Investor sentiment and the financial crisis: a sentiment-based portfolio theory perspective

The article proposes a portfolio model subjected to a constraint that captures the investor’s goal, with maximum estimation of expected return that is affected by investor sentiment. And we give a solution of the portfolio model by exploring the geometric features. Furthermore, we discuss the relationship between investor sentiment and the financial crisis by analysing the optimal allocation. The results show that: when investor sentiment is low enough, the investor should reject the investment, this condition leads the depression financial market to prevail, then the financial crisis erupts; when investor sentiment is modest, the financial crisis is difficult to erupt unless the decline of investor sentiment is quick and deep; but there is a special status that the financial crisis is caused by other factors rather than by investor sentiment; and only improving investor sentiment cannot move away from the financial crisis.     

On factors explaining the 2008 financial crisis

Using a statistical methodology guided by a genetic algorithm, we select the best econometric model for explaining the severity of the 2008 crisis, with the main determinant being the percentage of bank claims on private sector over deposits in the year 2006.     

财务危机预测模型的构建

基于Logistic回归模型,选取中国制造业上市公司作为样本对财务危机预测进行研究。从企业的盈利能力、营运能力、偿债能力、成长能力、现金流量等方面出发,选取了10个财务预警指标,经过回归分析得出,总资产收益率、总资产周转率、资产负债率、主营业务增长率、经营活动现金净流量对负债的比率五项财务指标对上市公司发生财务危机有重要影响。从而提出要从提高盈利能力、提升营运能力、增强偿债能力、提高成长能力、保障现金流的充足几方面来应对财务危机。     

Anatomy of a financial crisis

This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for understanding the nature of financial crises. It provides the following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform well to one in which output declines sharply. The asymmetric information framework explains the patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain. It indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank in which the central bank uses the discount window to provide liquidity to sectors outside of the banking system.     

全球金融危机反思与我国金融体制改革深化

始于美国次贷危机的本次全球金融危机,在使得主要国家金融体系遭受重创的同时,也揭示出发达国家金融体制的某些缺陷和未来改革趋向.在反思全球金融危机的成因,以及各国采取的应对金融危机措施的基础上,从体制、政策等多方面提出了深化我国金融体制改革的思考和建议,旨在为拓宽我国金融体制改革的思路提供参考,建立符合科学发展观的金融体制.     

The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.     

Measuring the end of the European financial crisis

In 2013 it was declared that ‘the eurozone crisis is over’. However, in fact, the series of financial crises since 2008 may have interrupted the process of EMU enlargement, which in turn triggered a continuing crisis of confidence in the euro. In this paper we extend the sigma‐convergence test to provide a more precise understanding of real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. On the basis of this, we predict the timing for eliminating the cost of economic asymmetric shocks. Our estimation indicates the RIP among EMU members and accessions were still valid after the disruptions of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the situation has been even worse since the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, and ceteris paribus, symmetry cannot be achieved without further policy actions. This implies that the EMU authority must do its best to strengthen symmetry and thereby solidify the EMU, at which point it will be better able to re‐start the process of enlargement.     

The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint

A panel of Korean firms is used to test for the soft budget constraint (SBC) in bank lending before and after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. SBC is present if a firm can borrow from its bank despite being in financial distress, which we define by a low Altman's z-score. We find that prior to 1997 financially distressed firms were able to borrow while after the crisis their ability to borrow declined substantially. We also demonstrate that SBC was a significant factor in the firms’ propensity to default during the crisis.     

Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia

This paper investigates institutional reasons for the soft-budget constraint problem; and how the soft-budget constraint problem creates conditions which may result in a financial crisis. As a consequence of soft-budget constraints, bad projects do not stop; bad loans accumulate; and banks and depositors do not receive bad news on time. Poorly informed depositors are then likely to herd to overinvest when there is no bankruptcy (`frenzy'); and they are likely to herd to panic when bankruptcy occurs (`crash'), which may be the result of excessive bad loans that are also a consequence of soft-budget constraints. In contrast, under hard-budget constraints information is disclosed quickly regarding liquidation. Better-informed investors are then less likely to herd wrongly.     

The political economy of the Ecuadorian financial crisis

This paper takes the unusual step of exploring economic hypothesesthrough interviews with key economic agents. It focuses on thecauses of Ecuador's 1999 banking collapse, within an eclecticframework with Minskian elements. Broad support is found for‘endogenous’ explanations of financial crises andlittle backing for explanations such as accidents or policymistakes. Interviewees argued that after the stabilisation programmeof 1992, agents became euphoric and accumulated debt to financeimprudent levels of expansion; that incentives for moral hazardled to financial corruption and excessive risk taking; and thatweak regulation after financial liberalisation encouraged financialfragility.     

ECB repo rate setting during the financial crisis

I estimate a reaction function for the ECB using an ordered logit model for the period 1999-2009. Allowing for a smooth transition from one set of parameters to another, I detect a rapid change in the middle of 2008.     

Monetary policy in a financial crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modelled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing fall in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.     

Bilateral portfolio dynamics during the global financial crisis

There has been considerable bilateral variation in the pattern of portfolio capital flows during the global financial crisis: for a given destination, investors from different countries adjusted their holdings to different degrees. We show that the size of the initial bilateral holding, geographical distance, common language, the level of trade and common institutional linkages help to explain the pattern of adjustment. These bilateral factors are more important for equities than for bonds and for investors from developing countries than for investors from advanced countries.     

External deficits and non-performing loans in the recent financial crisis

This paper analyses the deterioration of bank credit quality during the recent financial crisis in a cross-national sample. Rapid credit growth in 2000-2005 predicted the relative amount of non-performing loans only if it was combined with a current account deficit.     

企业财务危机及其防范对策

要想加快企业发展,提高企业市场竞争能力,就不能不对财务危机进行及时的预防和规避,本文对企业财务危机出现前的一些征兆及其防范对策等进行了阐述,得出只要管理得周全,企业的财务危机可以规避和防范的结论.     

On the dividend smoothing,signaling and the global financial crisis

This paper addresses twin problems related to dividend smoothing and signaling. Firstly, it provides direct test for dividend smoothing and signaling. Secondly, this paper attempts to examine the impact of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on dividend stability. The paper estimates the Lintner model by incorporating Tobit structure using ten years longitudinal data of firms listed on the Muscat Securities Market. An empirical case study is conducted to demonstrate the usefulness of the model. Our empirical results validate both the original and the modified Lintner model, which is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. The paper finds that the impact of GFC on dividend policy is insignificant. Moreover, the evidence lends support to the substitute model of agency costs theory.     

The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek government sector

The purpose of this paper is to develop Minskyan financial fragility indices for the government sector and to examine the financial structure of the Greek government before and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. We provide empirical evidence that clearly shows the growing financial fragility of the Greek public sector in the 2000s. We also assess the effectiveness of the implemented bailout adjustment programmes in Greece and claim that the conducted austerity measures and fiscal consolidation have not significantly improved the financial posture of the Greek government sector. We argue that the implementation of fiscal and wage austerity in an economy that lacks structural competitiveness produces prolonged recession and unemployment with adverse feedback effects on the financial fragility of the government.     

Overall effects of financial liberalization: financial crisis versus economic growth

ABSTRACT

The contribution of this work consists firstly in decomposing the effect of financial liberalization into a global direct positive effect on growth and an indirect negative effect via financial fragility and crisis. We show that the aggregate positive effect of financial liberalization outweighs the negative partial or temporary effect. Secondly, contrary to previous works, we distinguish many types of financial reforms. We found that equity market liberalization is the most important component in reducing economical costs associated with financial crisis. Thus, equity market liberalization is the most important favoring growth. Interest rate liberalization enhances significantly the probability of crisis leading to a short-run indirect effect more important than other financial reforms. Thirdly, we improved our work by addressing model uncertainty using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to choose appropriate indicators for model crisis specification.     

The role of controls in the international financial crisis

The impact of the great financial crisis that started in the United States with the implosion of “subprime” loans has drawn the public’s attention on one of the most innovative branches of financial market, the famous derivatives. The financial crisis and the involvement of major banking institutions thus call for some thinking about the concept of control in Italy and in a globalized world. In Italy, even though the scale of the risks connected with transactions in derivatives is limited, some banks may have damaged their reputations by pushing complex derivative products onto unwitting clients. Apart from reassurance and all kinds of justifications, and without arguing whether this was deliberate or not, the monetary authorities, Consob, and ABI have clearly reported the risk of a world financial crisis too late.