R&D COOPERATION WITH UNIT-ELASTIC DEMAND

The present paper shows that R&D cooperation leads to the monopoly outcome in terms of price and quantity if demand is unit-elastic. If the demand function exhibits an upper bound for the willingness to pay, R&D cooperation is inferior to a scenario in which firms cooperate both in their R&D and their output decision.     

HOW THE GLOBALIZATION OF R&D COMPETITION AFFECTS TRADE AND GROWTH

The implications of international R&D competition on trade and growth are investigated. The model is one in which a separate R&D sector competes with the manufacturing sector to secure human capital, and technology is licensed to manufacturers by the winner of a pre-emptive R&D competition. The results show that globalization of R&D competition leads to trade between countries (even identical countries), because the result of competition leads to a reallocation of human capital between sectors. The winning country exports technology and traditional goods, while the loser exports manufactured goods. Globalization with indiscriminate technology licensing increases the world's economic growth rate.     

WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS

This paper examines the behaviours of a profit‐maximizing firm and a labour‐managed profit‐per‐worker‐maximizing firm in a two‐stage quantity‐setting model with a wage‐rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the profit‐maximizing firm is the leader and the labour‐managed firm is the follower.     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH AN R&D RIVALRY

This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATION

This paper introduces defection into the strategic R&D model. In defecting, a firm cheats by choosing its R&D expenditures to maximise its own profits, instead of maximising the joint profits of the cooperating firms. Two cooperative environments are considered: R&D cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities; and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities and share information. Under R&D cartelisation, defection entails an increase (decrease) in R&D and effective spillovers for low (high) spillovers; whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in R&D and effective spillovers. Under R&D cartelisation, consumer surplus and total welfare increase (decrease) with defection when spillovers are low (high). Whereas consumer surplus and welfare always decrease with defection under RJV cartelisation. Under R&D cartelisation, the incentives for defection first decrease then increase with spillovers; they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing.     

Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Abstract.  In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D‐intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two‐stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade. JEL classification: F12, F13     

International R&D spillovers and institutions

The empirical analysis in “International R&D Spillovers” [Coe, D., Helpman, E., 1995. International R&D Spillovers. European Economic Review, 39, 859-887] is first revisited on an expanded data set that we have constructed for the purpose of this study. The new estimates confirm the key results reported in Coe and Helpman about the impact of domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks on TFP. In addition, we show that domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks have measurable impacts on TFP even after controlling for the impact of human capital. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to include institutional variables. Our results suggest that institutional differences are important determinants of TFP and that they impact the degree of R&D spillovers. Countries where the ease of doing business and the quality of tertiary education systems are relatively high tend to benefit more from their own R&D efforts, from international R&D spillovers, and from human capital formation. Strong patent protection is associated with higher levels of total factor productivity, higher returns to domestic R&D, and larger international R&D spillovers. Finally, countries whose legal systems are based on French and, to a lesser extent, Scandinavian law benefit less from their own and foreign R&D capital than countries whose legal origins are based on English or German law.     

Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Abstract .  We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers

Abstract.  This paper analyses R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that the change in R&D by a firm following cooperation is proportional to the gap between the spillover rate transmitted by that firm and a critical level of spillovers. In consequence, cooperation increases total R&D investments when the average of firms' spillover rates is sufficiently high. Whereas with symmetric spillovers cooperation is always beneficial to firms, with asymmetric spillovers only a very limited range of spillovers makes cooperation beneficial to both firms. Asymmetries also create a potential conflict between maximizing total welfare and maximizing effective cost reduction. JEL classification: L13, O33     

STRATEGIC R&D AND NETWORK COMPATIBILITY

We analyse the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments, respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

SCIENCE-BASED R&D IN SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH

Firm success is often associated with the development of better products. Private firms undertake applied R&D seeking market advantage, by capitalizing on the freely accessible results of basic research. But unpatentable basic research often fails to address applied R&D open problems. What is the role of the incentives in improving the innovative performance of an economy by matching partially motivated public researchers to their mission? Sometimes government-funded research projects are mission-directed, and yet in many cases the public sector academics indulge in carrier-driven research. An innovation system where, as in the United States, basic research is also driven by patents implicitly sets an ex-post incentive to the researchers guided by invisible hand. For a public innovation system – like the European one – designing an incentive scheme to motivate public researchers is of key importance for fostering the performance of the economic system. This paper extends the Schumpeterian multisector growth model with vertical innovation by highlighting a link between the degree of 'targetness' of public research and aggregate innovation. A positive effect of social capital is also proved.     

Knowledge specialization and R&D collaboration

This paper contributes to the knowledge-based explanation of R&D networks. It argues that knowledge overlap and novelty are complementary inputs of a R&D alliance, in forms that depend upon the exploration breadth and depth of the R&D activity. The paper investigates how the hypothesis of specialization of the knowledge endowments can recover a number of characteristic empirical properties of a pattern of R&D collaboration in the economy. Implications for network evolution are discussed.     

R&D depreciation,stocks, user costs and productivity growth for US R&D intensive industries

This paper estimates R&D depreciation rates for U.S. R&D intensive industries. R&D annually depreciates at; 18% for chemical products, 26% for nonelectrical machinery, 29% for electrical products, and 21% for transportation equipment. These depreciation rates lead to new estimates of the marginal (gross of depreciation) returns to R&D capital; 0.25 for chemical products, 0.31 for nonelectrical machinery, 0.34 for electrical products, and 0.27 for transportation equipment. R&D investment significantly contributed to productivity growth; virtually 100% in chemical products, 55% in nonelectrical machinery, 38 percent in electrical products, and 84% in transportation equipment.     

Demand shocks and firm-financed R&D expenditures

Business cycles might affect firms'?ability and incentive to perform R&;D. Firms finance most R&;D activities out of cash flow so when cash flow decreases the funds available for R&;D also decreases. This limits the ability of firms to perform R&;D, potentially leading to reduced R&;D expenditures during recessions. However, business cycles also influence the incentive to perform R&;D. The opportunity cost of funds devoted to R&;D falls during recessions since the return on production will likely be lower than during an expansion. During recessions, this provides firms with an incentive to redistribute an existing pool of funds away from production and towards R&;D projects. This paper tests whether the business cycle influences the incentive and ability of firms to engage in R&;D activities, in particular examining whether the response is symmetric across the business cycle.     

Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper three different cooperative R&D arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined. A policy game between two governments is analysed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. Allowing cooperation in R&D is also compared with the use of R&D subsidies. It is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative R&D, and allowing cooperation in R&D can be superior to the use of R&D subsidies. JEL Classification: F13, L24     

Institutions and the R&D of GM-crops

This paper analyzes how different institutional structures shape the research and development (R&D) of genetically modified crops (GM-crops). Whether this R&D is conducted within companies, cooperatives or public research organizations (both publicly and privately funded R&D) is expected to influence the type of crops and traits that are developed and therefore the effects on society and ecosystems that potentially could follow from the use of GM-crops. This issue is analyzed empirically by statistical analysis of 1323 notifications for field trials with GM-crops that have been submitted under two EU Directives in seven European countries. The results show that the type of R&D organization influences the traits and crops that are developed. Companies are more likely to submit notifications that concern GM-crops that secure the potential for profit than are other types of R&D organizations, while R&D organizations that are purely publicly funded are more likely to submit notifications that only concern biosafety research than are cooperatives and companies. Consideration of the environment, food safety and food security might justify institutional reforms of R&D of GM-crops. This might include increased public funding combined with changes in intellectual property rights.