Mortgage Refinancing,Adverse Selection,and FHA's Streamline Program

When interest rates decline, borrowers whose houses have appreciated significantly refinance out of FHA, while those whose houses have not do not. We provide evidence of the negative impact of regular (nonstreamline) refinancing in the mid-1980s on the average quality of FHA's surviving business. We demonstrate this adverse selection both informally and econometrically. We also argue that the sharp reduction in the cost of streamline refinancing (limited documentation, no required appraisal, and so on) in FHA's streamline refinance program in 1992 likely reduced the level of adverse selection in the FHA portfolio during the 1993 to 1994 refinancing boom, and we provide quantitative estimates of the resultant reduction in claim rates. While this reduction in cost almost certainly increased the financial viability of FHA during the middle 1990s, it may not in the long run.     

中国健康险市场逆向选择和正向选择并存现象的研究

本文以中国的健康险市场为例,考察不对称信息的影响。通过考察投保人投保金额以及附加险选择和索赔情况的相关关系,论文发现事后出现索赔的投保人,事前往往会选择购买附加险,但是投保金额却相对较低。结合理论模型分析,论文认为投保人在财富、风险偏好等方面的异质性以及信息不对称的存在是导致市场同时出现逆向选择和正向选择的主要原因。     

The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and Evidence

Views about the value to depository institutions of the federal safety net differ widely. Resolution of the issue is important because defining the appropriate relationship between the federal safety net and financial institutions is central to the design of efficient financial modernization strategies. A heuristic model is presented of how the safety net subsidy affects the size of the banking system and the behavior of banks. The model suggests that banks should have lower capital ratios than similar nonbank financial firms. Evidence is presented that supports this prediction and that banks have organized themselves in ways that take advantage of safety net benefits.     

优质小麦收入保险费率厘定及保费补贴研究--以河南省为例

为提高种粮效益、增加农民收入和满足优质小麦的市场需求,河南省近年来重点发展优质小麦等高品质农产品。在优质小麦的生产经营中,产量风险和价格风险是影响农民收入的重要因素,农业收入保险因其能够实现对产量风险和价格风险双重覆盖,未来将成为农业保险发展的重要险种。选取河南省优质小麦主产区2003-2018年的单产和强麦期货价格数据,确定优质小麦的产量和价格的边缘分布,并通过Copula函数确立产量和价格的联合分布,然后利用蒙特卡罗模拟法模拟收入数据,最后依据费率公式厘定出优质小麦收入保险在保障水平从70%提升到100%的过程中,纯费率从0.51%增加到5.76%,如将管理成本考虑在内,毛费率从0.64%变动到7.2%,费率的变动幅度大于保障水平的变化。进一步按照现行收入保险试点的政策要求,在85%的保障水平下,优质小麦收入保险的毛费率为2.31%,比传统小麦种植保险费率低3.69%,但保障水平反而提升50%,既能完全覆盖生产成本,又能保证收益。如果将优质小麦最低限价补贴转化为收入保险保费补贴,不仅有利于降低财政负担,保障农户收入的稳定,而且有助于促进农产品市场价格的形成和完善。     

Adverse Selection and the Required Return

An important feature of financial markets is that securitiesare traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors.We study how current and future adverse selection affect therequired return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated byadverse selection is not a cost, on average, for agents whotrade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly influencethe required return. Adverse selection contributes to trading-decisiondistortions, however, implying allocation costs, which affectthe required return. We explicitly derive the effect of adverseselection on required returns, and show how our result differsfrom models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an exogenouscost.     

Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets

This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry—and therefore, its negative consequences—decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993–2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship.     

农业保险保费补贴政策的减贫效应及其区域异质性

利用FGT贫困指数作为被解释变量,结合我国30个省份的2010-2018年农业保险保费财政补贴数据,构建面板分位数回归模型检验我国对农业保险保费财政补贴的减贫效应的异质性,并分东、中和西部进行了稳健性检验.研究表明,在经济发展水平低的地区,农业保险保费财政补贴具有显著的减贫效应,但经济发展水平不同的地区存在减贫效应的区域异质性:随着贫困程度加深(分位点增高),农业保险保费补贴的扶贫效应先增加后降低.农业保险保费财政补贴每提高1％,FGT贫困指数下降的范围为0.045％～0.15％.     

Adverse Selection and the Opaqueness of Insurers

While adverse selection problems between insureds and insurers are well known to insurance researchers, few explore adverse selection in the insurance industry from a capital markets perspective. This study examines adverse selection in the quoted prices of insurers' common stocks with a particular focus on the opacity of both asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities. We find that more opaque underwriting lines result in greater adverse selection costs for property-casualty (P-C) insurers. A similar effect is not apparent for life-health (L-H) insurers and we find no effect of asset opaqueness on adverse selection for either L-H or P-C insurers.     

Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterised version of the lemons’ model of Akerlof in the insurance context predicts total crowding-out of low risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of these experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding-out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding-out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. The latter can be sustained because insureds who objectively differ in their risk level do not perceive themselves as being so much different.     

Estimating International Adverse Selection in Annuities

Abstract

It is well known that purchasers of annuities have lower mortality than the general population. Less widely known is the quantitative extent of this adverse selection and how it varies across countries. This paper proposes and applies several methods for comparing alternative mortality tables and illustrates their impact on annuity valuation for men and women in the U.S. and the U.K. Our results indicate that the relatively lower mortality among older Americans who purchase annuities is equivalent to using a discount rate that is 50–100 basis points below the U.K. rate for compulsory annuitants or 10–20 basis points lower than the U.K. rate for voluntary annuitants. We then draw on the mortality experience of over half a billion lives to estimate mortality differentials due to varying degrees of adverse selection controlling for country, gender, and an allowance for mortality improvements. Results show that adverse selection associated with the purchase of individual annuities reduces mortality rates by at least 25% in the international context. We also find that the system of mortality tables used to value Japanese annuities is quite distinct from international norms.?     

Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents. Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract also depend on individual past performance (such as in car insurances). We show that dynamic insurance contracts yield a welfare improvement only if they are conditional on past performance. With conditional contracts, the first‐best can be approximated if the contract lasts long. Moreover, this is true for any fraction of low‐risk agents in the population.     

Flexible Spending Accounts and Adverse Selection

I model the interaction of flexible spending accounts (FSAs) and conventional insurance in a simple discrete loss setting with asymmetric information. I show that FSA availability can break a separating equilibrium, even when one would otherwise exist, because high-risk types might prefer the lower-coverage contract supplemented with FSA funds. In this case there may exist a Pareto-inferior separating equilibrium. It is also shown that FSA availability alters the optimal pooling contract. Employers can reduce coverage levels, raising expected utility for low-risk types, and can compensate high-risk types by offering supplemental FSA coverage. Thus, it is possible that FSAs strengthen pooling contracts.     

内蒙古再就业培训存在的问题及对策

内蒙古自治区从1995年实施再就业工程以来,始终将再就业培训作为解决下岗失业人员再就业的核心环节,尤其是最近几年来内蒙古自治区经济增长速度显著,产业结构调整加速,结构性失业突出,针对下岗失业人员的再就业培训在内蒙古自治区就显得极为重要,本文在介绍再就业培训的概念的基础上,分析了内蒙古再就业培训过程中所存在的问题,并针对问题提出相应的对策。     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection

Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple “insiders” receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer‐lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid‐ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives.     

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage–risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.     

逆向选择条件下带甄别期的最优保险设计

为了改善信息不对称对保险市场交易效率的影响,分投保人为两种及两种以上风险类型建立了带甄别期的保险契约模型,指出可以利用投保人在甄别期的风险发生情况来推断投保人的风险类型.带甄别期的保险契约是指:自保险合同生效之日起的一段时间内(甄别期),如果投保人发生风险,保险公司将给予一定的赔偿,甄别期过后,如果投保人再次发生风险,保险公司将不再给予任何赔偿;如果投保人在甄别期未发生风险,而在甄别期之后的剩余保险期发生风险,保险公司仍然给予与上述情况相同的赔偿.证明指出效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约不比R-S传统部分保险契约差,并给出了前者是后者严格帕累托改进的充分条件.此外,对于两种以上风险类型情形,证明了满足对次低风险投保人的激励相容约束是满足对其余高风险投保人激励相容约束的一个充分不必要条件,并给出了相应的充分条件,进一步指出该充分条件的集合恰是带甄别期的保险契约能够产生分离均衡的一个充分条件.最后,以一个算例说明确实存在效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约是R-S传统部分保险契约的严格帕累托改进情形.     

Multidimensional Screening in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the Rothschild–Stiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible.