Can central banks’ monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?

The original Taylor rule establishes a simple linear relation between the interest rate, inflation and the output gap. An important extension to this rule is the assumption of a forward-looking behaviour of central banks. Now they are assumed to target expected inflation and output gap instead of current values of these variables. Using a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function, this paper analyses whether central banks’ monetary policy can indeed be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a nonlinear rule. It also analyses whether that rule can be augmented with a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and financial variables. The results indicate that the monetary behaviour of the European Central Bank and Bank of England is best described by a nonlinear rule, but the behaviour of the Federal Reserve of the United States can be well described by a linear Taylor rule. Our evidence also suggests that only the European Central Bank is reacting to financial conditions.     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

Determinacy and expectational stability of equilibrium in a monetary sticky-price model with Taylor rule

Recent studies show that the Taylor rule possesses desirable properties in terms of generating determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibria under sticky prices. This paper examines whether this policy rule retains these properties within a discrete-time money-in-utility-function model, employing three timings of money balances of the utility function that the existing literature contains: end-of-period timing and two types of cash-in-advance timing. This paper shows: (i) even a small degree of non-separability of the utility function between consumption and real balances causes the Taylor rule to be much more likely to induce indeterminacy or E-instability if this rule responds not only to inflation but also to output or the output gap; (ii) differences among the three timings strongly alter conditions for the Taylor rule to ensure both determinacy and E-stability.     

Following the leader? The relevance of the Fed funds rate for inflation targeting countries

In a New-Keynesian model for a small open economy, we derive a CPI inflation-based Taylor rule that implements the flexible price allocation. We conclude that, in this rule, the natural rate of interest should be linked to the foreign interest rate and to domestic productivity shocks. This rule ensures that the CPI real rate moves in order to induce movements in consumption that are coherent with the flexible price allocation. The empirical evidence shows that inflation-targeting central banks respond to movements in the Fed funds rate, besides reacting to expected CPI inflation and to the domestic output gap. This is true for developed and emerging economies. Furthermore, we find that in emerging countries the response to foreign variables is not different from zero, as suggested by theory, when domestic inflation, rather than CPI inflation, is introduced in the policy rule.     

Monetary policy when potential output is uncertain: Understanding the growth gamble of the 1990s

The Fed kept interest rates low and essentially unchanged during the late 1990s despite a booming economy and record-low unemployment. These interest rates were accommodative by historical standards. Nonetheless, inflation remained low. How did the Fed succeed in sustaining rapid economic growth without fueling inflation and inflationary expectations? In retrospect, it is evident that the productive capacity of the economy increased. Yet as events unfolded, there was uncertainty about the expansion of the capacity of the economy and therefore about the sustainability of the Fed's policy.This paper provides an explanation for the success of the Fed in accommodating growth with stable inflation in the late 1990s. It shows that if the central bank is committed to reverse policy errors it makes because of unwarranted optimism, inflation can remain in check even if the central bank keeps interest rates low because of this optimism. In particular, a price level target—which is a simple way to model a commitment to offset errors—can serve to anchor inflation even if the public does not share the central bank's optimism about shifts in potential output. The paper shows that price level targeting is superior to inflation targeting in a wide range of situations. The paper also provides econometric evidence that, in contrast to earlier periods, the Fed has recently put substantial weight on the price level in setting interest rates. Moreover, it shows that CPI announcement surprises lead to reversion in the price level. Finally, it provides textual evidence that Alan Greenspan puts relatively more weight on the price level than inflation.     

The Taylor Principle and Monetary Policy Approaching a Zero Bound on Nominal Rates: Quantile Regression Results for the United States and Japan

This paper offers a new approach that estimates the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap at various points (quantiles) on the conditional distribution of interest rates. This offers an improvement on empirical estimates conducted only at the mean and also allows us to test the propositions that policy shows greater aggression to inflation in the reaction function in terms of a greater response coefficient as interest rates reach low levels, and increasing aggression as the lower bound is approached. We find support for the Taylor principle, a more aggressive response to inflation than under a Taylor rule, but no detectable evidence of increasing aggression as the zero lower bound is approached in the US and Japan.     

Nowcasting and the Taylor Rule

Actual federal funds rates in the U.S. have, at times, deviated from the recommendations of a simple Taylor rule. This paper proposes a “nowcasting” Taylor rule that preserves the form of the Taylor rule but encompasses realistic assumptions on information observable to policymakers. Because contemporaneous inflation rates and output gaps are not observable at the time policy is set, policymakers must form “nowcasts.” The optimal nowcast will depend, in part, on forecast uncertainty whenever policymakers have asymmetric costs to over‐ and underpredicting inflation and output. Empirical evidence shows that actual policy rates are consistent with those recommended by a nowcasting Taylor rule.     

Trend Inflation, Taylor Principle, and Indeterminacy

Positive trend inflation shrinks the determinacy region of a basic New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model when monetary policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Neither the Taylor principle, which requires the inflation coefficient to be greater than one, nor the generalized Taylor principle, which requires that the nominal interest rate to be raised by more than the increase in inflation in the long run, is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium. This finding holds for different types of Taylor rules, inertial policy rules, and price indexation schemes. Therefore, regardless of the theoretical setup, the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard average inflation in both theoretical and empirical analyses.     

A Historical Analysis of the Taylor Curve

Taylor (1979) shows that there is a permanent trade‐off between the volatilities of the output gap and inflation. Although a number of papers argue that the so‐called Taylor curve is a policy menu, we use it as an efficiency locus to gauge the appropriateness of monetary policy. We examine the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy from 1875 onward by measuring the orthogonal distance between the observed volatilities of the output gap and inflation from the Taylor curve. We also identify time periods in which the variability of the U.S. economy changed by observing shifts in this efficiency frontier.     

Nominal GDP Targeting and the Taylor Rule on an Even Playing Field

Some economists advocate nominal GDP targeting as an alternative to the Taylor Rule. These arguments are largely based on the idea that nominal GDP targeting would require less knowledge on the part of policymakers than a traditional Taylor Rule. In particular, a nominal GDP targeting rule would not require real-time knowledge of the output gap. We examine the importance of this claim by amending a standard New Keynesian model to assume that the central bank has imperfect information about the output gap and therefore must forecast the output gap based on previous information. Forecast errors by the central bank can then potentially induce unanticipated changes in the short-term nominal interest rate, distinct from a standard monetary policy shock. We show that forecast errors of the output gap by the Federal Reserve can account for up to 13% of the fluctuations in the output gap. In addition, our simulations imply that a nominal GDP targeting rule would produce lower volatility in both inflation and the output gap in comparison with the Taylor Rule under imperfect information.     

Risk management,nonlinearity and aggressiveness in monetary policy: The case of the US Fed

We contribute to the empirical literature on the risk-management approach to monetary policy by estimating regime switching models where the strength of the response of monetary policy to macroeconomic conditions depends on the level of risk associated with the inflation outlook and risk in financial markets. Using quarterly data for the Greenspan period we find that: (i) risk in the inflation outlook and in financial markets are a more powerful driver of monetary policy regime changes than variables typically suggested in the literature, such as the level of inflation and the output gap; (ii) estimation of regime switching models shows that the response of the US Fed to the inflation outlook is invariant across policy regimes; (iii) however, in periods of high economic risk monetary policy tends to respond more aggressively to the output gap and the degree of inertia tends to be lower than in normal circumstances; and (iv) the US Fed is estimated to have responded aggressively to the output gap in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, and in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These results are consistent with Mishkin (2008)’s view that in periods of high economic risk monetary authorities should respond aggressively to changes in macroeconomic conditions while the degree of inertia should be lower than in normal circumstances.     

Taylor rules and the term structure

The expectations model of the term structure has been subjected to numerous empirical tests and almost invariably rejected, with the failure generally attributed to systematic expectations errors or to shifts in risk premia. Rules for monetary policy designed along the lines of Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214] specify that the central bank adjusts short-term yields in response to deviations of inflation and output gaps from target level. Such rules give a good empirical account of the behavior of the short-term interest rate. Combining the Taylor rule and expectations theory, it is possible to generate—along lines pioneered by Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration and tests of present value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062-1088]—a series of theoretical long-term interest rates. When such theoretical rates are calculated for the US over 1980-2004, considerable support for the expectations theory emerges.     

Optimal monetary policy with durable consumption goods

We document that the durable goods sector is much more interest-sensitive than the nondurables sector, and then investigate the implications of these sectoral differences for monetary policy. We formulate a two-sector general equilibrium model that is calibrated both to match the sectoral responses to a monetary shock derived from our empirical VAR and to imply an empirically realistic degree of sectoral output volatility and comovement. While the social welfare function involves sector-specific output gaps and inflation rates, the performance of the optimal policy rule can be closely approximated by a simple rule that targets a weighted average of aggregate wage and price inflation. In contrast, a rule that stabilizes a more narrow measure of final goods price inflation performs poorly in terms of social welfare.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Cross‐Country Evidence

We explain the heterogeneous response of central banks to financial stability risks based on a financial stability orientation (FSO) index, which reflects statutory, regulatory, and discretionary components of central banks' monetary policy frameworks. Our baseline results from a cross‐country panel of modified Taylor rules suggest that central banks with a high FSO increase their policy rates in response to elevated financial stability risks by 0.27 percentage points more than central banks with a low orientation. Back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations suggest that this policy rate differential translates into a reduced crisis probability but also into considerably lower inflation and output growth rates.     

基于SVEC模型的中国货币政策效应与规则研究:1996M01-2011M02

本文基于SVEC模型框架,分析了1996年1月至2011年2月期间中国人民银行所使用的多种货币政策工具与多重政策目标之间存在的关系.研究结果表明,物价、产出及货币供给冲击均对利率工具和准备金率工具产生持久、显著的影响,这与通过泰勒规则预测得到的结论基本吻合,但与其预测的反应时滞存在一定的差别.利率和准备金率对实体经济有重要影响,但效果、传导时滞存在差异,同时,两种工具对货币供给冲击的反应既不充分、也不及时.针对以上结论,本文一一作了解释,并在此基础上得到了许多有益启示.     

Changing Monetary Policy Rules, Learning, and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics

When the exchange rate is priced by uncovered interest parity and central banks set nominal interest rates according to a reaction function such as the Taylor rule, the real exchange rate will be determined by expected inflation and the output gap or the unemployment gap of the home and foreign countries. This paper examines the implications of these Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. Because the true parameters in central bank policy rules are unknown to the public and change over time, the model is presented in the context of a least squares learning environment. This simple learning model captures the volatility and the major swings in the real deutschemark/euro–dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 2007.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

Congress and the Federal Reserve

We examine legislative activity to determine when Congress threatens the Fed and whether this pressure affects monetary policy. By the late‐1980s Congress shifted from threatening when unemployment was high to threatening when inflation was high. We use the Romer and Romer monetary shocks to isolate changes in the federal funds rate that cannot be explained by economic conditions and ask whether these shocks respond to pressure. In the 1970s, the Fed responded to bills credibly threatening Fed powers by lowering the federal funds target below that prescribed by current and forecast economic conditions. However, this accommodation ceased in the mid‐1980s.     

The Role of Inflation Target Adjustment in Stabilization Policy

How and under what circumstances can adjusting the inflation target serve as a stabilization-policy tool and contribute to welfare improvement? We answer these questions quantitatively with a standard New Keynesian model that includes cost-push-type shocks. Our proposed inflation target rule calls for the target to be adjusted in a persistent manner and in the opposite direction to the realization of a cost-push shock, which is essentially a makeup strategy. The inflation target rule, combined with a Taylor-type rule, significantly reduces inflation fluctuations originating from cost-push shocks and mitigates the stabilization trade-off, resulting in a similar level of welfare to that associated with the Ramsey optimal policy.     

Taxation and the Taylor principle

A nominal tax system is added to a sticky-price monetary business cycle model. When nominal interest income is taxed, the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor-type monetary policy rule must be significantly larger than one in order for the model economy to have a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. When effective tax rates are raised by inflation, the stability of the economy's equilibrium can be adversely affected. Finally, when depreciation is treated as a charge against taxable income, an even larger weight on inflation is required in the Taylor rule in order to obtain a determinate and stable equilibrium.