Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?

In this paper, we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of 25 countries—including 14 inflation targeters—with 16 years of monthly information. We find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, the level and the variance of inflation, disinflation periods, and global inflation. On average, the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting. When we differentiate between developed and developing countries, the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries.     

Why Don’t Oil Shocks Cause Inflation? Evidence from Disaggregate Inflation Data

This paper uses disaggregate U.S. inflation data to evaluate explanations for the breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation. A data set with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A comparison of the 1973–85 and 1986–2006 time periods reveals that substitution away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with approximately two‐thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being due to reduced energy usage, and one‐third to monetary policy. We find no evidence that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of oil shocks, played a role.     

Does Inflation Targeting Help Reduce Financial Dollarization?

We examine whether adopting an inflation‐targeting regime helps reduce financial dollarization as predicted by Ize and Levy Yeyati's ( 2003 ) portfolio model. To address the self‐selection problem of policy adoption, we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to a large sample of 106 developing countries for the years 1985–2004. We find strong evidence that inflation targeting has large and significant treatment effects on lowering both actual financial dollarization and the model implied minimum variance portfolio dollarization. Our results are robust to alternative samples and model specifications and also to control for additional factors in postmatching regressions.     

Residual Income Valuation: Are Inflation Adjustments Necessary?

This paper explores the question of whether the residual income valuation relationship (RIVR) should be written in inflation-adjusted terms. This question is of particular interest in the light of Ritter and Warrs (2002) claim that the standard nominal historical cost formulation of RIVR misvalues firms because it fails to deal properly with inflation. We present two inflation-adjusted formulations of RIVR, each of which is based on an income measure from the inflation accounting literature, and one of which is a general case of a formulation proposed by Ritter and Warr. We show that neither of these formulations is any more or less correct than the standard formulation of RIVR, and find no support for the view that it is necessary to write RIVR in inflation-adjusted terms. Finally we argue that, in a setting in which accounting numbers and forecasts thereof are normally presented in historical cost terms, the inflation adjustment of RIVR is likely to bring unnecessary complication to the valuation process, with increased scope for error.JEL Classification: M4     

Directional Accuracy of Urban Consumers’ Inflation Forecasts in China

We evaluate the directional accuracy of inflation forecasts based on the survey data of urban savings account holders in China. By using a new market-timing test, we show that the urban consumers’ expectations of inflation are not a useful predictor of the overall consumer price index (CPI) and the urban household CPI (U-CPI) in China. However, after our in-depth analysis using the inflation rate of each category in the U-CPI basket, we find that the consumers’ forecasts are useful in predicting the movement of the residence component in the U-CPI basket since the third quarter of 2009.     

How to Weigh Unemployment Relative to Inflation in Monetary Policy?

The monetary policy mandate for the Federal Reserve and of the Riksbank are essentially the same and boil down to stabilizing inflation around the inflation target and employment or unemployment around a long‐run sustainable rate. The relative weight on stabilizing unemployment or employment versus stabilizing inflation may be close to one. A positive unemployment‐gap forecast normally calls for a positive inflation‐gap forecast.     

REIT Returns and Inflation: Perverse or Reverse Causality Effects?

Contrary to the Fisherian theory of interest, previous studies document a negative relationship between REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) returns and inflation. In this research, we re-examine this perverse inflation behavior by testing for the causal relationships among REIT returns, real activity, monetary policy, and inflation through a vector error correction model. Our results indicate that the observations of REIT returns as perverse inflation hedges are spurious. The observed negative relationship between REIT returns and inflation is in fact a manifestation of the effects of changes in monetary policies. These findings are consistent with Darrat and Glascocks (1989) evidence of monetary effects on REIT returns.     

Inflation determination with Taylor rules: Is new-Keynesian analysis critically flawed?

Cochrane (2007) has strongly questioned the basic economic logic of current monetary policy analysis, arguing that New Keynesian (NK) models imply rational expectations paths with explosive inflation that do not imply explosions in real variables relevant for transversality conditions. Consequently, the usual logic does not rule out solutions with explosive inflation. That result does not, however, justify negative conclusions about NK analysis, for a different criterion is logically satisfactory. It is that, to be plausible, a RE solution must satisfy the property of least-squares learnability. Adoption of this criterion serves to justify in principle the bulk of current mainstream analysis.     

Does Global Liquidity Help to Forecast U.S. Inflation?

We construct a measure of global liquidity using the growth rates of broad money for the G7 economies. Global liquidity produces forecasts of U.S. inflation that are significantly more accurate than the forecasts based on U.S. money growth, Phillips curve, and autoregressive and moving average models. The marginal predictive power of global liquidity is strong at 3-year horizons. Results are robust to alternative measures of inflation.     

Does Inflation Adjust Faster to Aggregate Technology Shocks than to Monetary Policy Shocks?

This paper studies U.S. inflation adjustment speed to aggregate technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks in a medium size Bayesian vector autoregression model. According to the model estimated on the 1959–2007 sample, inflation adjusts much faster to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. These results are robust to different identification assumptions and measures of aggregate prices. However, by separately estimating the model over the pre‐ and post‐1980 periods, this paper further shows that inflation adjusts much faster to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks in the post‐1980 period, but not in the pre‐1980 period.     

Global or Domestic? Which Shocks Drive Inflation in European Small Open Economies?

We investigate which shocks drive inflation in small open economies. In the first step, we use the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) approach to identify the global shocks. Second, we regress the disaggregated price indices for selected European economies on the global shocks controlling for the domestic variables. We find that the fluctuations of inflation in the analyzed countries are to large extent determined by the cyclical movements of the domestic output gap however the commodity shock also contributes strongly to inflation variability. The role of the non-commodity global supply shock is less prominent, however, interpreted to some extent as a globalization shock, for most of the analyzed period lowers the inflation. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, this shock reversed what may be interpreted as the weakening of the globalization process.     

Raise Rates to Raise Inflation? Neo‐Fisherianism in the New Keynesian Model

Increasing the inflation target in a New Keynesian (NK) model may require increasing, rather than decreasing, the nominal interest rate in the short run. We refer to this positive short‐run comovement between the nominal rates and inflation conditional on a nominal shock as Neo‐Fisherianism. We show that the NK model is more likely to be Neo‐Fisherian the more persistent is the change in the inflation target and the more flexible are prices. Neo‐Fisherianism is driven by the forward‐looking nature of the model. Modifications that make the framework less forward‐looking make it less likely for the model to exhibit Neo‐Fisherianism.     

Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Household Expectations of Inflation Based on Micro Consumption Data

Survey data on household expectations of inflation are routinely used in economic analysis, yet it is not clear how accurately households are able to articulate their expectations in survey interviews. We propose an alternative approach to recovering households' expectations of inflation from their consumption expenditures. We show that these expectations measures have predictive power for consumer price index (CPI) inflation. They are better predictors of CPI inflation than household survey responses and more highly correlated with professional inflation forecasts, except for highly educated consumers, consistent with the view that more educated consumers are better able to articulate their expectations. We also document that households' inflation expectations respond to inflation news, as measured by the unpredictable component of inflation predictions in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The response to inflation news tends to increase with households' level of education, consistent with the existence of constraints on household's ability to process this information.     

The Structural Dynamics of U.S. Output and Inflation: What Explains the Changes?

We examine the dynamics of U.S. output and inflation using a structural time-varying coefficients vector autoregression. There are changes in the volatility of both variables and in the persistence of inflation, but variations are statistically insignificant. Technology shocks explain changes in output volatility; real demand disturbances variations in the persistence and volatility of inflation. We detect important time variations in the transmission of technology shocks to output and demand shocks to inflation and significant changes in the variance of technology and of monetary policy shocks.     

Financial Deepening,Asset Price Inflation,and Economic Convergence: Empirical Analysis Based on China’s Experience

Abstract

In this study, we test for convergence in financial development and economic growth in China’s financial deepening reform process by using system GMM method. The results show strong evidence of the mutually interactive and systematic relationship between financial development and economic growth, and the system is in a condition of long-run divergence. The main cause of divergence in the system changed after 2008 from financial depression to asset price expansion. This study provides evidence that the government should intensify financial deepening reforms and pay attention to financial resource flows to prevent excessive asset price expansion.     

Do Inflation Expectations Propagate the Inflationary Impact of Real Oil Price Shocks?: Evidence from the Michigan Survey

This paper presents evidence that inflation expectations, as measured by the Michigan Survey of Consumers, only play a minimal role in the propagation of real oil price shocks into inflation. This is despite evidence that confirms that inflation expectations are sensitive to real oil price shocks. Further analysis suggests that after the 1990s, inflation expectations may have played no part in propagating real oil price shocks into inflation.     

What Has—and Has Not—Been Learned about Monetary Policy in a Low‐Inflation Environment? A Review of the 2000s

As the world economy recovers from the worst financial crisis and most severe global slump in 75 years, policymakers, regulators, and academics are focusing intensely and appropriately on lessons to be learned for monetary policy. There are certainly many questions to answer. Among the most important are: Are inflation expectations “well anchored”? What, if any, influence should asset quantities and prices have on monetary policy? Do we have sufficient confidence in our alternative monetary policy tools to stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound?