Urbanization,informal sector,and development

Urbanization is a universal phenomenon in the postwar world, but its qualitative nature is varied across countries. Some nations have experienced urbanization that accompanied skill upgrading, industrialization, and the expansion of the urban formal (modern) sector, but others urbanized without such modernization and underwent the expansion of the urban informal (traditional) sector simultaneously. The question that naturally arises is what are the underlying causes for the differences. The purpose of the paper is to tackle this question analytically based on a dynamic model of urbanization and development.     

The effects of the minimum wage in Brazil on the distribution of family incomes: 1996–2001

The Brazilian economy has long relied on the minimum wage, having first implemented a minimum in 1940. Shortly after taking office in 2003, Brazil's President raised the minimum wage by 20% and promised to double the value of the minimum wage before his term ends in 2006. The usual rationale for minimum wage increases is to bring about beneficial changes in the income distribution, by raising incomes of poor and low-income families. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the efficacy of the minimum wage in Brazil in bringing about these changes in the income distribution. We examine data drawn from Brazil's major metropolitan areas, studying the years after Brazil's hyper-inflation ended. The estimates provide no evidence that minimum wages in Brazil lift family incomes at the lower points of the income distribution; if anything some of the evidence points to adverse effects on lower-income families.     

Inequality and growth: What comes from the different inequality measures?

The objective of the paper is to verify if income inequality impedes the growth rates in OECD countries in the period of 1990–2014 and to reveal whether the choice of the income inequality measure determines the sign and the strength of the estimated relationship. We use system GMM to estimate parameters of a dynamic panel growth model. The research indicates that income inequality negatively affects economic growth. We also find evidence that various measures of inequality bring the different scale of consequences for economic growth, with measures that give more weight to the middle part of the distribution being the weakest predictor of GDP growth. Simultaneously, we present the test of weak instruments, which helps to explain these differences.     

The relation between wealth and health: Evidence from a world panel of countries

Based on a world sample of countries, this paper presents panel data evidence that documents a U-shaped relation between GDP per capita (wealth) and life expectancy (health). The evidence also shows that excluding the possibility of a nonmonotonic relationship induces erroneous conclusions about the time-varying wealth-health correlation.     

Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy

This paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs and enforcement of financial contracts. It constructs and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogenous agents, occupational choices over formal and informal businesses, financial frictions and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal firms. The benefit from formalization is better access to outside finance. The quantitative exercises suggest that: (i) regulation costs and not the level of enforcement account for differences in the size of the informal sector between United States and Mediterranean Europe; (ii) for a developing country like Peru, however, contract enforcement and regulation costs are equally important in accounting for the size of the informal sector; and (iii) regulation costs and contract enforcement do not account for most of the income differences observed among countries.     

Fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two-sector developing economy

This paper develops a two-sector model of a developing economy and examines the role of the informal sector in limiting the government's ability to increase tax revenues. A key feature is the introduction of auditing of the informal sector and degree of tax enforcement in that sector. We emphasize the interdependence between tax policy and enforcement in achieving a developing economy's fiscal objectives and show that by judicious policy choices the presence of the informal sector need not hinder its ability to raise tax revenues. We supplement the formal analysis with numerical simulations highlighting the contrasting intertemporal tradeoffs implied by higher tax rates and tax-enforcement levels.     

Trust and attitudes toward income inequality: Does individualism matter?

In the last decade authors have increasingly examined the role of two cultural traits – trust and individualism – on a variety of economic outcomes ranging from gendered attitudes to entrepreneurship, human capital accumulation, and economic development. While both have positive effects, recent literature suggests that the effects of trust are often conditional on other variables, and this aspect has been neglected in the literature. Indeed, a recent paper found that with respect to gendered attitudes, there are important interactions between the traits of trust and individualism. Building on this foundation we explore how views of trust and individualism interact to affect attitudes about income inequality. Our results show that while views regarding social trust generally positively affect the desire for income equality, this effect is strengthened in the presence of high individualism. Alternatively stated, distrust in highly individualistic environments leads to a greater desire for income differences (inequality). Our result highlights the important role played by market-based price and profit incentives in fostering economic activity and exchange in larger, impersonal extended orders where interpersonal trust and reputational effects are generally absent (in contrast to personal, small group exchange). Our results are robust to a variety of techniques to establish identification and account for sample selection and omitted variable bias.     

Child Schooling and Work Decisions in India: The Role of Household and Regional Gender Equity

Abstract

This paper tests three hypotheses about how mothers' autonomy in India affects their children's participation in school and the labor market. To do so it extends the concept of mothers' autonomy beyond the household to include the constraints imposed by the extent of gender equity in the regions in which these women live. This study began with the expectation that increased autonomy for Indian mothers living in heterosexual households would increase child schooling and decrease child work. However, the results are mixed, indicating that mother's autonomy can be reinforced or constrained by the environment. The paper concludes that mothers and fathers in India make different decisions for girls vis-à-vis boys and that the variables reflecting mothers' autonomy vary in their impact, so that mothers' level of education relative to fathers' is not often statistically significant, while mothers' increased contributions to household expenditure decrease the probability of schooling and girls' work.     

Is Education Prejudiced by Country-Risk?

We consider country-risk as a determinant of education growth in a panel of countries. Applying cross-country dynamic panel data estimations, we show that among the different levels of education, the secondary is the most affected, followed by the tertiary. When different single measures of risk are considered one by one, the tertiary education is affected by more types of risk than any other level of education. This contributes to the literature on the educational production function, as it adds a robust determinant of that function and indicates that politicians should endeavour to decrease country-risk to enhance education.     

Accounting for the effect of health on cross-state income inequality in India

We perform development accounting in accordance with [Weil, 2005] and [Weil, 2007] in a cross-state analysis of India. Results of similar magnitude are found, demonstrating that health can account for 1% to 18% of income differences depending on the health measure.     

Foreign direct investment and governance quality in Russia

This paper studies the effect of poor governance quality on foreign direct investment in Russia. Using a survey of businesses across forty administrative districts, we find that higher frequency of using illegal payments and higher pressure from regulatory agencies, enforcement authorities, and criminals, negatively affect foreign direct investment. Our identification strategy builds on the exogenous cross-regional variation in worker strikes during 1895–1914, the period before the October Revolution. We find that moving from the average to the top governance quality across Russian regions more than doubles the FDI stock.     

Large-scale mortality shocks and the Great Irish Famine 1845–1852

This paper considers the consequences of a large scale mortality shock arising from a famine or epidemic for long run economic and demographic development. The Great Irish Famine of 1845–1852 is taken as a case-study and is incorporated as an exogenous mortality shock into the type of long-run unified growth theory pioneered by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), and modelled by Lagerlöf (2003a,b) among others. Through calibration, the impact of such a mortality shock occurring on the cusp of a country's transition from a Malthusian to a Modern Growth regime is then depicted.     

The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?

This paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust, in a sample of countries, both developed and developing. That relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic, policy, and institutional variables, to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period, and to controlling for endogeneity. It is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality, and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries. Those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system.     

Willingness to pay for managerial training: A case from the knitwear industry in Northern Vietnam

Managerial capital has received attention in recent years as one of the major determinants for enterprise productivity, growth, and longevity. While recent empirical studies make it clear that training intervention can improve the management level, it remains unclear why the managers had not made efforts to obtain these basic knowledge. To test the hypothesis that the reason lies in low valuation for obtaining knowledge, we conduct experimental training programs for the managers of SMEs in a knitwear cluster in rural town in Vietnam. We find that the demand for these training was indeed low prior to training, but increased greatly with own learning experience, and that those with a higher prior demand tended to benefit more from the training.     

CLUSTER‐BASED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM EAST ASIA*

In this paper I attempt to formulate an endogenous model of cluster‐based industrial development, based on case studies in Japan, Taiwan, and China, where the initiation phase is followed by the quantity expansion phase through imitation and subsequently by the quality improvement phase through innovation. I argue that such a process of industrial development is supported by the development of market transactions among assemblers, parts‐suppliers, and merchants, and the stimulation of innovation made possible by the benefits of industrial clusters arising from the geographical concentration of a large number of enterprises and a variety of human resources in a small geographical area.     

Corruption,competition and democracy

This paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. It is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms. This corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. Under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition. Some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related.