HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION,HOME PRODUCTION AND EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS*

In this paper, we construct a three‐sector endogenous growth model in which long‐run growth is propelled by human capital accumulation. We show that although the addition of a home sector to the standard two‐sector endogenous growth model preserves the well‐behaved balanced growth equilibrium properties, it generates new transitional dynamics around the balanced growth path. It is shown that, when there is a positive shock to physical capital, our model is more likely to exhibit paradoxical growth than are standard multisector endogenous growth models that exclude home production. Our analysis adds new results to those from the related literature on leisure.     

信息不对称、逆向选择和市场均衡

几乎所有研究信息不对称与逆向选择问题的文献都隐含着一家厂商在同一时刻只能提供单一质量水平产品的假设。本文在厂商可以同时提供高质量产品和低质量产品的假设基础上,通过建立模型来探讨信息不对称与逆向选择的关系。研究结论表明,当考虑到这一前提条件时,信息不对称所导致的逆向选择程度可能并不像先前的研究者所认为的那么严重,甚至可能不存在。此外,模型也指出,消费者所拥有的财富数量将严重地影响到逆向选择的程度,财富数量与逆向选择的严重程度存在着负相关关系。这个结论可以很好地解释在发展中国家假冒伪劣现象十分普遍的原因。最后,拟以浙江省龙井茶市场为例来验证本文所发展的理论。     

INFORMATION FRICTIONS AND HOUSING MARKET DYNAMICS

I examine the effects of seller uncertainty over their home value on the housing market. Using evidence from home listings and transactions data, I first show that sellers do not have full information about current period demand conditions for their homes. I incorporate this type of uncertainty into a dynamic microsearch model of the home selling problem with Bayesian learning. The estimated model highlights how information frictions help to explain the microdecisions of sellers and how these microdecisions affect aggregate market dynamics. The model generates a significant microfounded momentum effect in short‐run aggregate price appreciation rates.     

FERTILITY SHOCKS AND EQUILIBRIUM MARRIAGE‐RATE DYNAMICS

Female marriage probabilities were 50% higher in France in the years after World War 1, despite a large drop in the sex ratio. We develop a model of marital matching in which composition effects in the singles pool affect postdisruption matching rates. When calibrated to French data from World War 1, this mechanism explains 2/3 of the postwar rise in female marriage probabilities as the result of better composition of the pool of single men. We conclude that endogeneity issues make the sex ratio a potentially unreliable indicator of female marriage prospects.     

EQUILIBRIUM LENDING MECHANISM AND AGGREGATE ACTIVITY*

We construct a model of the credit market where financial contracting is subject to costly state verification and moral hazard. The economy's aggregate activity and its equilibrium lending mechanism are determined jointly. We analyze how changes in the model's exogenous variables, including the returns of the economy's investment projects and the supply of loans, affect the economy's aggregate output and the types of the credit through which investment is funded.     

MONEY AND BANKING IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We develop a new theory of money and banking based on the old story in which goldsmiths start accepting deposits for safe keeping, then their liabilities begin circulating as media of exchange, then they begin making loans. We first discuss the history. We then present a model where agents can open bank accounts and write checks. The equilibrium means of payment may be cash, checks, or both. Sometimes multiple equilibria exist. Introducing banks increases the set of parameters for which money is valued–thus, money and banking are complements. We also derive a microfounded version of the usual money multiplier.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS*

In this article, industrial evolution is driven by endogenous technology choices of firms, generating a rich environment that includes the possibility of a dramatic shakeout. The likelihood, magnitude, and timing of this shakeout are characterized and depend not only on the size of an innovation but also on cost structure. In this setting, trade liberalization reduces the likelihood of a shakeout, resulting in more stable industrial structures. However, when shakeouts arise in global markets, the distribution of exits can vary widely across countries. Furthermore, conditions exist where a shakeout occurs in a closed economy but not in an open economy.     

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AWARENESS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS,AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We explore the significance of general equilibrium feedback effects for wage‐bargaining. We examine a two‐sector economy and show that if agents only consider labor demand effects low real wages and low unemployment are the consequences. With an intermediate view, i.e., when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are perceived simultaneously, we once again obtain a situation with low wages and unemployment. The results may explain why unemployment is high in some European countries.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM: EXISTENCE,UNIQUENESS AND COMPARATIVE STATICS *

This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in models of international trade under oligopoly. The existence of Cournot equilibrium is established without the usual assumption that profit functions are concave. Instead the proof uses a weaker‘aggregate concavity’condition. A simple proof is used to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium. And, the paper considers the implications of the assumptions, used to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, on the comparative static results.     

HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM*

We analyze an equilibrium labor market with on‐the‐job search and experience effects (as workers learn by doing). The analysis yields a Mincer wage equation with worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. Equilibrium sorting—where over time more experienced workers also tend to move to better paid employment—has a significant impact on wage inequality.     

EVOLUTIONARY DRIFT IN PREFERENCE AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION*

This paper studies the situation where myopic players repeatedly face a society with two actions where their common fitness exhibits economies of scale. Both states in which all players choose the same actions are equilibria. In each period, players adjust their actions based on their preferences, which are in turn shaped by natural selection. The preferences of the players need not match the underlying fitness. When rare mutations are introduced into the evolutionary process, their preferences may drift without affecting equilibrium behaviour. This paper shows that these drifts influence the results of equilibrium selection.     

STABILITY AND INSTABILITY OF THE COUCRNOT EQUILIBRIUM*

Conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be locally asymptotically stable or unstable are explored, which are still compatible with the second‐order condition for the optimum. The Cournot equilibrium may not be stable even if the condition owing to Fisher (1961 ), Hahn (1962 ), and Okuguchi (1964 , 1976, 1999 ) is satisfied, which was given as a sufficient condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable. However, as long as a game by symmetric players is concerned, the Cournot equilibrium is unstable whenever F‐H‐O condition is not satisfied. In this sense, that F‐H‐O condition is not satisfied is sufficient for the Cournot equilibrium to be unstable.     

COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.     

INPUT AND OUTPUT INVENTORIES IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM*

We build and estimate a two‐sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two types of inventories: Input inventories facilitate the production of finished goods, output inventories yield utility services. The estimated model replicates the volatility and cyclicality of inventory investment and inventory‐to‐target ratios. Although inventories are an important element of the model’s propagation mechanism, shocks to inventory efficiency are not an important source of business cycles. When the model is estimated over two subperiods (pre‐ and post‐1984), changes in the volatility of inventory shocks or in structural parameters associated with inventories play a small role in reducing the volatility of output.