浅论控制权回报激励的扭曲问题——兼谈我国国有企业经营者激励约束机制运行效率低的有关问题

按照企业理论的观点 ,企业所有权的基本框架是将剩余控制权安排给经营者 ,将剩余索取权安排给所有者和经营者分享。但经营者滥用控制权 ,致使回报激励扭曲现象难以避免。通过对控制权回报激励相关理论的阐述 ,探讨中国国有企业控制权回报激励扭曲的原因 ,提出了解决回报激励扭曲之问题途径     

国有企业经理人剩余控制权收益分析

企业剩余控制权是企业的重要决策权。在现代股份制条件下,企业剩余控制权发生了从所有者向经理人手中的转移,经理由此获得了相应的控制权收益。特别是国有企业中的剩余所有权与剩余控制权极不对称的组合,经理人积极地使自己的控制权收益最大化。因此,我国国有企业应重新建立起剩余控制权与索取权的对应关系。     

企业利益相关者财务治理:分类特征与完善

一、企业利益相关者财权及财务治理现代企业理论认为企业是利益相关者(要素所有者)之间签订的一组契约的联结。企业所有权的核心问题是各利益相关者之间权利与义务的界定,即企业剩余索取权与控制权的安排问题。企业所有权的有效安排是企业高效运行的基础和根本保证。从企业所有权安排的本质看,无论是企业的剩余索取权还是控制权,其核心都表现在企业的财务权利上。     

关于所有权成本与公司治理结构的初探

一、所有权与所有权成本 企业所有权存在的前提是契约的不完备性和未来世界的不确定性。现代企业理论把企业视为一系列契约的组合，是个人之间交易的一种方式，其隐含的前提是签约人必须对自己投入企业的要素拥有明确的所有权，这种产权交易的结果形成了企业所有权。本文为强调企业所有权与治理结构的内在逻辑联系．将企业所有权定义为对企业的剩余控制权和对企业利润或剩余收益的索取权。但事实上．所有权关系本身也有成本．     

经营者人力资本与企业所有权安排

经营者人力资本的特性影响企业所有权安排,将企业所有权安排给经营者是企业本质的要求,最优的企业所有权安排具体化为剩余索取权和剩余控制权的对称性安排,所以经营者享有剩余索取权优化了企业所有权安排,体现了经营者人力资本的价值。     

理论中的企业所有权:悖论性质及其超越

本文认为,无论用剩余索取权还是用剩余控制权抑或用这两种剩余权利的统一体来定义企业所有权,由于其对企业自然属性的忽视以及考察企业所有权的方法存在的问题,导致其无法规避理论上的悖论性结果。文章提出,为跨出这种理论上的悖论境地,必须寻找新的途径对企业所有权进行重新界定。在企业理论中,如果涉及到企业所有权,就简单地直接使用法律上的企业所有权概念;而研究那些"实际存在"的权利的时候,就使用产权这一概念,因为产权本来就表示一组权利。     

企业制度结构的经济学解释

企业的制度结构具体表现为所有权结构及雇佣结构。剩余控制权的配置决定企业的所有权结构,权威的分布则决定企业的雇佣结构。借助经济组织理论,本文对企业制度结构的形成逻辑进行了经济学解释,以此为基础,认为股东导向的公司治理模式是同时实现实物资本和人力资本利益最大化的基本选择。     

资本结构与股权结构关系研究

本文在终极所有权、控制权理论框架下,对我国上市公司资本结构与股权结构之间的关系进行了研究。研究发现,终极控股股东控制权与所有权的分离使得控股股东倾向于获得控制权私利,从而降低了上市公司的负债水平。终极控股股东担任上市公司高级管理者并没有加剧这一现象,但除控股股东外的其他股东并没有起到监督大股东的作用。家族企业的负债水平要高于国有企业和其他企业,家族企业控股股东获取控制权私利的动机不如国家和其他类型企业强烈。     

会计规则剩余控制权与会计规则的分类治理模式探讨

在不完全契约的理论框架下,企业的控制权来自于剩余控制权,而剩余控制权源于对物资资产的财产所有权.随着组织形态的复杂化和多样化不断加强,古典意义中的剩余控制权也逐渐呈现出多种多样的表现形式.本文主要对会计规则控制权进行深入的研究,并对会计规则的分类治理模式做了细致的分析,以期对相关的工作人员有所帮助.     

企业契约的利益相关者模型

企业是利益相关者参与的一系列契约的联结.利益相关者包括股东、经理人员、债权人、供应商、消费者、工人以及社会公众等,他们将自己所拥有的资源投入到企业,同时也就拥有了不同的企业所有权.企业所有权包括索取权(包括固定索取权、变动索取权和剩余索取权)和控制权(包括固定控制权和剩余控制权),而企业所有权安排则是在制度环境、供求关系、资源投入量、资源的信号显示机制、资源可抵押性、资产专用性、风险选择和组织化程度等因素的影响下,利益相关者利益冲突与协调的结果.这些因素的不断变化之特征,决定企业所有权安排是一个动态的过程,它具有状态依存特征.     

Ultimate ownership,risk-taking and firm value: evidence from China

This article investigates the relationship among ultimate ownership, risk-taking and firm value using firm-level data from Chinese companies. The results indicate that dominant ultimate controlling shareholders exacerbate the agency problem. The larger the divergence between ultimate shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights, the stronger motivation is to reduce corporate risk-taking (CRT) to safeguard private benefits. Furthermore, the presence of a dominant ultimate controlling shareholder is harmful to firm value, and the divergence between its control right and cash flow right has a significantly negative effect on firm value. Corporate risk-taking plays a significant mediating effect between ultimate controlling shareholder and firm value. Based on these results based on theory and practice, we propose a number of practical implications for managers.     

Assets,Attributes and Ownership

The notion of full asset ownership is important in economics, for example, in recent work on the boundaries of the firm. Much of this work has been taken up with the issue why it matters who owns an asset. However, recognizing that assets have multiple attributes, and that these may be subject to capture in a world of positive measurement and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of full asset ownership is problematic. New property rights theorists sidestep these issues by implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly enforced (i.e. full asset ownership obtains). We discuss the notion of property rights and ownership in a setting characterized by positive costs of enforcement, and suggest that in such a setting, the new property rights model is a part of a more overarching perspective, which also includes older contributions to property rights economics.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership control of foreign affiliates: A property rights theory perspective

This paper applies property rights theory to explain changes in foreign affiliates’ ownership. Post-entry ownership change is driven by both firm-level characteristics and by the differences in the institutional environments in host countries. We distinguish between financial market development and the level of corruption as two different institutional dimensions, such that changes along these dimensions impact upon ownership change in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that changes in ownership are affected by the foreign affiliate’s relatedness with its parent’s sector, as well as by the affiliate’s maturity. We use firm level data across 125 host countries to test our hypotheses.     

相关和自主的立体企业剩余产权--主体性的视角和观点

经济学的企业产权理论所揭示的是相关性企业产权,是关于产权的一般规定和共性,是不完整的。企业产权必定具有特殊性,具有共性之上的个性和相关性基础上的自主性,尤其是从管理学和主体性的视角观察,必定会得出这样的认识和结论。企业产权的本质是相关与自主统一的主体性剩余产权,而且是一种立体结构,有企业契约、团队生产和管理、企业和企业家创新等层面的相关和自主统一的主体性剩余产权。     

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders’ contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996–2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders’ contestability.     

Founding Family Controlled Firms: Performance, Risk, and Value

An agency theory framework is used to test the effects of founding family control on firm performance, capital structure, and value. Both the finance and management literatures regarding the relationship between firm control and firm value are explored. Controlling for size, industry, and managerial ownership, the results suggest that firms controlled by the founding family have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.     

Agency costs in banking firms: An analysis of expense preference behavior

Behavioral approaches to the theory of the firm contend that the agency relationship that must develop when a separation exists between management and ownership may have various agency costs. One such cost is the cost of monitoring managers to avoid expense preference behavior on their part. Managers may engage in expense preference behavior any time they manage firms in noncompetitive markets and ownership of the firm is dispersed enough to put control in the hands of management. This research reports on an analysis of the existence and influence of expense preference behavior on the salaries of chief operating officers of banks. Various studies have resulted in conflicting conclusions about the effect of expense preference behavior on various input costs facing banks. Only the study by Hannan and Mavinga (1980) includes an explicit measure of the separation of ownership from control of the firm. However, that study does not analyze executive compensation. Using such a measure, this study reports that the salaries of chief operating officers in banks are significantly higher if both the necessary and sufficient conditions for expense preference behavior are satisfied.     

企业的生命成本分析

现代企业理论探讨了古典理论所忽视的企业问题,将经济学的研究领域深入企业的内部,分析了企业的性质、起源、组织方式以及产权关系等问题。但是,现代企业理论也忽视对企业生命有机体和生命成本的分析。实际上,企业从根本上说是由组织系统内部非物质或超物质的活力或生命力所组成,具有生命特征,遵循生命规律,其终极目标是改变人的生活,使人获得快乐与幸福。在对企业的本质和起源的分析中,认为企业是为了节约生命费用的有机体而存在。在对企业的产权分析中,提出了节约生命费用要素者拥有企业所有权是现代企业所有权理论的核心思想。