Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank’s depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw. Our results show that (i) bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic, and (ii) subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision. For the multiple-opportunity case, we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules. We find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game, which involves Bayesian updating of probabilities, explains subject behavior better than other rules.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Leaving the market or reducing the coverage? A model-based experimental analysis of the demand for insurance

This study develops a theoretical, and experimental analysis addressing the issue of premium variations on the demand for insurance. Accounting for risk attitudes, our contribution disentangles the decision to buy insurance from the conditional demand (the non-null demand for insurance). Partially validating our theoretical predictions, our experimental results show that, when it has an effect, a non-massive increase in the premium (either in the unit price or the fixed cost) exclusively results in an exit from the insurance market (the risk lovers first, then the risk averters). Moreover, our study highlights a key feature of risk-seeking agents' behavior; they exhibit behavior consistent with gambling and opportunism rather than a lack of interest in insurance.     

Antisocial behavior in experiments: What have we learned from the past two decades?

Antisocial behavior experiments, both conducted in the laboratory or in the field, have become commonplace in the experimental economics literature. Such experiments found their relevance in the real world as people are not always selfish or nice to others, but they also sometimes behave spitefully. This paper focuses on payoff-destruction experiments conducted over the last two decades and synthesizes the findings. We are able to find 46 studies where we found inequity reduction and pure spite as the main motives for such behavior. This behavior can also be explained by conflict experience. We conclude with suggestions for future research.     

Self-confidence and strategic behavior

We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the higher score wins, a player is very likely to choose to compete when he knows that his own stated confidence is higher than the other player’s, but rarely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated confidence is inflated by males when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated (by males and females) when luring (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Overconfident statements are used in environments that seem familiar, and we present evidence that suggests that this can occur on an unconscious level.     

Efficiency and Income Shares in High‐Demand Energy Networks: Who Receives the Congestion Rents when a Line is Constrained?

We create an experimental spot market for electricity with demand side bidding, and use experimental methods to study the efficiency of the market and the income shares of the generators, wholesale buyers and transmission line operators. Nodal and line prices are computed on the basis of short run marginal costs, energy losses in transmission, and network opportunity costs when a line is constrained. We find that a traditional, competitive model, which yields congestion rents for the transmission line owners, does not explain the observed bidding behavior; and that subtle differences in institutional rules can cause changes in market efficiency.     

Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games

Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency‐increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency‐reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency‐enhancing and efficiency‐reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence.     

Fear itself: How risk sensitive firms can give demand shocks bite

Many economists believe that recessions arise when aggregate demand is insufficient to support full employment. However, replicating this intuition within a real business cycle (RBC) model has proven surprisingly challenging. Rather than eliciting a contraction, lower consumer demand leads to greater household savings in many such models, fueling new investment and causing the economy to expand. The present paper proposes a novel way to resolve this apparent paradox: risk-averse firms. In the model to follow, cautious firms reduce their demand for investment prior to a recession. This contraction in the demand for capital overcomes the increased supply arising from consumer savings and restores intuitive business cycle behavior. In particular, the paper demonstrates that the model economy contracts when subjected to an uncertainty shock in consumer demand, mimicking a pre-recessionary environment in which firms, fearing a lack of orders, precipitate the downturn by reducing capital expenditures. These results are consistent with microeconomic evidence that uncertainty, particularly uncertainty about future demand, is the primary reason for firms shedding workers or scaling down operations in advance of an economic downturn. More generally, they imply that firm's attitudes towards risk shouldn't be ignored in modern macroeconomic models.     

Notes on optimal transportation

We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each consumer buys 0 or 1 unit, and each supplier sells 0 or 1 unit. Consumer types, supplier types and qualities can be either discrete of continuous, in which case they are allowed to be multidimensional. Prices play a double role: they keep some agents out of the market, and they match the remaining ones pairwise. We define equilibrium prices and equilibrium distributions, and we prove that equilibria exist, we investigate to what extend equilibrium prices and distributions are unique, and we prove that equilibria are efficient. In the particular case when there is a continuum of types, and a generalized Spence–Mirrlees condition is satisfied, we prove the existence of a pure equilibrium, where demand distributions are in fact demand functions, and we show to what extent it is unique. The proofs rely on convex analysis, and care has been given to illustrate the theory with examples.     

Decomposing desert and tangibility effects in a charitable giving experiment

Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory “endowments” they make less self-interested choices than when they use money they have either earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab. In the context of a charitable giving experiment we decompose this into two common artifacts of the laboratory: the intangibility of money (or experimental currency units) promised on a computer screen relative to cash in hand, and the distinct treatment of random “windfall” gains relative to earned money. While both effects are found to be significant in non-parametric tests, the former effect, which has been neglected in previous studies, has a stronger impact on total donations, while the latter effect has a greater impact on the probability of donating. These results have clear implications for experimental design, and also suggest that the availability of more abstract payment methods may increase other-regarding behavior in the field.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

Oil supply and economic development strategy: A dynamic planning approach

Most oligopolistic models of the oil market begin with the assumption of rising supply curves for oil. Lack of convincing evidence that high oil prices are being maintained by oligopolistic action has raised the possibility of competitive behavior in the oil market and therefore of a backward bending supply curve. This paper presents numerical solutions of a linear dynamic planning model of an oil exporting country with a development strategy which consists of utilizing oil revenues for building an export sector to replace oil. To make a stronger case a high absorber, Algeria, is used as an example. The numerical results are consistent with the hypothesis that there may well be good economic reasons to restrict supply of oil in response to increased prices. Three important characteristics of the model which produce this result are (a) diminishing marginal utility of consumption, (b) absorptive capacity, and (c) imperfect capital markets. A ‘perverse’ supply behavior is found consistent with optimal allocation of oil resources when a price increase is expected to last for a long time. The effects of temporary price changes which can, for example, result from temporary supply shocks or demand changes during the business cycle are also studied. It is shown that in response to such short term price changes competitive behavior is ‘normal’, i.e., supply varies in the same direction as the price. This implies that reductions in OPEC production which have taken place during the recent market downturns cannot be taken as evidence of cartel coordination, as they usually are, since they are also consistent with price-taking behavior.     

Market demand of smart but uninformed consumers rotates counterclockwise with better information: surprising welfare effects

Providing truthful and unbiased information about the true value of a good to a priori heterogeneous consumers generates a mean-preserving counterclockwise rotation of demand. The welfare analysis of such rotation in monopoly and perfectly competitive models indicates that consumers can lose surplus if they become better informed.     

Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types

We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each consumer buys 0 or 1 unit, and each supplier sells 0 or 1 unit. Consumer types, supplier types and qualities can be either discrete of continuous, in which case they are allowed to be multidimensional. Prices play a double role: they keep some agents out of the market, and they match the remaining ones pairwise. We define equilibrium prices and equilibrium distributions, and we prove that equilibria exist, we investigate to what extend equilibrium prices and distributions are unique, and we prove that equilibria are efficient. In the particular case when there is a continuum of types, and a generalized Spence–Mirrlees condition is satisfied, we prove the existence of a pure equilibrium, where demand distributions are in fact demand functions, and we show to what extent it is unique. The proofs rely on convex analysis, and care has been given to illustrate the theory with examples.     

Testing for individual and time effects in the two-way error component model with time-invariant regressors

In this paper, we focus on testing for individual and time effects in the two-way error component model with time-invariant regressors. We present the so-called FEF estimators when time-invariant regressors are exogenous and the FEF-IV estimators when one or more of time-invariant variables are endogenous, and obtain their asymptotic properties under some mild conditions. In the light of the moment-based test methods of Wu and Li (2014), we construct several tests for the existence of individual and time effects in the two-way error component model with time-invariant regressors. The resulting tests can be shown to have some desired properties as follows: they do not need any distributional assumptions on the error components; they do not require any assumptions on the correlation among the two random effects and the time-varying regressors; they are robust to the presence of one effect when the other one is tested. Simulation study and real data analysis are carried out for illustration of the above.     

What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?

This paper surveys the literature on psychological and strategic mental processes of bandwagon behavior, discusses the literature of bandwagon behavior in the context of the two different types, bandwagon vote choices and bandwagon abstention effects, and examines the rationality of other-regarding bandwagon vote choices. Key experimental results are reported to investigate the extent that bandwagon behavior can be explained by other-regarding preferences in contrast to a psychological desire to simply support a winner. We find support for purely psychological non-other-regarding bandwagon behavior but primarily when subjects have information about the distribution of voter choices in previous elections but individual choices are private. Interestingly, when voting is public this type of bandwagon behavior disappears and bandwagon behavior that could be other-regrading is much higher. Given that observability increases other-regarding behavior in other contexts, our results suggest that some of the observed bandwagon behavior may be explained by other-regarding preferences as well.     

The micro economics of group behavior: General characterization

We study the demand function of a group of S members facing a global budget constraint. Any vector belonging to the budget set can be consumed within the group, with no restriction on the form of individual preferences, the nature of individual consumptions or the form of the decision process beyond efficiency. Moreover, only the group aggregate behavior, summarized by its demand function, is observable. We provide necessary and (locally) sufficient restrictions that fully characterize the group's demand function, with and without distribution factors. We show that the private or public nature of consumption within the group is not testable from aggregate data on group behavior.     

Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation

“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for the provision of public goods. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This effect can produce multiple equilibria with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved by imposing temporary taxes or subsidies, or through advertising that influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.