经理人过度自信、不对称信息与企业投资决策

通过构造二阶段投资模型,本文探讨信息不对称情况下经理人过度自信对企业投资决策的影响。研究结果表明:对于真实融资约束企业和伪融资约束企业,经理人过度自信心理偏误可能引发投资过度或投资不足;过度自信程度对企业投资-现金流敏感度有正向影响;对于过度自信程度轻微的劣质企业,投资对现金流不敏感,经理人心理偏误仅在举债筹资时可能引发过度投资。     

经理入过度自信、不对称信息与企业投资决策

通过构造二阶段投资模型,本文探讨信息不对称情况下经理人过度自信对企业投资决策的影响。研究结果表明：对于真实融资约束企业和伪融资约束企业,经理人过度自信心理偏误可能引发投资过度或投资不足;过度自信程度对企业投资一现金流敏感度有正向影响;对于过度自信程度轻微的劣质企业,投资对现金流不敏感,经理人心理偏误仅在举债筹资时可能引发过度投资。     

管理者过度自信、道德风险与企业投资决策

本文分析了道德风险背景下管理者过度自信对企业投资决策的影响.研究结论认为,在资本市场完全竞争、信息对称、投资者理性假设下,管理者过度自信能够提高管理者努力水平,但也可能造成投资过度或投资不足;管理者自信程度与企业非效率投资的可能性存在非单调关系,与企业投资一现金流敏感度正相关.     

管理者过度自信、道德风险与企业投资决策

本文分析了道德风险背景下管理者过度自信对企业投资决策的影响。研究结论认为,在资本市场完全竞争、信息对称、投资者理性假设下,管理者过度自信能够提高管理者努力水平,但也可能造成投资过度或投资不足;管理者自信程度与企业非效率投资的可能性存在非单调关系,与企业投资—现金流敏感度正相关。     

基于信息不对称基础下企业融资问题研究综述

企业与外部投资者之间的信息不对称问题是导致企业融资难的重要原因,严重制约企业发展.因此,这一问题一直是国内外学者关注的焦点.本文通过对国内外相关的研究文献进行梳理总结以及展望,以期对未来进一步的研究有所帮助.     

管理者过度自信与上市公司过度投资

我国上市公司存在着过度投资行为,这种过度投资行为的原因解释均是从代理理论进行的。行为金融学认为,管理者的过度自信也会引发过度投资问题。本文从管理者的过度自信角度出发,实证检验了管理者的过度自信会导致企业过度投资的假说在我国上市公司身上是成立的,即使存在融资约束时,过度自信的管理者也会产生过度投资行为。     

CEO过度自信、权益资本成本与融资约束

本文选取2012—2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,分析了CEO过度自信对权益资本成本的影响。并检验了在不同融资程度下,CEO过度自信对权益资本成本的影响是否有所变化。研究表明CEO过度自信对权益资本成本有显著的正向影响,并且随着融资约束程度的加大,CEO过度自信对权益资本成本的影响逐渐降低,即融资约束对二者关系具有一定的抑制作用。本文为研究CEO心理偏差对公司经营产生的经济后果提供了一定的借鉴作用,丰富了CEO个人特质的研究成果。     

管理者过度自信与企业投资现金敏感度——基于英国上市公司的实证研究

本文以英国上市公司为样本,发现融资约束公司普遍表现出管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性之间显著的正相关关系。与此相反,这种积极的关系不能在融资无约束公司中找到。这个结果和预期相一致,即在融资约束公司中过度自信的管理者的投资决策应该比非过度自信的管理者投资决策对现金流更加敏感。因为,现金流的增加能够促使过度自信的管理者加大投资并达到他们想要的水平。     

媒体负面报道、过度自信与过度投资

过度自信是管理者普遍的心理特征,过度自信的管理者行为对公司投资决策有重大影响。文章基于媒体负面报道的视角,探讨了媒体负面报道如何通过影响管理者过度自信从而降低公司的过度投资。研究发现,媒体负面报道削弱了过度自信与过度投资的正相关关系,并且对国有上市公司过度自信与过度投资正相关关系的影响较大;进一步研究发现,公司过度投资的减少有利于公司业绩的提高和高管薪酬降低。这说明,媒体监督已经成为了完善公司治理、保护投资者利益的重要组成部分。     

Financial competence,overconfidence, and trusting investments: Results from an experiment

Financial transactions sometimes occur in an environment where third-party enforcement is lacking. Behavioral explanations typically allude to the social preferences, where an individual’s utility is directly affected by another’s outcome, as the driver of the trusting investments and reciprocal returns. We hypothesize that, in part, these decisions are determined by an individual’s financial literacy and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Experimental evidence is coupled with an innovative financial literacy assessment, which measures general competence, numeracy skills, and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Results indicate that overconfidence is a significant determinant of behavior. Specifically, overconfident individuals make larger contributions in the investment game. We also document that there is an escalated effect in overconfident individuals who are also exhibit risk loving preferences.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.     

Corporate risk management and asymmetric information

We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs.     

Temporarily asymmetric information and labour contracts

Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended. The two main findings are that ex post inefficient termination may be used as a self-selection device and that when workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker should be overpaid.     

Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing

Radner (1993) proposed a model of decentralized associative computation as a means to understand information processing in organizations. In the model, in which an organization processes a single cohort of data, resources are measured by the number of managers. This paper (i) explains why resources should instead be measured by the time the managers are busy, (ii) shows that, nevertheless, the characterization of sufficient conditions for efficient networks in Radner (1993) and Keren and Levhari (1979) is valid for either measure, (iii) shows that measuring resources by the number of operations leads to sharper results on necessary conditions for efficiency, (iv) strengthens Radner's results on the irregularity of efficient hierarchies, and (v) compares the relative costs of parallelization under the two measures. Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 30 September 1997     

Transfer pricing under asymmetric information

This paper analyses optimal transfer prices in a firm organized in two divisions. The production costs of the divisions are their respective private information. The objective of headquarters is to determine the transfer pricing method that maximizes total profit less managers' compensation. Managers are interested in their current compensation and in the market evaluation of their experience. In this setting, the paper discusses why particular transfer pricing methods found in practice and literature may induce-inefficiencies, and it identifies conditions under which each method is preferable. Major results are: a market-based transfer price does not implement the first-best solution if there are benefits from internal trade; cost-based transfer,prices may achieve first-best, and they are preferable to negotiated transfer prices if communication is cost-less; dual transfer prices do not implement the first-best solution, as long as collusion cannot be discouraged.

‘There are two truisms in business. Transfer prices are wrong and charges for corporate overhead are too high.‘¹     

Measuring and adjusting for overconfidence

To evaluate density forecasts, the applied scoring rule is often arbitrarily chosen. The selection of the scoring rule strongly influences the ranking of forecasts. This paper identifies overconfidence as the main driver for scoring differences. A novel approach to measure overconfidence is proposed. Based on a non-proper scoring rule, the forecasts can be individually adjusted toward a calibrated forecast. Applying the adjustment procedure to the survey of professional forecasters, it can be shown that out-of-sample forecasts can be significantly improved. Also the ranking of the adjusted forecasts becomes less sensitive to the selection of scoring rules.     

Managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism: interpretations from industry and strategic implications for organizations

Environmental issues are becoming increasingly important in organization theory and practice. Corporate environmentalism is emerging as a process of addressing environmental issues facing business firms. In this paper I examine managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism and describes how key organizational members interpret the relationship between their firm and the biophysical environment. Corporate environmental orientation and environmental strategy focus are two themes of corporate environmentalism that emerge from the study. I discuss managerial perceptions of regulatory forces, public environmental concern, top management commitment and need for competitive advantage, and how perceptions of these factors might translate into environmental strategies. I conclude by discussing implications of corporate environmentalism for organizational theory and practice.     

公司治理结构与会计信息质量

会计信息的真实与否对于会计能否实现其目标,发挥其作用密切相关,其质量的高低不仅影响到公司的发展,还影响到公司内部不同的利益相关者,究其原因,最根本的是公司治理结构的不完善。本文即从公司治理结构的角度来分析会计信息质量问题,找出原因及相应的对策。