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1.
When it is difficult for firms to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, research and development (R&D) spending on process innovation to lower the cost of production is crucial for profitability. However, the information asymmetry in production costs that results from innovation reduces the efficiency of all firms in a market for a homogeneous good. We employ a signalling game to discuss the feasibility of utilising R&D spending and output levels as cost signals in an environment of quantity competition. The results show that a firm does not spend its money on R&D solely to signal the type of cost. Rather, R&D spending may be chosen as a cost signal over the output level only if expenditures on R&D can lead to a sufficiently high probability of reducing production costs. 相似文献
2.
This article examines the impact of the R&D fiscal incentive programme on R&D by Dutch firms. Taking a factor demand approach, we measure the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. Econometric models are estimated using a rich unbalanced panel of firm data covering the period 1996 to 2004 with firm specific R&D user costs varying with tax incentives. Using the estimated user cost elasticity, we perform a cost–benefit analysis of the R&D incentive programme. We find some evidence of additionality suggesting that the level based programme of R&D incentives in the Netherlands is effective in stimulating firms’ investment in R&D. However, the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms. The analysis also indicates that the level based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to a substantial social deadweight loss. 相似文献
3.
This article investigates the relationship between firm’s R&D intensity, expressed as R&D expenditure over sales, and investment intensity in tangible assets. It is commonly acknowledged that R&D requires additional physical investment to be implemented. R&D increases a firm’s productivity and return to tangible investments, thus, providing to the firm incentives to bear high tangible capital costs and to invest more. This represents a crucial issue for a firm’s growth, particularly considering the strong interaction between physical capital accumulation and technological progress. The analysis is based on a large sample of manufacturing firms across seven European countries in the period 2007–2009. Since the sub-sample of firms performing R&D might not be random, there may potentially be an endogeneity issue. The analysis also considers that firms may decide to spend on R&D and investment in physical capital simultaneously. The questions of both endogeneity and simultaneity are dealt with by employing an instrumental variable two-step procedure. We find a positive and significant impact of R&D intensity on firms’ tangible investment intensity. The econometric results highlight the importance of financial factors, particularly with respect to firms’ internal resources. Exposure to international trade has a negative impact on investment, possibly depending on the time-span of the sample used.Abbreviations: Technological Innovation and R&D; Investment Capital; Industry Studies; Firm Behavior; Empirical Analysis 相似文献
4.
This article studies the influence of corporate governance factors on firm R&D investment in a transitional economy like China. By using the data from the listed companies in China, this article statistically tests the hypotheses on the relations between corporate R&D intensity and managerial discretion of CEOs, independent outside directors, degree of share concentration, share held by the state, and share held by a manager. According to the results, the managerial discretion of CEOs has a significant and negative correlation with the firm R&D investment. The number of the independent outside directors in the board has a positive influence on the R&D investment. And as the shares held by a manager increase, the firm R&D intensity will decrease at first, and then increase along an inverted parabolic curve. All these findings show that the improvement of corporate governance and stock incentive plan, and the cultivation of active and long-term stock investors, may finally lead to the upgrade of corporate innovation capabilities. 相似文献
5.
Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Jee-Hyeong Park 《The Canadian journal of economics》2001,34(4):967-987
In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a high-tech firm and a low-tech firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( high-quality and low-quality ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's product R&D activities. If the product market is under quantity competition, the results are opposite: an R&D subsidy (tax) incentive for the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government; and the high-tech firm's government always gains in the R&D policy game, in contrast to the standard prisoner's dilemma result of the R&D policy literature. JEL Classification: F13 相似文献
6.
We compare the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D competition. If a firm’s marginal cost is lower than that of its rival, then this firm (its rival) is referred to as the more (less) efficient firm. Under each mode of competition, there are three types of equilibria: blockaded-entry, deterred-entry, and accommodated-entry. Moreover, the presence of R&D investment makes it harder for the less efficient firm to survive. Cournot competition entails a unique equilibrium, whereas Bertrand competition may yield two equilibria. It is harder for the less efficient firm to survive under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Versus Cournot competition, Bertrand competition yields higher industry output, and it shifts production from the less efficient firm to the more efficient firm. This result, together with the known size effect, explains the following three findings. First, the more efficient firm has a normal output ranking, whereas the less efficient firm may demonstrate an output reversal. Second, the more efficient firm may demonstrate a R&D reversal, whereas the less efficient firm has a normal R&D ranking (its Cournot R&D effort exceeds its Bertrand R&D effort). Third, Bertrand competition is more welfare-efficient than Cournot competition. 相似文献
7.
Sungho Yun 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2018,53(2):152-173
We explore the welfare effect of minimum safety standards, focusing on the case where duopoly firms are asymmetric in that they have different safety effort costs. If duopoly firms are symmetric, they do not provide enough safety to be socially efficient, and so imposing minimum safety standards can resolve this problem. We show, however, that imposing minimum safety standards may reduce the social welfare when there is a large asymmetry in the safety effort costs. In the unregulated equilibrium, the high-cost firm’s safety effort is smaller than that of the low-cost firm, and the high-cost firm is more likely to provide a larger safety effort than is needed to have a socially efficient level with larger asymmetry in the safety effort costs. If safety standards raise the high-cost firm’s safety effort, both firms’ safety efforts may end up further away from the socially efficient level: the low-cost firm reduces its safety effort when the rival’s effort increases because safety efforts are strategic substitutes. 相似文献
8.
Abstract Business cycles might affect the ability of firms to finance R&D, since firms rely on cash flow to finance most R&D activities. However, business cycles also influence the incentive to perform R&D. The opportunity cost of funds devoted to R&D falls during recessions, since the return on production will likely be lower than during an expansion. During recessions, this provides firms with an incentive to redistribute an existing pool of funds away from production and towards R&D projects. The changes in the size and distribution of the pool may also be asymmetric across the business cycle. For example, cash-flow constraints are more likely to bind during recessions than expansions. This paper finds strong evidence for the cash-flow effect, but not the opportunity-cost effect. This means that R&D is pro-cyclical, but smoothing out the business cycle will actually lead to reduced R&D, since the duration of expansions exceeds the duration of recessions. 相似文献
9.
This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization. 相似文献
10.
This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity. 相似文献
11.
This paper examines the impact of the outsourcing of production on the volume and composition of the home country's research and development (R&D). We find that outsourcing decreases the process R&D of the multinational firm in large markets when it only conducts process R&D (the substitution effect between outsourcing and process R&D). Outsourcing tends to emerge as a complementary factor to product development when the multinational firm conducts both product R&D and process R&D (the complementary effect between outsourcing and product R&D) under some conditions. This implies that international outsourcing has a different effect on product innovation and process innovation. 相似文献
12.
研发决策是企业战略发展和组织管理中必不可少的重要内容,对于垄断企业更是如此。分别从企业层面和产业层面对垄断条件下垄断企业的最优研发决策进行了分析。研究表明,由于信息不完全和研发成本的存在,垄断厂商可能会选择低效技术;当研发投入成本较低、风险较小时,厂商进行技术转换、增加研发投入的激励更大。而在进行技术投入时,非合作竞争中的研发投入水平和厂商利润均小于合作研发时的水平,从而导致研发不足。而通过合作研发将技术的外部扩散效应内部化,对企业的研发具有正向激励作用。 相似文献
13.
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated. 相似文献
14.
本文基于种类扩展型技术进步框架构建了理论模型,分析研发创新对企业层面生产供给波动的影响效应以及其作用机理,并利用中国制造业企业数据对理论模型进行验证。本文发现,研发创新带来的更多技术种类能够在一定程度上抵御生产波动的风险,企业研发创新强度越大、全要素生产率越高,则企业产出波动性和生产率波动性越小。进一步研究发现,研发投入是通过扩展技术种类范围、提升全要素生产率间接地抑制波动,而研发产出会对企业层面波动产生直接和间接的抑制作用。因此,本文揭示了“创新性毁灭”之外研发创新影响企业层面波动的另一种机制,为改善供给状况、平抑实体经济波动提供了政策启示。 相似文献
15.
This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage. 相似文献
16.
Christopher A. Laincz 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2009,19(5):643-673
This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics.
R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms
compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity
of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy.
R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological
barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium,
the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition,
the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization
literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents,
the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important
roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy. 相似文献
17.
Jakob Klette 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(2-4):247-272
It is often claimed that the opportunities to create new manufacturing jobs in open, high-cost economies such as Norway, are concentrated in activities which are technologically advanced and knowledge intensive. This paper examines the relationship between job creation and innovation, as measured by R&D investments, in Norwegian manufacturing. We compare job creation in plants belonging to R&D firms to job creation in plants belonging to firms without R&D. We also compare job creation in plants belonging to high and low tech industries. Our data set covers more than 80 percent of manufacturing employment in Norway over the period 1982–92. The paper challenges the optimistic view about job creation in R&D intensive firms and high-tech industries. Some main findings are: (i) Net job creation is not higher in high-tech industries. (ii) There is no clear-cut positive relationship between net job creation and the R&D-intensity of the firm. (iii) There is less net job creation and less job-security in R&D-intensitefirms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 相似文献
18.
Zakaria Babutsidze 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2016,26(1):143-169
This paper presents a simple model of firm and consumer behavior. We formulate a sub-market entry game, where boundedly rational firms decide on investing in R&D for inventing new products that will appeal to targeted groups of consumers. The success depends on the amount of resources available for the project as well as on the firm’s familiarity with market characteristics. Successful innovation feeds back into the firm size and (potentially into) market knowledge and increases the future R&D productivity. A new product decreases the market-shares of incumbents. However, this business stealing effect is asymmetric across incumbent population. We identify the section of parameter space where firms have an incentive to diversify horizontally. In this section, the model results in rich industrial dynamics. Firm size heterogeneity emerges endogenously in the model. Equilibrium firm size distributions are heavy tailed and skewed to the right. The heaviness of the tail depends on submarket specificity of firm’s market knowledge. This relationship is non-monotonic, emphasizing two different effects of innovation on industrial dynamics (positive feedback and asymmetric business stealing). 相似文献
19.
Andrin Spescha 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(2):156-179
ABSTRACTThis paper examines how efficiently different groups of firms use their R&D expenditures. To this end, it investigates how the empirical relationship between firms' R&D expenditures and their sales growth varies with different values of firm size, firm age, and the number of firms in the respective industry. Using panel data for Switzerland ranging from 1995 to 2012, the paper finds that smaller, more mature firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than both relatively larger or younger firms. The paper argues that, on the one hand, these firms can benefit from various small size advantages in the R&D process, such as more motivated researchers, caused by a stronger connection to the firm's fate. On the other hand, these firms can also benefit from a well-established R&D department that allows absorbing the latest technological developments. The paper further finds that industries consisting of many small firms show a more positive relation between R&D expenditures and sales growth than industries consisting of only a few large firms. The intuition behind this result is that industries consisting of many small firms imply more independent innovative trials, which then together result in a higher probability of discovering successful innovations. In sum, the paper finds that groups consisting of a large number of small, more mature firms spend their R&D in the most efficient way. 相似文献
20.
In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation. 相似文献