Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a leveraged company to shut it down in a continuous time, stochastic environment. Keeping the firm as an ongoing concern has an option value but equity and debt holders value it differently. Equityholders’ decisions exhibit excessive continuation and reduce firm's value. Using a compound exchange option approach, we characterise the resulting agency costs of debt, derive the “price” of these costs and analyse their dynamics. We also show how agency costs can be reduced by the design of debt.     

Mergers and corporate debt financing

We investigate the effect of mergers on corporate debt financing using time series analysis. We find that corporate debt use increases during periods of very high merger activity but is not significantly affected by variations within the normal range of merger activity. Traditional trade-off and pecking order variables also significantly affect corporate financing choice.     

Financial distress,bank debt restructurings,and layoffs

We develop a model of a financially distressed firm to analyze the implications of a bank debt restructuring when the operational characteristics of the firm's project for the post-distress period are endogenously determined as part of the workout. We establish a formal link between the debt restructuring and operational actions such as employee layoffs, and show how these actions are affected by the firm's capital structure, the ordering of absolute priorities, and the allocation of control rights and residual claims after reorganization. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of reorganization law.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

Pyramidal groups and debt

This paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company. However, when this behavior increases the cost of funds, the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent.After accounting for standard controls, we find that holding companies in Italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash-flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role. These findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure.     

International portfolio diversification and endogenous labor supply choice

This paper presents a multi-country general equilibrium model driven by productivity shocks, where labor supply and consumption are chosen endogenously. We use this framework to study the effect of labor supply for optimal international diversification. We find that the model's ability to help explain home-bias depends crucially on the level of substitutability between consumption and non-working time. Quantitatively, the non-separability in the preferences helps in a nonnegligible way, but it cannot entirely explain the extreme degree of home-bias in U.S. portfolios.     

Political participation and entrepreneurial initial public offerings in China

This paper examines the economic consequences of political participation by entrepreneurs in China. Using unique data on political participation and initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms, we find that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibit superior post-IPO performance. We also find that firms characterized by political participation are subject to less underpricing. Furthermore, the superior performance is concentrated among firms that operate in an environment characterized by rich rent-seeking opportunities instead of abundant business opportunities, suggesting that political participation is facilitating rent seeking rather than serving simply as a proxy for political recognition for entrepreneurship.     

Political economy of private firms in China

The sweeping change in political economy associated with the rapid growth of the private sector in China is rarely studied empirically in the economics literature. Using four cross-sectional surveys of private firms between 1995 and 2010, we examine the dynamics of rent creation from Party membership and other political connections when the regime changed from anti-capitalistic to pro-capitalistic during the period 2002–2004. We find that entrepreneurs with political connection enjoyed significantly more rents only after the constitutional amendments. This finding sheds lights on the nature of the political economy of today’s Chinese economy. Endogeneity/causality problems are addressed.     

A new measure of financial development: Theory leads measurement

This study presents a new measure of financial development that is directly derived from theory. Our measure, the Marginal Utilization of Debt (hereafter, MUD) comes from the seminal work of Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Further, it is directly related to the development facts of Gurley and Shaw (1955). MUD is a global measure that reflects conditions in both debt and equity markets. It varies enormously across nations; from 0.23 in Australia at one extreme to 0.96 in Turkey at the other. Cross‐country variations in MUD are not random; they are related to special‐purpose measures of debt and equity market advancement from the financial development literature. Richer, more advanced nations have smaller average MUDs. We argue that the MUD may be useful for a variety of purposes and provide three example applications.     

Disagreement between rating agencies and bond opacity: A theoretical perspective

In this paper, we explicitly model a bond rating process under varying degrees of bond opacity and derive conditions under which disagreements between rating agencies (rating splits) can serve as a useful proxy for opacity in empirical analyses.     

Securitization of mortgage debt,domestic lending,and international risk sharing

Abstract Securitization makes mortgage‐related risks internationally tradeable and thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroeconomic risk: in the years 2003–2008, the increase in international cross‐holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries’ conditional consumption volatility (relative to the United States) by about 10–15 percentage points. We turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining this result. Domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if debt is securitized and traded internationally. Conversely, the risk‐sharing benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up – as it did in the recent financial crisis.     

Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement

This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.     

The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization

We use a large data set of Russian manufacturing firms to describe the ownership structure in the Russian industry at the end of the mass privatization program in 1994 and its subsequent evolution. The data shows a high, but gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders (managers and workers). We estimate the effect of a wide range of firm characteristics on the decision to privatize, the initial ownership structure after privatization, and on subsequent changes of ownership stakes. We test and find support for several predictions of the model by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). For example, collusion among workers makes them more reluctant to sell shares to outsiders. Firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by their desire to insure against unemployment in the case of restructuring by outsiders. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization. A methodological novelty of this paper is the application of a tobit model with sample selection to the choice of ownership stakes.     

Public debt and financial development

We examine the role of public debt in financial development. The literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark. We contrast this “safe asset” view to a “lazy banks” view: developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly, because it could make banks profitable but inefficient. Results from country-level and bank-level regressions are more supportive of the “lazy banks” view, but the “safe asset” view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks. There is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression.     

Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We measure governance quality using broad-based comprehensive governance metrics provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The empirical evidence reveals a robust inverse association between leverage and governance quality. Firms with poor governance are significantly more leveraged. It appears that leverage substitutes for corporate governance in alleviating agency conflicts. Further, we utilize empirical methods that control for endogeneity and show that poor governance quality likely brings about, and does not merely reflect, higher leverage. Our results are important as they show that the overall quality of corporate governance has a material impact on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.     

Asset prices, debt constraints and inefficiency

We consider (possibly non-stationary) economies with endogenous solvency constraints under uncertainty over an infinite horizon, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) [5]. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass, 1972 [10]) completely characterizes constrained inefficiency under the hypothesis of uniform gains from risk-sharing (which is always satisfied in stationary economies when the autarchy is constrained inefficient). Uniform gains from risk-sharing also guarantee a finite value of the intertemporal aggregate endowment at a constrained optimum. Hence, no equilibrium exhibits a null interest rate in the long run. Finally, constrained inefficiency occurs if and only if there exists a feasible redistribution producing a welfare improvement at all contingencies.     

A lattice approach for pricing convertible bond asset swaps with market risk and counterparty risk

This paper proposes a new lattice framework for valuing convertible bonds (CBs) and asset swaps on CBs (CBASs) with market risk and counterparty risk, where interest rate is assumed to follow a mean-reverting square root process. The reduced-form approach is generalized to include a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process for equity price prior to default. In order to approximate the CEV process while taking into account stochastic interest rate and the correlation between stock price and interest rate, I first propose a transform that is uncorrelated with interest rate, and then construct a new lattice method which can ensure the validity of branching probabilities for all nodes. The lattice framework performs properly when it is used to value European call options. Based on the empirical results in Duffie et al. (J. Fin. Econ. 83(3): 635-665, 2007) and Jankowitsch et al. (J. Bank. Fin. 32(7): 1269-1285, 2008), a novel default intensity process is constructed which is specified as a function of time, stock price, and interest rate. When valuing the asset swaps, the counterparty risk is taken into consideration. Based on the results of the numerical experiments, the impacts of different parameters on the prices of CBs and CBASs are explained.