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通过构造二阶段投资模型,本文探讨信息不对称情况下经理人过度自信对企业投资决策的影响。研究结果表明:对于真实融资约束企业和伪融资约束企业,经理人过度自信心理偏误可能引发投资过度或投资不足;过度自信程度对企业投资一现金流敏感度有正向影响;对于过度自信程度轻微的劣质企业,投资对现金流不敏感,经理人心理偏误仅在举债筹资时可能引发过度投资。 相似文献
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本文分析了道德风险背景下管理者过度自信对企业投资决策的影响.研究结论认为,在资本市场完全竞争、信息对称、投资者理性假设下,管理者过度自信能够提高管理者努力水平,但也可能造成投资过度或投资不足;管理者自信程度与企业非效率投资的可能性存在非单调关系,与企业投资一现金流敏感度正相关. 相似文献
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本文分析了道德风险背景下管理者过度自信对企业投资决策的影响。研究结论认为,在资本市场完全竞争、信息对称、投资者理性假设下,管理者过度自信能够提高管理者努力水平,但也可能造成投资过度或投资不足;管理者自信程度与企业非效率投资的可能性存在非单调关系,与企业投资—现金流敏感度正相关。 相似文献
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本文以英国上市公司为样本,发现融资约束公司普遍表现出管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性之间显著的正相关关系。与此相反,这种积极的关系不能在融资无约束公司中找到。这个结果和预期相一致,即在融资约束公司中过度自信的管理者的投资决策应该比非过度自信的管理者投资决策对现金流更加敏感。因为,现金流的增加能够促使过度自信的管理者加大投资并达到他们想要的水平。 相似文献
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过度自信认知偏差在管理者的身上体现的更为淋漓尽致,而且对于公司的融资决策与公司业绩都造成了巨大的影响。文章分析了管理者过度自信、融资决策及公司业绩三者的关系,并从影响融资决策的资本结构与负债期限结构两个方面研究了管理者过度自信对融资决策的影响,以及融资决策对公司业绩的影响,进一步发现管理者过度自信这种认知偏差会通过公司融资决策行为间接影响公司业绩。 相似文献
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This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse. 相似文献
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Bryan C. McCannon Colleen Tokar Asaad Mark Wilson 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2016,40(3):590-606
Financial transactions sometimes occur in an environment where third-party enforcement is lacking. Behavioral explanations typically allude to the social preferences, where an individual’s utility is directly affected by another’s outcome, as the driver of the trusting investments and reciprocal returns. We hypothesize that, in part, these decisions are determined by an individual’s financial literacy and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Experimental evidence is coupled with an innovative financial literacy assessment, which measures general competence, numeracy skills, and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Results indicate that overconfidence is a significant determinant of behavior. Specifically, overconfident individuals make larger contributions in the investment game. We also document that there is an escalated effect in overconfident individuals who are also exhibit risk loving preferences. 相似文献
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In this study, we investigate a dynamic model wherein an overconfident and a risk-neutral informed trader optimally exploit their long-lived private information regarding the value of an asset. We find that when the degree of overconfidence becomes larger, or the intensity of private information flow becomes larger relative to the initial private signal, the market becomes more stable. Additionally, we find that the greater the intensity of private information flow relative to the initial private signal, the more evident the patient transaction and the slower the information is incorporated in the price. 相似文献
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An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders. 相似文献
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In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes. 相似文献
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We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs. 相似文献
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sa Rosn 《Labour economics》1994,1(3-4)
Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended. The two main findings are that ex post inefficient termination may be used as a self-selection device and that when workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker should be overpaid. 相似文献
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Radner (1993) proposed a model of decentralized associative computation as a means to understand information processing in organizations. In the model, in which an organization processes a single cohort of data, resources are measured by the number of managers. This paper (i) explains why resources should instead be measured by the time the managers are busy, (ii) shows that, nevertheless, the characterization of sufficient conditions for efficient networks in Radner (1993) and Keren and Levhari (1979) is valid for either measure, (iii) shows that measuring resources by the number of operations leads to sharper results on necessary conditions for efficiency, (iv) strengthens Radner's results on the irregularity of efficient hierarchies, and (v) compares the relative costs of parallelization under the two measures. Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 30 September 1997 相似文献
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Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to create a measure of managerial efficiency in an attempt to reassess the conflicting theories concerning the impact of organizational performance on manager succession, and the counter-theories concerning the impact of manager succession on organizational performance. The analysis uses data for 147 college basketball teams from 1984 to 1991. The results indicate that winning, not efficiency, is the key criterion used in determining managerial retention. Yet when managers of losing teams are dismissed the teams tend to do even worse. If, however, the efficiency of the new manager is greater than that of the former, the disruptive effect of succession is minimized. Because administrators appear to focus on winning, not efficiency, they will often select new managers who are less efficient than departed managers. These results are unique to this literature and indicate promise for the use of DEA in analyses of the internal efficiencies of organizations. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献