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1.
This paper attempts to analyze the strategic use of optimal tariffs and to examine the effects of national bias on the optimal trade policy and social welfare in a two-country, two-good, price competition model derived from Neven et al. (1991). The major findings are as follows. (1) If all consumers prefer the domestic good, then buy domestic campaigns will decrease the prohibitive tariff rate and increase local welfare. (2) If at least some consumers prefer the foreign good, but not to a great extent, then buy domestic campaigns will not change the optimal tariff rate, but may improve local welfare. (3) When all consumers greatly prefer the foreign good, then promotion of buy domestic decreases the optimal tariff rate, but it cannot improve social welfare. With this framework, we also prove that buy domestic campaigns serve as a substitute for tariffs with respect to a strategic trade policy. 相似文献
2.
Christopher Green 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1993,3(1):23-42
The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition. 相似文献
3.
Mixon Franklin G. Charles Sawyer W. Treviño Len J. 《Constitutional Political Economy》2004,15(4):371-381
In a seminal contribution to the literature on bureaucracy, Breton and Wintrobe (The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982) develop a model wherein subordinates and superiors in a bureaucratic structure trade with each other to advance the objectives of the superiors. The success of such an organizational arrangement (for superiors) is based upon the development of vertical trust networks in a way that facilitates the promise of informal payments by superiors in return for informal services provided by their subordinates. Breton and Wintrobe [Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) 905] also provide a theoretical application of their model by describing the Nazi bureaucracy as a conglomeration of competing agencies that zealously carried out the Final Solution to the Jewish question. As an extension, this note develops two compelling empirical examples of vertical and horizontal trust networks within the Nazi regime: Einsatzgruppen As (Special Action Detachments) attempt to liquidate all Lithuanian Jews after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.JEL Classification: D23, D73. 相似文献
4.
Eckart Jäger 《Journal of Economics》1999,70(3):281-307
The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions. 相似文献
5.
J. Spraggon 《Experimental Economics》2004,7(3):249-269
The experimental treatments analysed in this paper are simple in that there is a unique Nash equilibrium resulting in each player having a dominant strategy. However, the data show quite clearly that subjects do not always choose this strategy. In fact, when this dominant strategy is not a focal outcome it does not even describe the average decision adequately. It is shown that average individual decisions are best described by a decision error model based on a censored distribution as opposed to the truncated regression model which is typically used in similar studies. Moreover it is shown that in the treatments where the dominant strategy is not focal dynamics are important with average subject decisions initially corresponding to the focal outcome and then adjusting towards the Nash prediction. Overall, 66.7% of subjects are consistent with Payoff Maximization, 27.8% are consistent with an alternate preference maximization and 5.6% are random. 相似文献
6.
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover. 相似文献
7.
The paper studies the industry wage structures of Austria, Norway, the union sector of the U. S. as well as the non-union sector of the U. S. We make comparable regressions for each country, and are thus able to compare the sectoral earnings patterns controlling for the usual individual characteristics. Our results confirm the hypothesis that the pattern of the inter-industry pay structure is largely independent of labour market institutions: High paying industries in a non-union environment tend to pay high wages also in regimes where bargaining is very centralised and coordinated.This, however, does not mean that collective bargaining does not matter. The influence is mainly on the amount of wage dispersion: We find considerably lower industry pay gaps in centralised Austria and Norway than in decentralised U. S. Within the U. S., pay differentials within the union sector slightly exceed those of the non-union sector.The results give support to non-competitive explanations of the labour market. If efficiency wage mechanisms are the reason for wage differentials we expect central bargainers to internalise these effects. Competitive explanations, on the other hand, would predict no difference between the non-union outcome and a central agreement aiming at achieving full employment.This work was conducted while we were both affiliated with the University of California at Berkeley, and we thank the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California, Berkeley, for its support and hospitality. The research was supported by the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung under the project JO548-SOZ (Zweimüller) and the Norwegian NORAS under the LOS program (Barth). A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Labour Seminar at the University of California, Berkeley. We thank the participants, especially Bill Dickens and Jonathan Leonard for valuable comments. We are indebted to Bill Dickens also for giving us access to the U. S. data set CPS 1983. Thanks also to Herbert Walther for useful comments. 相似文献
8.
Domenico Da Empoli 《Constitutional Political Economy》2000,11(1):59-67
The usefulness of the public-choice approach for a better understanding of international organizations can be demonstrated by applying it to the analysis of the structure and functions of a new international organization, the International Sea-Bed Authority, established in 1994, after two decades of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim to control the oceans' mineral resources beyond the limits of national jurisdictions (which have been proclaimed by the U.N. Assembly common heritage of mankind). First, the reasons for establishing this organization, whose basis is the common heritage of mankind nature of ocean resources, are examined under two aspects: 1) definition and protection of property rights; 2) environmental control of sea-bed mining activities. Secondly, the organization's decisionmaking system is presented, including such features as the assembly, council with chamber voting, finance committee with decision by consensus, features that balance the voting power of members and protect those countries that bear the financial responsibility for the budget. Finally, some comments are offered about more general aspects of the theory of international organizations: the bureaucracy (and diplomacy) of these organizations as well as the interdependence among international organizations, which opens the way to forms of international logrolling and makes it advisable for countries not to exit from these organizations, even when they have no primary interest in them. 相似文献
9.
Shigehiro Serizawa 《Economic Theory》1996,7(3):501-512
Summary We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, no exploitation and non-bossiness. Any such procedure is a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing determined by the minimum demand principle.I wish to thank Professors Salvador Barbera, Matthew Jackson, Herve Moulin and William Thomson for their helpful suggestions and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Conversations with Professors Hideo Konishi, Shinji Oseto Ken-ichi Shimomura and Stephen Ching were helpful. This work is supported by the Japan Economic Research Foundation and Research Grants PB89-0294 and PB89-0075 from the Direcion General de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnica, Spanish Ministry of Education. 相似文献
10.
Michael Hoel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1992,2(2):141-159
Several serious environmental problems have a global character. International cooperation to reduce emissions for this type of problems often takes the form of an agreement among the cooperating countries to cut back emissions by a uniform percent rate compared with some base year. This type of agreements has two disadvantages. In the first place, it is well known from environmental economics that equal percentage reductions of emissions from different sources usually gives an inefficient outcome, in the sense that the same environmental goals could be achieved at lower costs through a different distribution of emission reductions. A second problem with agreements of equal percentage reductions is that not all countries will find it in their interest to participate in such agreements. In the paper, it is assumed that the set of countries which participate in an agreement is endogenously determined, with a country participating in an agreement provided that this makes the country better off than it would have been in a situation without any agreement. The agreement among the participating countries is assumed to be a uniform percentage reduction of their emissions. The countries have different opinions about what this uniform percentage should be. In the paper, it is assumed that the outcome is determined by the median country of the participating countries. The assumptions above lead to a particular equilibrium, in which some but not all countries cooperate. The equilibrium reduction of emissions for the cooperating countries is also derived. This equilibrium compared with the first best optimum within the context of simple numerical example.Presented at the conference Environmental Cooperation and Policy in the Single European Market, Venice, April 16–20, 1990. The paper is part of the research project Energy and Society at the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. I am grateful to Ignazio Musu and Henk Folmer for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
11.
Ohne ZusammenfassungFerner zahlreicheBuchbesprechungen, insbesondere in der Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, und Zeitungsartikel. 相似文献
12.
Mark J. Machina 《Economic Theory》2005,26(1):1-62
Summary. The basic analytical concepts, tools and results of the classical expected utility/subjective probability model of risk preferences and beliefs under subjective uncertainty can be extended to general event-smooth preferences over subjective acts that do not necessarily satisfy either of the key behavioral assumptions of the classical model, namely the Sure-Thing Principle or the Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication. This is accomplished by a technique analogous to that used by Machina (1982) and others to generalize expected utility analysis under objective uncertainty, combined with an event-theoretic approach to the classical model and the use of a special class of subjective events, acts and mixtures that exhibit almost-objective like properties. The classical expected utility/subjective probability characterizations of outcome monotonicity, outcome derivatives, probabilistic sophistication, comparative and relative subjective likelihood, and comparative risk aversion are all globally robustified to general event-smooth preferences over subjective acts.Received: 4 May 2004, Revised: 4 October 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D81.This paper presents a considerably improved version of the concept of event-differentiability from Machina (1992). An alternative definition has been independently developed by Epstein (1999) in his analysis of the concept of uncertainty aversion. I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Mark Durst, Jürgen Eichberger, Daniel Ellsberg, Clive Granger, Simon Grant, Edi Karni, Peter Klibanoff, David Kreps, Duncan Luce, Robert Nau, Uzi Segal, Peter Wakker, Joel Watson and especially Larry Epstein, Ted Groves and Joel Sobel for helpful discussions and comments. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 9209012 and 9870894. 相似文献
13.
Monetary policy and price level determinacy in a cash-in-advance economy 总被引:15,自引:0,他引:15
Michael Woodford 《Economic Theory》1994,4(3):345-380
Summary The paper considers the determinacy of the equilibrium price level in the cash-in-advance monetary economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), in the case of deterministic fundamentals. The possibilities both of a multiplicity of perfect foresight equilibria and of sunspot equilibria are considered. Two types of monetary policy regimes are considered and compared, one in which the money supply grows at a given exogenous rate (that may be positive or negative), and one in which the nominal interest rate on one-period government debt is pegged at a given non-negative level. In the case of constant money growth rate regimes, it is shown that one can easily have both indeterminacy of perfect foresight equilibrium and existence of sunspot equilibria; indeed, in the case of negative rates of money growth (as called for by Friedman (1969)), both types of indeterminacy necessarily occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium (and non-existence of equilibria other than a deterministic steady state) are also given, and a class of cases is identified in which a sufficiently high rate of money growth guarantees this. Thus there may be a conflict between the aims of choosing a rate of money growth that results in a high level of welfare in the steady state equilibrium and choosing a rate that makes this steady state the unique equilibrium.) In the case of the interest rate pegging regimes, sufficient conditions are given for uniqueness of equilibrium (and impossibility of sunspot equilibria), and it is shown that these necessarily hold in the case of any low enough nominal interest rate. Thus the nominal interest rate peg allows simultaneous achievement of price level determinacy and a high level of welfare in the unique (steady state) equilibrium.In this paper I consider the consequences of alternative choices of the monetary policy regime for the determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium value of money, and in particular for the existence or not of sunspot equilibria, i.e., rational expectations equilibria in which fluctuations in the price level occur in response to random events that represent no change in economic fundamentals, simply due to self-fulfilling revisions of people's expectations. I am interested in particular in making the point that a consideration of the complete set of possible equilibria associated with a given policy regime may alter one's evaluation of the relative desirability of alternative policies, relative to the conclusion that one might reach if one considered only a single possible equilibrium associated with each policy regime (perhaps a unique equilibrium involving a minimum set of state variables). In view of this I give particular attention to policy regimes of types that have sometimes been advocated as ways of reducing the inefficiency associated with a rate of return differential between money and other financial assets, and show that policies that might otherwise be desirable (policies that make possible a more desirable equilibrium than would otherwise be possible) can have the unfortunate consequence of rendering equilibrium indeterminate and making possible equilibrium fluctuations in response to sunspot events.Two classes of policy regimes are considered in particular: on the one hand, alternative constant rates of growth or contraction of the money supply, financed through lump sum taxes or transfers, with zero net government assets at all times; and on the other, alternative constant nominal interest rate pegs, to be maintained through open market operations between money and interest-bearing debt, with an exogenously fixed level of net transfer payments. The first class of policies is considered because of Friedman's (1969) well-known proposal that a constant contraction of the money supply of this sort would be welfare improving. I find that while thestationary equilibrium associated with the Friedman regime achieves the maximum possible level of utility for the representative consumer, and while the level of utility associated with stationary equilibrium may be monotonically decreasing in the rate of money growth, lower rates of money growth (in particular, rates near that called for by Friedman) are associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium and the existence of sunspot equilibria, while these problems need not arise in the case of higher rates of money growth.The second class of policies is considered because they represent an obvious alternative approach to the elimination of the same rate of return differential with which Friedman is concerned. Achievement of permanently low nominal interest rates through a simple interest rate peg is not often advocated; one reason is that it is often asserted that such a policy must result in price level indeterminacy. In fact, I find that if the interest rate pegging regime is properly specified, it results in aunique rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of the level at which interest rates are to be pegged. Thus not only does the interest rate peg not result in price level indeterminacy but it allows nominal interest rates to be maintained permanently at a level lower than that which can be obtained through a policy regime of the first sort without creating price level indeterminacy. It would hence appear, at least in the case of the kind of economy modeled here, that interest rate pegging is a more reliable way of trying to reduce the inefficiency associated with consumers being forced to economize on liquidity.This paper represents a revision of Woodford (1988). I would like to thank Leonardo Auernheimer, Buz Brock, Willem Buiter, Peter Howitt, Teh-Ming Huo, David Laidler, David Levine, Bennett McCallum, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments, and the National Science Foundation for research support. 相似文献
14.
Russia at the dawn of the 21st century is experiencing a collapsing economy. In a world where healthy economies create and maintain capital, it is critically important that all efforts be made to assure all creditors and especially private direct investors that in the event of debtor-insolvency their business interests are protected. The role of bankruptcy law under a regime of what I call creditor rights is limited. The court system can be used to avoid a creditors's race to grab assets. Whenever the going concern value of a firm is greater than the sum of the assets sold separately a case can be made for a bankruptcy procedure as a way of protecting creditor rights. This paper examines the historical origins of the creditor rights tradition and advocates such a regime for modern Russia. This paper holds that especially with respect to Russia, we would do well to heed John Stuart Mill's advice and support reforms that favor creditors and protect the value of their rights. Those insolvent firms owned and managed by political oligarchs should be cut down, dismembered, and the assets they command transferred to new and more imaginative and solvent groups of managers. 相似文献
15.
Since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, future commitments are likely to beframed in terms of tradable quotas. The discussions on the allocation of thequotas among countries will be based – at least partly – on rulescorresponding to a certain conception of equity. For instance, allocatingquotas in direct proportion to population, in relation to GDP or accordingto past emissions has been advocated. Taking a long term perspective, wecompute such allocations of tradable quotas with a dynamic (closed-loop)model. The total amount of quotas to be distributed at each periodcorresponds to the world optimal amount of emissions to be realized at eachperiod. We observe that most equitable allocation rules do not make theagreement individually rational for every country along the entire timepath. We then propose a mechanism which determines allocations of quotasthat are as close as possible to any equitable allocation while satisfyingindividual rationality. 相似文献
16.
Roger Lagunoff 《Economic Theory》1992,2(4):465-480
Summary This paper defines a choice process over social outcomes in which agents choose the institutional rules ormechanisms themselves without outside interference. Truly endogenizing the mechanism selection process in this way, however, involves facing an infinite regress problem in which outcomes are chosen by games which are themselves chosen by games, ad infinitum. This paper allows the possibility of such an infinite regress which we callfully endogenous mechanism selection.We introduce the notion ofFree Choice which restricts the class of mechanisms in the regress to those which prevent agents from being locked in to an equilibrium outcome by the actions of others. Under this condition, the infinite regress is shown to get truncated with the number of selection iterations endogenously determined. It turns out that the outcomes resulting from a Free Choice-constrained regress are (Weakly) Pareto optimal; in particular, these outcomes solve a weighted Rawlsian Maxmin criterion. We also show that these outcomes are invariant to the equilibrium concept used to evaluate games in the regress.This paper is based on the author's dissertation from the University of Minnesota (November, 1989).I am very grateful for the guidance, advice, and encouragement from my advisor, Marcel K. Richter, and for the many helpful suggestions from David Levine. I have also benefited from conversations with Nabil Al-Najjar, Gerhard Glomm, Leonid Hurwicz, James Jordan, Ramon Marimon, Andrew McClennan, Ariel Rubinstein, and William Thomson. 相似文献
17.
Chenghu Ma 《Economic Theory》1996,7(3):567-570
Summary The paper by C. Ma [1] contains several errors. First, statement and proof of Theorem 2.1 on the existence of intertemporal recursive utility function as a unique solution to the Koopmans equation must be amended. Several additional technical conditions concerning the consumption domain, measurability of certainty equivalent and utility process need to be assumed for the validity of the theorem. Second, the assumptions for Theorem 3.1 need to be amended to include the Feller's condition that, for any bounded continuous functionf C(S × n
+), (f(St+1, )¦st =s) is bounded and continuous in (s, ). In addition, for Theorem 3.1, the pricep, the endowmente and the dividend rate as functions of the state variables S are assumed to be continuous.The Feller's condition for Theorem 3.1 is to ensure the value function to be well-defined. This condition needs to be assumed even for the expected additive utility functions (See Lucas [2]). It is noticed that, under this condition, the right hand side of equation (3.5) in [1] defines a bounded continuous function ins and. The proof of Theorem 3.1 remains valid with this remark in place.A correct version of Theorem 2.1 in [1] is stated and proved in this corrigendum. Ozaki and Streufert [3] is the first to cast doubt on the validity of this theorem. They point out correctly that additional conditions to ensure the measurability of the utility process need to be assumed. This condition is identified as conditionCE
4 below. In addition, I notice that, the consumption space is not suitably defined in [1], especially when a unbounded consumption set is assumed. In contrast to what claimed in [3], I show that the uniformly bounded consumption setX and stationary information structure are not necessary for the validity of Theorem 2.1.I would like to thank Hiroyuki Ozaki and Peter Streufert for pointing out correctly some mistakes made in the original article. Comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee are gratefully appreciated. Financially support from SSHRC of Canada is acknowledged. 相似文献
18.
Without an international climate agreement, extraction of more natural gas could reduce emissions of CO2 as more clean natural gas may drive out dirty coal and oil. Using a computable equilibrium model for the Western European electricity and natural gas markets, we examine whether increased extraction of natural gas in Norway reduces global emissions of CO2. We find that both in the short run and in the long run total emissions are reduced if the additional quantity of natural gas is used in gas power production in Norway. If instead the additional quantity is exported directly, total emissions increase both in the short run and in the long run. However, if modest CO2-taxes are imposed, increased extraction of natural gas will reduce CO2 emissions also when the additional natural gas is exported directed.earlier version of this paper was presented at the 25th Annual IAEE International Conference in Aberdeen June 2002. 相似文献
19.
Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation
Agents' characteristics space ( )
- A
Action space of each agent (aA)
-
Y
Y = x A
-
Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics
-
(X)
Space of probability measures onX
-
C(X)
Space of continuous functions onX
-
X
Family of Borel sets ofX
-
State space of aggregate uncertainty ( )
-
x
t=1
aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game
-
= (1,2,...,t,...)
-
t
t (1, 2,..., t)
- L1(t,C ×A),v
t
Normed space of measurable functions from
t
toC( x A)
-
8o(t,( x A))
Space of measurable functions from
tto( x A)
- Xt
Xt= x
s=1
t
X
-
X
t
Borel field onX
t
-
v
Distribution on
- vt
Marginal distribution of v on
t
- v(t)((¦t))
Conditional distribution on
given
t
- vt(s)(vt(¦s))
Conditional distribution on
t
given
s
(wheres)
-
t
Periodt distributional strategy
-
Distributional strategy for all periods =(1,2,...,t,...)
-
t
Transition process for agents' types
- (
t,t,y)(P
t+1(,
t
,
t
,y))
Transition function associated with
t
-
u
t
Utility function
-
V
t
(, a, , t)
Value function for each collection (, a, ,
t
)
-
W
t
(, ,
t
)
Value function given optimal action a
-
C()
Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions
-
B()
Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency)
-
E
Set of equilibrium distributional strategies
-
x
t=1
(
t
, (x A))
- S
Expanded state space for Markov construction
- (, a, )
Value function for Markov construction
-
P(
t
*
,
t
y)(P(,
t
*
,
t
,
y
))
Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game
We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
20.
Dr. Ruvin Gekker 《Journal of Economics》1992,55(3):265-275
Among many attempts to circumvent Sen's impossibility result Gibbard's theory of alienable rights has attracted attention of many researchers. Basu's (1984) theorem essentially depends on a Nash-type equilibrium concept. In this paper we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption where individuals have conjectures about the responses of others and investigate the robustness of Basu's result under this new solution concept. We also examine a possibility of coalition formation and cooperation under the meta-rights approach.For helpful discussions I would like to thank Rajat Deb, Joseph Greenberg, and Shlomo Weber. I am also indebted to an anonymous referee of this Journal for many valuable comments. 相似文献