various styles. We introduce three consistency indicators to quantify the hedge fund managers' style opportunism levels. We finally document that there is no evidence that style consistency leads to superior hedge funds' performance.     

The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies and the Asymmetry of Return Distributions

We present hedge fund performance estimates that adjust for stale prices, Fama‐French risk factors and skewness. We contrast these new performance estimates with traditional performance measures. Using three‐factor models to adjust for staleness in prices and to incorporate Fama‐French factors along with the Harvey‐Siddique (2000) two‐factor model that incorporates skewness, we find that for the period 1990–2003, all hedge fund categories achieve above average performance when measured against an aggregate market index. More significantly, however, when we estimate performance at the individual hedge fund level, we discover that only 40 to 47% of the funds are shown to achieve an above average performance over that time period depending on the model used. These results have important implications for investors, endowments and pensions when they choose hedge fund managers.     

Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option‐like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund‐value from the high‐water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced‐form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low‐quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.     

Risk Measures for Hedge Funds: a Cross‐sectional Approach

This paper analyses the risk‐return trade‐off in the hedge fund industry. We compare semi‐deviation, value‐at‐risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES) and Tail Risk (TR) with standard deviation at the individual fund level as well as the portfolio level. Using the Fama and French (1992) methodology and the combined live and defunct hedge fund data from TASS, we find that the left‐tail risk captured by Expected Shortfall (ES) and Tail Risk (TR) explains the cross‐sectional variation in hedge fund returns very well, while the other risk measures provide statistically insignificant or marginally significant results. During the period between January 1995 and December 2004, hedge funds with high ES outperform those with low ES by an annual return difference of 7%. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical argument by Artzner et al. (1999) that ES is superior to VaR as a downside risk measure. We also find the Cornish‐Fisher (1937) expansion is superior to the nonparametric method in estimating ES and TR.     

对冲基金激进主义策略的研究综述

近些年,对冲基金激进主义策略受到越来越多基金管理者的关注,其研究重心也开始从资本市场价格变动转向标的企业管理层。对冲基金激进主义策略呈现出"改善公司治理、注重目标企业长期发展、减少委托代理冲突"等特点。本文针对该策略研究的转变,从对冲基金激进主义策略特征、市场有效性、策略研究方法以及对公司治理的改善等几个方面,对对冲基金激进主义策略进行综述。     

Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

This paper studies the presence of hedge funds in the Chapter 11 process and their effects on bankruptcy outcomes. Hedge funds strategically choose positions in the capital structure where their actions could have a bigger impact on value. Their presence, especially as unsecured creditors, helps balance power between the debtor and secured creditors. Their effect on the debtor manifests in higher probabilities of the latter's loss of exclusive rights to file reorganization plans, CEO turnover, and adoptions of key employee retention plan, while their effect on secured creditors manifests in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims.     

The Effect of Shortfall as a Risk Measure for Portfolios with Hedge Funds

Abstract:  Current research suggests that the large downside risk in hedge fund returns disqualifies the variance as an appropriate risk measure. For example, one can easily construct portfolios with nonlinear pay-offs that have both a high Sharpe ratio and a high downside risk. This paper examines the consequences of shortfall-based risk measures in the context of portfolio optimization. In contrast to popular belief, we show that negative skewness for optimal mean-shortfall portfolios can be much greater than for mean-variance portfolios. Using empirical hedge fund return data we show that the optimal mean-shortfall portfolio substantially reduces the probability of small shortfalls at the expense of an increased extreme crash probability. We explain this by proving analytically under what conditions short-put payoffs are optimal for a mean-shortfall investor. Finally, we show that quadratic shortfall or semivariance is less prone to these problems. This suggests that the precise choice of the downside risk measure is highly relevant for optimal portfolio construction under loss averse preferences.     

REIT Operational Efficiency: Performance,Risk, and Return

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Relations between Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) efficiency and operational performance, risk, and stock return are examined. REIT-level...     

The Secondary Market for Hedge Funds and the Closed Hedge Fund Premium

Rational theories of the closed‐end fund premium puzzle highlight fund share and asset illiquidity, managerial ability, and fees as important determinants of the premium. Several of these attributes are difficult to measure for mutual funds, and easier to measure for hedge funds. This paper employs new data from a secondary market for hedge funds, discovers a closed‐hedge fund premium that is highly correlated with the closed‐end mutual fund premium, and shows that the closed‐hedge fund premium is well explained by variables suggested by rational theories. Sentiment‐based explanations do not find support in the data.     

Hedge Funds and Corporate Innovation

Using National Bureau of Economics Research patent data and hedge fund holdings in US firms from 1998 to 2006, we examine the effect of hedge fund ownership on corporate innovation. We find that hedge fund ownership increases both patent quantity and quality, even after controlling for endogeneity. Hedge funds appear to increase innovation and firm value by increasing research and development (R&D) productivity and innovation efficiency rather than R&D input. Our study suggests another channel through which hedge funds may enhance firm value, contributing to the literature on hedge fund ownership.     

国际金融系统风险的放大与传导:对冲基金在金融风暴中的作用

作为国际热钱的代表,对冲基金在2007～2008年金融风暴中究竟起了怎样的作用?本文首先分析了对冲基金在危机中去杠杆化操作的原因及后果;通过构造1171家美国上市银行加权平均投资组合,以其月度收益率作为美国银行业代理变量,采用1994～2008年对冲基金月度数据进行经验论证。研究发现:第一,对冲基金去杠杆化放大了系统风险;第二,对冲基金全行业具有杠杆效应的一致性;第三,对冲基金的收益水平与美国银行业紧密相关,因此,对冲基金的行动是资本市场剧烈波动的影响因素,向美国银行业传导了系统风险,推动了金融风暴的形成。最后,本文提出加强对冲基金监管的思路。     

Hedge Fund Risk Dynamics: Implications for Performance Appraisal

Accurate appraisal of hedge fund performance must recognize the freedom with which managers shift asset classes, strategies, and leverage in response to changing market conditions and arbitrage opportunities. The standard measure of performance is the abnormal return defined by a hedge fund's exposure to risk factors. If exposures are assumed constant when, in fact, they vary through time, estimated abnormal returns may be incorrect. We employ an optimal changepoint regression that allows risk exposures to shift, and illustrate the impact on performance appraisal using a sample of live and dead funds during the period January 1994 through December 2005.     

Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble

This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives

This article studies one of the potential causes of the financialmarket bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutualfunds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds'advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendencyto herd. We argue that investing in bubble stocks amounts toherding and contracts with high incentives induce managers todiverge from the herd, thus reducing their holding of bubblestocks. The differential exposure to bubble stocks significantlyimpacted the funds' performance both in the period prior toMarch 2000, as well as afterwards.