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This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract. 相似文献
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Zhiyong Yao 《Bulletin of economic research》2015,67(4):324-335
Some labour contract negotiations involve strikes while most conclude with immediate settlement. This article offers a model of union‐firm negotiation with private information to show that either strikes or immediate settlement will take place in the equilibrium. Different from most signalling literature where the signals are exogenously given, this article endogenizes the choice of signals. We compare two signals, the employment level and the strategic delay. We show that the low‐revenue firm will choose the signal which gives it higher payoff while separating itself from the high‐revenue firm. 相似文献
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在供应商和销售商组成的二级供应链中,供应商隐藏关于生产成本的私人信息,销售商隐藏关于销售努力的行动,且双方地位相当,此时协调主体不明确。为了解决该问题,文章引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,站在供应链整体利润最大化的角度,设计基于收益共享和成本共担的协调契约,对供应商和销售商实施双向激励。研究结果表明:当收益共享比例和成本共担比例满足一定条件时,供应链实现了协调。此时,该契约调动了供应商降低生产成本、销售商提高努力水平的积极性,合作双方达到了"双赢"。笔者通过数值实验对结果进行了验证,表明了结果的有效性。 相似文献
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《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2008,68(3-4):735-754
We model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent, but agents may have time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences and lack complete self-awareness of these preferences. The self-control problem and naïveté of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack-off, even though doing so is observable. When the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naïve, the second-best solution entails allowing a present-biased agent to slack-off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking. With greater self-awareness among present-biased agents, the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract. Furthermore, when shirking can be severely punished, this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem. Instead the principal may exploit present-biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack-off (which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do) but at the expense of foregoing much compensation. 相似文献
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在考虑养老服务集成商营销努力的情况下,通过设计成本分担契约、收益共享契约激励养老服务提供商改善服务质量,分析了两类激励契约的适用条件;比较了对养老服务质量、营销水平决策和各成员利润的改善作用。研究结果表明:提供商的服务质量、利润会随着成本分担比例的增加而递增,随着收益共享比例的增加而递减;集成商的营销水平会随着成本分担比例的增加而增加,而随着收益共享比例的增加而递减,利润水平会随着成本分担比例和收益共享比例的增加而递减;需求影响系数对三种情境下的提供商和集成商利润产生正向作用,签订成本分担契约对提供商较为有利,集成商可能更倾向于收益共享契约;成本影响系数则对利润产生负向作用,签订收益共享契约对提供商较为有利,对于集成商来说,其利润在三种情境下的差异不大;成本分担契约对激励提供商改善服务质量和集成商提升营销水平具有最佳的激励作用。在大多数情况下,提供商获得的利润总是高于集成商。 相似文献
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We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement. 相似文献
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We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agentsituations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to theprincipal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signalabout their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agentsreduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile downto the first-best level, even though the principal cannot observe theagents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a"simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of nomore than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments tothe agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An importantimplication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiationand proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemesthat utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways. 相似文献
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Jia Xie 《International Economic Review》2017,58(1):157-182
This article studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome, so information systems are used for incentives only. When the outcome is noncontractible, a risk‐averse principal relies on imperfect information for both incentives and risk sharing. Under the first‐order approach, this article relaxes Gjesdal's criterion for ranking information systems and finds conditions justifying the first‐order approach when the principal is risk averse and the outcome is noncontractible. 相似文献
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Channel competition and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with demand and cost disruptions
The impacts of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer are examined. First, coordination of the dual-channel supply chain without disruption is proposed, by using a revenue sharing contract. Furthermore, the effects of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and profit are examined from the perspective of partners and the whole supply chain. Optimal prices and quantum of production in the event of disruptions occurring are derived. Suitable changes and improvements in revenue sharing contracts can help coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with disruptions. Finally, the proposed models are further analysed through numerical examples. 相似文献
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We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of
contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type.
In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between
the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect
outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against
each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast,
when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because
competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level
and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical
predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’
(and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade,
and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. 相似文献
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This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness. 相似文献
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We examine the economics of royalties in bioprospecting contracts between a pharmaceutical and genetic resource supplier (local), with an eye to understanding the relative advantages of indexing royalty payments to gross revenue or net revenue. We show a risk-averse firm facing only production or only cost risks will index royalties to net revenue. When facing both types of risk, the choice of royalty type depends on the relative magnitudes of the production and cost risk. In each case, the risk-averse firm chooses the royalty type that shifts as much risk as possible to the local. When the local is risk neutral, the pharmaceutical's and local's preferences are compatible. If the local is risk averse and there is only one type of risk, it will prefer a gross revenue royalty, and shift as much risk as possible to the firm: here the local and firm preferences are compatible only if the firm is risk-neutral, Lastly, we show if the firm sets the terms of the contract, and both agents are risk averse, the firm will not likely volunteer to implement the socially optimal royalty arrangement as it prefers to shift as much risk to the local, who now also prefers a more certain return. This last outcome is at the heart of the benefit sharing discussion and suggests if risk sharing and equity are a concern in benefit sharing, then the choice of royalty type can be an important part of negotiations between pharmaceuticals and locals for the phytochemical from nature for new drug discovery. 相似文献
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In this paper we explore the economic principle behind the revenue‐sharing rule for interconnection charges. Our main finding is that symmetric firms can collude by splitting the revenues equally. We further characterize the optimal revenue‐sharing ratio and discuss the relationship between optimal ratio and the optimal access price. We also show that the revenue‐sharing rule can have the perverse effect of inducing a firm to raise its own costs in order to gain a higher share of revenues. 相似文献
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基于收益共享契约的三级供应链如何应对突发事件 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文针对一个由供应商-制造商-零售商构成的三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求基础上,探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响,同时改进了协调供应链的收益共享契约,使之能够应对突发事件。 相似文献
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Sankar Mukhopadhyay Tarun Kabiraj Arijit Mukherjee 《International Review of Economics & Finance》1999,8(4):94
This article examines the possibility of a profitable technology transfer deal in a duopoly. We show that under a fixed fee contract, technology transfer will be always profitable if the products are sufficiently differentiated or the firms behave sufficiently cooperatively or both. Under a profit sharing contract, however, a profitable technology transfer deal always exists even in a market characterised by Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods. 相似文献
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This article contains an analysis of a simple principal–agent problem illustrating possible problems that may arise when the prinicpal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and valuations. In particular, it is possible that an incentive contract designed by the principal induces the agent to choose an action that is not in the principal's best interest. 相似文献
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Silvio Städter 《Applied economics letters》2018,25(21):1493-1498
This article analyses the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay when the agent is loss averse. I use a principal–agent model with moral hazard in which a principal and an agent bargain over an incentive contract. I show that even a non-binding cap on the agent’s payments can have consequences for the bargained outcome and consequently for the effort the agent exerts. 相似文献
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Ed Nosal 《International Economic Review》2006,47(4):1093-1111
In the standard principal–agent model, the information structure is fixed. In this article the principal can choose to acquire additional information about the state of the world before he contracts with an agent. In the event that the principal acquires this information, the agent never learns what the principal knows about the state of the world. I examine cases where the agent can and cannot observe whether the principal has acquired the additional information. The implications for risk sharing, information acquisition, investment, and welfare are examined for both cases. 相似文献