Political Participation of Mobile Citizens and the Size of the Welfare State

This paper deals with the implications of personal mobilityfor political participation of citizens and for the resultingsize of the welfare state. We show that mobility of citizensmay influence the individual decision to participate in thepolitical process and thereby may change policy outcomes. Ifcitizens who prefer a larger public sector are relatively immobile,the size of the welfare state may increase with mobility. (JELD72, J61)     

Formal and Informal Labour Markets: Challenges and Policy in the Central and Eastern European New EU Members and Candidate Countries

The paper aims at comparing the formal and informal labour marketsin the Central and Eastern European new EU Member States andcandidate countries of the European Union. First, the currentsituation of the labour market is described, focusing on therecent developments since the breaking up of the East. Thenthe policy design of these labour markets is depicted and itseffects on formal and informal labour markets. The most importantchallenges for employment policy as well as the effects of enlargementon the labour markets are analysed. The paper ends with a shortsummary. (JEL J21, J23, H26, H11, O17, O57)     

Welfare Migration: Is the Net Fiscal Burden a Good Measure of its Economic Impact on the Welfare of the Native-Born Population?

Migration of young workers (as distinct from retirees), evenwhen driven in by the generosity of the welfare state, slowsdown the trend of increasing dependency ratio. But, even thoughlow-skill migration improves the dependency ratio, it neverthelessburdens the welfare state. Recent studies by Smith and Edmonston(1977), and Sinn et al. (2003) comprehensively estimate thefiscal burden that low-skill migration imposes on the fiscalsystem. However an important message of this paper is that inan infinite-horizon set-up, one cannot fully grasp the implicationsof migration for the welfare state, just by looking at the netfiscal burden that migrants impose on the fiscal system. Inan infinite-horizon, overlapping generations economy, this netburden, could change to net gain to the native born population.(JEL F22, H3, J10)     

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

Labour-supply impacts of effective welfare programme parameters: a reanalysis

We quantify the impact of effective welfare programme parameters on the labour supply of single female household heads – the primary group of welfare recipients in the USA. Our panel of data is derived from the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey for the years 1979 to 1990 inclusive. Behavioural impacts from a range of economic variables are consistent in sign with predictions made by economic theory. We find that effective welfare gurantee levels and the effective tax rate on earned income both significantly decrease labour supply. The marginal effects of these welfare programme parameters are economically small: a US$1000 increase in the expected welfare guarantee level reduces annual labour supply by about 36 hours; a 10 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate on earned income reduces annual labour supply by about 7.5 hours.     

Health spending in Italy: The impact of immigrants

The welfare impact of immigration is a highly debated issue especially for countries on the external borders of the European Union. This paper studies how immigrants affect public health expenditure across Italian regions during the period 2003–2016 using NUTS II level data. Identification strategy is based on shift–share instruments, which are made robust to pull factors that might attract immigrants in Italy and to internal migration of natives. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in immigrants over total resident population leads to a decrease in public health expenditure per capita by about 3.8% (i.e. around 69 euro per capita). Among possible channels, we find no support for any crowding out effect from public to private health services by natives due to increasing immigration or for any role played by different levels of efficiency across regional health systems. Our results are driven by immigrants' demographic structure: they are mostly males and younger workers that call for less health spending, according to a positive selection mechanism. Moreover, linguistic barriers contribute to limiting the immigrants' reliance on public healthcare, which is confirmed also by the use of the European Health Interview Survey microdata.     

RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT OF LOW‐PAID IMMIGRANTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL U.S. WAGE‐EARNERS

This paper builds on earlier work that used a general‐equilibrium model to show that reducing employment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States through a tighter border‐security policy lowers the average income of legal residents. Here we exploit further the detail available in the general‐equilibrium model to look at distributional effects, recognizing that the policy increases wage rates for low‐paid legal workers. We assess the social welfare effect on legal workers using a constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function. We contrast our general‐equilibrium approach to immigration analysis with the more commonly used partial‐equilibrium, econometric approach. (JEL D63, J61, C68)     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country

We consider the implications of cooperation with respect to immigration control between a final‐destination country (D) and its poorer neighbor (T). Assuming that the latter serves as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, a key question is how much aid should D provide to T for the purpose of strengthening its immigration controls. The problem for T is to determine what proportion of aid to use strictly for immigration control rather than trying to meet other border‐security objectives. We examine the Nash equilibrium values of the policy instruments of both countries and compare them with those which are optimal when international cooperation on immigration control extends to maximization of joint welfare. We also consider a two‐stage game in which D first decides on how much aid to transfer to T, with the latter subsequently choosing how to use it.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

Reassessing welfare reform data: a response to cherry

Abstract

This is a response to Robert Cherry's comment on the article, “Welfare as We [Don't] Know It: A Review and Feminist Critique of Welfare Reform Research” that appeared in the 10(2) issue of Feminist Economics. This response argues that while some combination of welfare reform, the booming economy in the late 1990s, and changes in economic policy all worked together to decrease caseloads and increase employment rates among welfare leavers, these are incomplete measures of the impact of welfare reform on the lives of lone mothers. This paper also argues that the effects of welfare reform on lone mothers are more mixed than Cherry acknowledges. This paper concludes that when one holistically examines low-income lone mothers' lives, it is premature to declare welfare reform a success.     

Population increase,economic growth,educational inequality,and income distribution: some recent evidence

The relationship between population increase, economic growth, education and income inequality was examined in a cross-section study based on data from 26 developing and 2 developed countries. As other studies have noted, high population growth is associated with a less equal income distribution. A 1 percentage point reduction in the rate of population growth tends to raise the income share of the poorest 80% in the less developed world by almost 5 percentage points and is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the income share of the poorest 40%. The relationship between short-run income growth and equality, on the other hand, is strong and positive. Estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the short-run rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) increases the income share of the bottom 80% by about 2 percentage points and that of the poorest 40% by almost 1 percentage point. Although higher mean schooling appears to be a mild equalizer, educational inequality does not appear to have an adverse effect on income distribution. Overall, these results challenge the widely held belief that there must be a growth-equity trade-off. Moreover, they suggest that the impact of educational inequality on income distribution may be different from that observed in earlier studies, implying a need for caution in using these earlier results as a basis for educational policy development.     

The impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance on labor force participation

This paper studies the effect of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference regressions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability enrollment of 6 to 7.4 percentage points and an increase in employment of 1.6 to 3.4 percentage points. The policy change had important spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance program. Specifically, the share of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased by 3.5 to 3.9 percentage points, and the share receiving sickness insurance benefits, by roughly 0.7 percentage points.     

Credible redistribution policy and skilled migration

We analyze the joint determination of income redistribution and migration flows across fiscally independent regions. In our model, regional governments lack commitment so their policy announcements must be credible, and redistribution between skilled and unskilled workers is bounded by informational constraints. In any given region, the welfare of all workers is increasing in the share of skilled workers, as after-tax incomes increase for both skilled and unskilled workers. When skilled workers are more geographically mobile than unskilled ones, the endogenous response of redistribution policy can induce regional agglomeration of skilled workers. We also find that the equilibrium features symmetry-breaking if migration costs are relatively low; and that worker mobility tends to amplify pre-existing welfare differences in income and welfare across regions.     

CAN UNIONS HURT WORKERS? A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY

This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has market power over wages. The presence of the union induces a social welfare maximizing government to implement a high level of immigration, leading to a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view but also from the workers' point of view. When interest group politics prevails and workers' ability to influence the policy-maker is strengthened by existence of the union, we show the conditions under which workers may benefit from the presence of the union.     

Can Pre-recorded Evidence Raise Conviction Rates in Cases of Domestic Violence?

This paper explores the association between pre-recorded evidence and court outcomes in cases of domestic violence. Net of controls and time fixed effects, we find that cases with pre-recorded evidence are 3.4 percentage points more likely to result in a conviction. This increase occurs through three channels: a 5.6 percentage point increase in the probability of a conviction among (the one in four) cases that proceed to a defended hearing; a 2.4 percentage point increase in the probability of a guilty plea; and, a 2.4 percentage point decrease in the probability that the prosecution withdraws their case.     

Does immigration affect the Phillips curve? Some evidence for Spain

The Phillips curve has flattened in Spain over 1995-2006: Unemployment has fallen by 15 percentage points, with roughly constant inflation. This change has been much more pronounced than elsewhere. We argue that this stems from the immigration boom in Spain over this period. We show that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is shifted by immigration if natives’ and immigrants’ labor supply elasticities and bargaining power differ. Estimation of this curve for Spain indicates that the fall in unemployment since 1995 would have led to an annual increase in inflation of 2.5 percentage points if it had not been largely offset by immigration.     

The macroeconomic impact of foreign labour influx into the industrialized nation state and the complementary policies

This paper makes a numerical assessment on the macroeconomic impact of foreign labor influx into the industrialized nation state allowing free trade in goods but imposing an immigration quota on labor, and then explores the complementary policies for the impact of foreign labor influx. One of the main findings is that immigration itself brings welfare gains only if prices are flexible, but a skill-biased intake policy can bring a much larger welfare gain. The complementary policy options to boost welfare gains by immigration increase are monetary expansion, adopting foreign components more, and influencing foreign demand for intermediate goods indirectly by inviting foreign direct investment. For these policies to cope, the destination country should try to correct the market structure so that prices can be flexible.     

The Immigration Policy Puzzle

This paper revisits the puzzle of immigration policy: standard economic theory predicts that free immigration improves natives' welfare, but (with few historical exceptions) an open door policy is never implemented in practice. What rationalizes the puzzle? We first review the model of immigration policy where the policy maker maximizes national income of natives net of the tax burden of immigration. We show that this model fails to provide realistic policy outcomes when the receiving region's technology is described by a standard Cobb–Douglas or CES function. Then we describe three extensions of this basic model that reconcile theory with evidence. The first introduces a cost of integration of the immigrant community in the destination country; the second takes into account the policy maker's redistributive concern across different social groups; the last extension considers positive spillover effects of (skilled) migrants on the receiving economy.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.