跟单信用证欺诈防范中的两难选择——就进口商品质量的控制谈“受益人欺诈”与“软条款欺诈”

进口商为了能控制进口商品质量 ,防范信用证业务中的“受益人欺诈”而采取某些最为有效的条款 ,这些信用证条款又会导致进口商认为是“软条款”欺诈。在对两难选择的原因分析的基础上 ,提出了创新的解决思路。     

银行信用证风险管理的变化和趋势

信用证是被开证行应开证申请人的要求,通过一项约定向受益人保证其付款责任,受益人通过提交信用证规定的全部单据后向开证行收款。信用证的最重要的特征是各有关当事人处理的是单据,而不是与单据有关的货物、服务及／或其他行为。如果出口商提交了符合的单据,除了从开证行那里得到货款,他们从进口商那里也可以得到付款。信用证为遵守跟单信用证合同的进口商提供了保障。     

进口信用证业务风险分析与防范的管理

信用证业务以其特有的融资性、独立性、流通性以及迅捷的结算方式 ,受到进口商的一致青睐 ,但信用证结算过程中的风险也日益增多。文章分析了进口信用证业务中存在的种种风险 ,提出了银行应采取的防范措施     

国际贸易中信用证项下的风险分析

信用证(Letter of Credir,简称 L/C)结算方式是随着国际贸易的发展,在银行与金融机构参与国际贸易结算的过程中逐步形成的。信用证是把进口商履行的付款责任,转为由银行履行的付款责任,以保证出口商安全迅速收到货款,进口商按时受到货运单据。因此,信用证在一定程度上解决了进出口商之间付款和交货环节中的互不信任的矛盾洞时,也为进出口双方提供了资金融通的便利。所以,自出现信有证以来,这种结算方式发展很快,并在国际贸易中被广泛应用。目前,在我国信用证是对外贸易中的最主要结算方式。但是,根据《跟单信用证统一惯例》的规定,信用证…     

跟单信用证的风险及防范措施

以跟单信用证的内涵界定为基础,对跟单信用证的风险来源进行分析,从出口商和进口商的角度提出使用跟单信用证所产生风险的主要形式,进而得到防范信用证风险的措施。     

浅析出口商采用信用证支付方式面临的风险及防范

在国际贸易的日益发展的今天,出口商希望能安全收汇,进口商希望能按时收到货运单据.信用证的支付方式把汇付、托收等支付方式的商业信用取代为银行信用,本应由进口商履行的付款责任转给银行,从而保证出口商安全迅速地收到货款.但是从信用证的操作流程来看,银行在结算过程中只处理单据,不管货物和合同的情况,这就给有意欺诈的进口商提供了诈骗的机会.所以,在国际贸易中使用信用证的支付方式对于出口商来说并不是百分百安全的,这种支付方式也存在着一定的风险.因此,出口商在使用信用证方式进行支付时必须要清楚可能出现的风险,并进行有效的防范,以保证贸易活动安全顺利的进行.     

大宗商品贸易中进口信用证项下支付风险与防范

金融危机导致国际市场上大宗商品交易价格波动剧烈。作为大宗商品进口大国,我国通常采取信用证这一公认安全结算的方式。但由于其自身特点,信用证在提供保障和资金融通便利的同时,对进出口双方均存在一定风险。试从大宗商品贸易与信用证特点出发,从进口商角度对价格、融资、信用三方面风险展开讨论,并分别提供相应风险防范策略。     

信用证的作用与商检证书的关系

在国际经济贸易活动中,信用证的作用是十分重要的,也是商检工作中常见的。但对信用证的作用及与商检证书的关系,有些同志还缺乏了解。在此作一粗浅介绍,以供有关同志借鉴。在进出口贸易活动中,信用证是开证银行根据进口商(开证者)的申请,向出口商(受益人)开立的一定金额的在一定期限内凭规定的单证承诺付款的书面证件。信用证是建立在银行具有支付能力和信用牢靠基础之上     

信用证项下制单应该注意的若干问题

在国际贸易活动,买卖双方可能互不信任,买方担心预付款后,卖方不按合同要求发货;卖方也担心在发货或提交货运单据后买方不付款,所以信用证的使用越来越广泛.在贸易条件下,出口商根据进口商申请的以出口商为受益人的信用证,进行信用证项下交单.但是,制单员在制单的过程中,会出现很多不符点,导致单据被结汇银行退回,给进口商带来风险.本篇文章,根据具体业务操作中遇到的一些实际情况,分析信用证项下制单应该注意的若干问题,旨在提高企业的制单效率.     

浅析信用证欺诈风险及银行防范对策

随 着我国对外经济交往的增多 ,国际贸易的飞速发展 ,信用证日益成为国际贸易结算的重要工具 ,但是 ,近几年犯罪分子利用信用证进行欺诈活动比较猖獗 ,作为银行如何识别和防范信用证欺诈 ,应引起国际结算从业人员的高度重视。什么是信用证业务呢 ?信用证是一种开证银行根据申请人 (进口商 )的要求和申请向受益人 (出口商 )作出的条件的付款承诺 ,受益人只有在按信用证规定提供了信用证要求的单据时才能得到付款。信用证是国际贸易发展到一定程度的历史产物 ,它促进了国际贸易的发展。与其它国际结算方式相比 ,由于银行信用的介入 ,其可靠性得到加强 ,这是买卖双方乐于采用信用证结算的主要原因。但是 ,由于银行在信用证结算中只对有关单证作表面的审查 ,只要单证一致、单单一致就应对卖方付款 ,而对货物不予审查 ,这就使得一些不法商人有机可乘。卖方利用银行不管货物的特点 ,销售一些根本不存在的货物 ,并伪造提单 ;或者有时提单所取货物与实际货物完全不一样。在这种情况下 ,买方付了款 ,却拿不到货 ,或者拿到的货与所订的完全不同 ,成为受害者。对此 ,国际海事局经常发布公告 ,提醒一些进口商当心受不法出口商欺诈。在实践中 ,常见的信...     

A rational foundation for wishful exchange rate forecasts

Professor Takatoshi Ito in a recent American Economic Review paper documents that exporters and importers have biased exchange rate forecasts and the biases are in opposite directions. At first glance, it is difficult to provide a rational foundation for such behavior. Professor Ito hypothesizes that these forecasts are the result of wishful expectations. However, if forecasts are stochastic, then minimization of a quadratic loss function results in a rational hedge applied to either $/¥ or ¥/$. The different perspectives of importers and exporters determines which form is hedged and determines the direction of the bias.     

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the currents of trade

This paper examines how criminalizing the act of bribing a foreign public official affects international trade flows using a watershed global anti-corruption initiative — the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. I exploit variation in the timing of implementation by exporting countries and in the level of corruption of importing countries to quantify the Convention's effects on bilateral exports. I use a large panel of country pairs to control for confounding global and national trends and shocks. I find that, on average, the Convention caused a reduction in exports from signatory countries to high corruption importers relative to low corruption importers. In particular, we observe a 5.7% relative decline in bilateral exports to importers that lie one standard deviation lower on the Worldwide Governance Indicators corruption index. This suggests that by creating large penalties for foreign bribery, the Convention indirectly increased transaction costs between signatory countries and high corruption importers. The Convention may have induced OECD firms to divert their exports to less corrupt countries; while non-OECD firms not bound by the Convention may have increased their exports to corrupt countries. I also find evidence that the Convention's effects differed across product categories.     

Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty *

This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]     

The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America

This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.     

Volume Quotas with Heterogeneous Product Categories*

Volume quotas on imports are an important part of assistance packages afforded a number of major industries in Australia. Generally, quota is allocated to importers free of charge, although recently a proportion of quota for some product groups has been sold by tender. In this paper we compare the effects of volume quotas applied to heterogeneous product groups when allocated free of charge, by full tender sale and by a combination offender sale and free allocation. The analysis is undertaken for both competitive markets and in the case where importers have some market power.     

Gains and losses from transfers of solid waste

Municipal solid waste is often transferred to landfills in other regions or states. While municipalities frequently resist imports, the interpretations of the Interstate Commerce Clause require that landfills accept waste regardless of its origin. This may require importers to act in ways that are not in their own best interest. The analysis of this paper suggests that importers benefit from trade when their landfill is so large that it is not exhausted at the end of the planning period. However, when landfill capacity is sufficiently scarce, importing waste is not welfare enhancing. Such municipalities have considerable motivation to try to de facto exclude waste from outside the municipality.     

The role of price risk in China’s agricultural and fisheries exports to the US

This article explores the effect of price risk on the US importers’ optimal allocation of agriculture imports between the major supplier, China, and other competing countries. We first modify a demand system to account for the impacts of own-price risk and cross-price risk, and then apply the model to 16 agricultural and fisheries commodities exported to the US. The estimation results show that importers are sensitive to price risks of 14 Chinese commodities. Comparisons between price risk–trade relations of agricultural and fisheries products and between trade effects of cross-price risk on Chinese goods and substitutes provide strong evidence for explaining the observed trade patterns. Our study highlights the importance of price stability in promoting international trade, especially from developing countries to developed countries.     

WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERSPECTIVES: OIL AND NATURAL GAS

Among nations that are net oil exporters, those that are net importers, and those in balance, there are conflicting interests regarding the price level—which currently is many times the competitive level. However, avoiding too brusque a price change is in the interest of all. A glut was no barrier to price increases after 1973, nor in 1978. And a glut is not an absolute barrier even today. Nations which comprise the oil cartel have short horizons and high discount factors. This increases the likelihood that they will attempt price hikes and makes any equilibrium precarious. Even non-cartel nations produce less oil and gas than would be profitable because governments, responding to public opinion, try to obtain more rent than there is to take. These governments apparently use unrealistically low discount rates. This paper attempts to point out parallel, common, and conflicting interests among the nations of the Western Hemisphere regarding price and production policy on crude oil and natural gas. In crude oil and oil products, Argentina is in balance, and Canada is practically so. Venezuela and Ecuador, both OPEC members, are net exporters. Mexico, a de facto member of OPEC, has observed a self-imposed quota more faithfully than some OPEC members. The rest of the nations in the hemisphere are net importers.     

Exchange rate uncertainty and import prices in the euro area

This paper analyzes the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on the pricing behavior of import firms in the euro area. Uncertainty is measured via the volatility of the structural shocks to the exchange rate in a nonlinear vector‐autoregressive model framework and is an important determinant of import prices. An increase in exchange rate uncertainty is associated with a fall in prices on average, which suggests that the exchange rate risk is borne by the importers. Controlling for the origin of imports (within or outside the euro area) is important for assessing the impact of exchange rate movements on prices.