多边贸易体制互惠原则探析——兼论多边贸易体制对发展中和 “非市场经济 ”成员的差别待遇

互惠是人类合作关系的基石,国际贸易协定将之作为基本原则原因正在于此。在多边贸易体制中,互惠虽未得到明确界定,但却被公认与最惠国共同构成其两个基本原则,互惠是双边谈判的动因和策略,最惠国则是双边谈判成果多边化的实现机制。与最惠国的有条件性和无条件性相对应,互惠有特定和一般之分。由于一般互惠缺乏严格的减让对等和利益平衡,多边贸易体制始终是特定互惠和一般互惠的混合,并在对发达成员、发展中成员和"非市场经济"成员分别强调不同互惠待遇的基础上,形成了一个三层结构。     

Labor-management contract negotiations in an electronic meeting room: A case study

We present perhaps the first case study of labor-management contract talks conducted in an electronic meeting room supported by a computer Negotiation Support System (NSS). The organization's union and management representatives spent a total of 57 hours (13 sessions) in the electronic meeting room; their efforts resulted successfully in a contract ratified by both sides. The NSS described comprised three tools from theGroup Systems electronic meeting system and three ad hoc tools. Besides the NSS, three other intervention factors were introduced in tandem with the NSS: new negotiation process techniques, the active involvement of third party mediators, and a unique negotiation setting. The new process techniques were introduced based on the goals of integrative bargaining and the Win-Win techniques. The negotiation process was divided into three distinct stages: strategy, issues, and bargaining.     

Business-to-Business Negotiations: The Role of Relativism,Deceit, and Opportunism

Purpose: Studies examining the impact of relativism and deceitful tendencies on unethical negotiation tactics have yielded inconsistent results; some studies report a positive relationship, some negative, while some others report a nonexistent relationship between these constructs. These inconsistencies suggest that there may be intervening variables mediating the effects of these factors on unethical negotiation tactics. We propose that opportunism plays an important role in determining the effects of these two antecedents on business managers' perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.

Method: An Internet-based survey was administered to a sample of managers at U.S. firms engaged in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modeling techniques were used to evaluate the mediating role of opportunism between deceitful tendencies and relativism on questionable negotiation tactics.

Findings: The analysis supports the hypothesized role of opportunism as a mediating variable. Opportunism was found to play a significant role in mediating the relationships of both relativism and deceitful tendencies on attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.

Contribution: In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested here, this article includes suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that a negotiation partner's relativism and deceitful tendencies will negatively impact business negotiation.     

Perceptual differences in appropriateness and likelihood of use of negotiation behaviors: A cross-cultural analysis

This paper examines the influence of culture and economic climate on perceptions of ethicality of negotiation behaviors between two emerging trading partners in the Western Hemisphere. Three hundred and forty future business leaders from Brazil and the United States rated their perceptions of the appropriateness and likelihood of use of eighteen negotiation behaviors. The results indicate significant differences in perceptions of the appropriateness of most tactics, but similarities in terms of respondents' likelihood of employing tactics that involve third parties. For respondents from both countries, traditional competitive bargaining behaviors (e.g., pretending you are in no hurry, hiding your bottom line, exaggerating an opening demand) were among the most accepted tactics. The implications of these findings for cross-cultural negotiations are discussed, along with opportunities for future research.     

Design and Implementation of Business Objects for Automated Business Negotiations

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the specification, generation and exchange of business objects in the context of electronic commerce. Common business objects have been defined for product catalogs, purchase orders and other business entities. However, no business objects have been defined and implemented for supporting automated business negotiations even though business negotiation is very much an integral part of business activities. In this work, we have designed and implemented a set of business negotiation objects for supporting the bargaining type of business negotiations. These objects define the operations and information contents needed for negotiation parties to express their requirements and constraints during a bargaining process. They correspond to a set of negotiation primitives, which is a superset of the negotiation-related primitives defined in two popular languages: ACL and COOL. The implementation of these objects is patterned after the business object documents in the XML format proposed by the Open Applications Group, thus conforming to the established standard. The incorporation of several types of constraint specifications in these business negotiation objects provides the negotiation parties and the negotiation servers that represent them much expressive power in specifying callforproposals and proposals. Two synchronization problems and their solutions associated with the withdrawal and modification of negotiation proposals are addressed and presented in this paper. The use of these business negotiation objects in a bilateral bargaining protocol is also presented. We have validated the utility of these objects in an integrated network environment, which consists of two replicated negotiation servers, two commercial products, and some other university research systems that form a supply chain.     

Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO

Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process.     

“I am Disgusted by Your Proposal”: The Effects of a Strategic Flinch in Negotiations

To flinch in negotiations refers to verbal or physical displays of shock, disgust, or disbelief made in response to an opening offer. We investigated the impact of advising negotiators to strategically flinch in distributive bargaining. In experiment 1, negotiators who flinched claimed significantly more value than negotiators who did not flinch. Targets of a flinch, however, viewed the negotiation relationship less positively than negotiators in a control condition. Yet, flinching appeared to have no effect on the target negotiators’ perceptions of how well they did. In experiment 2, the notion that a subtle flinch might still facilitate value claiming but without imperilling the bargaining relationship was supported. Implications for negotiation theory and practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

A Recursive Protocol for Negotiating Contracts Under Non-monotonic Preference Structures

Negotiating contracts with multiple interdependent issues may yield non-monotonic preference spaces for the participating agents. These negotiations are specially challenging because of the complexity and dimension of the search space. Automated negotiation mechanisms designed and proven useful for monotonic utility spaces may fail in these negotiation scenarios. This paper presents a novel solution to the problem of automated multi-issue negotiations in the context of complex utility spaces. We seek to address the challenge of intractably large contract spaces and utility functions with multiple local optima in automated negotiation scenarios. A protocol for automated bilateral multi-attribute negotiation processes is proposed, in which the individual agents??preferences can be non-monotonic and discontinuous. The protocol is based on a recursive non-mediated bargaining mechanism, which involves two agents who simultaneously exchange proposals defined as regions within the negotiation space. An agreement on a region implies a new bargaining which is restricted to that region. This recursive process is governed by a set of rules which modulate the joint exploration of the negotiation space until an agreement is found or a deadline expires. The protocol is experimentally evaluated under monotonic and non-monotonic preference scenarios, confirming that the protocol is able to produce outcomes close to the Pareto frontier in acceptable negotiation time, outperforming previous approaches.     

Web Services for Negotiation and Bargaining in Electronic Markets: Design Requirements, Proof-of-Concepts, and Potential Applications to e-Procurement

Information Systems researchers continue to develop Web services hoping that, in a near future, these services will be widely offered in the e-marketplace, using a Web-based protocol that is universally adopted for posting, locating and invoking available services. Posting services does not, however, necessarily lead to market transactions, and a number of brokering activities are needed to facilitate trade. These include, but are not limited to, service discovery and ranking, price negotiation and contract preparation. We propose a set of Web services that support the process of negotiation and bargaining to facilitate the matching of supply and demand of Web services. As a market broker, these web services would help (a) discover the supply/demand of web services in e-marketplaces; (b) find the most appropriate available service for a specific request; (c) facilitate services be modified if needed to satisfy user's needs; (d) arbitrate the pricing mechanism with the recourse to bargaining whenever necessary; and (e) generate a contract. As a proof of concept, we illustrate the potential use of Web services for negotiation and bargaining in e-procurement.     

Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation

Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents’ networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness predicted disapproval of false promises and misrepresentation. Empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the analysis. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy.     

The effect of communication medium on negotiation performance

Concepts of media efficiency and media richness are employed to describe the impact of communication media on two key aspects of negotiation behavior—reducing uncertainty about the task, and managing equivocality about negotiator's bargaining orientation. A controlled experiment was conducted to examine how the use of either audio or text forms of verbal communication, and the presence or absence of visual communication, impacts negotiation performance in a bilateral monopoly task. Each member of a pair of negotiators received private instructions either to maximize joint profit (a cooperative bargaining orientation) or to maximize individual profit (an individualistic bargaining orientation). Negotiation performance was measured via the total amount of relative cooperativeness of verbal communication and joint profit. In the audio mode as opposed to the text mode, the total amount of verbal communication and joint profit was increased. In the presence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was less than that of cooperative negotiators. In the absence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was no less than that of cooperative negotiators. In sum the findings suggest that uncertainty regarding the logical structure of the task was reduced primarily via verbal communciation, while equivocality regarding the bargaining orientation of the other negotiator was reduced primarily via visual communication. The implications for group decision and negotiation research and practice are explored.     

What matters in a price negotiation: Evidence from the U.S. auto retailing industry

While there is a great deal of theoretical and experimental literature on what factors affect bargaining outcomes, there is little empirical work based on data from real markets. In this paper we analyze negotiations for new cars, a $340 billion industry in the United States in 2010. Our results suggest that search costs, incomplete information, and bargaining disutility have an economically significant effect in real-world negotiations: we estimate that relative to an uninformed consumer, a consumer with basic information about the seller’s reservation price and his own outside options captures 15% of the average dealer margin from selling an automobile. We also find that a buyer’s search cost and bargaining disutility have significant effects on bargaining outcomes. Finally, our results show that while search is common, there remains a substantial group of consumers who do not engage in any of the search behaviors we measure. We hypothesize that these buyers are not aware of how easy and effective certain activities in improving negotiation outcomes can be.     

A Model of Bargaining over Hazardous Waste Cleanup

We put forward a formal model of a bargaining problem in which two parties suspected of contaminating the environment are responsible for clean-up costs. If the parties do not negotiate an agreement on a cost allocation, one will be imposed by the government. This process is commonly used in environmental cleanups performed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). Passed by the US Congress in 1980 and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CERCLA provides the U.S. government with authority to manage releases (or threatened releases) of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment. We conclude that potentially responsible parties will be induced to settle only in the face of specific allocations of clean-up and explicit threats. For example, at the Middlefield–Ellis–Whisman Superfund site in Mountain View, California, the responsibilities of the different parties for soil and groundwater contamination are understood by all, yet our negotiation model predicts that without the threat that additional costs will be imposed, agreement on the allocation of clean up costs will never be reached.     

Fuzzy Negotiation Solutions of n-Person Cooperative Games by Knowledge Engineering in Bargaining

A model for negotiation is developed upon the basis of a previous model called Fuzzy Negotiation Solution by Knowledge Engineering. The new model, called Compensatory Negotiation Solution by Knowledge Engineering and FNSKE are based on the combination of knowledge of experts in negotiation, rather than on classical notions of rationality. The experts in negotiation present four propositions in a non-mathematical way and with a natural language, according to the theory of Knowledge Engineering. In the CNSKE model, knowledge is represented through logic predicates, and the calculations are made using the Compensatory Fuzzy Logic system. CFL is a system whose operators satisfy the axioms of Utility. The CFL operators, especially because of the compensation property, are more adequate than the norm and co-norm’s operators to model human decision-making, according to empirical results. The Good Deal Index in CNSKE is statistically estimated from the GDI in FNSKE. This is a quantitative index, which provides the solution concept. The fuzzy function f(C) represents the likelihood the players of a coalition C to reach an agreement into this coalition. Counterpart Convenience Indexes 1, 2 allow each player to select the best coalition for negotiation. The advantage of CNSKE over FNSKE is that the idempotency of conjunction and disjunction operators give every membership function -obtained from the predicates- the possibility to be interpreted by itself. Hence, the truth-values of the CNSKE membership functions can be semantically interpreted. In addition, CNSKE can be easily applied to solve real negotiation problems.     

Negotiation protocol based on ordered weighted averaging and Fuzzy metrics

ABSTRACT

Negotiation Support Systems are used to exchange offers and to improve the negotiation process. Some methods are based on perspectives like heuristics in order to bring the negotiation protocol gradually closer to reality. These approaches can be important in real negotiation as they can help to improve skillsespecially in distributive bargaining. This paper proposes a Negotiation Support framework to provide the negotiator with recommendations on making decisions in a negotiation process. To input this idea into negotiation protocols, this paper suggests that some concepts based on OWA (Ordered Weighted Averaging) and some of its metrics (Orness, Dispersion) be included in the heuristics of a structured negotiation schedule. It is expected that the support provided will aid the negotiator to make decisions during the negotiation process, to learn from the elicitation and his own behavior the results obtained can help the negotiator improving his skills in the negotiation process.     

Resolving Impasses in e-Negotiation: Does e-Mediation Work?

In this article we evaluate the performance of an e-mediation system, referred to as VienNA, in an e-negotiation environment. A set of hypotheses drawn from the mediation and e-mediation literatures are explored. Bargaining processes, outcomes, and perceptions are compared for bargainers that have access to the VienNA system with those that do not have access during negotiation. Supporting several of the hypotheses, bargainers with access to the system were more flexible during the process, showed more concession reciprocation, sent more messages dealing with relationships and related sources of conflict, and were more satisfied with both the process and outcome. Early use of the system produced more flexible bargaining and better outcomes than later use, a finding that supports research on mediation in international conflicts. More balanced agreements occurred when bargainers consulted a form of advice known as fairness norms. Implications of these results for theory and practice are discussed along with suggestions for further research.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed: DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, Free Trade Under Fire BARBARA BLASZCZYK, IRAJ HOSHI and RICHARD WOODWARD (eds.), Secondary Privatisation in Transition Economies: The Evolution of Enterprise Ownership in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia JAGDISH BHAGWATI (ed.), Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in Freeing Trade THEO S. EICHER and STEPHEN J. TURNOVSKY (eds.), Inequality and Growth: Theory and Policy Implications     

A Classification of Bargaining Steps and their Impact on Negotiation Outcomes

In this paper, we develop a typology of bargaining steps for multi-issue negotiations, which is derived from possible changes in single issues. By considering all combinations of such changes, we create a consistent classification of steps. This classification forms the basis of an empirical analysis of the impact of different types of bargaining steps on various outcome dimensions of negotiations. We perform an exploratory analysis based on an ex-post analysis of existing negotiation data, which was collected over several years using an Internet-based negotiation support system. Empirical results indicate a strong positive impact of log-rolling strategies and a negative impact of “hard” tactics like insistence on the chances of reaching an agreement. Contrary to expectations, hard tactics do not improve the efficiency of agreements.     

East–West Differences in “Tricky” Tactics: A Comparison of the Tactical Preferences of Chinese and Australian Negotiators

How do Eastern and Western perceptions of “tricky” or ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics differ? We address this question by comparing 161 Chinese and 146 Australian participants’ ratings of the appropriateness of different types of negotiation tactics. We predict that their differing cultural values (e.g., individualism/collectivism, importance of face) as well as their different implicit theories of how negotiation ought to be conducted (i.e., mental models, such as captured in The Secret Art of War: The 36 Stratagems) will be salient in their perceptions of tactics. Examining 24 tactics falling into eight categories, we found that overall the Chinese respondents saw these tactics as more appropriate than did the Australian respondents. There were, however, differences across categories of tactics. Chinese participants rated tactics related to the 36 stratagems as significantly more appropriate than did Australian participants, including diverting attention, misrepresenting information and making false promises. In some cases, the Chinese also saw feigning positive feelings/emotions as more appropriate than did the Australian participants, while an Australian preference for feigning negative feelings/emotions was partially supported. The implications of these findings for practitioners are discussed, along with opportunities for future research.