FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE LIQUIDITY EFFECTS OF STOCK SPLITS AND STOCK DIVIDENDS

Currently, there is a limited amount of empirical evidence suggesting that stock splits are associated with a decline in trading liquidity. This evidence directly contrasts with managements' professed intentions for undertaking a split. The evidence to date, however, is of a short-run nature. This study reexamines the liquidity effects of stock splits and stock dividends by assessing both their short- and long-term effects on trading liquidity (i.e., proportional trading volume and percentage bid-ask spreads). The results suggest that stock dividends are associated with decreased proportional trading volume in both the short term and long term, but stock splits are not. The results also indicate that neither stock splits nor stock dividends have an effect on percentage bid-ask spreads.     

THE CROSS-SECTIONAL EFFECTS OF OPTION LISTING ON FIRM STOCK RETURN VARIANCES

We develop a set of hypotheses to explain cross-sectional differences in variance changes associated with option listing. Transactions variance is decomposed into three components: the bid-ask spread, return autocorrelations, and intrinsic variance. Each is investigated separately. We find support for hypotheses that link: (1) changes in dealer transactions costs to changes in the bid-ask spread following option listing; (2) changes in the quantity and quality of information and the value of new information to movements of the return autocorrelation structure toward zero; and (3) changes in trading volume and the clientele that trades the underlying security to changes in intrinsic variance following option listing.     

A FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS: THE CASE OF REVERSE STOCK SPLITS

In this study we analyze reverse stock splits and demonstrate that the total risk of returns to reverse splitting securities declines after the split, yet systematic risk remains essentially unchanged. In general, securities have negative abnormal stock returns at reverse split announcements, though smaller companies have stronger negative reactions. Companies forced to reverse split have positive wealth effects.     

SMALL FIRM AND VALUE EFFECTS IN THE CANADIAN STOCK MARKET

We examine the relation among average returns, market beta, firm size, and book-to-market value for Canadian stocks during 1975–92. We document a negative relation between average return and the market capitalization of firms, but find no relation between average return and market beta. While the small firm effect is significant during a period of reduced capital gains tax, it is noticeably lower than during the period leading up to the change. We find that average returns are positively related to book-to-market value especially during the period of lower capital gains tax.     

A NOTE ON FIRM SIZE, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY AND MARKET REACTIONS TO US STOCK OWNERSHIP REPORTING ANNOUNCEMENTS

This note examines cross-sectional differences in market reaction to five percent stock ownership reporting announcements. The results presented here document an inverse relationship between firm size and market reaction. Specifically, the announcement day market reaction is 310 percent larger for a portfolio of small firms compared to a portfolio of large firms.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

THE RISE IN MANAGERIAL STOCK OWNERSHIP

Despite the widespread view from Berle and Means onward that ownership of U.S. companies has become increasingly separated from managerial control, the authors report that managerial ownership of public corporations is markedly higher today than in 1935. Using a comprehensive sample of the 1,500 publicly traded firms in 1935 and a comparable sample of 4,200 firms in 1995, their study finds that managerial ownership increased from an average of 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995. In terms of real (1995) dollar values, average managerial ownership increased from $18 million to $73 million over the same 60‐year period. One potential explanation for this increase is that greater reliance on managerial ownership has substituted for less reliance on other incentive alignment devices, such as pay‐for performance and the market for corporate control. The authors, however, report just the opposite. The use of such other corporate governance mechanisms has generally also increased over time, suggesting that the top managements of today's publicly traded corporations face greater pressure from investors and boards of directors than managements earlier in the century. An alternative explanation concern possible changes over time in the effects of certain company characteristics on the costs and benefits of using managerial ownership as a control device. While most of the characteristics the authors examined had the same relationship to managerial ownership in both periods, the role of volatility was different. In 1935, managerial ownership was inversely related to firm volatility; that is, higher volatility was associated with lower managerial ownership. In 1995, however, the relationship of managerial ownership to volatility was “nonlinear”; managerial ownership was positively related to firm volatility at low and moderate levels of volatility but the relationship turns negative when firm volatility is high. The overall lower level of volatility today, together with advances in capital markets and financial theory that have reduced the costs of hedging, appear to have reduced the costs of managers holding large stakes in their firms.     

THE EFFECTS OF BORROWING ON THE RATE OF GROWTH OF CAPITAL AND THE RISK OF RUIN OF A FIRM

The research reported in this paper used Monte Carlo simulation to study the long term effects of borrowing policy on the rate of growth of capital and the risk (probability) of ruin of hypothetical firms, operating in explicitly described, realistic capital budgeting environments. The capital rationing environment is described explicitly. The debt policies modeled were based on the results of interviews with senior financial executives in eight major firms. The results indicate that three intuitively appealing ranking procedures performed equally well and all out-performed a random selection decision procedure: yielding higher rates of capital growth with lower risks of ruin. In general, an aggressive borrowing policy resulted in a higher average capital growth rate for a firm but a conservative borrowing policy resulted in a lower risk of ruin. It is believed that the results provide some interesting insights which indicate that a computer simulation model could be used to aid management in the evaluation of their capital budgeting procedures and borrowing policies.