A time-inconsistent Dynkin game: from intra-personal to inter-personal equilibria

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two intertwined levels of game-theoretic reasoning. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium among her current and future selves, so as to resolve time inconsistency triggered by non-exponential discounting. Next, given the other player’s chosen stopping policy, each player selects a best response among her intra-personal equilibria. A resulting inter-personal equilibrium is then a Nash equilibrium between the two players, each of whom employs her best intra-personal equilibrium with respect to the other player’s stopping policy. Under appropriate conditions, we show that an inter-personal equilibrium exists, based on concrete iterative procedures along with Zorn’s lemma. To illustrate our theoretical results, we investigate a two-player real options valuation problem where two firms negotiate a deal of cooperation to initiate a project jointly. By deriving inter-personal equilibria explicitly, we find that coercive power in negotiation depends crucially on the impatience levels of the two firms.

     

Dividend policy under conditions of capital market and signaling equilibria

This article develops a generalized capital asset pricing model with dividend signaling under the assumption of asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outside investors. The generalized capital asset pricing model is derived under reasonably plausible conditions that are sufficient for the existence of dividends. The model provides a theoretical framework for testing the effect of dividends on equity price and returns. Further, if dividends serve as a credible signal and the cost of signaling is positive, paying higher dividends results in higher systematic risk.     

Capital structure and business cycles

This study investigates the relationship between business cycles and capital structure. Specifically, it extends the work of Lemmon et al. (2008) , by incorporating the effect of four different stages of the business cycle – peak, contraction, trough and expansion – on the relative importance of the unobserved permanent component of the capital structure. Results indicate that business cycles play an important role in explaining the unobserved permanent component of leverage ratios after controlling for firm fixed effects. In particular, the model becomes much stronger in explaining the variation in leverage ratios after accounting for business cycle phases.     

Capital structure under collusion

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.     

Capital structure and international debt shifting

This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that a foreign subsidiary's capital structure reflects local corporate tax rates as well as tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries, although the overall economic effect of taxes on leverage appears to be small. Ignoring the international debt shifting arising from differences in national tax rates would understate the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.     

Capital structure and large investment projects

This paper provides empirical evidence that lumpy investment projects provide firms with the opportunity to adjust leverage at low marginal cost. Consistent with a theoretical model, I find that 1) firms sequence equity before debt during the financing period of their investment projects, and 2) that firms adjust their leverage ratios toward their target leverage during these investment periods. I also show that proactive increases in leverage observed in other studies can be explained by the evolution of firms' target leverage ratios over the financing period of a project. My results are consistent with trade-off theory and imply that firms move toward their target capital structures when they invest.     

Capital structure dynamics and transitory debt

Firms deliberately but temporarily deviate from permanent leverage targets by issuing transitory debt to fund investment. Leverage targets conservatively embed the option to issue transitory debt, with the evolution of leverage reflecting the sequence of investment outlays. We estimate a dynamic capital structure model with these features and find that it replicates industry leverage very well, explains debt issuances/repayments better than extant tradeoff models, and accounts for the leverage changes accompanying investment “spikes.” It generates leverage ratios with slow average speeds of adjustment to target, which are dampened by intentional temporary movements away from target, not debt issuance costs.     

企业并购的最优化支付结构博弈

并购支付结构的合理安排,在很大程度上对该并购行为的财富效应与成功概率有着深刻的影响。无论对于主并公司还是目标公司而言,支付工具的选择及其支付组合不同工具比重的安排,从很大程度上决定了并购交易的增值目标是否能够得以顺利实现。但是,给基于不同交易主体的不同利益基点,主并企业和目标企业在支付结构设计的目标上却不尽相同。     

Capital structure theory: Reconsidered

In the mainstream of the academic field of finance, the Modigliani and Miller's (1958) proof of capital structure irrelevance theory, has been praised as the cornerstone of modern scientific finance. However, the capital structure irrelevance theory is based on a set of assumptions, which are both unrealistic and contradictory to the main assumption of the mainstream academic finance. This paper shows that by making more appropriate assumptions, capital structure becomes relevant. The paper, on a foundational ground, argues that since the results of sophisticated mathematical models change as soon as their underlying assumptions are changed, the claim about the scientific nature of the mainstream academic finance becomes questionable.     

Capital structure with dividend restrictions

This paper develops a symmetric information model of a new firm which incorporates a constraint on dividend payments known as a balance sheet test. This test solves moral hazard problems that arise in credit markets where complete contracting over future actions is not possible. This constraint breaks down the traditional symmetric information result of separability between financial and real variables, and thus maximizing shareholder returns in this setting is not equivalent to maximizing total firm value. As a consequence, more profitable firms, those with a higher average product of capital, will have lower debt/equity ratios. Debt/equity ratios will be positively correlated with the firm's physical capital and negatively correlated with the firm's market power.     

Capital structure with risky foreign investment

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.     

Capital structure effects of international expansion

This study investigates and qualifies the impact of internationalization on the capital structure of a firm. Previous studies have associated firm internationalization with foreign sales or foreign assets. However, an increase in sales volume generated abroad does not necessarily mean that a firm has actually invested in a new foreign country. This study examines non-financial firms included in the main developed stock indexes that report a new geographical area of operation. It reveals that, at less advanced levels of internationalization, growth in foreign volumes and new geographic expansion lead to differential decision-making in capital structure choices.This study concludes that (1) when the target foreign market is developed, the new market entry does not lead to significant changes in capital structure, whatever the past experience of the firm. (2) The capital structure of well-diversified firms is not significantly modified following a new foreign entry. (3) Both domestic firms and firms only active in developed markets significantly increase their debt to equity ratio when expanding into a region or country where they had no operation before. Well-diversified firms clearly exhibit a different behavior compared to firms in less advanced levels of internationalization.     

Capital structure,equity ownership and firm performance

This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’ frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Capital structure choice and company taxation: A meta-study

This paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on the tax impact on corporate debt financing. Synthesizing the evidence from 48 previous studies, we find that this impact is substantial. In particular, the tax rate proxy determines the outcome of primary analyses. Measures like the simulated marginal tax rate (Graham, 1996) avoid a downward bias in estimates for the debt response to tax. Moreover, econometric specifications and the set of control-variables affect tax effects. Accounting for misspecification biases by means of meta-regressions, we predict a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of about 0.27.     

Capital structure,equity mispricing,and stock repurchases

We evaluate motives for share repurchases using a unified framework where a firm has a target capital structure and has equity that can be mispriced. We document that capital structure adjustments are a value-increasing motive for repurchases and that the extent to which adjusting capital structure through a repurchase creates value depends on the undervaluation of the firm. Underlevered and undervalued firms enjoy the greatest economic gains from a repurchase, as evidenced by the stock price reaction to the repurchase announcement, and these firms are more likely to announce a share repurchase program.     

Capital structure,executive compensation,and investment efficiency

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.     

Capital structure and financing of SMEs: Australian evidence

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure and use of financing for small and medium sized enterprises. Hypotheses utilising static trade-off and pecking order arguments are empirically examined using a series of firm characteristics including: size, asset structure, profitability, growth and risk. The hypotheses developed are tested using a large Australian nationwide panel survey. The results suggest that asset structure, profitability and growth are important determinants of capital structure and financing. For asset structure the direction of the influence is reliant upon the capital structure or financing measure employed. The results generally support static trade-off and pecking order arguments proposed by theoretical models.     

Capital structure,credit risk,and macroeconomic conditions

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and dynamic capital structure choice. We begin by observing that when cash flows depend on current economic conditions, there will be a benefit for firms to adapt their default and financing policies to the position of the economy in the business cycle phase. We then demonstrate that this simple observation has a wide range of empirical implications for corporations. Notably, we show that our model can replicate observed debt levels and the countercyclicality of leverage ratios. We also demonstrate that it can reproduce the observed term structure of credit spreads and generate strictly positive credit spreads for debt contracts with very short maturities. Finally, we characterize the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the pace and size of capital structure changes, and debt capacity.