Does the investment horizon of institutional investors matter for stock liquidity?

This paper examines the role of the investment horizon of institutional investors on stock liquidity of firms. We show that an increase in long-term institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm liquidity, while an increase in short-term ownership is positively related to a firm's stock liquidity. We identify the ownership-liquidity relationship by examining two major channels: the trading activity channel and the informational friction channel. Long-term investors reduce stock liquidity through low frequency trading and access to value-enhancing and private information, which induces adverse selection bias. In contrast, short-term investors improve liquidity through trading activity and competition with other investors, which lowers transaction costs. Our findings further suggest that the effects of an increase in long-term (short-term) institutional investors on liquidity weaken (strengthen) when a firm has more publicly available information. Finally, we show that the positive impact of an increase in long-term ownership on valuation is more pronounced for firms with higher liquidity and the valuation effect is persistent.     

Stock Splits: An Institutional Investor Preference

This study examines the relationship between the level of institutional ownership and the likelihood that firms will enact a stock split. There is evidence of a positive relationship between institutional ownership and subsequent split behavior. A firm size effect emerges from the finding that larger firms have higher percentages of institutional owners. This implies that institutional investors either encourage stock split behavior or invest in firms that exhibit indicators of eminent stock splits. Institutions purchasing shares before the split are likely to obtain short-term and long-term earmings increases.     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

Comparable firms and the precision of equity valuations

I investigate the relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables (i.e., firms in the same line of business as the firm being valued) and the precision of the firm's equity valuation. When investors have more information, previous studies argue that investors can make a more precise estimate of a firm's true equity value and this implies a lower (excess) stock return volatility around corporate events such as earnings announcements. I develop a simple model that shows a negative relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables and the firm's stock return volatility. Using alternative measures of information provided by comparables and different definitions of comparables, I consistently find a negative and significant relationship between these information measures and stock return volatility, ceteris paribus.     

Institutional monitoring and litigation risk: Evidence from employee disputes

In this article, we investigate how institutional investors help mitigate business‐related risks in a corporate environment. Using a large sample of employment disputes, litigations, and court cases, we find that institutional investors play a significant role in reducing employment litigation. We observe that firms with larger shares of institutional ownership have a lower incidence of employment lawsuits and that long‐term institutional investors are more effective at decreasing employee mistreatment. Our results suggest that institutional investors can improve the employee work environment and help mitigate future employee litigation. The improvement in employee work conditions has been shown to increase a firm's value through increased employee output, reduced litigation, and direct and indirect costs. Our results shed light on the effectiveness of institutional monitoring on a firm's litigation risk.     

Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency

We examine the association between institutional ownership and defined benefit (DB) pension decisions. We find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with pension underfunding, opportunistic increases in the expected rate of return assumption in the presence of underfunding, and significant ownership of the firm's own stock in the DB plan portfolio. Furthermore, these relations are stronger when institutional ownership is concentrated, when institutions are nontransient investors, or when institutions are relatively large. These results suggest that institutional investors are monitoring firm pension decisions, particularly those institutions with stronger monitoring incentives or resources.     

Stock price synchronicity,crash risk,and institutional investors

Both stock price synchronicity and crash risk are negatively related to the firm's ownership by dedicated institutional investors, which have strong incentive to monitor due to their large stake holdings and long investment horizons. In contrast, the relations become positive for transient institutional investors as they tend to trade rather than monitor. These findings suggest that institutional monitoring limits managers' extraction of the firm's cash flows, which reduces the firm-specific risk absorbed by managers, thereby leading to a lower R². Moreover, institutional monitoring mitigates managerial bad-news hoarding, which results in a stock price crash when the accumulated bad news is finally released.     

Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of accruals. Using Bushee;s (1998) classification of institutional investors, we show that firms with a high level of institutional ownership and a minimum threshold level of active institutional traders have stock prices that more accurately reflect the persistence of accruals. This result holds after controlling for differences in the persistence of accruals between firms with high and low institutional ownership, and after controlling for other characteristics that are correlated with institutional ownership and future returns. Additionally, firms with low institutional ownership are smaller, less profitable, and have lower share turnover, suggesting that limits to arbitrage impede institutional investors from exploiting the seemingly large abnormal returns for these firms.     

Accounting Choice, Home Bias, and U.S. Investment in Non-U.S. Firms

This paper examines the relation between accounting choice and U.S. institutional investor ownership in non‐U.S. firms. We predict that U.S. investors exhibit home bias in their preference for accounting methods conforming to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) because such methods are more familiar, reduce information processing costs, and are perceived as higher quality. We find that firms exhibiting higher levels (changes) of U.S. GAAP conformity have greater levels (changes) of U.S. institutional ownership. Lead‐lag regressions suggest that increases in U.S. GAAP conformity precede increases in U.S. investment, but changes in U.S. institutional holdings do not precede changes in accounting methods. We also find that the positive relation between U.S. GAAP conformity and U.S. investment holds regardless of a firm's visibility to U.S. investors (e.g., American Depositary Receipt listing, stock index membership, analyst following, firm size). However, we find that U.S. GAAP conformity has a significantly greater impact among firms already visible to U.S. investors.     

The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance

This paper examines the relation between institutional investor involvement in and the operating performance of large firms. We find a significant relation between a firm’s operating cash flow returns and both the percent of institutional stock ownership and the number of institutional stockholders. However, this relation is found only for a subset of institutional investors: those less likely to have a business relationship with the firm. These results suggest that institutional investors with potential business relations with the firms in which they invest are compromised as monitors of the firm.     

Does institutional ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from Vietnam

The literature on institutional ownership and stock return volatility often ignores small emerging countries. However, this issue is more profound, due to the large size of institutional investors and small stock market size, in emerging equity markets. This paper examines the effects of the institutional ownership on the firm-level volatility of stock returns in Vietnam. Our data cover most of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange for the period 2006–2012. Employing different analysis techniques for panel data and controlling for possible endogeneity problems, our empirical results suggest that institutional investors stabilize the stock return volatility. Moreover, we document that: i) the stabilizing effect of institutional investor ownership is higher in dividend paying firms, and ii) if firms are paying out more dividends, this stabilizing effect is greater. Our results outline the important role of institutional investors in maintaining the stability in emerging stock markets.     

THE LIQUIDITY ROUTE TO A LOWER COST OF CAPITAL

The managements of many public companies do not pay much attention to the liquidity of their securities. Many if not most CEOs and CFOs feel powerless to affect what goes on in financial markets, and a common attitude among top executives is that maintaining liquidity is the concern of the securities exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission. This approach may work for those companies whose stocks are already highly liquid—a group made up mainly of large‐cap companies, as well as a number of smaller high‐flying, high‐tech firms. But, for the vast majority of public companies—especially smaller and mid‐sized firms—this is likely to be the wrong policy. As the authors of this article demonstrated in their pioneering study (published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 1986), liquidity appears to be a major determinant of a company's cost of capital. As their theory suggests and their empirical tests confirmed, the more liquid a company's securities, the lower its cost of capital and the higher its stock price. And, as discussed in this article, academic research since then has produced a large and impressive body of evidence linking greater liquidity to higher stock prices. Although recent technological innovations such as Internet‐based trading have increased liquidity generally, not all companies appear to have benefited equally. The authors offer a number of suggestions for companies intent on increasing the liquidity of their stock. Specifically, they propose that managers do the following: (1) consider measures, such as stock splits, designed to increase their investor base by attracting small investors; (2) seek trading venues for their securities that promise to increase liquidity; and (3) take advantage of the new Internet technology to provide more and better information to investors. Moreover, for smaller companies with little or no analyst coverage, the authors offer the radical suggestion that such companies actually pay analysts to cover their stock, much as companies pay Moody's or Standard & Poors to rate their bonds. This, in the authors' view, would be a more efficient alternative to the current practice of using stock splits to encourage intermediaries to make markets in the firm's shares.     

Ownership level,ownership concentration and liquidity

We examine the link between the liquidity of a firm's stock and its ownership structure, specifically, how much of the firm's stock is owned by insiders and institutions, and how concentrated is their ownership. We find that the liquidity-ownership relation is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than insider ownership. Importantly, liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively related to institutional blockholdings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that while the level of institutional ownership proxies for trading activity, the concentration of such ownership proxies for adverse selection.     

Why are Stock Splits Declining?

The percentage of firms undertaking stock splits has fallen from a peak of 23% in 1982 to less than 1% in 2009. Controlling for time trends and other economic determinants, the declining incidence of stock splits is significantly associated with a drop in household investors’ equity holdings and with a rise in household income. We also report a decline in the size of split factors that is associated with an increase in institutional ownership of equity and with an increase in household income. Collectively, the evidence is consistent with firms responding rationally to changes in investor characteristics.     

Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns

We employ corporate takeover decisions to investigate the impact of institutional ownership on corporate performance. The OLS regressions of bidder gains on institutional ownership indicate a positive relation between the two. However, we find institutional ownership to be significantly determined by firm size, insider ownership and the firm's presence in the S&P 500 index. Thus, when bidder gains are regressed on the predicted values of institutional ownership in two-stage regressions, the recursive estimates do not confirm the relationship shown by the OLS regressions. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence that active institutional investors (e.g., CalPERS) as a group enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control. These findings cast doubt on the superior selection/monitoring abilities of institutional investors.     

Institutional investment horizons,corporate governance,and credit ratings: International evidence

Using a comprehensive set of firms from 57 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we examine the relation between institutional investor horizons and firm-level credit ratings. Controlling for firm- and country-specific factors, as well as for firm fixed effects, we find that larger long-term (short-term) institutional ownership is associated with higher (lower) credit ratings. This finding is robust to sample composition, alternative estimation methods, and endogeneity concerns. Long-term institutional ownership affects ratings more during times of higher expropriation risk, for firms with weaker internal corporate governance, and for those in countries with lower-quality institutional environments. Additional analysis shows that long-term investors facilitate access to debt markets for firms facing severe agency problems. These findings suggest that, unlike their short-term counterparts, long-term investors improve a firm's credit risk profile through effective monitoring.     

Institutional investors: Arbitrageurs or rational trend chasers

This paper studies the relationship between institutional investor holdings and stock misvaluation in the U.S. between 1980 and 2010. I find that institutional investors overweigh overvalued and underweigh undervalued stocks in their portfolio, taking the market portfolio as a benchmark. Cross-sectionally, institutional investors hold more overvalued stocks than undervalued stocks. The time-series studies also show that institutional ownership of overvalued portfolios increases as the portfolios' degree of overvaluation. As an investment strategy, institutional investors' ride of stock misvaluation is neither driven by the fund flows from individual investors into institutions, nor industry-specific. Consistent with the agency problem explanation, investment companies and independent investment advisors have a higher tendency to ride stock misvaluation than other institutions. There is weak evidence that institutional investors make a profit by riding stock misvaluation. My findings challenge the models that view individual investors as noise traders and disregard the role of institutional investors in stock market misvaluation.     

Insider ownership and signals: evidence from stock split announcement effects

This study examines whether investors regard the level of insider ownership of a firm as useful for evaluating stock split decisions. Results show that the abnormal returns at the announcement of stock splits are positively related to the level of insider ownership. The results prevail even after controlling for other relevant factors. Further analysis indicates the positive relation exists for small firms, but not for large firms. This indicates the market evaluates stock split decisions within the context of both insider ownership and information asymmetry.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Determinants of Managerial Stock Ownership: The Case of CEOs

Research on the determinants of managerial equity ownership in firms is scant. To a limited extent, prior researchers have examined the variations in insider ownership proportions by combining the officers and directors into one group. This paper differs from earlier studies by focusing on the CEO. The evidence suggests that agency costs, free cash flow, and potential non-diversification losses and CEO attributes are important in explaining variations in CEOs' equity proportions in firms. Specifically, the paper finds that the proportion of CEO's ownership is related positively to the firm's debt level, diversification potential of the firm's common stock, free cash flows, and earnings volatility, and related negatively to the firm size.