Discounts and Public Service Obligations in the Airline Market: Lessons from Spain

We examine the impact of the universal service policy that was applied to the Spanish airline market during the period 2001?C2009. Our analysis shows that routes that benefit from price discounts that were granted by the government to island residents enjoy higher demand than the rest of the country??s domestic routes. However, the lower elasticity of demand of these routes allows airlines to set higher prices. We also find that airlines that operate inter-island routes on which their services are regulated by price caps and frequency floors charge lower prices and schedule higher flight frequencies than is the case on unregulated routes. Overall, our analysis suggests that price discounts for island residents help guarantee the profitability of routes that are regulated by public service obligations.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.     

Information and two-sided platform profits

We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., facing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.     

Competition reform and household welfare: A microsimulation analysis of the telecommunication sector in Ethiopia

This paper presents a novel simulation method for estimating the likely welfare effects of policy reforms aimed at increasing competition in strategic economic sectors such as mobile phone services. The proposed method relies on a partial equilibrium simulation approach and estimates the welfare impacts on current consumers and the potential welfare effects among new consumers brought into the market by changes in prices due to competition. This approach is applied to the information and communication technology (ICT) sector in Ethiopia, one of the three countries in the world with a monopoly in the market for mobile phone services. Based on household budget survey data for 2015/16 and departing from a baseline reform scenario that dilutes the market share of the state-owned monopoly to 45 percent, the simulation model estimates a 25.3 percent reduction in the price of mobile services and an increase in 5.7 million new users of mobile services. The predicted drop in prices and increased users would generate a combined relative welfare gain of 1.18 percent (1.09 percent among current users and 0.09 percent among new users), that could be translated into a 0.31 percentage point decline in the national poverty rate and equivalent to lifting about 275,000 people out of poverty. Alternative reform scenarios that dilute the market share of the monopoly to 75 percent and to 30 percent are expected to reduce poverty rate in 0.13 and 0.52 percentage points, respectively. The method proposed in this study represents a useful tool for promoting competition reforms in developing countries, particularly in sectors known for excluding significant segments of the population because of high consumer prices.     

On the Absence of Directional Price Discrimination in the U.S. Airline Industry*

Certain forms of price discrimination in oligopoly markets can lead to more aggressive competition and lower profits, yet few empirical studies examine how extensively such strategies are used. I consider one such strategy, testing whether airlines charge different prices on the same flights to passengers that originate from different endpoints. Using fare quote data I formulate a new approach to measure discrimination while controlling for cost heterogeneity and find that carriers within the U.S. domestic market do not engage in directional price discrimination despite frequently using other similar pricing strategies that are unlikely to enhance competition.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

制度倾斜、低技术锁定与中国经济增长

本文试图回答熊彼特创造性破坏理论在中国为何难以成立的问题。通过建立垄断企业与非垄断企业的博弈模型,我们证明了:对垄断厂商在制度与政策上的倾斜,会削弱非垄断企业进行创新的动力。进一步地,这会使得非垄断企业减少研发人员投入并增大其成为垄断厂商中间制品生产者的概率,同时使垄断厂商成为创新主导者的概率增大,于是创新对经济增长的贡献减少,最终使得经济增长主要是通过资本投入实现。在上述情况下,内生性的技术创新出现的频率会大大降低。这正是中国特色低技术锁定存在的根本性因素。     

Toward international settlement reform: FCC benchmarks versus ITU rates

The global telecommunications service market is undergoing significant change as more countries privatize suppliers, liberalize national markets, and encourage entry. Despite these changes, international settlement rates remain significantly higher than the cost to terminate calls and many carriers reap substantial monopoly profits from the settlement payments they receive. Annual US settlement payments approximate $5 billion. Settlement rates are declining but the progress has been slow. High settlement rates, by raising the cost of international telephone service, result in high calling prices. To accelerate a reduction in settlement rates, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a set of maximum rates, called benchmark rates, which it expects US carriers to use in their settlements with other carriers and created a process designed to insure the implementation of these rates. The FCC benchmark rates vary primarily on the basis of a country's level of economic development. When the FCC took its action, the benchmark rates, which range from 15 to 23¢, were significantly below the rates in effect with most countries. The FCC action was widely criticized even though the rates exceed costs, vary according to countries’ levels of economic development, and will be phased in over five years to give countries time to adjust. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) took an unprecedented step of proposing an alternative set of settlement rates for its members. The ITU rates differ significantly from the FCC rates, being much lower for economically advanced countries and significantly higher for less developed countries. The ITU rates vary according to a country's teledensity but the rationale for the ITU categories lacks support. In addition, other, arbitrary categories are part of the plan. Neither the FCC nor the ITU approach to reducing settlement rates address the problem of reforming the international settlement process and replacing it with an economically efficient, market oriented payment scheme. The first stage of the FCC policy went into effect in 1999. Complemented by changing market conditions, the policy has lead to lower US settlement rates, but most rates still exceed competitive market levels. Virtually all US minutes in the FCC's top two income categories comply with the prescribed benchmark rates. In fact, many countries in these two categories have rates with US carriers that are below benchmark levels. Several less developed countries have also negotiated rates with US carriers that conform to the FCC plan. As a result, US carriers benefit from the FCC policy as their average settlement costs decline. These cost reductions make possible lower calling prices but the market structure of US international communications service industry may inhibit the flow-through of these savings to US consumers. US consumer's prices were falling before the FCC acted on settlement rates. The FCC action seems to have increased the pressure to further reduce these rates. At the same time, however, service markets are being increasingly segmented and price discrimination is more widely practiced so only some US consumers benefit from lower settlement rates.     

COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*

In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.     

The Economic Impact of Wireless Number Portability

This paper examines the price response of wireless carriers to the introduction of number portability in the U.S. I find that wireless prices decreased in response to number portability, but not uniformly across plans. Average prices for the plans with the fewest minutes decreased by only $0.19/month (0.97%), but average prices for medium and high‐volume plans decreased by $3.64/month (4.84%) and $10.29/month (6.81%), respectively. The results suggest that higher‐volume users in the wireless market benefited more from the policy‐induced reduction in switching costs.     

Horizontal concentration and anticompetitive behavior in the central Canadian cement industry: testing arbitrage cost hypotheses

Consider a market with a small number of firms attempting to collude. If they successfully act as a dominant firm, they will raise price. This in turn will expand output by any fringe firms and thus reduce the market share of the colluding group. Thus, higher prices will decrease concentration over time. Here we test this hypothesis, using a modification of Spiller and Huang (1986) and data from the post-1974 Toronto cement market. The weight of the evidence indicates that market price has a negative effect on concentration, implying that the firms in this market act, with significant though limited, success as a cartel.     

Cheap Tuesdays and the demand for cinema

Many movie markets are characterised by extensive uniform pricing practices, hampering the ability to estimate price elasticities of demand. Australia presents a rare exception, with most cinemas offering cheap Tuesday ticket prices. We exploit this feature to estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model of demand for the Sydney region in 2007. We harness an extensive set of film, cinema, and time-dependent characteristics to build a rich demand system. Our results are consistent with a market expansion effect from the practice of discounted Tuesday tickets, and suggest that cinemas could profit from price dispersion by discounts based on observable characteristics.     

Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents’ Profits and Consumer Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case

I estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. I find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The price increase was most pronounced among the introducers existing brands. I also find that the data used in the paper identify a significant enhancement of consumer welfare as a result of the change in product characteristics provided by new brands even if a large portion of welfare gain is explained by the assumption on the error term in the utility function.JEL classification: D40, D60, L13, L66, H20     

The Welfare Losses From Price-Matching PolicIes

Several recent papers argue that price-matching policies raise equilibrium prices. We add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses, which have two sources: Harberger triangles from high prices and Posner rectangles from over-entry. We compare price-matching markets with entry to monopoly and price-matching markets without entry, and find that price matching with entry creates greater welfare losses than monopoly in markets with a low ratio of fixed to marginal cost. We illustrate this result using parameters from the US wholesale gasoline and air travel markets, and relate our model to price matching among NASDAQ market makers.     

The Determinants of Pricing in the Mexican Domestic Airline Sector: The Impact of Competition and Airport Congestion

Low-cost airlines in Mexico affect the lowest-quoted fares of one of the two principal incumbent carriers, but have no effect on the lowest-quoted fares of the other incumbent carrier. The same conclusion holds for competition between incumbent carriers where the lowest-quoted fares of one of the incumbent carriers is lower when incumbents compete. Congestion at the Mexico City airport is limiting potential competition, with carriers being able to charge a significant price premium. This suggests that the societal costs of airport congestion can go well beyond the negative congestion externality and should also include the effects of reduced competition. These findings raise important public policy issues.     

Competition and the performance of hospital markets

This paper explores the relationship between competition and market performance for the primarily nonprofit industry, hospital services. A theoretical framework is adopted that assumes hospitals compete for physician affiliations on the basis of hospital price and resources provided. The model indicates that monopoly power leads to higher quality-adjusted hospital prices, resulting in a reduction in the level of hospital resources consumed. This reduction can occur through admissions, patient length of stay, or resources consumed per patient-day. A regression analysis reveals that all three are reduced as market concentration increases.     

基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析

本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属（接入）寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明：在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。     

Low-cost airlines and online price dispersion

This paper presents a new form of online pricing tactic where airlines post, at the same time and for the same flight, fares in different currencies that violate the Law of One Price. Unexpectedly for an online market, price dispersion may be accompanied by a hidden discount that tends to persist in the period preceding a flight's departure. The econometric analysis reveals that airlines post dispersive fares in less competitive routes with more heterogeneous demand. Furthermore, temporal persistence of intra-firm fare dispersion suggests that it is an equilibrium phenomenon engendered by the airlines' need to manage stochastic demand conditions for a specific flight.     

ANOTHER LOOK AT PRICE PROMOTION*

Weekly sales at retail stores exhibit several patterns that the literature on price promotion does not fully capture. In this paper we develop a simple symmetric model where duopoly manufacturers distribute through a monopoly retailer to serve consumers with heterogeneous reservation prices. We show that the heterogeneity in consumers' reservation prices coupled with the retailer's market power is sufficient to resolve the deficiency in the literature. We then show that, while pricing patterns under this model differ significantly from those under a model where the retailer has no market power, the manufacturers' expected profits are the same in both cases.