中国上市公司董事会治理评价实证研究

董事会治理是公司治理的核心,董事会治理评价是公司治理评价系统的关键内容.本文在对国内外有关研究文献进行评述的基础上,构筑了董事会治理评价指标体系,并从不同的角度对我国上市公司董事会治理状况及其与公司绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析.实证结果显示:第一,控股股东性质、行业因素会对董事会治理水平产生一定的影响,民营企业具有显著的治理优势;第二,公司治理绩效与董事会治理水平之间呈现一种倒U曲线关系.实证结果验证了Rediker与Seth关于董事会治理机制间替代效应的观点.该结论的政策含义是,在当前董事会治理缺乏外部治理机制、大股东治理弱化、内部董事间的相互监督和经理人持股的激励效应都不强的情况下,董事会治理改革的关键在于,通过引入战略投资者特别是民间战略投资者,完善董事会专业委员会的制度建设,强化内部治理机制.     

董事会治理与企业技术创新:理论与实证

本文在代理理论的框架内考察了公司治理之董事会治理与企业技术创新投入的关系,并基于2004-2008年501家中国上市公司的数据对此进行了实证研究。结果表明:1)董事会规模与企业技术创新投入存在不显著的负相关关系;2)独立董事占比与企业技术创新投入存在显著的正相关关系,独立董事占比较高的企业其技术创新投入要显著高于独立董事占比较低的企业;3)董事长与总经理两职分离的制度安排对企业技术创新投入有显著的积极影响,两职分离的企业其技术创新投入要显著高于两职合一的企业;4)董事会股权激励对企业技术创新存在积极影响,董事会股权激励水平越高,企业技术创新投入越多,但这种发现仅具有较低的统计显著性。     

中国公司治理结构的现状

本文介绍了我国公司治理结构的发展与现状，并针对所存在的问题提出了一些改进意见。通过此文，可以使读者对公司治理结构有一个全面的认识，从而有助于国内企业公司治理结构的完善与发展。     

The effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia using a sample of 164 companies listed on the Main Board in Bursa Malaysia from 5 different industries （consumer, trading ＆ services, industrial, constructions and properties） within 2001 to 2005. Throughout, this study will use correlation and regression analysis in the SPSS software to determine the effects of corporate governance practices on Market Valuation. In analyzing firms＇ market valuation, we will use the Tobin＇s Q formula and for the corporate governance compliance, we will look at 4 criteria to compare with market valuation, which are （1） Board of Director＇s composition, （2） Board of Director＇s remuneration （salaries）, （3） Board of Director＇s training and development, （4） Board of Director＇s meeting. In order to determine the effects between the corporate governance compliance and market valuation, we will use regression analysis. Based on the correlation analysis, the first null hypothesis must be rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, in which dependent variable and independent variables are significantly correlated with BOD remuneration and BOD training availability. Overall, there is a significant relationship between Tobin＇s Q and independent variables （BOD remuneration and BOD training）. This study also recommends that for the company who did not comply with the code, they should follow the best practice because it will be a pivotal weapon in facing with the fierce competition in era globalization.     

关于健全和完善我国上市公司治理结构几个关键问题的思考

健全和完善我国公司治理结构,前提是必须确定我国公司治理结构的目标就是“股东利益的最大化”,关键是改变国有股“一股独大”的畸形股权结构,核心是保证公司董事会的“独立性”,并建立充分履行其职能的运行机制,重点是要建立一个与公司治理结构相适应的公司外部治理机制,条件是要创造一种良好的公司治理文化。     

独立董事声誉与独立董事劳动力市场有效性

一般来说,独立董事能够对管理层起到监督作用从而提高公司治理水平,然而在我国上市公司特殊的制度背景下,独立董事制度实施的效果究竟如何,一直是理论界和实务界争论的热点问题。本文引入"独立董事声誉"这一长期被忽视的独立董事制度设计的核心理念,构建了引入声誉机制的独立董事激励模型,并采用2004年至2005年沪市A股独立董事作为研究样本进行追踪,实证检验了我国上市公司独立董事所受到的声誉激励水平。研究发现我国独立董事的劳动力市场缺乏有效性,声誉激励只能够促使独立董事避开公开违规事件,却不能激励独立董事更好地履行监管职责。这很可能是影响我国独立董事制度发挥作用最重要的原因。     

The legal environment and corporate valuation: Evidence from cross-border takeovers

We examine the cumulative abnormal returns to U.S. targets, their foreign acquirers, and the target-acquirer portfolio in 181 successful cross-border tender offers during the period 1982–1991. We find that the incentive mechanisms created by the degree of shareholder-creditor rights protection and legal enforcement in the acquiring firm country can explain the observed variation in target, acquirer, and portfolio returns. We also find that foreign acquirers overpay for Delaware-incorporated targets. Our results are strengthened after controlling for deal-related effects addressed in the domestic mergers and cross-border investments literature.     

The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint

A panel of Korean firms is used to test for the soft budget constraint (SBC) in bank lending before and after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. SBC is present if a firm can borrow from its bank despite being in financial distress, which we define by a low Altman's z-score. We find that prior to 1997 financially distressed firms were able to borrow while after the crisis their ability to borrow declined substantially. We also demonstrate that SBC was a significant factor in the firms’ propensity to default during the crisis.     

董事会社会资本与公司成长性分析

董事会社会资本对公司成长性的影响机制问题日益成为公司治理中广泛关注的焦点和难点.本文从上市公司董事会社会资本角度,把董事会社会资本细分为:董事会社会行业资本、社会连锁资本和社会政治资本,并运用2009年通讯业上市企业的截面数据,通过多元线性回归分析实证检验了上市公司董事会社会资本对公司成长性的影响.研究结果表明,上市公司董事会社会资本对公司成长性具有显著正向影响.具体而言,社会行业资本对公司成长性具有正向显著影响;社会连锁资本对公司成长性具有显著正向影响;社会政治资本对公司成长性没有显著影响.研究结果通过进行稳定性检验,检验结果基本一致.该研究对进一步揭示董事会社会资本功能的优化配置以及企业成长性的促进提供了借鉴与参考.     

Assessing whether corporate social responsibility influence corporate value

This study used the corporate social responsibility (CSR) index to gauge the corporate value and social responsibility performance of corporations in Taiwan. We investigated whether CSR influences corporate value and whether the extent of that influence varies with corporate value or time. The results indicate that the influence of CSR on corporate value does not change with time. CSR exerts a positive influence on company value, and this influence does not change over time. However, the extent of the influence significantly varies with corporate value. When the corporate value of a company is not high, investing in CSR would only increase costs and fail to effectively increase corporate value. In contrast, if the corporate value of the company is high, investments in CSR in this circumstance would instead promote the effective increase of corporate value.     

Hedge fund activism and corporate innovation

This paper investigates the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate innovating activities. It finds that innovative firms are as likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds as non-innovative firms. Activist hedge funds tend to target innovative firms with low innovation efficiency. Hedge fund interventions are associated with significant improvements in innovation output in both highly competitive and less competitive industries. The improvement is more pronounced in active intervention events. Our results suggest that activist hedge funds are not myopic investors and their interventions enhance innovative activities that benefit innovative firms’ long-term performance.     

Stock market reactions to announcements of the board of directors: evidence from Italy

The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance. It is an internal mechanism that controls and monitors the actions of managers and aligns the utility functions between corporate owners and managers. The board of directors performs multiple functions that concern, for example, the replacement of the managers, financial policy, the preparation of strategic plans and other actions that affect the performance of the company. The board plays an important role since on the one hand it controls the actions of management and on the other it advises the management regarding the strategies to be adopted. In this study, 100 announcements regarding the appointment of the board of directors of 100 Italian listed companies during the period 2012–2014 are investigated. The results show a positive reaction within 20 days around the announcement date. In four of the six time windows, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are positive and statistically significant. The positive reaction of the market would appear, however, to be linked more to the composition of the board of directors than to the size of the board of directors.     

Estimating the effect of board independence on managerial ownership using a quasi-natural experiment

Grounded in agency theory, this article investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that board independence leads to significantly higher managerial ownership. In particular, firms forced to raise board independence exhibit managerial ownership that is 26.35% higher, relative to firms not required to raise board independence. Thus, board independence and managerial equity ownership constitute governance mechanisms that act as complements, rather than substitutes. Our empirical strategy relies on a quasi-natural experiment and is far more likely to show a causal effect than what has been documented in the literature. Finally, an instrumental-variable analysis reinforces our conclusion.     

Using demographic identification to estimate the effects of board size on corporate performance

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the US. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger boards. Consistent with this notion, our empirical results show that firms located where the size of the director-age population is larger have significantly larger board size. Because the director-age population represents broad demographic trends outside of any firm’s control, it is unlikely related to firm outcomes or policies and should be exogenous. Using the director-age population as our instrument, we estimate the effects of board size on firm value and profitability. Our approach is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal effect.     

Effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility reports: evidence from China

This article investigates effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. By using a unique longitude data set of Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2016, this study finds that ownership structure and board characteristics are significantly associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. In particular, our study finds that state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board size are positively and significantly associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. However, board independence is not related to the decision. We also find CEO duality is negatively and significantly related to the decision. Our findings highlight the role of corporate governance in firms’ transparency by influencing the voluntary disclosure of additional information on firms’ CSR activities.     

国有企业混合所有制改革中的公司内部治理

中国共产党的十八届三中全会提出要积极发展混合所有制经济,对国有企业进行混合所有制改革,一些国有企业也开始了混合所有制改革试点工作,但股权结构、委托代理关系、董事会构成及运行机制等公司内部治理问题是困扰目前国有企业混合所有制改革的关键问题。本研究首先从理论上界定了国有企业混合所有制改革中公司内部治理的基本概念,对混合所有制改革中的委托代理关系进行了梳理和探讨,并在“股东-董事会-经理人”三者间构建了一个双重委托代理关系。其次从董事会治理模式、董事会构成以及董事会信息共享机制、权力制衡机制和决策机制等方面对国有企业混合所有制改革中的企业内部治理进行了探讨,力图为国有企业解决混合所有制改革中遇到的问题提供借鉴和参考。     

Diversity among Norwegian Boards of Directors: Does a Quota for Women Improve Firm Performance?

Exploiting the Norwegian boards of directors’ quota reform of 2003, this study evaluates the impact of increased diversity on firm performance. Applying difference-in-difference approaches to accounting data covering the period 2003–07, the paper compares the return on assets for non-finance public limited companies (PLCs) and ordinary limited companies (LTDs), whereof only the former were affected by the reform. The impact of the reform on firm performance is negligible. Neither changed return on total assets (ROA) nor changed operating revenues and cost can be attributed to the reform. However, following the reform PLCs have to a larger extent accumulated capital, financed by debt or by a combination of debt and own capital.     

内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理

内部资本市场缓解了企业集团的融资约束,提升了投资效率,但也增加了公司治理的难度。在缺乏有效公司治理机制的情况下,内部资本市场的功能部分地被异化为经理人寻租或控股股东进行“利益输送”的渠道。本文讨论了内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理的关系,分析了内部资本市场的部分功能异化的原因,提出了治理的建议。     

Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on chief executive officer (CEO) power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs, consistent with the substitution effect. Because co-opted directors impose less stringent oversight, the CEO is able to exercise a great deal of latitude in running the firm. Therefore, it is less necessary for the CEO to command so much power where more directors are co-opted, hence leading to less powerful CEOs. In other words, co-opted directors substitute for strong CEO power. Crucially, we find that board co-option exhibits much more explanatory power than does board independence, which has been the primary measure of board effectiveness in the literature.     

董事会互动过程(IOP)有效性研究

随着国内企业的迅速发展,董事会制度得到普遍发展。增强董事会的有效性研究成为公司治理研究的重要问题。董事会团队内部成员的互动过程对董事会有效性具有一定的影响,加强董事会有效性研究对于提升董事间的满足感、增强互动合作精神、提高其在公司的影响力等方面具有重要作用。